Reports from the many outposts of higher education across the United States and the world reflect often-lurid power struggles, among faculty, staff, administrators and even institutional governors. No one is very interested in the normal everyday operation of organizations, most which is pretty dull. When change is thought to be required, administrations tend to launch centralized initiatives that seek to reform or quickly quickly how the organization operates. This, however, is much like trying to turn a supertanker on a dime. It cannot be done. Moreover, such plans, if they are implemented at all, are likely to turn out quite differently from the original vision, with subsequent planning attempts to undo the damage caused by earlier plans. In the corporate world, planning is passé, and the notion that higher education is “in crisis” has led to a continuing craze for rapid institutional innovation through new management strategies and “leadership,” both seen as simply individual skills that can be learned and deployed. These have come to substitute for careful consideration of the many factors and forces that universities face, both internally and externally. Do such things work?

This book serves two purposes: First, it a reflection on the world faced by universities across the United States, 20 years into the 21st century. The so-called crisis of higher education in the United States has come to occupy many minds and managers, including faculty, administrators, pundits, politicians, scandalmongers and even Presidents. Whether there is such a crisis is questionable, in part because it is linked to larger changes in political economies, between the end of World War II and today, that made higher education possible on a large scale and seem defective today. The very ontologies of higher education—often expressed in the form of “mission statements”—have been called into question.

Second, it is an “institutional biography” of the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC) which tries to untangle the complex decision and relations that, over time, constitute large, bureaucratic entities such as UCSC. As is true of many human institutions, universities are complex communities shaped by and responding to a range of “institutional logics” that specify the frameworks, structures, personnel and practices that are required for it to function. Much of what I cover in this book has been described and addressed elsewhere (see the bibliography). But none of those sources examine the institutional and organizational development of the campus in terms of struggles to instantiate power and authority, even though much of an institution’s biography comes down to this.

The full manuscript of this book is available at https://sustainablesystemsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Unhappy.pdf
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Acknowledgments

I have written this book about the university campus that has been my academic home since 1990. Academics rarely write about their home campus in any depth or detail, since it is too much like hanging out the dirty laundry, revealing family secrets and being too personal (a particular attribute of those living in California). This book is not “research” in the generally understood sense, either, although the bibliography runs to more than 30 pages. It is not an exposé, either and not my intention to embarrass or demean anything or anyone. Yet, I cannot avoid telling stories about both colleagues and the campus, even if under conditions of anonymity. To be sure, I am fairly safe in writing, since I am well past risking tenure, promotion or even employment, although I might alienate friends both high and low.¹ I apologize to anyone who might be offended and will certainly correct or change anything that might be construed as inaccurate.

I want to acknowledge those who helped with access to materials, whom I consulted and who I spoke with and interviewed. These people include Irene Reti and everyone at McHenry Special Collections, Matthew Mednick in the Academic Senate Office, Kim Lau, Terry Burke, Ronnie Gruhn, Nirvikar Singh, Karen Bassi, Bill Domhoff, Barbara Laurence and, especially, Rick Diamond. I owe special thanks to those whose oral histories provided invaluable background for and history of UCSC, the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, and Dean McHenry and Carlos Noreña, whose archival collections included many important documents. I apologize to those whom I may have forgotten. This manuscript is a work of both history and opinion, and all faults and flaws are mine. Please be sure to comment and correct those of the latter you think are insupportable.

¹ I once made a comment to a colleague about my low esteem for the architecture of Colleges Nine and Ten—I called then “gemeinschaft,” since the look a lot like the superstructure of mines. My colleague was deeply offended; he had been involved in the architectural design of the two colleges. Oops!
Chapter 1  

By way of a preface

All happy universities are like one another; every unhappy university is unhappy in its own way.²

I. Introduction

This book is an “institutional biography” of the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), my academic home for the past three decades. An “institutional biography,” as opposed to a simple history, institutional analysis or organizational description, tries to untangle the complex decision and relations that, over time, constitute large, bureaucratic entities. As is true of many human institutions, universities are complex communities shaped by and responding to a range of “institutional logics” that specify the frameworks, structures, personnel and practices that are required for it to function. The differences among universities are in the details and, while broad design and exogenous factors are critical to operation, those details matter a great deal to operation. Whether there are any “happy” universities in the United States thus depends on how far into the details one wishes to delve.

This book is also a reflection on the world faced by universities across the United States, 20 years into the 21st century. The so-called crisis of higher education in the United States has come to occupy many minds and managers, including faculty, administrators, pundits, politicians, scandalmongers and even Presidents. Indeed, whether there is such a crisis is questionable, in part because it is linked somehow to larger changes in the political economies, between the end of World War II and today, that have made higher education possible on a large scale. The very ontologies of higher education—often expressed in the form of “mission statements”—have been called into question as a result. The fault, if there is one, is not in the organizations themselves but in ourselves, since we cannot, as a polity, agree on the ontologies of the society in which we live.

Let me make clear my working hypothesis regarding these differences: organizations are constructed and operate on the basis of two primary factors: power and wealth. Whose power and wealth is a focus of constant conflict and struggle, but they are nonetheless central. To be sure, visions, missions and ideals are important in shaping an organization, but it is the distribution of power and authority, both formal and informal, that determines how the organization will be structured and governed, the availability of resources that determines what is possible and whether visions and missions can be fulfilled and the practices (or habitus) of those who staff it that allow

² Paraphrased from Anna Karenina—"Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way"—with apologies to Leo Tolstoy. Nabokov flipped the original Tolstoy quote in the beginning of his novel Ada: “All happy families are more or less dissimilar; all unhappy ones are more or less alike.”
it to operate. When authority is under-determined, the resulting power struggles may come to shape organizational structure in a fairly ad hoc way. When such unintended these structural arrangements impose constraints on what can be tried or implemented, struggles over scarce resources will be won by those who have effective power and authority. Finally, faced with these circumstances and constraints, the agents throughout the institution will adapt, innovate and improvise as necessary for them to fulfill their responsibilities. These struggles and responses comprise, over time, the essence of an institutional biography.

How, then, does one research and write an institutional biography of an organization? There are, of course, archival records, memoirs, autobiographies, books and articles, but these tend to reflect the views and predilections of the writers and authors and the sources that some of them consulted. Interviews with those “present at the creation”—of which there are fewer with each passing year—as well as oral histories and other records are based on selective memories and interpretations. There is usually a proliferation of documents available, indeed, many more than can be acquired and consulted, and deciding which of those are important and which are irrelevant—is as much a matter of judgment as significance. And, of course, an author imposes an interpretation—or, at least, qualified explanations—on those data such as are available. The goal of such a biography is not to propose “what might have been done differently” in the past but, rather, to understand “how what was done has affected the campus through the present day.” This means that some things are more important to an institutional biography, and it also means that the available data are skewed in particular ways.

I should emphasize here that this is a qualitative study and rests on my reading of the various archival documents, oral histories, articles and contemporary interviews, all of which, necessarily, are narratives of incidents, events and struggles as told by those involved in the creation of those sources. To take one example, the stories told about the “pioneer days” of UCSC will differ between someone who was an assistant professor at the time, a second who was a full professor and the biographer, who must rely on what the former told. Even archival documents reflect the positionality and views of their authors and cannot be read as objective accounts of what happened. Occasionally, there are hints of struggle, especially in documents from the UCSC Academic Senate, but even these tend to be couched in diplomatic language that does not reflect the actual exchanges that have taken place in the composition of those documents.

Much of what I cover in this book has been described and addressed elsewhere (see the bibliography). But almost all these sources are motivated by claims about the early promise of UCSC and the results five, ten or 20 years later. After 2000, there is little in the way of reflected campus histories or interpretations. None of those that are available, so far as I know, examine the institutional and organizational development of the campus in terms of struggles to instantiate power and authority, even though much of an institution’s biography comes down to this. I don’t see either power or authority in unidimensional terms, which means that my understanding of
efforts to shape the campus are not simply about organizational hierarchies and money. Language, imaginaries, discourses and habitus also matter, as is the case with all social institutions (these are discussed in later chapters).

Reports from the many outposts of higher education across the United States and the world often reflect such power struggles, among faculty, staff, administrators and even institutional governors (for the UC system, these are “Regents”). No one is very interested in the normal everyday operation of organizations; it is the eruptions that garner attention. Most of the normal operations are pretty dull and, in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, constitute the institutional *habitus* as articulated by those who stand in a university’s field. When change is thought to be required, an administration tends to launch centralized initiatives that seek to reform or change quickly how the organization operates. This, however, is much like trying to turn a supertanker on a dime. It cannot be done. Moreover, such plans, if they are implemented at all, are likely to turn out quite differently from the original vision, and subsequent planning attempts to undo the damage caused by earlier plans. In the corporate world, planning is passé, and the notion that higher education is “in crisis” has led to a continuing craze for rapid institutional innovation through new management strategies and “leadership,” both seen as simply individual skills that can be learned and deployed. These have come to substitute for careful consideration of the many factors and forces that universities face, both internally and externally.

II. From whence came the university?

Meyer and his coauthors (2008) argue that “universities” first emerged as recognizable organizations as early as 1088, with the establishment of the University of Bologna. Although it is widely held that universities developed out from Roman Catholic monastic schools, there is also evidence that Bologna did not. Indeed, things like universities probably existed even earlier, in Africa and Asia, under Muslim rulers, and it is possible that their model was transferred to Europe. In any event, the faculties in these early universities were required to be clerics, whatever they taught (which is the origin of the robes worn at graduations).

Over centuries, the particular forms of universities changed in response to various national, economic and epistemological pressures—universities often became hotbeds of national expression, especially in newly created states, and contributors to both national infrastructure and economy. The broad institutional framework of the university did not change greatly, although the missions and subjects of specific campuses did. Over time, the Scientific Revolution embedded in universities the notion and practice of the objective pursuit of knowledge, which could not be national since such knowledge must, of necessity, be universal.3

---

3 The failure of nationalist science was evident in the distinction made by Nazi Germany between “Jewish” and “Aryan” science (Merton, 1938) and the material consequences that followed. Nationalist science also appears today in the United States as “ALT-climate science.”
The first U.S. universities were established by Protestant denominations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These were modeled after the colleges at Oxford and Cambridge, with the view toward educating cadres of future ministers and socializing them into the beliefs and principles of the particular founding denomination (Catholic colleges did not appear in the United States until the mid-eighteenth century).

State-sponsored public universities only appeared with the Morrill Act of 1862 (and the subsequent Morrill Act of 1890, which required that former Confederate states show that race was not a criterion for admission to their universities or alternatively made them create land-grant colleges for persons of color, which is what they did). As noted in Chapter 1, the objective of the act was

endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life (7 U.S. Code § 304).

The section of the California Constitution that chartered the University of California did not refer to these goals, although the first section of Article 9, “Education” specified that “A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”

The provisions of the Morrill Act can be read in two ways: as mandating teaching of “agriculture and the mechanic arts,” on the one hand, while not “excluding other scientific and classical studies,” on the other. The former stands for economic growth through vocational development in the service of the state; the latter, for work that was less applied and directed toward (presumably) the expansion of knowledge. Interestingly, the California Constitution foregrounds the role and goal of education to be “the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people,” a decidedly nationalist proposition.

Over the subsequent century, public universities in general, and the University of California, in particular, have been subject to fierce class and social struggles and significant economic changes, as their missions, often driven by American nationalism and political economy, have had to change in response to these struggles and pressures. Like many other public institutions, the survival and prosperity of public universities are dependent on adjusting to these changes in ways that do not disrupt overall institutional structures and practices. Experiments in new college and university models have been tried—UCSC is one such example—but have not fully succeeded on their founders’ terms. In subsequent chapters, we shall see how this
historical, social, and economic environment has affected both the University of California and UCSC, not always to either’s benefit.

III. What makes a university a university?

Before going further, it might be helpful to ask “What makes a university a university?” Here, I distinguish between the “university” as an institution of higher education and the “university campus” as a specific organizational manifestation of that institution. In everyday conversation, we tend to regard the terms “organization” and “institution” as interchangeable, but they are not. I will elaborate on the distinction in chapter 2; here, I simply point out, following Bourdieu, that an organization is the manifestation, in time and space, of a particular type or form of social institution that codifies “rules of the game” in a specific social context.

The American “public university” is a specific institutional form that provides the scaffolding, so to speak, within which individual universities build and pursue their individual endeavors. Individuals inhabit organizations, filling particular roles defined by their locations in the organization and behaving according to prescribed practices as well as their own understandings, proclivities and interests. Units are the bureaucratic entities in which individuals are located and through which teaching, research and administration are conducted. Campuses are the organizational frameworks within which individuals and units are located. Public university campuses are often part of state systems, which promulgate overarching rules and practices, dispense resources, and represent the system to governments and others.

UCSC is thus an organization—a specific manifestation of an institution—that provides higher education to cadres of undergraduate and graduate students, via bureaucratic and academic rules, roles and practices. Some of these are mandatory and prescribed by higher authorities (the UC system, State of California, federal government, accrediting agencies, etc.). Others are particular to a campus itself (visions, missions, faculty and staff, etc.). But no university is an island (or, for that matter, a City on a Hill). Both the general and the particular are the result of the concatenation of many factors and forces that arise from the workings of society, market and state over time, space and societal “levels.”

It is useful to think of distinct “levels of analysis” in considering the external and internal environments faced by a university as an organization representing an institutional form, although distinctions among levels are hardly so clear in reality—the levels are idealizations. Both institutional and organizational forms and practices are situated in historical time and space—local, state, national, global—whose forces and pressures and constrain subsequent possibilities and opportunities. Figure 1.1 illustrates the Matryoshka-like space in which a public university exists.
History (or time) is also central to both institutions and organizations. Those who study organizations tend to focus on recent history and current conditions, engaging with what Fernand Braudel, the French historian and a founder of the Annales School, critiqued about much historical writing: its focus on “histoire courte durée (short span) or histoire événementielle (a history of events)” (Hexter, 1972: 502-505). Braudel preferred to engage with the longue durée of decades and centuries, considering the social, technological and environmental structures that constrain and enable societies to develop and change. Most accounts of specific universities stick with the short span, the events and the heroes, and rarely, if ever, consider the larger structures within which the institution was imagined, designed, established and operated (see, e.g., Stadman, 1970).

If we want, however, to explain why conditions at a particular campus exist as they do today, we have to engage with something closer to the longue durée, taking into account the longer-term contingent, contextual and enduring features and factors. These, in turn, are not catalogued or listed anywhere in convenient or methodical form but must be teased out of the mass of historical accounts and narratives told in print, published anecdotes, individual recollections and archived documents produced along the way. Building on my reading of various literatures, my 30 years of
experience at UCSC, and the figure above, I propose the following “factors” (Table 1.1) as playing roles in shaping a university (such factors can, of course, be generalized to other universities, with their particular histories and conditions).

Table 1.1: External and internal factors that shape higher education institutions and organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor &amp; context</th>
<th>Definitions &amp; explanations</th>
<th>Level(s) of analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Historical origins &amp; context (external)</td>
<td>1. Institutional histories of universities (their origins &amp; context)</td>
<td>World, country, Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Historical contexts in which systems &amp; campuses were created</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Historical origins of &amp; reasons for specific campuses</td>
<td>State or province*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. History of specific campus</td>
<td>State, higher ed system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political economy (external)</td>
<td>1. Status of higher ed across societies, as public or private good</td>
<td>World, country, Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Demand for higher education as status-linked practices &amp; training</td>
<td>Country, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Power relations among groups, classes, demographic categories</td>
<td>Country, state, locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Geography &amp; demography (external)</td>
<td>1. Distribution of campuses across political units</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Locations of campuses vis-a-vis demography</td>
<td>System, locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Regional distribution of wealth</td>
<td>Locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Geographic terrain</td>
<td>Locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Institutional logic (external)</td>
<td>1. University “operating system”</td>
<td>Country, state, system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Focus on teaching or research &amp; status &amp; ranking</td>
<td>Country, system*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social norms &amp; pressures (external)</td>
<td>1. Shifts in class &amp; racial power relations</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Changes in social expectations of universities (racial)</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Changes in economic demands on universities (training)</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Funding mechanisms for higher education</td>
<td>Country, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Resources &amp; capital available for higher education</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Transition from education as public good to private good</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bureaucracy (external &amp; internal)</td>
<td>1. System rules &amp; regulations for administration &amp; operations</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Local rules &amp; regulations for administration &amp; operations</td>
<td>Campus, units, Units, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Informal rules and regulations</td>
<td>Units, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission &amp; vision (internal)</td>
<td>1. Specification of what the campus will provide to students</td>
<td>Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Specification of what the campus will do for higher ed</td>
<td>Campus, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Specification of campus contributions to society</td>
<td>Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Planning &amp; design (internal)</td>
<td>1. Spatial layout of terrain &amp; landscape</td>
<td>Campus; units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Architectural design &amp; location of buildings and infrastructure</td>
<td>Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Spatial relationship to locale</td>
<td>Locale, campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Organizational structure (internal)</td>
<td>1. Specification of units, responsibilities, metrics</td>
<td>Campus, units, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Relationships among academic, administrative &amp; service units</td>
<td>Campus, units, Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Social “architecture” of campus</td>
<td>Units, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Agency &amp; individual autonomy (Internal)</td>
<td>1. Individuals in positions of authority &amp; responsibility</td>
<td>Campus, units, Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Relative autonomy of personnel &amp; individuals</td>
<td>Campus, units, Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Individual personalities &amp; predilections</td>
<td>Units, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Contingent events</td>
<td>1. Unanticipated events &amp; forces (e.g., Great Recession; COVID-19 pandemic)</td>
<td>World, country, state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* “State” and “province” refer to subnational entities
** “System” refers to higher education system
† “Unit” is a department, school, office, etc.

Some of these factors are external, some are internal, and some are both. External (or exogenous) factors have both general institutional and specific organizational causes and effects, while internal or endogenous factors are common to all campuses but are frequently expressed in particular ways on individual campuses. Taken together, these factors “make a university” in terms of: general expectations (what a university must offer and how if it is to be recognized as a university); broad global and social forces and influences (what is the relevant “field” in which universities operate and how do they respond to economic variability, social movements, etc.); specific conditions in time and space (national, state and local politics; political, economic and social change over time); and the shape and operation of a specific
campus, which must meet institutional expectations while effectively providing education to students and producing research.

To a not-insignificant degree, Table 1.1 illustrates the “agent-structure” problem so commonly evoked in social and political analyses of institutions and activism. Any organization, in confronting both levels and factors, must conform to certain structural requirements, norms and expectations. Within those structures, individuals and units have certain degrees of freedom to pursue their normal (and normative) activities and to experiment with innovative forms that might “bend” the rules. A significant amount of “innovation” may, however, be idealist in nature, failing to take into account the historical and contemporary constraints that impose limits on those degrees of freedom. Money, of course, greases all wheels: most universities will jump into new experimental programs and centers if someone else will pay for them. Even better is enough money to provide a conspicuous, named building with which the experiment will run. In time, the experiment may fail, but a building is forever.

Today, institutional innovation is highly prized, especially if it promises to generate surplus revenues that can be returned to the general fund. Like many startups, however, the progenitors of an innovation often fail to ascertain whether anyone wants or needs it, instead assuming that sheer brilliance is sufficient to get an enterprise up and running, and to keep it going. We hear often about successful innovations and enterprises; we never hear about those programs and centers that have failed and been closed, in an effort to avoid a stain on the old alma mater (all that stuff about failures belonging to no one and such). Yet, often more can be learned from failures than successes, especially since the latter are often more a matter of luck and design.

IV. Genesis

UCSC opened in 1965, in anticipation of the coming flood of college-age “baby boomers.” Higher education expanded across the United States and around the world (Meyer, et al., 2008). By the mid-1950s, the six University of California campuses began to appear as insufficient to meet projected demand, driven by the GI Bill, increasing numbers of women entering college, and a rapidly growing state population. The shock of Sputnik and the Cold War played significant roles, as well, in the growth of science and engineering which were deemed essential to victory over

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4 Inquissima haec bellorum condicio est: prospera omnes sibi indicant, aduersa uni imputantur, translated as: “It is the hard condition of military command, that a share in prosperous events is claimed by all, but misfortunes are imputed to one alone” This is an unfair thing about war: victory is claimed by all, failure to one alone” (Tacitus, The Life of Cnaeus Julius Agricola, 27:1, The Oxford Translation Revised, with Notes, 1897, at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/7524/7524-h/7524-h.htm#link2H_4_0003 (accessed January 22, 2020).
the Soviet Union. To accommodate the flood, three new campuses were planned while already-existing campuses were expanded.

An oft-repeated, somewhat apocryphal story was told by Dean McHenry, founding Chancellor of the University of California, Santa Cruz, in his oral memoir (1974: vol II, pp. 68-72): In the summer of 1961, members of the UC Board of Regents trekked to the southern end of San Francisco Bay to look at candidate sites for one of the three new UC campuses. It was a hot and muggy day in the Almaden Valley near San Jose. It was sunny and much cooler at the Cowell Ranch in Santa Cruz. The Regents were wined and dined and taken on a tour of the Ranch. They fell in love with the sheer beauty of the two-thousand acre site, and its meadows, chaparral, redwoods and ocean views. Almaden never stood a chance. Santa Cruz would be the site for the new campus.

But geopolitics might have advised otherwise. Scholars of geopolitics have long argued that geography, resources and location shape states, nations, war and peace, poverty and wealth (see, e.g., Spykman, 1944; Sprout & Sprout, 1971). The same can be said of other institutions and organizations. There were no such scholars present at the creation of UCSC, who could have pointed out the importance of geography to the future of the new campus. During the early 1960s, Santa Cruz was a sleepy, conservative beach town, much like many others along the California coast, boasting tourist attractions such as the Boardwalk and the Mystery Spot, a small, declining fishing industry and a few factories (e.g., Wrigley Gum).

The primary physical connection between Santa Cruz and San Jose was California State Highway 17, then (and still) a twisty, accident-prone road that weekend visitors, but few commuters, were willing to risk. In 1961, no one anticipated the emergence 30-odd miles to the north of a “Silicon Valley,” with its mammoth tech corporations, venture capitalists and entrepreneurial energies. There were growing defense corporations in the region but no information technology and no billionaires. Consequently, Santa Cruz was largely excluded from the Silicon Valley boom and capital trickled, at best, over Highway 17.

The presence of other universities—Stanford, Berkeley, Santa Clara, San Jose State and, more recently, an outpost of Carnegie-Mellon—did not help. In the 1960s, those issues did not seem to matter, but the choice of Santa Cruz was a fateful one, and UCSC has struggled with that choice ever since.

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5 According to Schofer and Meyer (2005: 898), however, expansion between 1960 and 1975 was not driven by functionalist needs or market demand; rather, they argue that, “a new model of society became institutionalized globally—one in which schooled knowledge and personnel were seen as appropriate for a wide variety of social positions, and in which many more young people were seen as appropriate candidates for higher education,” and which is “consistent with the notion that properties of national education and society are strongly affected by prevailing world models” (id., p. 902). We might see this as a precursor of “the body as an accumulation strategy” (Harvey, 1998) and a site of “human capital.”

6 In the University of California system, which has a President, the Chancellor is the equivalent of a campus “president.”
Initially, what was called the “South Bay” campus was imagined to be a fairly conventional public university, but Clark Kerr (1989), President of the University of California from 1958 to 1967, and Dean McHenry decided to make UCSC different. Kerr and McHenry were determined to create a new type of public liberal arts university, combining the experience of a much smaller campus with the best Western Civilization had to offer, along with training in the scientific and technical disciplines required by the Cold War struggle funded by rising defense budgets and federal research funding. Unlike other public universities, UCSC would not be rigidly stratified or divided by schools, departments, disciplines or carefully prescribed programs of study. Instead, the organization and structure of the campus would reflect and nurture the growing liberalization of American society and the rising demand for intellectual freedom. It would allow students the freedom to explore as they learned and learn as they explored. Most of all, UCSC would not be another “UC Berkeley,” which Kerr and McHenry regarded as an ossified, bureaucratic organization that could not and would not change with the times. Instead, the campus would be organized around academic “colleges.”

The college-based model became the special project of Kerr and McHenry. According to some accounts from the period, Kerr and McHenry were inspired by the Oxbridge system in the United Kingdom. According to others, their model was Swarthmore, where Kerr had been an undergraduate. Evidence from the archives suggests that the actual model for UCSC came from some of the UK’s new “red brick” universities, which were opening for business at the same time and also organizing around academic colleges. Undergraduates would live and be educated in relatively small residential and academic units of a few hundred, each with its own faculty, its own liberal arts curriculum and its own zeitgeist. During the 1960s and 1970s, such alternative colleges were increasingly popular, as a couple of dozen were created (Dressel, 1971; Hartocollis, 2019). But almost all of those were designed for undergraduates only. UCSC would pay special attention to undergraduates but there would also be graduate students and research labs, as required of a UC campus.

McHenry was the champion of the college system campus and fought tirelessly with faculty, the central office of the University of California and the state to sustain it. Unfortunately, McHenry liked to run things by himself and did not put in place an authority structure that could sustain the college system once he was gone. Kerr was fired by Governor Reagan in 1967, McHenry retired in 1974, and the UC Office of the President lost interest in the independent college model of education. Over the following two decades, the UCSC campus and colleges languished.

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7 To be clear, these were not “colleges” in the conventional sense, e.g., a College of Arts and Sciences or a College of Engineering.

8 In many ways, UCSC anticipated the future trend of more individualized education, but the goal was to turn out more robust thinkers and citizens rather than maximize flows of entrepreneurs and human capital.
If the college-based model failed to thrive, the weak authority structure put in place by McHenry led to a near-permanent power struggle between faculty and administration, and among its constituent academic and bureaucratic units. The seeds of these struggles were sown even before the campus opened in 1965 and sprouted even before Day One of operations. One lasting consequence is that successive administrations have tried to accommodate faculty initiatives and “shared governance” while resisting and suppressing them and “governing from the top.” And just as an individual’s early childhood and her/his relationship with parents shape the child and adult, and affect that person for a lifetime, the early organizational dysfunctions of UCSC were “baked into” its DNA, its memory and its culture. They remain there today.

A scholar of geopolitics would also posit resources as the cause of power struggles among nations (see, e.g., Lipschutz, 1989). In a university, the equivalent of resources is, of course, money. Institutions of higher education, like all organizations, can never have enough of the stuff, since there are always salaries to be paid, new programs to be launched, new equipment to be bought and new people to be dazzled. Nor are universities not shy of competing with each other for money, devising schemes to divert funds and grants and poaching star-quality faculty who can bring in more money. As Stanford has demonstrated all too well, money begets success and success brings in more money. And not only is Stanford rich, it is in the thick of Silicon Valley, with its fabulous companies and its numerous billionaires, the seedbed for many of the startups and platforms that dominate the Valley and are constantly in the public eye as a result. Stanford’s success is all the more remarkable because, during the 1960s, it was considered a university of modest repute.

A consequence of this geography, and unanticipated in the broader political economy, has left UCSC always “short” of funding, even as it struggles to fulfill its responsibility to educate students while trying to build a world-class research university. It is much like the “scissors crisis” that snipped the life out of the Soviet Union (Tarschys, 1983), facing costs that rise more rapidly than revenues, leading to repeated cuts in vital programs and creating a host of unresolved contradictions. To be sure, many public universities these days find themselves in similar circumstances but, as my twisted epigraph suggests, no other university faces quite the same unfavorable conditions and circumstances as those which confront UCSC.

One place where crisis and contradiction are most evident is in the campus’s history of strategic planning and aborted initiatives, which have absorbed much time, labor and money (see Chapters 10 and 11). Over the decades since 1963, UCSC has repeatedly launched strategic plans—by my count, as many as 15 or 16—replete with ambitious initiatives and projects, promising a bright and prosperous future. Most of those plans have failed to produce any significant results.

The most recent plan, composed between 2017 and 2019, was left unfinished, as its progenitor left the campus for greener fields. It is languishing and likely to vanish from institutional memory within a few more years. The UCSC administration does not
acknowledge these many efforts and has spent almost no time and energy trying to understand why the previous plans have failed. Indeed, few recall these initiatives, which have disappeared from the institution’s history. Occasionally, these plans are invoked by those who found themselves caught up in them, often having spent many fruitless hours with little effect. A central question to be considered here is: can UCSC succeed in one or any of its ongoing and future ventures, or is it doomed to fail, again and again? Perhaps the very notion of strategic planning is passé (as I shall suggest in a later chapter). Trying to understand and explain such history is one of my goals in this book.

But is UCSC really that different from other universities? Over my three decades on the faculty, I have had frequent discussions with various colleagues about the organizational, personnel, institutional and bureaucratic features of the campus, many of which seem to make effective teaching and rewarding research more difficult than it should be. After comparing notes and bemoaning the latest academic or administration initiative or demand, my interlocutor often responds (as if in compensation), “Well, all universities face the same problems.” I have my doubts about this, based purely on anecdotal evidence: colleagues who have moved to UCSC from other educational institutions often tell me that it is more difficult to accomplish things at UCSC. They find the campus more conservative and risk averse than others and it seems to operate more frequently at cross-purposes and in contradiction with itself. These colleagues often claim that their previous university was bad, but... UCSC really seems to be worse. If so, how and why?

V. UCSC contextualized

Given the conditions and pressures under which all public universities labor, why do I argue that UCSC is really different? As suggested earlier, my argument is that the sources of this difference are found in the intersection of the particular historical and social factors, forces and conditions that emerged during the 1950s and 1960s. For the 15 or 20 years following the end of World War Two, “truth” and “facts” were taken as givens and seemed easy to define. There was broad national unity about the mission of the United States in the world. Expertise and technocracy appeared provide the basis for future governance and government. By 1965, when UCSC opened for business, faith in truth, facts, science and authority was eroding and under siege due to the rise of New Social Movements, nuclear fears and the Vietnam War. The materialism of consumer society triggered a backlash that, eventually, resulted in the emergence of what came to be called the “counterculture” (Roszak 1969), whose impacts are still visible today. We should not imagine that Kerr and McHenry were involved in these movements or their influences—indeed, it was reaction against the Free Speech Movement and its sequelae that brought Kerr down in 1967, even though he had precious little to do with those events.

Still, by the late 1960s, there was a growing sense among liberal and conservative elites that the country was going off the rails. For the latter, the solution was easy:
greater discipline! For the former, it was concern that action was displacing thought, especially in politics, and those actions were not well thought out. The canon and values of Western Civilization were being cast aside in favor of a focus on science and technology, leaving students adrift in an ocean of relativism and nihilism (this might sound familiar today, but in the 1960s, it was not a conservative trope). College was the place where the incipient adults of the future could be taught about the canon and those values, but big research universities, like UC-Berkeley, had neither the time nor the inclination to provide such education. UCSC, however, did.

Inasmuch as there would be nine full-service UC campuses by the end of the 1960s, it must have seemed acceptable to allow a new, relatively small campus to experiment with alternatives to the “multiversity,” as Clark Kerr (1982) later called it. Such “Alternative” colleges were being opened elsewhere at the same time: Evergreen State College, a public campus in Washington, opened in 1967 (it currently has about 4,000 enrolled students); Hampshire College, a private campus in Massachusetts, in 1975 (with 1,400 students, but see Hartocollis, 2019), and quite a few others (Dressel, 1971). These did away with traditional disciplines and encouraged independent majors crafted by individual students and supervised by small faculty committees; flexible degree requirements; and interdisciplinarity. In many ways, UCSC anticipated the future in terms of today’s “experiential learning”: Doing was as important as thinking (today, the doing is expected to teach skills for future employment).

In other ways, UCSC also anticipated the problems of today: it was hamstrung by repeated financial crises, a louche reputation arising from its alternativity, and the standardized institutional and bureaucratic requirements and demands imposed by membership in the UC system, which did not easily tolerate outliers. Add to this were the contingent and contextual attacks launched on UC, first by governor Ronald Reagan and later, governor Jerry Brown, which made difficult the entire business of conducting higher education in California. Given projections for UCSC’s future growth and design—up to 27,500 students and as many as 20 colleges were envisioned in the original plan—we might doubt whether UCSC could have sustained the alternative model even under very favorable conditions (as recently as 1990, UCSC had only about 7,000 full-time students). Both Hampshire and Evergreen have faced financial and enrollment difficulties over the past few years, although they soldier on (Hartocollis, 2019; Cerullo, 2019). Not every alternative college has been so fortunate, as we shall see later in this book.

VI. Organization is (almost) forever

The original academic system at UCSC consisted of both colleges and “Boards of Study.” Students were resident in a particular college and also took many of their classes in their home college. Each college was designed to offer a complete program of instruction during students’ first two years, after which students would specialize in a more conventional major. Boards of Study—a term borrowed from the Red Brick universities in the UK—were created to represent academic disciplines but were not “departments” in the usual sense, since faculty were scattered among the colleges.
and taught their specialties in their home colleges. These Boards were meant to handle a few administrative tasks, take on limited responsibilities and authority and provide a space in which faculty from specific disciplines could interact. The faculty at any single college would come from a range of disciplines and would be reviewed for tenure and promotion in both colleges and their disciplinary Board of Study. Colleges were authorized to make hiring decisions in consultation with Boards of Study, with new positions made available according to the curricular “needs” of a particular college. Finally, academic curricula for the first two years were developed through the colleges rather than the Boards although, again, the latter were players in this process.

The college system dictated much of UCSCs original organizational structure, bureaucracy and faculty. The colleges were fairly strong and independent units that reported directly to the Chancellor. By contrast, Boards of Study reported to the deans of one of the four (later five) academic “divisions”—Arts and Humanities, Social Sciences, Physical Sciences and Engineering—who received and distributed limited resources to the Boards in order to keep them relative weak. With the eventual decline of the original college system (Noreña 1999), the colleges lost much of their influence over academic affairs, which were transferred to Boards (renamed “departments” in the 1990s) and Divisions, becoming a perennial “problem” that no one was able to solve.

Even today, departments remain relatively weak and deans more powerful than at many other universities, and final decisions about faculty searches and focuses are subject to decanal approval. But this divisional structure also makes interdivisional collaboration difficult, with deans as gatekeepers more intent on protecting divisional turf than facilitating interdisciplinary innovation. In addition, the campus rules and regulations make it very difficult to appoint new in more than one department, thereby further limiting new and creative endeavors (see Chapter 9).

Building the campus around colleges and what turned out to be a central science district has had physical and organizational impacts, too. Today, academic, administrative, residential and service buildings and infrastructure are built on something like 800 acres of the 2,000 acre mountainside campus, with much of the built area still including open meadows, forests and canyons. As a result, the distance across campus, from Merrill College on the east side of the campus to Oakes College on the west side, is more than a mile. Departments are housed in one or two adjacent buildings but not necessarily in close proximity to cognate disciplines (Politics is on the east side, Sociology on the west). Most students and faculty stay close to their major or departmental “base,” since mobility is limited and time-consuming. It is not unusual to encounter a student or faculty member who has never been to the opposite side of campus and has little idea what is over there. Since more and more faculty work at home—fewer miles to commute, less chance of being disturbed, more chance of finding parking—random encounters among faculty from different divisions happen less and less (there is no faculty club or other casual meeting place on campus). The result is a certain degree of alienation from the
campus that, in turn, reduces the time and energy that many are willing to put into service roles.

The decline of the college system not only disrupted the mission and vision of the campus founders and most of its early faculty, students and alumni, but also left behind “ruins” and “fragments” that continue to shape the academic and design landscapes, much like the deeply-buried, lower layers in a long-inhabited city continue to affect how things are designed and built and constrain what changes are possible (or, as one of my colleagues prefers to call it, the university’s DNA.) The colleges still exist (there are currently ten and it is highly unlikely that there will ever be any more) but do not have much influence at UCSC. Nevertheless, their existence continues to affect how the campus functions and what can be done to change or restructure the organization. These are only a few of the organizational and geographic features that make UCSC “different.” There are others, and they will appear in the chapters that follow.

VI. What is in the rest of this book?

In this book, I seek to address the themes and topics laid out above. Part one addresses higher education in general. Chapter 2 develops an analytical framework for understanding institutions (the university) and organizations (university campuses). For better or worse, it is easier for universities to create new units dedicated to change than to reform existing units, which has significant implications for resource-limited organizations. Chapter 3 asks to what degree can an organization, such as a university, develop a “strategic” plan for future operation? Finally, Chapter 4 examines the so-called crisis in higher education, relating it to the historical and material conditions of the past 75 years and suggesting that, if there is a crisis, it is a reflection of society at large.

Part II of this book turns to the University of California and UCSC in particular. Chapter 5 provides a selective history of the University of California, with an eye to identifying how the levels of analysis in Figure 1.1 and factors listed in Table 1.1 have shaped the organization as it is today. Chapter 6 examines the imaginaries of UCSC and how they were put into action. Chapter 7 provides a potted history of UCSC while Chapter 8 describes how the campus has been, and is, operated. Chapter 9 focuses on the “making and breaking” of the Colleges, since they played such an important role in shaping the campus. Chapter 10 examines the history of strategic and academic planning from 1962 to 2019, identifying common themes and significant differences among them, and asking what impact they have had on the campus. Chapter 11 recounts a tale of two initiatives intended to expand the reach of UCSC and revenue flows to it: the effort to establish a viable satellite site in Silicon Valley; and the current and ongoing “Strategic Academic Plan,” briefly described in Chapter 8. Finally, in Chapter 12, I try to temper my critique with some observations about critical issues facing UCSC. This last chapter also provides some recommendations for reform and restructuring, but with the proviso that they are unlikely to be pursued precisely because organizations are so difficult to change.
Chapter 2
The University as Institution and Organization

“What are American institutions?” asked Mr. Glascock.

“Everything is an institution. Having iced water to drink in every room of the house is an institution. Having hospitals in every town is an institution. Travelling altogether in one class of railway cars is an institution. Saying sir, is an institution. Teaching all the children mathematics is an institution. Plenty of food is an institution. Getting drunk is an institution in a great many towns. Lecturing is an institution. There are plenty of them, and some are very good but you wouldn't like it.”

—Anthony Trollope, He Knew He was Right, p. 388—

I. Introduction

What are institutions? What are organizations? Why does the difference matter? As I noted in chapter 1, institution and organization are often used vaguely and interchangeably, across disciplines and among scholars. They are not the same thing, although institutions and organizations are related and dependent on each other. Institutions frame the general expectations of and requirements of the individual organizations that are the concrete manifestations of the institution, at the same time that individual organizations, in their operations and practices, reproduce the regulations and principles of the broader institution.

Consider baseball. Most people would agree that baseball is one of North America’s premier institutions (many would argue, to the contrary, on behalf of American football, but that is a matter of taste or indifference). Baseball derives from a number of much older games, but it emerged in something like its contemporary form during the mid to late 19th century. Since then, there have existed innumerable teams and leagues, for all ages and genders, and countless formal, informal and pickup games using baseballs, softballs, spaldeens and other round objects. Today, Major League Baseball (MLB)—an organization largely beholden to team owners—dominates the sport in North America. The game itself is a social institution encompassing all of the expressions of baseball, over time, while MLB is an organization, composed of a centralized corporate office and 30 individual team organizations. MLB is the repository of professional baseball as an American institution as well as the source of legitimation when changes are made to the professional game.

10 The late George Carlin’s classic routine on “baseball vs. football” essentially described the former as a peaceful, pastoral, essentially Jeffersonian game and the latter as a militarized and technologized fundamentally Hamiltonian struggle. Both are American institutions, but I prefer to work with baseball. See “George Carlin in Baseball and Football,” The Baseball Almanac, nd., at: http://www.baseball-almanac.com/humor7.shtml (accessed October 4, 2018).
When major changes are made in the structure of baseball (e.g., going from 154 to 162 games per season, or creating the “designated hitter” in the American League), purists complain that the game is being “ruined” and is no longer true to its “traditions”—which are really creations in time and have never been static or timeless. Individual team organizations are not permitted make changes in the game’s “constitution,” that is, the rules that specify the parameters of the game. They can, however, introduce innovations that become part of the institutional framework. One example was breaking the color barrier when Jackie Robinson was hired by the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947. This could be read as a change in practices, however, rather than in official rules and regulations.

No one would argue that baseball is a functional institution, in the sense that it emerged to meet a critical material need in American society and continues to do so today. Individual teams have come and gone, or moved from one city to another, without any significant impact on either the United States or Canada. Some fans might claim they could not live without baseball, but this is rhetoric and not reality. North America without baseball might be a different society, but it would still exist in recognizable form.

One could say much the same about the University of California system and its ten campuses: without it, California might be different, but the state and its institutions of higher education would still exist in recognizable form. UC is an organization that instantiates the university as a social institution in California, and its campuses are organizations that engage in institutional practices arising from the concept of the “university.” The UC system is not a university in this institutional sense, but it does create its own institutional practices. Each campus, in turn, has its own proclivities and practices, but all must meet certain institutionalized criteria as mandated by the UC system as a whole.

To sum up: Baseball teams, in playing their games, reproduce a particular framing of “baseball” as a North American institution; UC campuses, in teaching and conducting research, reproduce a particular framing of “university” as an American and California-based institution.

A dip into the research literatures on both institutions and organizations reveals, however, considerable disagreement on definitions and operations of both, and leads the researcher to other literatures that seem to address the same concepts and practices, albeit with different language and framing. In this chapter, I try to parse the literatures that seem relevant to an “institutional biography,” as I have described it in Chapter 1, in an effort to establish a useful analytical framework for the rest of the book. I begin with a discussion of what an institution is and why they exist, then do the same for “organization” and, finally, examine their relationship to each other. I then turn to the various theories and literatures that seek to explain the operation and functions of institutions and organizations and their broader societal roles. As is often the case with such matters, arguments and frameworks offered by scholars...
often reflect ideological and political dispositions regarding the nature and needs of social order, leading to the exclusion of some elements and the reification of others. The third section of this chapter constructs my own particular framework, organized around the “factors” enumerated in chapter 1, but with further elaborations, observations and caveats. My goal in this last section is to articulate a framework that can be applied, in Part II, to the institutional biography of UC Santa Cruz.

II. Institutions and organizations: Theories and all that

The various literatures and approaches to institutions and organizations tend to reflect underlying political and sociological views and disagreements about human nature and society (see Table 2.1). The most compelling accounts, in my view, are those that seek to integrate certain elements in a way that reflects the complexity of human social life and treat institutions and organizations as sociological phenomena rather than merely bureaucratic ones. There are those who eschew such eclecticism, for reasons of ontology, epistemology and ideology, as well as concern for or fear of the potential political consequences of promoting one approach or another; my generally eclectic approach could be called “historical-materialist sociology,” which leans toward a form of historical materialism rather than idealism, even as I also acknowledges the central importance of ideas, ideals and idealism in life and society. History matters deeply, and not merely as an account of events or Whiggish explanations of the past (Ménard, 1995: 167). This might be taken as promoting a particular, neo-Marxian approach to analysis, but I do not think it unduly political or ideological.

In this approach, we recognize that historical structures and practices, both material and mental, that emerged decades or even centuries ago, but nonetheless continue to shape the world today and will continue to do so in the future. The co-constitution of the material “base” of society along with the mentalities that organize it come about through the social practices that produce and reproduce that co-constitutive framework (e.g., the institution of baseball is reproduced, legitimated, reified through the rule, choice and chance-governed games that teams and their members play, which is a structure whose history has shaped what the game and institution are today). In developing this approach, I have drawn on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Bruno Latour and, Michel Foucault, among others. At the same time, and where appropriate, I draw on the work, arguments and theories of others who are neither Continental or critical.
Table 2.1: Theories of institutions and organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functionalist theory</strong></td>
<td>Society is composed of interdependent parts that are designed and operate to meet specific social needs—function determines organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic institutionalism</strong></td>
<td>Institutions and organizations exist to provide efficient solutions to collective action problems and are based on regularized expectations and behaviors that can be anticipated by rational individuals in an organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marxian institutionalism</strong></td>
<td>Institutions and organizations are bourgeois creations of capitalists to extract labor value from the working class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict theory</strong></td>
<td>Institutions and organizations are conservative creations of the ruling classes in response to threats of disorder, and they discipline society through class hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bureaucracy theory</strong></td>
<td>Organizations operate according to standard sets of rules and regulations that specify inputs and outputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization theory</strong></td>
<td>Organizations are “rational, hierarchical” bureaucracies with specific goals, tasks, designs and administrative structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalism</strong></td>
<td>Institutions emerge as “distinctive forms, processes, strategies, outlooks, and competencies as they emerge from patterns of organizational interaction and adaptation… Institutionalization constrains conduct in two main ways: by bringing it within a normative order, and by making it hostage to its own history.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New institutionalism</strong></td>
<td>Institutions are sets of rules and organized normative prescriptions, practices and meanings that are internalized and followed by individuals in society and organizations, which normalize the way things are and are done, and which change very slowly over time and come to be seen as “natural.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neo-institutionalism</strong></td>
<td>Similar to the New Institutionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional logics</strong></td>
<td>Organizations are organized and operate according to the “logics” of the core institutions of society—markets, state, family, democracy, religion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author

The analytical distinction between institutions and organizations is a fuzzy one, with definitions following the ontological and epistemological principles of particular scholars and disciplines. For example, a neoclassical economic approach, premised on individual preferences and goals as driving human choice and action, regards organizations as solutions to the collective action problem and institutions as, essentially, superstructures of prescribed rules and interests (Ménard, 1995). Economic institutionalism sees institutions, such as markets, as more-or-less emerging spontaneously over space and time to reduce transaction costs of exchange in markets.
(e.g., North & Thomas, 1976; see also March & Olson, 1984), with specific material instantiations, such as market places, stock exchanges, etc. In both approaches, the basic unit of analysis is the rational individual whose acceptance of institutions and participation in organizations is driven by specific preferences, desires and interests. The longevity of institutions and organizations is a consequence of the efficiency of “solutions” to new problems, adapting as needed in response to changing external conditions, rather than a means of fulfilling some social goal.

By contrast, sociological theories focus on multiple levels of analysis and the possibility of practice-driven (rather than strictly rational) motivations. David Selznick (1996) has argued, for instance, that institutions are the expression of particular forms of organized practices, while organizations give substance to institutions as generalized social forms, although this seems to beg the question of isomorphism among institutions and organizations of a particular type. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 149) suggest that, much like Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) model of interstate neorealism, “Organizations in a structured field...respond to an environment that consists of other organizations responding to their environment, which consists of organizations responding to an environment of organizations’ responses.” Ultimately, it would seem, responses and counter-responses lead to the institutionalization of appropriate practices across a social field, just as states respond in similar fashion to the strategic distribution of power in the international arena. How those institutions and organizations got started, however, is just one of those unfathomable mysteries.11

The new institutionalism—which is now almost 40 years old and no longer so “new”—regards institutions as giving rise to organizations, but its theorists are somewhat unclear about how or why institutions develop in the first place. According to March and Olson (2011: 1; see also March and Olson 1984)

An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances.

This is an account of what institutions are but says nothing about how or why they come into being in the first place. Do “rules and organized practices” emerge from functional needs (how we fish), efficiency (how we can catch the most fish) or out of “structures of meaning” (why we fish)? Perhaps fish are required for sacrifices to propitiate the gods of water and fish; if so, then more fish are better and catching more fish is important to the survival of the tribe and the world and not strictly functional. Long after those gods have been forgotten, particular fishing practices may nevertheless persist, often to be explained in functional terms by economists, if not anthropologists.

11 Theorists of classical realism, such as Hans Morgenthau, like to cite “The Melian Dialogue” from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War as evidence of the timeless role of power and the absence of morality in interstate affairs. Not everyone reads Thucydides that way, however.
Another example of the origin problem is explaining the emergence of price-based markets as a widespread institutional practice. In the beginning, there was barter, but there were no prices or notions of supply and demand. Exchange values were set on the basis of experience, local conditions and what everyone else was doing or asking (or so it can be assumed). Somewhere along the way, money appeared—why is not important—first as a unit of account, later as a store of value for market exchange (Graeber, 2011). Eventually, rules establishing that goods could be valued in terms of money came to be widely practiced and were institutionalized. Again, the why and how of markets’ origins are opaque. Today, we tend to assume this practice as natural and universal over both time and space—which it is not.

Neo-institutionalism is a variant of the new institutionalism. Meyer and colleagues (2008: 190) write that “institutional theory emphasizes that local organizations arise in good measure independent of local circumstances—deriving from wider sociocultural environments that support and even require local structuration around exogenous models and meanings.” In other words, specific institutions, such as exchange in markets, are universal and give rise to local expressions in the form of organizations (but why did those models and meanings emerge in the first place?). After this statement, however, Meyer, et al. veer into a kind of neo-functionalism, arguing that “the existence and legitimation capacity of rule-like external models are crucial to the creation and stabilization of all sorts of everyday structures” (Meyer, et al, 2008: 190). In other words, institutions and their rules seem to emerge from some kind of transcendent force at a suitable location (this sounds suspiciously like natural law mixed with geopolitics).

To apply their explanation to the subject of this book, a university campus is a local organization that is only recognizable as a university if it follows the models and meanings of “university” as a near-universal institution. Consequently

From their medieval origins to their postnational incarnation, universities are not mainly local organizations justified by specific economic and political functions or shaped by particular historical legacies or power struggles. A much broader cultural and civilizational mission has always informed higher education (Meyer, et al, 2008: 210).

From their perspective, organizations are structured broadly along the lines specified by the institution and operate according to both general and specific bureaucratic rules and frameworks. Organizations are bureaucracies in this operational sense, with the specific local bureaucratic framework partially specified by the expectations of the broader institution and partially by social norms of appropriate procedures particular to the organization. It’s all very chicken and egg confusing.

Organization theory (OT) focuses on the specific internal means-ends structure of an organization, how efficiently goals are accomplished, and how structural reorganization might increase efficiency. The institutional basis is assumed and
remains uninterrogated. So, inferring from the language of neo-institutionalism above, organization theory takes both institutional and local goals as the outputs of an organization, and organizational processes and procedures as inputs, to be observed and analyzed with respect to efficiency in outputs and in meeting the needs they are designed to fulfill. The higher level of an institutional environment is invoked only insofar as it sets the external conditions within which an organization must operate (e.g., the market and political economy of a field or industry).

Both institutions and organizations have a material and social history that encompasses physical expressions (in social and particular terms), normative demands and “elaborately institutionalized...set of cultural assumptions and organizational rules that establish the framework of modern societies” (Meyer, et al, 2008: 190). In the case of institutions, the material expression emerges from both long history and political economy. Organizations, by contrast, emerge in specific locales in response to both social and market forces. In both instances, distributions of power and wealth matter, too, in that “subaltern” efforts to create new organizations are hard put to succeed without corresponding support from social elites.12

Institutions are not “natural” in the sense that we might describe the biological human body and brain (with many caveats), but they are often “naturalized” as a result of a long history of specific organizations and practices that express archetypes. Thus, the “university” as an institution has a millennium-long history during which its contents and practices have changed but whose fundamental organizational expressions still incorporate both conceptual and material elements from that history. Organizations, by contrast, are distinct from one another because, although there is a generally-common structure to each one in a given society, the particular articulation of one is different from every other as a result of expression in particular local social environments.

All of this is quite messy in the abstract, which is why the broad generalizations made about the so-called crisis of higher education by public intellectuals, scholars and experts tend not to be very helpful or useful in reforming or changing organizations. In their critique of American institutions of higher education—colleges and universities—critics treat the anecdotal as representing the general (e.g., all college campuses are liberal and suppress conservative speakers), and the individual as representing the universal (e.g., all college professors are liberals). Thus, protests on specific campuses come to be represented as examples of trends and tendencies on all campuses, to which generalized critiques, attacks, recommendations and policies are offered. To be sure, there may be general and generalized flaws in the institutional model but that model can be modified or changed only through the specific practices undertaken by individual organizations that may, over time,

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12 An illustrative example might be that of the “Penny University” in Santa Cruz, established in the early 1970s by dissidents from UCSC (Page Smith and others); see, e.g., Lussenhop, 2009) https://www.santacruz.com/news/a_snapshot_of_a_penny_university_meeting.html (accessed March 19, 2019).
reshape the structure and parameters of the broader institution (usually as a result of copying success or following fads).

III. (Re) Shaping institutions and organizations

In chapter 1, I proposed that the contemporary university, as an organization, is shaped and reshaped by a set of internal and external “factors” (Table 1.1 is reproduced below). In subsequent sections and chapters, I will refer to these as they seem to apply to universities in general as well as the University of California and UCSC. It would be helpful, of course, to be able to specify the relative weight of each factor over time and space, although these would clearly be variable across both (some of this is done in the chapters on UC and UCSC). Here, I provide further commentary on each of these factors and the impacts they may have on a generic university campus.

1. Historical origins: Institutions emerge over three relevant time periods, parallel to Braudel’s three time frames: *histoire courte durée* (recent histories); *histoire événementielle* (the history of recent events?); *longue durée* (long-term histories). Here, a “long history” describes the political and social contexts in which institutions emerge in order to fulfill certain societal needs and desires, both functional and ideological (e.g., the Morrill Land Act creating land grant universities as a reflection of national ideology). In the medium term, national and “provincial” histories matter, since these provide the operating context in which institutions and organizations exist. Short-term histories apply to individual campuses and their day-to-day and year-to-year operations. How and why particular institutions, such as the University of California, and campuses such as UCSC, emerged at specific times across the *longue durée*, is a much more location-specific question which will be addressed in later chapters.

2. Political economy: Institutions and individual organizations emerge from settings in which various forms of social, economic and political power are being expressed as well as the structural contexts that engender and support them. As suggested in Table 2.1, the very existence of higher education in a particular society arises from notional demands that certain social and national needs and desires as well as ideological and “common-sense” beliefs that higher education is a status-supporting “positional good” (Hirsch, 1976). For at least a century, higher education was a positional good that conveyed status to the college graduate, but as it has moved to mass production and more degrees are granted, the less status is associated with each individual degree. This may be why many students and parents aspire to admission to the Ivy League and other highly rated private universities (with some parents willing to pay an illegal premium for a spot, as seen in recent “pay for admission” scandals).
Table 2.1: External and internal factors that shape higher education institutions and organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor &amp; context</th>
<th>Definitions &amp; explanations</th>
<th>Level(s) of analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Historical origins &amp; context</td>
<td>1. Institutional histories of universities (their origins &amp; context)</td>
<td>World, country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Historical contexts in which systems &amp; campuses were created</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Historical origins of &amp; reasons for specific campuses</td>
<td>State or province*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. History of specific campus</td>
<td>State, higher ed system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political economy</td>
<td>1. Status of higher ed across societies, as public or private good</td>
<td>World, country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Demand for higher education as status-linked practices &amp; training</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Power relations among groups, classes, demographic categories</td>
<td>Country, state, locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Geography &amp; demography</td>
<td>1. Distribution of campuses across political units</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Locations of campuses vis a vis demography</td>
<td>System, locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Regional distribution of wealth</td>
<td>Locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Geographic terrain</td>
<td>Locale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Institutional logic</td>
<td>1. University “operating system”</td>
<td>Country, state, system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Focus on teaching or research &amp; status &amp; ranking</td>
<td>Country, system**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social norms &amp; pressures</td>
<td>1. Shifts in class &amp; racial power relations</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Changes in social expectations of universities (racial)</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Changes in economic demands on universities (training)</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Funding mechanisms for higher education</td>
<td>Country, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Resources &amp; capital available for higher education</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Transition from education as public good to private good</td>
<td>Country, society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bureaucracy</td>
<td>1. System rules &amp; regulations for administration &amp; operations</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(external &amp; internal)</td>
<td>2. Local rules &amp; regulations for administration &amp; operations</td>
<td>Campus, units†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Informal rules and regulations</td>
<td>Units, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission &amp; vision</td>
<td>1. Specification of what the campus will provide to students</td>
<td>Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(internal)</td>
<td>2. Specification of what the campus will do for higher ed</td>
<td>Campus, individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Specification of campus contributions to society</td>
<td>Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Planning &amp; design</td>
<td>1. Spatial layout of terrain &amp; landscape</td>
<td>Campus; units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(internal)</td>
<td>2. Architectural design &amp; location of buildings and infrastructure</td>
<td>Campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Spatial relationship to locale</td>
<td>Locale, campus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. **Geography**: Location, location, location! *Where* a campus is sited tends to be motivated by state politics and demography (who votes), especially in response to concentrations of middle-class (white) voters (see Chapters 4). The specific local terrain and landscape in which a campus is built are usually not very important, unless they are exceptional in some way or impose constraints on access to the free flow of people and money (as in the case of UCSC). Geography can also affect the demographics of a student body, for example, if it is a commuter campus or offers exceptional recreational activities, such as surfing.

4. **Institutional logic**: Institutional scholars define “logics” as “socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 101, cited in Cloutier & Langley, 2013: 361). In some sense, therefore, an institutional logic is closer to a discourse or ideological framework than an operating system that makes the gears turn, and reflects the dominant social beliefs of the day as the “proper” way for an organization to operate (e.g., efficiency and prosperity through market discipline). For many centuries, universities pursued a “craft-based” logic, with students taught in small classes by individual scholars, along the lines of apprenticeships. In the 20th century, this was partially displaced by the logic of Taylorism and Fordist mass production, with graduate studies continuing the craft-based approach. Later in the 20th century, from 1945 into the 1970s, this was modified to a “Fordist-Keynesian” logic, which regarded higher education as a public good contributing to social welfare. Between the 1980s and the present, the gradual withdrawal of public funding led universities to pursue a market-based, libertarian logic, combining Fordism, disciplinary specialization and experiential learning, with students treated as both “customers” and stocks of future “human capital” against whom loans could be borrowed to pay tuition and living expenses.
5. **Social norms and pressures**: Institutions and organizations of higher education inculcate particular social norms and practices that might not always reflect those that are dominant in the outside world into students. Along with shifts in academic and technical specializations, these norms are not isolated from gradual shifts in social hierarchies and relations that result from transformations in the broader political economy (e.g., impacts of globalization and high-tech on identity, well-being, status). Conflict among groups with differing logics, visions and “appropriate” social norms, and their reproduction develops. These, in turn, are driven by entrenched interests, both internal (e.g., strategies for increasing campus diversity) and external (e.g., opposition to fostering racial diversity). The conflicts are fought out in both arenas, with the university campus often treated as an intellectual battlefield. In the United States (and in other countries where the “new nationalism” has emerged), so-called culture wars affect virtually every public and private institution and organization, and can have real impacts on organizational autonomy and financing (e.g., threats to reduce contributions in response to alleged events and practices on a campus; Trump, 2019).

6. **Resources and funding**: During much of the 20th century, public universities were funded through state taxes, on the principle that such education produced a public good that would create knowledgeable and obedient individuals whose post-graduate activities would benefit society as a whole. As “tax revolts” spread across the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some began to challenge this orthodoxy. Prior to 1945, public universities were substantially white and middle-class, did not enroll large numbers of students and did not constitute a significant burden on state expenditures. California’s Proposition 13, and similar laws elsewhere, launched a trend of defunding public education that continues today. In those states with highly progressive income taxes, such as California, recessions and state budget deficits led to reductions in public support for higher education in favor of other needs.

To supplement declining public support, many public universities turned to tuition, which, today, comprises a, if not the, major source of operating funds for many public universities, forcing many students to burden their futures with student debt (Meister, 2011). The relative decline in state support has also driven campuses into a relentless search for extramural research funds, wealthy private donors and “recharge” revenues for various internal services and public events. All of this is taking place in a highly competitive funding environment. The apparent scarcity of resources and funding may, however, be something of an illusion: science and engineering, which are able to tap into major sources of research funds, are also extremely expensive to mount and sustain, and may actually lose money for their campuses. Social sciences, arts and humanities, by contrast, cost much less to mount, but also bring in much less “overhead” and graduate funding, leading some to charge that they do not “carry their weight” on campus. As a result, these struggles over money tend to shortchange undergraduate education.

7. **Bureaucracy**: All hierarchical organizations are governed by and operated according to well-established, authoritative frameworks of roles, rules and relations.
Some of these frameworks are relatively standardized (e.g., for corporations), while others are tailored to a specific institution and individual organizations (e.g., for baseball). Such frameworks usually materialize as written texts (once upon a time, in binders; today in on-line pdfs) designed to provide guidance to decision-making processes and procedures. What actually happens in real organizations almost always differs from one to the next, even if they are notionally governed by the same set of institutional rules (Rochlin, 2011: 16; Bertels & Lawrence, 2016). Moreover, due to unusual cases and changing contexts, numerous real practices, neither described nor authorized in those binders and pdfs, are created as ad hoc solutions to new problems and, eventually, become customary practice (Delbridge & Edwards, 2008). Without such ad hoc rules and practices, an organization could not function (Hodson, et al, 2012; Egan, 2012).

8. Mission & vision: Mission has to do with general principles and goals of an organization, which may be societal in nature, specific to an organization or both. Vision has to do with the specific expression of institutional mission, manifest in specific organizations and hoped-for outcomes. For example, the mission of higher education in California is expressed in the state’s Constitution as:

A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement (Article 9, Section 1).

Clark Kerr’s vision for UCSC was a campus which would have the advantages of a big university in terms of the library, cultural programs, laboratories [but] also the advantages of a series of small colleges with sense of community and a better opportunity to make friends than on a big, homogenized campus (Kerr, 1989: 9).

Over time, as internal and external environments change, visions and missions are rewritten so as to remain relevant and timely. But these are more in the nature of branding and public relations exercises because, generally speaking, both tend to exceed what an organization does, can or will do in the future. Moreover, existing recessions and crises often derail both visions and plans (see Chapters 3 and 10).

9. Planning and design: Campuses are usually designed with a central academic core with offices and classrooms, surrounded by laboratories and student housing (Clark, 2000). With time (and donors), new additions expand their boundaries and modify campus infrastructure; UCLA offers a good example of this, with its neoclassical central core surrounded by a somewhat random penumbra of buildings. Sometimes, as in the case of UCSC, terrain and landscape motivate particular layouts or designs (Church, 1962; Clifford, 2015), with geology, topography and forests shaping what would or could be built in particular locations. Nowadays, large-scale campus
construction projects can trigger community opposition, which may determine where something is built, or whether it can be built at all.

10. Organizational structure: Conventionally structured universities group similar disciplines (engineering; sciences; humanities, etc.) together, frequently in broad disciplinary schools and colleges (e.g., College of Arts and Sciences). Administrations tend to follow a hierarchical template with specified authority relations to Schools, Colleges, units and departments. Over time, however, the original structure—if there is one—changes to adapt to new circumstances and pressures, perhaps by creating new administrative positions and offices or combining and rearranging old ones. It is difficult, however, to completely disestablish existing units in such a structure. Units under threat are able to mobilize diverse constituencies in opposition to changes, and are sometimes successful in preventing them. But a university is not like a corporation or even a government, both of which have relatively controlled and controllable hierarchies and units. Universities are sometimes described as organized “anarchies” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 156) or “loosely-coupled organizations” (Weick, 1976). That is, administration is always not simply a matter of issuing orders; rather, implementation must be negotiated at all levels, with the result that, sometimes, proposed changes are modified or cancelled. Of course, any changes that are made might not have the intended effects and can result in greater operational problems and inefficiencies.

11. Contingent events: Stuff happens. The Vietnam War and Free Speech Movement disrupted the practices of the 1950s. The Great Recession triggered a diminution in state funding and student ability to pay. The election of Donald Trump created uncertainty about the status of undocumented students and eroded social support for higher education. COVID-19 disrupted education as usual. These are unanticipated but not improbable events. Their impacts may be broadly distributed, as a rule of thumb, but whether they affect individuals, families or universities, those that are poorer and less influential experience greater and more negative consequences than wealthy and powerful ones. Is it possible to prepare for contingent events? To some degree: in 1989, UCSC and the surrounding region were rocked by a significant earthquake (although not the “Big One” forecast for the San Andreas fault), and the campus has paid much greater attention to seismic reinforcing than was previously the case. But there is a cost to preparing for a low probability, high impact event if indeed there is a way to fully prepare. Such uncertainty has led to a growing emphasis on “resilience” which, in this context, means each organization must be prepared to operate without much, if any, external assistance (e.g., each UC campus is responding to the COVID-19 crisis in its own, idiosyncratic fashion).

At the end of the day, of course, these 11 “factors” are not independent variables. A few, such as funding and resources, are “master factors” affecting many of the other ones. Planning and design depend on funding; organizational structure and bureaucracy are much the same. Some, such as history, cannot be changed, and it is very difficult to eliminate historical effects. Which are most important can only be
determined from the specific biography of a specific organization. Below, I address “agency vs. structure” as a distinct factor.

12. Agency vs. structure in large organizations: Most of the literatures discussed here elide the matter of power relations within large organizations, how such relations emerge and develop, and whether they are constitutive of long-term structures (Reed, 2012). These literatures tend to focus on the organization of organizations—corporate and academic—that follow a broadly shared structural template, or on changes in the organization and practices of specific industries (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Delbridge & Edwards, 2008). Large organizations are, by definition, hierarchical bureaucracies, with rules, regulations, roles and procedures. Those at the top of the organization usually—but not always—have the authority to identify and define the mechanisms whereby the organization will operate, and to assign roles and responsibilities to those lower down, who are expected to faithfully undertake them. Internally, a campus administration can structure the bureaucracy with some degree of freedom, based on its own assessment of needs and responsibilities, but a new campus does not appear *ex nihilo*; it is already structured by well-established procedures and requirements.

But organizations are not only structures, they are also people, and people have their own, individual ideas about how things should be done. Sometimes, people can change things and make a difference. The role and power of agency and autonomy are actually rather important, and it is at the center of one of the great theoretical disputes in historical analysis: is history driven by “great persons” (i.e., innovative leaders) or by structural features (i.e., established rules, roles and regulations or by contingency? Nowadays, most historical-institutional accounts seek something in the middle, although “founders” are usually given more credit for creation, success and failure than she or he might deserve (as I end up doing here). At the same time, most such accounts ignore failures and focus on the successes, thinking that the latter are more instructive to those who would emulate the founders.

Individuals working in organizations experience constrained agency. How constrained depends on historical, social, bureaucratic and organizational factors and the forms of discipline exercised by management. Still, in any organization operating in a business-as-usual mode, there are openings and opportunities for individual and group innovation and entrepreneurship, as well as resistance and sabotage. Sometimes, passiveness is an effective form of resistance: orders are simply ignored. In a highly structured organization, such as a corporation, individual initiative is discouraged or channeled into specialized units where innovation can be scrutinized, vetted and funded or starved, as management decides. University administrations are often credited with high degrees of agency, yet even its members are limited in what they can do and accomplish, especially if faculty and staff support are withheld.

The best way to think about agency vs. structure, therefore, is in terms of “constrained agency and individual autonomy.” Returning to the example of baseball, an individual player, having hit a home run, could run to third base and
reach home via first, but no one is going to do that, since that is against the rules of the game (and it is not rational, either). But players can employ a number of tactics at bat and in the field—perhaps at the direction of their manager—that can affect play and outcomes (with a bobble or mistake being called an “error”—permitted but penalized). The team manager has greater agency and autonomy, but is still constrained by the rules and does not play in the game.

Any organization, be it Berkeley or baseball, operates in a similar fashion. As noted earlier, there are the written rules, the informal rules, the customary practices, social relationships, knowledge of the game and the individual agent. The “leader” may devise and deploy new initiatives, promising a better and brighter future for all, imposing penalties on those who fail to follow along and giving plaudits to those who do. But a leader who fails to take account of those agents on whom success relies may well realize no success at all, due to passivity, resistance and sabotage. The tradeoff, then, between appearing dynamic, on the one hand, and wise, on the other, is a tricky one, as we shall see.

In a University, especially one that is seeking an appropriate structure to fulfill its vision and meet its goals, top-down management of agency, innovation and opposition are much more difficult propositions. The ability to (re)shape structure becomes an expression of power and authority, which can only be contested at great cost to subordinates. When authority is poorly defined or absent, the power to shape practices becomes important. It is not that “power abhors a vacuum,” but rather that power is a critical tool in shaping practices, through demonstration, rhetoric, logic and, yes, coercion.

To understand how this dynamic works, it is helpful to apply a Bourdieuan framework (Battilana, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008) based on his notion of habitus and emergent practices:

[Habitus refers to a ] systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1992: 53).

Furthermore,

The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action,
tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms (Bourdieu, 1992: 54).

Thus, behavior and practice are not wholly constrained by social and regulatory structures, nor are they permitted to range over all that is possible; the requirement of intelligibility in social relations means that participants in an organization must understand what others are doing, how they are placed relationally and how practices are part of the operation of the “machine” or “organism.” This requirement assumes, however, that there is a pre-existing template or framework—corporate, academic, athletic—within and around which patterns of behavior, or *habitus*, can develop.

A second critical feature of Bourdieu’s *habitus* is “social capital.” This term has come to be used widely, and often crudely and incorrectly, to denote the relationships and connections held by individuals that, in essence, allow the body to become a locus for self-generation of capital. As David Harvey (1998: 411) puts it:

> The organization, mobilization, and channeling of human desires, the active political engagement with tactics of persuasion, surveillance, and coercion, become part of the consumptuary apparatus of capitalism, in turn producing all manner of pressures on the body as a site of and a performative agent for rational consumption for further accumulation (compare Henry Ford’s obsession with training social workers to monitor the budgets of his workers).

Bourdieu’s (1986) notion differs somewhat from Harvey’s:

> Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word…. The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.

New organizations go into business without much in the way of *habitus* and must develop one in order to operate effectively. Such organizations as are created to fulfill particular functions—corporations, militaries—tend to follow many of the structures and practices that characterize other, similar organizations. Those organizations seeking to “break the mold” have to develop their own sui generis *habitus* while remaining intelligible to society. New organizations often experience

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13 Neither the mechanical nor the biological metaphor really works in the case of social organizations, and even an ecological one falls short. “Network society” or even “assemblage” offers an image in which connections go among individuals. Maybe something “quantum-based” would be helpful here.
struggles by individuals variously situated in the structure to impose some or all of their individual *habitus* on the organization, based on their experience, custom, ideas and aspirations (for example, as we shall see, the effort to minimize the role of departments at UCSC ran into the efforts of various faculty members who had internalized the *habitus* of departments at other universities). The success or failure of such struggles depends, on the one hand, on the power and authority granted to particular positions by regulation and legislation and, on the other hand, the ability to improvise in cases where authority is unclear or undefined. But, even if such relations are defined in bureaucratic terms, they still must be concretized in practice.

Two observations are relevant here: first, if there is no precedent for an internal unit or organizational objective, there is usually no model or template for organizing and administering said unit or objectives. This was the challenge in creating the academic system at UCSC and a cause of many decades of struggle. Second, no organization can operate successfully by “working to rule.” Innovations, shortcuts and favors—sometimes called “practical norms”—are necessary, as well (de Sardan, 2015; Hodson, et al, 2012). As De Herdt and de Sardan (nd: 3) put it

Practical norms are usually different from official norms, complementing, bypassing and even contradicting them. Yet many practices are at least patterns of behaviour, they have some permanence, they are kept in place by particular mechanisms and people take them for granted. Practical norms are informal regulations/regularities of routinized practices not complying, at least partly, with official norms. They are latent and implicit.

Sunk costs, historical precedent, political resistance to change, and so on, are held responsible for inducing a "structural inertia" (Hannan and Freeman, 1977: 253), but what appears a form of "inertia" may, in fact, be a critical element of normal operations. Its removal can be nothing short of disastrous.

As I proposed in Chapter One, in a political community—and a university campus *is* a political community, whatever protests to the contrary might suggest—the outcomes of internal struggles depend on who can bring to bear power, wealth and norms most effectively. Who can make the most plausible and persuasive arguments about how authority should be structured, and who can most effectively structure authority? Again, organizational charts are formal maps of the distribution of power, wealth and authority, but they do not reveal the actual ways in which the three are wielded—that is sui generis and can only be identified through sociological fieldwork.

To be sure, university campuses are the sites of perennial struggles over norms and practices, and over academic programs and funding for them, among and between faculty and administration. But, for the most part, these are ritualized struggles: the faculty proposes, the administration disposes. There are institutionalized rules, both written and customary, and there are winners and losers. People complain about unfair procedures and stacked decks and, sometimes, decisions are overturned or defied in unexpected ways. This is “business as usual.”
In later chapters, I will look more closely at the structure and bureaucracy of UCSC and how they have shaped, and continue to affect, the normal operations of the campus. My “hypothesis” is that there is something *sui generis* about UCSC that makes a difference. This difference is not due to some vague-defined “cultural” or pathological factors; it is, I think, closer to an “adaptive” *habitus*, whereby a campus originally envisioned as different, and personnel—faculty, staff, administrators—who have internalized certain norms about higher education, struggle to reconcile that difference with those norms. Of course, all universities are exceptional, but some are more exceptional than others—and notions of exceptionalism impose a particular burden on those charged with bringing those imaginaries to life.

V. Concluding remarks

My goal in this chapter has been to offer a “theory of the environment” for social institutions and the organizations that emerge from them, by enumerating and describing a set of interacting factors (or non-independent variables, in a more formal sense) that shape and direct an organization (e.g., a campus) and feed back into the more general structure of the institution (e.g., “the university”). Taking an institutional approach allows us to see how our society is structured and organized by socially shared practices and *habitus*, both articulated in and through particular organizations that are the material expressions of those institutions. But practices and *habitus* are more in the way of “how to do things” (methodology) rather than “why things are a particular way” (ontology). In the case of universities, we have to look at histories of various durations to tease out the ontology and, even there, these cannot always tell us the “why?”

Universities are the specific material expressions of something we call “higher education,” an institution whose purpose and goals have varied according to both social history and political economy (the two are not easily teased apart). In dissecting these, moreover, we must not ignore or downplay the forms of power being exercised and how these reflect external and internal political struggles. Like many institutions and organizations, universities are always in the midst of “becoming,” as opposed to “being.” They are rife with contradictions that are difficult to deal with or eliminate. Such conditions are, perhaps, behind the real “crisis” of higher education.
Chapter 3
The Tragedy of Strategic Academic Planning

Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose (Sun Tzu, 2000: 4)

I. Introduction

These days, everyone wants to know what the future will bring (especially following COVID-19. And everyone wants to be ready for that future, which requires planning: anticipation of an uncertain future with specific designs and policies to cope with it. A Google search for the terms “strategic planning” and “university” results in more than 45 million hits, suggesting that universities are hard at work gaming the future.¹⁴

Whether such gaming works is, however, quite another question. It is difficult to find any retrospective assessments of higher education strategic plans five or ten years after public release—at least, I have not found any. By that time, of course, the previous strategic plan has been put on a shelf and ignored while a new one is being produced that duplicates substantially its predecessor. Rarely does such a plan try to chart an entirely new direction for an organization. The history of UCSC’s 15-odd strategic plans, to which I will return later in this book, bears this out.

The irony here is that strategic planning is somewhat passé in management circles, due to the fluidity and unpredictability of “the Future.” When the economy (and demography) are reasonably stable, it may be feasible to project the demand for goods and services over the next five or ten years. When an economy is subject to relatively sudden shocks—Great Recessions, the bursting of speculative bubbles or pandemics, for example—trends are no longer destiny, and following earlier trends may lead to negative outcomes or even bankruptcy. Hence, the question: What are you going to do when things go bad?

And, as we have seen (and continue to see), things inevitably go bad. The society-wide institutional logics of marketization and privatization mean that public universities are more exposed to the ups and downs of the business cycle than ever before. The speculative economy tends to inflate certain asset categories that may soar to unprecedented heights but whose limits are subject to “last-one-out” panics. Whether student tuition and private donors can then make up the gap in public funding is more of a political than an economic question. Finally, contingent events—

¹⁴ I use the term “gaming” quite deliberately, although no one actually tries to do this in some probabilistic sense, as we shall see.
in this case, the appearance of COVID-19—can render uncertain any and all assumptions about even the coming academic year (2020-21).

In response, the watchwords of corporate managers and government officials today are “resilience” and “adaptability,” both of which are trotted out in recognition that reliable prediction is problematic. Even “Big Data,” which are advertised as making prediction possible, cannot deal with “black swans,” those events no one sees coming. It might be noted that “resilience” and “adaptability” have become the goals of much contemporary planning for climate change. Rather than involving collective preparation for untoward events, these two concepts might be better read as “Be prepared and good luck—you’ll be on your own for a while!”

I begin this chapter with a brief overview of the concept and practice of strategic planning, what it is intended to accomplish, and why it seems to have fallen out of favor. The second section turns to strategic academic planning, that exercise routinely and frequently carried out by universities. In the third, I reflect on the two terms named above—resilience and adaptability—and whether they provide any useful ideas for responding to broad conditions of uncertainty about the future.

II. What is strategy? What is planning?

In its broadest sense, “strategy” is a plan of action for organizations confronting a projected future environment and based on specified goals and means of getting there (“tactics” are action-oriented objectives about how strategic elements are to be implemented). As noted above, strategic planning requires “gaming” the future, with all of its potential uncertainties and possible outcomes.

Chess offers an illustration, as a game in which strategy plays an important role in terms of established “games” and players’ efforts to analyze what an opponent’s coming moves might be. Individual moves in chess comprise the tactics to fulfilling the plan. The best chess players are able to map out a several sequences of future moves in response to their opponent’s potential sequences of future moves. But chess is relatively simple in terms of its variables.

While the practice of military strategy is thousands of years old, as exemplified in the work of Sun Tzu (2000), its more recent applications have involved the large-scale deployment of men and materiel in response to an opponent’s likely actions, along with the logistics required to supply and sustain that deployment and the demands of

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15 In Foundation, the first book in Isaac Asimov’s series about the distant future, predicting the future was called “psychohistory.” As I recall, that did not work very well for the characters in the book, either.

potential engagement. As the U.S. invasion of Iraq suggests, however, strategies may be successful in the short term and unsuccessful in the longer, due to a failure to plan or imagine different scenarios.

Nuclear strategy emerged out of the conundrum of deterrence, which was recognized soon after the atomic bombings of Japan. Whereas military strategy deals with the actual movement of men and materiel, nuclear strategy relies on the threat of imaginary tactics, as exemplified in game theory. Here, the goal is to prevent an opponent from making a move—at least, a move involving the launch of nuclear weapons—through application of psychology. There is broad agreement, however, that once a nuclear detonation in anger has taken place, there is not much future over which to further strategize or game.

As is the case with many epistemologies and technologies, strategic planning has military origins. During World War II, strategy and tactics were combined into what came to be called “operations analysis” (or “operations research”; OR), an analytical method which sought to identify “lessons,” based on accumulated accounts, data and statistics. The goal of early OR was to identify the effectiveness of particular tactics (e.g., bombing of cities) in achieving strategic objectives (e.g., defeat of the enemy). The hope was that OR would make it possible to wage war more effectively and efficiently by avoiding tactical mistakes, emulating tactical successes and prevent costly and useless expenditures of men and materiel. In the event, there were few opportunities to apply the insights of OR to World War Three—although not for lack of trying—especially since it was expected to be a short one.

Charles Shrader (2005: v) identifies five “essential steps” in OR:

1. The definition of the problem and the determination of the means of measuring its critical elements;
2. the collection of data (either by direct observation, the use of historical data, or the use of computer-generated data);
3. the analysis of the collected data (using both mathematical and nonmathematical methods);
4. the determination of conclusions based on the analysis of the collected data; and
5. the recommendation to the military decision maker of a course of action designed to correct or improve weapons and equipment, organization, doctrine, strategy, or policy.

The Army Logistics University (ORSA Committee, 2011: 5) offers an informative diagram (Figure 8.1) of what is essentially the “scientific process” involved in operations analysis and systems research for strategic planning. It is no accident that this process resembles—in fact, is identical to—the formal scientific method. What is missing from the diagram, which is generally present in applications of the scientific method, are the foundational assumptions on which an analytical exercise is based.
37

Table 3.1: The “Scientific Process” of Operations Research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Define the problem</td>
<td>Why do the study?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Develop analysis plan</td>
<td>What do we know?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gather &amp; review data</td>
<td>Valid?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Construct/populate your model(s)</td>
<td>Scenario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Test your hypothesis</td>
<td>Acceptable?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Run the Model(s)</td>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Analyze the results</td>
<td>Void?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Develop insights</td>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Document/Brief results</td>
<td>Parameters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Solicit feedback/criticism</td>
<td>Cost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(e.g., we are smarter, our weapons are better, our troops are superior).

During the 1950s and after, the growing availability of digital computers made OR easier, in the sense that many different tactics and strategies (inputs) could be analyzed in terms of varying goals, objectives and outcomes (outputs). This made possible the goal of identifying the most “effective” actions and the logistics that could lead to the desired outcomes. The construction of different scenarios of varying conditions through computer modeling became the basis for “strategic operations research,” which was, essentially, war planning and gaming (the parallel appearance of strategic game theory was no coincidence). The introduction of newer data and events could alter the outcomes of such a planning and gaming process, of course, making possible an endless stream of documents. The real problem facing such planning was what then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described in 2002 as the “unknown unknowns”—that which you didn’t know you did not know.18

17 One of my dissertation advisors, Gene Rochlin, argued that desktop computers were possibly the “worst” thing that ever happened to strategic planning and modelling, because it allowed anyone to model without any vetting and to present that model as “science.”

18 For those who do not remember the past but would like to repeat it, Rumsfeld (2002) offered this wisdom in a Department of Defense news briefing on February 12, 2002. The full quote is: “Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones [sic].”
Taking a leaf from defense analysts, in 1954, management guru Peter Drucker introduced “strategic planning” to the private sector in *The Practice of Management*. In 1986, he (Drucker, 1986: 92) defined strategic planning as

the continuous process of making present entrepreneurial \((\text{risk-taking})\) decisions systematically and with the greatest knowledge of their futurity; organizing systematically the efforts needed to carry out these decisions; and measuring the results of these decisions against the expectations through organized, systematic feedback (emphasis in original).

With somewhat greater clarity, continued Drucker (1986: 93)

What is crucial in strategic planning is, first, that systematic and purposeful work on attaining objectives be done; second, that planning start out with sloughing off yesterday, and that abandonment be planned as part of the systematic attempt to attain tomorrow; third, that we look for new and different ways to attain objectives rather than believe that doing more of the same will suffice; and finally, that we think through the time dimensions and ask, “When do we have to start work to get results when we need them?”

Note several often-ignored points in this definition. First, the practices of the past must be “sloughed off” and even abandoned, should that prove necessary. Second, multiple ways to attain goals should be mapped out, some of which might be more efficient and effective than present practices. Finally, writing a plan is not the same as implementing it: to realize a future goal, action must begin much sooner. We might add that realistic costing is also essential; that which is unaffordable should be excluded.

Given the popularity of corporate strategic planning, it is perhaps ironic (or not) that, less than ten years later, Henry Mintzberg (1994) pronounced its demise. He argued that strategy and planning were “mutually exclusive” (Roney, 2010: 74) and that “strategic planning” was an “oxymoron” (Mintzberg, 1994: 321). Mintzberg devoted an entire chapter of *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* to “Fundamental Fallacies of Strategic Planning,” explaining why he thought it dead. Curiously, his reasons have more to do with the planners than the process: how they think, what they assume (but don’t articulate), how they use data and information, and their conviction that the future can be forecast with high reliability and certainty (that is, the future is mostly an extension of the past).19

Mintzberg offers four “fallacies” common to those who believe that strategic planning works:

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19 Trend lines assume that the past is a reliable basis on which to predict a deterministic future, much like Newton’s First Law of Motion: “Every object in a state of uniform motion will remain in that state of motion unless an external force acts on it.” But those “external forces!” Gotta watch out for them.
1. The Fallacy of Predetermination, which assumes that context is stable or predictable and, therefore, outcomes are predetermined (p. 224)

2. The Fallacy of Detachment, which sees “thought...[as] detached from action, strategy from operations, ostensible thinking from real doers,” which allows planners to imagine they are detached from that for which they are making plans (p. 223)

3. The Fallacy of Formalization, which is the belief that strategy making is best done with systems analysis, which can create strategies without the involvement of people (p. 294)

4. The Assumption of Quantification, which is the belief that the “strategy making process is driven by ‘hard data,’ comprising quantitative aggregates of the detailed ‘facts’ about the organization and environment” (pp. 223-24).

As a result, argues Mintzberg, formalized plans and programs tend to focus on stable structures while ignoring agency, practice and habitus, which, after all, are what makes an organization run. Structures provide boundaries and conditions of possibility, but are socially determined, which means they can be changed or subverted. Furthermore, when high-level executives plan (indeed, when everybody plans), they idealize “floor-level” practices and processes, imagining them to be happening “by the book” rather than functioning only by virtue of violation of the book. Valuing “hard data” over the tacit experience of “soft data” and oral communications among managers and employees, both of which are essential to organizational functions, risks developing strategies that cannot be put into practice. Finally, forecasting based on a stable future can lock organizations into plans that are difficult or impossible to change if necessary, and that may well have to be abandoned under extreme changes and conditions.

What does Mintzberg offer instead? He (1994: 239-45) makes a distinction between “strategic planning” and “strategy making” or “strategy formation.” The latter involve formulating responses to changes in the real environment, with less reliance on high-level thinkers and more on action-oriented managers and staff.

More often, it appears, strategies are changed because conditions change, not cyclically or regularly so much as discontinuously. In other words, strategy typically gets changed because something fundamental has changed in the environment, on a one-time basis.... Serious changes in strategy generally means a shift in gestalt... (id.: 240)

In an article, with the subtitle “Strategy... Who Needs It Anyway?” (Fabel, Jonk & Aurik, 2014: 7), the authors argue that “Every time a new phenomenon appears, strategy formulation becomes a bit more complex as more factors must be considered simultaneously, further eroding the chance for strategy to step in as a guiding force.” They argue that the business environment changes so quickly that long-term planning
is pointless, inasmuch as it requires more certainty about future conditions than is possible.

O’Donovan and Flower (2013: 2) write that “As the complexity of our physical and social systems make the world more unpredictable, we have to abandon our focus on prediction and shift into rapid prototyping and experimentation so that we learn quickly about what actually works.”

Preparation for multiple futures rests on one of two approaches. The first is scenario-building and modeling: what are the various future conditions that could emerge or evolve from the present, how might these affect current trends, how can the organization prepare for these alternatives? The second is “adaptive strategy” (O’Donovan & Flower, 2013: 2) or “agility, flexibility and resilience” (Aurik, Fable & Jonk, 2014: 9), which requires “a roadmap of the terrain that lies before an organization and...a set of navigational tools, realizing that there will be many different options for reaching the destination [because]....the destination may shift based on what we learn along the way” (O’Donovan & Flower, 2013: 2).

III. Strategic academic planning

What, exactly, is covered by the term “academic?” The word is generally understood to encompass the basic functions of a university—teaching and research—the execution of which are largely under the purview of university faculty. The introduction of “academic” between “strategic” and “planning” introduces additional levels of detail and complexity into the exercise. These are difficult to accommodate through conventional planning approaches that, as noted above, assume stability and a future of additional funding, in the face of repeated evidence that neither is usually correct.

When they are finally completed, strategic academic plans are often trumpeted as marking out new paths that will carry the organization to heretofore unimagined heights and prosperity (which only the topmost administrators seem to truly believe). Any action items issued along with said plan assume unlimited enthusiasm on the part of faculty, staff and students and a willingness to devote the necessary time to pursuing the new path—which is rarely, if ever, the case. Consequently, according to Hinton (2012:7)

At its beginning, the strategic plan in post-secondary education was viewed as a tool to articulate institutional mission and vision, help prioritize resources, and promote organizational focus. As a result, many of the early strategic planning efforts produced documents that described the institution but did little to motivate a process. These “shelf documents” often sowed the seeds of discontent within the institution, since many who participated in the process spent long hours on the plan’s development and then saw relatively little implementation.
Certainly, as we shall see in later chapters, this has been the case for UCSC’s many strategic academic plans.

But why should this be so? Why do Hinton’s observations seem so often to be true? Here, it is necessary to return to a number of points raised in Chapter 2 about institutions and organizations:

i. Universities are loosely-coupled organizations and are difficult to move;
ii. Institutional logics shift slowly but inexorably over time without awareness;
iii. Opacity in decision-making trumps consultation with faculty and staff, often due to a lack of time;
iv. Shared governance between administration and faculty is largely a fiction;
v. Dissent, resistance and sabotage by faculty, staff and students block plans, policies and actions.

i. **Universities as loosely-coupled organizations**

What, exactly, is a university in organizational terms? It is not a corporation or military governed through hierarchy, in which line staff have only limited autonomy in deciding which way the organization will go (bigger cars or smaller ones? gasoline or electric? war or peace?). Nor is it a government agency ostensibly serving the public while subject to bureaucratic infighting and capture by powerful interests. The university is not a civil society organization that meets regularly or a social movement seeking to carve out its way through politics and history. It is not a church or religious sect of some kind, even though Western universities originated out of the Catholic Church.

A university is, perhaps, best thought of as a kind of “Holy Roman Empire,” composed of innumerable units, divided leadership, driven by particular interests, each struggling to fulfill a vision while meeting the mundane needs of students and faculty, engaging in attacks on each other although sometimes creating alliances and, occasionally, uniting to protect the whole. The “domestic politics” of individual units loom large in such an entity and the notional head of the empire (President or Chancellor) may find it difficult to accomplish very much. And whereas militaries are “tightly coupled” and orders are to be followed exactly, and corporations are moderately coupled, with roles, functions and authority clearly defined, universities are “loosely-coupled” organizations (Weick, 1976).

Individual “agency” matters, i.e., the ability of some individuals to play a meaningful role, but the collegiate organizational structure imposes serious constraints. At the same time, sabotage by individuals—other agents—is always possible, but is unlikely to influence management unless it becomes pervasive. Finally, line staff are not paid to worry about the future (except insofar as their own futures may be under threat) or their union takes action on their behalf. In universities, and notwithstanding organizational plans that suggest a clear hierarchy, linked units may have
considerable degrees of autonomy and delegated authority and the power to resist and obstruct the desires and actions of units above them, leading to organizational paralysis. The UC system, through no real intention of its own, seems to fit this synecdoche rather well. The individual campuses, like a Mandelbrot set (another poor analogy) seem to reproduce such loosely coupled politics, at smaller and smaller scales.

The upshot is that, while the exercise of strategic planning is dictated by Administration, the active cooperation of those myriad units and their inhabitants are required to actually produce a plan. In the military, the generals can decide on strategy and tactics and need not consult anyone below them (although their orders may be blocked by the “wall of colonels”; in a corporation, planning may be extended to include managers but rank-and-file will be excluded. Loose-coupling, however, often means that orders from the top may not make it to the bottom intact. Moreover, those involved in the planning exercise may not be sensitive to or aware of how the organization and its units actually operate. Idealization of the process says nothing about how to carry it out.

ii. Shifting institutional logics

To repeat the definition offered in Chapter 2, institutional logics are “socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 101, cited in Cloutier & Langley, 2013: 361). That is, such a “logic” is a combination of ontology, epistemology and methodology that dictates the purpose of the institution and its organizations; knowledge, rules and relationships that structure the institution and organization; and practices and processes that make the organization function. The ontology is dictated by the encompassing logic of the broader society; the epistemology by the norms of the society regarding the institution’s structure and objectives; and the methodology by those operations that will fulfill social goals and objectives.

As I proposed in Chapter 2 and will address further in Chapter 4 and subsequent chapters, the ontology of higher education in American society is based on the proposition that scientific and social knowledge based on particular worldviews can improve social morality and well-being. The epistemology is based on teaching and research rooted in rationality, reason and the scientific method (for the most part). Finally, the methodologies of teaching and research are discipline-specific although they are all premised on “best practices” in pedagogy and knowledge acquisition.

To put the point more baldly, changing operational logics in external society will penetrate various types of institutions more or less rapidly—perhaps as a function of coupling—without planners full awareness that this is happening. Thus, an institutional logic that, at one point in time, is consonant with that of external society (e.g., Fordist-Keynesian) may be poorly matched at another point in time
The failure to recognize or to plan in response to such change is not the fault of the planners, however, but it can certainly be a problem for the plan.

iii. Decision-making is opaque and consultation is minimized

Complex organizations such as universities are difficult to run efficiently—a term often confused with “effectiveness”—and the loose coupling of the players makes operations even more difficult as well as distant from idealized models. While there are many templates for setting up and running an organization, once a choice is made, with units and relationships established, the initial bureaucratic structure of an organization tends to become fairly fixed and difficult to change or reform later on. Rather than trying to change the structure, as new needs and functions appear, it is easier to add new units and new administrators than change, merge or abolish old ones—hence, the tendency toward administrative expansion. Sometimes, of course, units are disestablished or renamed or even replaced by newly named units with old and new responsibilities. Staff may be reshuffled and given new responsibilities but remain largely the same people. New rules and regulations may be promulgated but old practices and shortcuts remain in place, adding to confusion. It is rare that a university gets smaller and there are no incentives for units to become so efficient as to render staff superfluous.

Nevertheless, operating such a complex organization requires that someone with authority and power be available to decide when to push the buttons and pull the levers, and to hand the pushing and pulling to a subordinate (who can also be blamed if something goes wrong). In such a hierarchy, we assume that “rulers” at the top issue the orders while “peasants” at the bottom do the work, with specified goals and in a prescribed fashion. But, as James Scott (1985) once pointed out, even peasants may resist such orders. What happens when the peasants are allowed—nay, authorized and encouraged—to construct and run parts of the organization and decide to disobey orders and do something differently (but arguably more effectively)? What if the peasants’ picks and shovels work better than the ones handed out by the rulers?20

As organizations get larger, it also becomes more difficult to respond to the external environment in a flexible and resilient manner, given all the moving parts. Some units and their inhabitants may see their particularistic interests in a zero-sum game with others and resist directives. New units may deprive older ones of resources, privileged units may receive more than less-privileged ones, and individuals and faculty groups might win or lose as a result of orders from the top. Strategic academic planning may fall victim to all kinds of internal contingencies and external pressures, and even the successful production of a plan does not mean it will actually be implemented as imagined (if at all).

20 “Peasants” may have disincentives to work more efficiently, since they must divide their crops with the rulers. Organizational staff however, are often driven by a desire to serve others (e.g., students) more effectively.
Especially in loosely-coupled organizations, authoritative decisions about anything tend to raise questions of governance, participation, priorities, needs and resource distribution, all of which may be contested by rank and file and left unresolved. Broad participation in planning, decision-making and implementation appears desirable in order to promote legitimacy and ownership of change, yet significant decision-making is often interrupted, generates resistance, breaks down or takes a very long time.

The temptation is great to make decisions and develop plans from the top while engaging in a fictional and somewhat opaque participatory exercise. This entails holding numerous consultative meetings, design workshops and informational town halls, carefully recording questions, objections and suggestions while downplaying or even ignoring them. The draft and final plans are then described as the outcome of extended and in-depth consultations with faculty, students and staff even as these are largely ignored. At the end of the day, in spite of much *sturm und drang*, not much may happen.

iv. **Shared governance is a fiction**

Many public universities, including the UC campuses, operate within a decision-making framework called “shared governance.” Martin Trow (1988: 204) reminds us that universities are not democracies, and “shared governance” is not really shared, but is more akin to “advise and consent.” It is probably safe to say that most faculty members have only a vague notion of what shared governance means, or the limits to and constraints on it, until they become actively involved in the Academic Senate. The delusion of the democratic campus persists.

“Shared governance” does not mean that faculty have comprehensive authority or rights over a universities policies and decisions. Ostensibly, the faculty, through a representative body such as an academic senate, has authority over academics and education—what constitutes a disciplinary curriculum, what is taught and how it is taught, and related matters. A campus administration manages the organization, controls the purse strings for academic issues and has the unilateral right to make binding decisions about virtually all other matters.

For the most part, faculty serve in an advisory function—they can participate in administrative functions, provide analyses of and opinions about administration decisions, actions and funding and, sometimes, obstruct or sabotage policies and directives. As suggested above, it behooves a university administration to cultivate faculty support through extensive consultation, a time-consuming process that delays implementation. But final authority is vested in the hierarchy of authority running downward from a board of regents to a system chancellor or president and on to campus heads.
An administration can decline to support academic initiatives or refuse to fund them, thereby blocking faculty prerogatives. Sometimes, moreover, the lines between academic and administration rights and responsibilities become blurred. This can be seen in personnel matters.

Most public universities have rather elaborate mechanisms for hiring and reviewing faculty, divided between academic evaluation and employment matters. The selection of candidates is an academic function, left to faculty and their departments—although the advertising, selection and interview processes are subject to careful vetting by administration’s human resources units. Having read and assessed tens or hundreds of job applications, departments generally invite three or four candidates to campus to meet, teach and present. Those interviewed are evaluated on the basis of academic accomplishments, such as books and journal articles, a job talk describing some portion of their research and, more and more often, guest lectures in classes. The faculty of a department then meet to discuss the candidates and decide on which one will be recommended for hire. Similarly, when continuing faculty undergo periodic personnel reviews, departments read and assess research productivity and salience, teaching quality and service, and make recommendations concerning salary increases and promotions.

That term recommend is very important. The recommendation wends its way up through the bureaucratic hierarchy, is usually passed through some kind of representative faculty committee on personnel—which may support or reject a department’s recommendation, and ends up on the desk of the campus administrator (provost or vice chancellor, as the case may be). That individual has the final say on hires, raises and promotions because employment is an administrative function and not an academic one. Yet, it can be argued that such decisions can have significant impacts on academics and education, for example when tenure is denied or a prominent member of a department departs because of a refusal to increase that person’s salary.

Shared governance adds to the bureaucratic and organizational complexity of a university. No matter what the putative benefits of a policy or practice, someone’s ox is almost always being gored when decisions are made, even with extensive consultation. Any faculty decisions, advice or recommendations that go against an administration’s desires and inclinations are likely to be ignored. “Advise and consent” goes only so far at a university, and it is at that point that shared governance is revealed to be much less than advertised.

v. Dissent, resistance and sabotage

How a university operates or is “run” depends on a great deal more than just the faculty, staff and administration, of course. At the end of the day, normal operation happens on the basis of a habitus that keeps the wheels turning. Teachers teach, staffers staff and managers manage, according to routinized and internalized procedures. There is a risk, of course, if conditions deteriorate to the point of mass
departures and retirements, since internalizing *habitus* takes time and institutional memory becomes scarce. Knowledge vanishes. Informal methods and shortcuts are forgotten. Learning curves are steep and costly, especially if new hires must learn from scratch.

Moreover, both the administration and the faculty and staff who work for a university are concerned about more than just operation. In Bourdieu’s (1986) formulation, academics generate other forms of “capital” besides money, especially those involving reputation, status and research, which may have little to do with organizational planning but which matter greatly to them. When it comes to proposing changes in institutional structure, norms and practices that appear to diminish these forms of capital, resistance is almost certain to develop.

Dissent, resistance and sabotage all have impacts on planning and operation. Dissent, in the absence of a movement, tends to be fostered by a few individuals who can be dismissed as cranks or outliers, even if they reflect the views of large numbers of faculty. It is safer to keep one’s head down, just in case dissent brings down the full force of administrative discipline and punishment. Movements are difficult to sustain in the absence of some form of organization—such as a union—and faculty at many campuses are loath to unionize, since they do not see themselves as working for a wage.

Resistance is generally passive rather than active. Just as an administration may ignore faculty concerns and demands, faculty and staff can simply not “work to rule” by continuing “traditional” practices. Minor violations are usually ignored by the administration, although one or another bureaucrat can call individuals to account. If a practice is widespread, however, it becomes difficult to impose discipline, especially if such action mobilizes a movement. At that point—and it is a point that administrations want to avoid, at all costs—resistance may be activated to a political level. This is what happened in 2020 in response to a wildcat wage strike by teaching assistants at UCSC.

Sabotage is possible but difficult to execute, because an active challenge to the operation of a campus in a particular way is likely to have a deleterious effect on the *quality* of teaching and education. In 2019 and 2020, a group of teaching assistants at UCSC refused to submit final grades, striking for a “cost of living adjustment” needed due to the high cost of housing in Santa Cruz. For a number of reasons, the UCSC and UC administrations would not reopen negotiations over the TAs contracts and the grade strike morphed into a broader movement, with support from faculty, staff and unions. That movement then spread to other UC campuses. Arguably, however, the impacts on undergraduate education was not insignificant, even though many classes were held in other locations, outside of the assigned classrooms.

These five points are not independent of one another, but they all serve to complicate strategic academic planning, impede the planning process and obstruct a plan’s implementation. They can be regarded as relatively permanent features of
loosely coupled organizations, such as universities, at which the distribution of power and authority is poorly defined and in which there is a considerable amount of autonomy available to agents scattered throughout the structure.

IV. Strategic academic planning in practice

What, then, is contained in the many academic plans? They are better understood as “imaginaries” rather than blueprints (to which they are often compared). In this context, I am adopting and adapting Sheila Jasanoff’s (2015: 4) concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries,” defined in a recent book (Felt, et al., 2017: 27) on European universities as

collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable [societal and simultaneously academic] futures’ related to developing a specific form of a public university... [drawing] attention to how institutional developments are intertwined with ideals of what constitutes a good societal future as well as how wider social orders are reflected in institutions of knowledge production and higher education

Whereas a blueprint is a visual guide to organization, structure and materials, usually of buildings, an “imaginary” is a contextualized notion of an idealized future for a campus, whose goal is to convince its audience that the notion can be made real.

According to Michael Cowan (2011: 166-67)

[academic] plans are designed to persuade readers, especially the clients who must approve the plans, who must fund the plans—whether they are campus administrators, or Office of the President administrators, or Regents, or legislators, or the general public, or so forth. And therefore plans are also rhetorical acts. That is, they use languages, images, numbers, and so forth to persuade the clients and other readers that the visions presented in the plans, projected in the plans, are worth moving to embodiment in bricks and glass and stone and everything. And the plans therefore should be read themselves carefully as texts, read for their implicit as well as for their explicit values and assumptions and goals, looking for unconscious assumptions as well as conscious assumptions and goals.

A strategic academic plan is not a map of how to get from here to there\textsuperscript{21}; it does not address the myriad of small actions that will be required to complete the journey. Instead, it is a vision of where the authors would like to be in some years’ time. But, in the absence of some degree of certainty about the future environment or what might be required to get there, it is almost impossible to evaluate whether the vision makes sense or not.

\textsuperscript{21} It might be apt to compare strategic academic planning as text to the \textit{Wizard of Oz}, in which Dorothy dreams of a different future world, is magically transported there, follows the Yellow Brick Road and discovers that the Wizard and Emerald City are not what was promised.
This contradiction looms ever larger for higher education. Few, if any, people in the 1950s and 1960s foresaw the economic changes to come (O’Connor, 1973) or how they might affect broader political economy and social logics (Block, 1977). I will return to this topic in the following chapter; suffice it to say here that the rise of market logic heralded the decline of the welfare state and its generous support of public education.

In the “old days,” that is, prior to the 1990s, and under the older Fordist-Keynesian logic, public universities had some assurance that they faced a relatively reliable and predictable future. Fordist-Keynesian logic institutionalized a particular post-war class structure, in which the white middle class was employed in white-collar jobs that notionally required a college education, while blue-collar workers were employed in factories offering wages adequate to upward mobility aspirations without going to college (this ignores, of course, a significant lumpen proletariat composed of the poor and minorities). Public university tuitions were relatively minimal and state governments and (largely white) middle-class publics regarded access to public universities as a birthright or property right. To be sure, there were periodic economic recessions, but these were regarded as temporary, short-lived aberrations from economic growth trends.

As market logic began to penetrate into universities, during the late 1990s and into the 21st century, Hinton (2012:8) writes: an “ever-fickle cycle of management theories du jour” came to dominate the exercise of strategic academic planning. As a result, the rapidity with which new management theories were applied seems to render previous plans and approaches both obsolete and misbegotten. Each new cycle of planning relies on new management programs and “experts” in executing them. Because those driving such efforts are not necessarily cognizant of the peculiarities of the university for which they are planning, the process often generates empty exercises in which participation is necessary in order not to be left out should something happen, but which take up significant amounts of time that might be better devoted to teach, research and grantwriting. The resulting cynicism and refusal to participate in a planning exercise, except under duress, are not surprising.

The role of faculty and staff in the planning process has, arguably changed, too. In earlier times, and whether or not it was warranted, faculty were regarded as experts in teaching and education and played a significant role in writing academic plans (in fact, as we shall see, the first Provost of Cowell College wrote UCSC’s first strategic academic plan largely by himself, and its focus was primarily on academics). In recent years, faculty roles have been expanded to incorporate “human capital accumulation.” Faculty are now expected to be fundraisers as well as educators, and the former function sometimes appears to trump the latter. Moreover, new faculty are being assessed for their grant-obtaining prowess and in a new form of financial

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22 Fordism refers to the mass production assembly system that Henry Ford mounted so successfully. Keynesianism refers to the so-called welfare state that, among other things, provides social services and public goods in the interest of national society as a whole.
speculation, universities are willing to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars betting that new faculty will bring in millions in the future and thereby offset salary, research costs, overhead and support for graduate students research assistants.

Those who are experienced grantwriters in STEM fields are often quite successful in obtaining funding for their research, but even extramural support (with a 52% overhead rate) cannot cover all overhead costs. By contrast, faculty in non-STEM fields face a much more difficult extramural environment and, even though their grants are small and overhead relatively low, are more likely to be in departments facing the accountant’s scalpel (or cleaver, as the case may be).

To be implemented, strategic academic plans must find capital (or funds) to support both process and new initiatives. For the foreseeable future, it seems safe to assume that such capital will not be forthcoming from state governments. This means that universities must rely on three other sources of funding: (i) some sort of public bond, although many universities lack the credit capacity to float very large issues; (ii) student tuition, which is used to cover basic costs and for which there is considerable competition; (iii) public-private partnerships, which rely on some kind of revenue flow to the private partner. Donors might be found to pay for new buildings, but many public universities have thin donor bases. New academic programs must be funded out of core revenues—unless a private donor is willing to pay for one.

Finally, someone or some campus unit must be committed to seeing the plan, or parts of it, through to implementation. Experience suggests that assigning a single individual to head up a new project that requires capital to launch is likely to be quite difficult, whereas dedicating a unit to the task is quite expensive. UCSC’s efforts to develop a campus in Silicon Valley, addressed in Chapter 11, is an example of how, in the absence of reliable funding, elements of strategic plans can fail.

V. Concluding thoughts

Is strategic academic planning really the acting out of a tragedy? According to the online *Oxford English Dictionary,* a tragedy is

> A classical or Renaissance verse drama, written in an elevated style and dealing with the downfall or death of the protagonist, typically a political leader or royal personage who is brought to ruin because of his or her own error or fault, or because of a conflict with a greater force (such as fate or the gods).

If we regard the university as the protagonist in the drama of higher education, the “tragedy” is the repeated creation of texts that ignore previous experience and warnings about the futility of strategic academic planning. Whether this repetition reflects a character flaw in the protagonist, or a conflict with fate and the gods, is not so clear, especially if the protagonist is at the mercy of external forces over

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23 https://www-oed-com.oca.ucsc.edu/view/Entry/204352?redirectedFrom=tragedy#eid
which it has little or no control or recourse. We shall return to this topic in Chapters 10 and 11, in which I review the content and fate of UCSC’s strategic academic plans.
Chapter 4

The political economy of the “crisis” in higher education

I. Introduction

Over the past few decades, significant numbers of academics, observers and pundits have loudly proclaimed a “crisis” in America’s system of higher education. The problem is that there is little agreement on what this “crisis” is about. In a broad sense, there are those, usually of a conservative bent, who see universities as teaching students the “wrong” stuff, both vocationally and politically, stifling “freedom of speech.” They call for a cleansing of the stables. Those with more progressive leanings bemoan the failure of higher education to meet the needs of under-represented populations by stacking the deck against students from those groups and while perpetuating the myths and inequities of the past 250 years. More generally, public universities themselves complain about the decline in public funding and the “hollowing out” of higher education as a result.

Nor does the “crisis” end there: what should universities teach, and how does what they teach facilitate employment among their graduates? Is research or teaching primary? Should greater emphasis be placed on STEM education and are so many graduate students really necessary? And, does higher education serve the nation, the economy or itself? These, and other complaints and accounts, create a cacophony of voices recommending all kinds of changes without adding much to public understanding what is going on and how to respond.

This chapter offers a somewhat critical, heterodox approach to the issue by focusing not on methods, goals or outcomes, all of which are instrumental matters but, rather, by examining the political economy of higher education, in historical as well as contemporary terms. The gist of the argument I present here is that the “crisis,” such as it is, arises from structural contradictions in both society and the political economy that produces and reproduces the society in which institutions of higher education operate. The crisis is an *ontological* one having to do with historical transformations in relationships among labor, technology, knowledge and capital, rather than a *methodological* one about what and how to teach in order to ensure post-graduate employment.

I begin this chapter with an overview of the conventional wisdom regarding the so-called crisis, and the various “solutions” offered to address it. I then turn to a discussion of the very concept of “crisis,” from both the generally understood sense—a disruption in the normal order of society—and a more critical sense—the culmination of contradictions rooted in the basic normative and structural organization of society. In this instance, the crisis cannot be separated from the broader cultural clashes of
(post)modern societies. In the third section, I summarize the historical processes of change and transformation in capitalist political economy that give rise to the contradictions and contemporary political, economic and social turbulence, and how these matter for higher education. Finally, I suggest some ways in which we might deal with the effects of those contradictions on higher education.

II. The conventional wisdom

A casual reading of books and articles about the “crisis of higher education” reveals a plethora of complaints, explanations and solutions to the “problem.” Here is an abridged list, extracted from a variety of sources: 24

1. Colleges and universities are not teaching the skills and knowledge students require to succeed in the high-tech, information-based economy and are failing to utilize the best modern technologies to deliver education more efficiently;
2. Students are not learning because pedagogical methods are lagging behind the times, course content is irrelevant, students are not interested and they learn very little;
3. Completion, retention and graduation rates are in decline even as “too many graduates are not prepared to think critically and creatively, speak and write cogently, solve problems, comprehend complex issues, accept accountability, take the perspective of others, or meet employer expectations” (Hersh & Keeling, 2018);
4. Tuition costs are too high for the kind of education students are receiving, many families struggle to pay for college, and student debts are piling up without clear evidence that college is worth the cost;
5. The costs of tenured faculty far exceed the benefits from them and they don’t teach very much, the number of administrative staffers has grown out of control, campuses are dens of “progressive leftish monocultures” (Vedder, 2019), there are few efforts to rein in costs and too much teaching is being done by casual lecturers;
6. The decline in state support for public universities is driving them toward privatization, greater reliance on tuition and donors, and research contracts with private corporations to produce proprietary knowledge;
7. Public funding from taxes, federal agencies and others have provided disincentives to greater efficiency and “quality control” in terms of expenditures—and no one is really sure where all the money goes;
8. The failure of U.S.-based universities to channel more students into STEM fields threatens the country’s global primacy in higher education and the high-tech economy on which it depends;
9. Colleges and universities provide open and friendly access and environments to higher-income elites, while remaining largely closed and hostile to low-income, minority and first-generation students;

24 I will not provide an extensive list of references here, although an online search will identify dozens if not hundreds of books and articles on the “crisis.” A Google search for “crisis” and “higher education” returns over 100 million hits.
The bachelor’s degree has been turned into a job ticket, universities treat students as “customers,” liberal arts has been replaced by “professional training,” “with teaching and learning devalued, deprioritized and replaced by an emphasis on simpleminded metrics that feed magazine rankings, enrollment, winning teams, facilities, with more revenue from sideline businesses” (Hersh & Keeling, 2018).

Doubtless, another ten critiques could be added to this list.

What these points reveal about the proclaimed “crisis” of higher education is the degree to which analysts and critics focus on “normal” (read “traditional”) operations and practices as causes of the crisis. Arguably, there are problems with the pedagogy of higher education, how it is delivered and paid for, who is best qualified to deliver it and what students are (or are not) learning. But among all of these critiques, there is no mention of the historical and structural forces and processes that have brought us here.

Thus, it is claimed, every university needs more STEM and less literature, more entrepreneurs and fewer functionaries, more computer instruction and reduced numbers of liberal arts classes. The student factories of the 20th century must turn themselves into the nimble, agile and innovative startups of the 21st. General Motors must become Tesla, so to speak (although that last might be a poor analogy, since the long-term survival of Tesla is by no means assured). And education must become “relevant” to the needs of the society of the future and rather than the concerns of the societies of the past. History is out; coding is in.

The fact is that there are far too many interests invested in higher education as it is now structured and far too many oxen that would be gored were the contradictions in the system of higher education to be resolved. These interests do and will struggle over ways to deal with contradictions such that the basic institutional structure remains intact and protects their interests, often in preference to those of others’. The issue here is not whether radical change and transformation are desirable or necessary; rather, it is what band aids can stanch the loss of blood, so to speak, without requiring major surgery (admittedly, a poor metaphor).

To give an example: as I write this, in Spring 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic has led to “shelter-in-place” orders in many parts of the world. Campuses and schools have been closed and are moving to “remote instruction” via the internet as a substitute for in-person classes. Instructors are being forced to modify their classes in various ways, although basic delivery formats will remain the same. While many instructors deplore this move, they also expect that they and their students will return to campuses in due time. But there is a significant probability that university

25 “Remote instruction” should be distinguished from “online education.” The latter generally involves a great deal of change in pedagogical methods, lengthy curriculum development and various media technologies and techniques in order to present quality classes. The former simply involves more-or-less conventional lecturing to widely scattered students via apps such as ZOOM or Google Hangouts.
and school administrations will argue that, notwithstanding many flaws, remote instruction has succeeded and ought to be used regularly rather than in exceptional times. That would be unlikely to improve educational quality, but it almost certainly will reduce the costs of delivering that education.

Such mundane prescriptions are somewhat ironic in view of Silicon Valley’s obsession with “disruption,” the notion that “old” forms of institutional organization are best destroyed rather than fixed and replaced by new, sleeker ways of doing things (usually having to do with technology). On-line educational, for example, for which enthusiasm has declined somewhat since it peaked around 2015, is not much more than an alternative delivery system, while ending tenure as some have proposed turns teaching into a “gig” rather than a profession. Privatization shifts the burden of costs from the taxpayers to the students’ future debt repayments, while STEM education leads to ever-greater specialization and ever-narrower analytical skills. These “solutions” are rather more similar to replacing an “older” method with a “newer” one and hoping that things change. To be sure, the lives and livelihoods of many individuals will be disrupted, but the organizational form will march on.

I’ve alluded to a number of contradictions in earlier chapters of this book; I use the term here in a way similar to Marx but without there necessarily being a synthesis as a result of resolution. Any contradiction in an institutional structure will, ultimately, precipitate in an apparent “crisis,” but whether a crisis results in a new or different structure is not guaranteed, as the response to COVID-19 suggests. My use of the term is to suggest that there will not be a dialectical resolution of two opposing forces or processes but, rather, a collapse of specific organizations and even the institution as a whole. Whether a synthesis emerges is wholly contingent and contextual.

III. The historical and material origins of contradictions in higher education

Here I want to introduce a new concept—speculative education—which, I will argue, represents a fundamental change in capitalist political economy, from production and consumption to speculation, that has led to the contradictions faced by higher education. Just as the consumer economy emerged in the early 20th century to absorb the surplus production of America’s burgeoning industrial sector, the speculative economy emerged in the late 20th century to absorb the surplus capital that began to appear after the dollar was taken off the gold exchange standard. In parallel to this, but with a 20-year lag, higher education was driven to shift from the production of bodies in service to the public good to the production of minds in service of the private good. Furthermore, universities have moved from contributing to stocks of skills and knowledge, that is, to the knowledge commons, to generating flows of skills and knowledge that can be financialized, e.g., via intellectual property and privatization of research. Moreover, under this regime of speculative education, students speculate in their own bodies, and their potential to generate capital flows after graduation. How and why has this happened?
There is no gainsaying that the social framework within which higher education is provided to high school graduates has changed, and that the so-called culture wars have reached deeply into the country’s educational framework as part of broader political conflicts and struggles. These conflicts and struggles do not originate within the educational system even as they engulf it, and they are not independent of the changes across U.S. society and in its political economy that have precipitated the culture wars. Thus, the forces affecting higher education are also a consequence of material and ideological struggles over social power and hegemony. Higher education has never been apolitical but today it is both a means and an end in those highly visible political struggles.

The shift in public education from a common to an individual interest does matter here. Broadly speaking, between 1950 and 1975, higher education was widely regarded as a social good, whose costs would be amply covered by parents and other taxpayers. Graduates would easily find jobs and then repay society through their tax payments and social contributions to the commonweal. To this end, the universities of the mid-20th century sought to graduate individuals broadly versed in critical stocks of knowledge, in the belief that this was a social good, which would ramify through both the economy and society and produce widespread benefits. The returns on a liberal arts education would appear only over the long haul, as accumulated wisdom and experience turns graduates into skilled, higher-paid analysts and actors.

But we should note the emergence of several contradictions arising from these arrangement and logics:

1. The flood of new students following World War II and the subsequent Baby Boom were primarily white and middle class while poor and minority students were largely excluded;
2. The value of a college degree as a necessary credential for white-collar employment rose even as blue-collar industries were beginning to succumb to foreign competition and offshoring, and the supply of college graduates began to outrun the demand; and
3. Economic growth led to rising costs of education even as recessions and tax revolts began to eat away at the base for public funding, and the search for new revenue sources, including student tuition, private donors and limited extramural research monies.

It is probably not a coincidence that the tax revolts (e.g., Proposition 13 in California) happened during an era of increasing diversity across the country, as growing numbers of older, white taxpayers began to ask why they should pay for the educations of low-income and minority students. When state governments no longer subsidized higher education, tuitions increased and even middle-class families found it difficult, if not impossible, to pay their children’s college bills.

The shift to privatization of public goods and services, with drastic cuts to social services and welfare, laid greater responsibilities on individuals to “pay their way.”
Higher education also came to be treated as a private good, even if delivered by public universities, benefiting individuals who would want to keep their future income rather than contribute to societies as a whole. The college degree became the building of individual “human capital,” which would provide future returns to individual wealth and wellbeing that would help to “grow the economy” (Newfield, 2018) and, not incidentally, provide donations to alma maters and others. Whether college graduates contribute to the common good in ways that cannot be monetized is not quantifiable and, hence, is excluded from public discussion.

Today, our society is obsessed with short-term returns on investment through speculative activities and universities are encouraged (even forced) to do likewise. A student thus borrows against future earnings to speculate in a disciplinary specialization that will, it is hoped, provide employment and make it possible to pay off those debts. A university encourages students to invest in specializations that will, it is hoped, also allow those students to become donors after they have paid off their debts. Every student becomes a center of capital accumulation, which can be tapped by the individual, the society and, yes, the old alma mater.

I (along with many others) have spoken about this change from public good to private interest in terms of the decline of the Keynesian welfare state to the libertarian market state. But in the United States, at least, the welfare state, such as it was, lasted only about 40 years, while the contemporary market state has a history of only about 35 years. To fully understand the change in institutional logics, from production to speculation, we need to look more deeply into the origins and history of higher education and the role it has played in the production and reproduction of society, economy and state. That means returning to the very origins of the university, as I did in in Chapter One.

IV. The role of higher education in society

In accounting for the political struggles in universities, and their articulation across higher education more broadly, we need to examine more closely the role of higher education in American society (a role that has diffused across the world since 1945). To fully understand this role, however, we must look at the history and political economy of higher education rather than deducing principles from contemporary conditions alone (as such analyses and critiques are normally done).

Over the past two centuries, higher education has served a number of social and political objectives involving reproduction of the existing social order through socialization of the young into its principles (ideology) and practices (vocation). College graduates are expected to engage in both, within reason, rather than trying to disrupt that order (e.g., defense chemist rather than bomb maker). As higher education has evolved over that period, it has also drawn on and reinforced class structure, through selective and restrictive admission policies and the types of scientific and vocational training offered (with the latter being replaced, after 1945, by cultural “training” in arts and humanities).
In the United States, and as written in the California Constitution, for example, the primary goal of the public university was to shape productive and patriotic citizens who would contribute to the well being of the Commonwealth. To repeat, the Morrill Land Grant Act, which set aside public tracts to be sold in support of public universities, articulated as its primary goal endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college [in each state] where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life (7 U.S. Code § 304).

Note the phrases “scientific and classical studies...including military tactics...[and] agriculture and the mechanic arts... to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes....” Who are these “industrial classes,” anyway? Certainly, they were not factory labor or agricultural workers or even small-scale business owners. Rather, they were the children of the upper middle classes (the wealthy went East)—the bourgeoisie—whose political and economic influence was waxing during the latter half of the 19th century.

There were, of course, other interests at stake here. The Morrill Act applied mostly to states with large amounts of federal public lands, which Washington, DC wanted to see more densely settled and managed by professionals. The western railroads relied on such settlement to provide them with travelers and shipping. Food production was less of an issue—even though land grant universities were expected to provide significant training in agriculture to farmers’ children—than was “developing” the wide-open spaces in the Lockean and Jeffersonian spirit.

Within California, its Constitution referred to the Morrill Act but failed to clearly articulate a specific mission for the new state university. As a result, the dual mission—liberal and practical education—became a point of contention between those educational and political leaders who aspired to the German research university model as a template and those industrial and agricultural spokespeople who believed that the University of California, should “prepare large numbers of young men for successful lives on the farm, in the factory, and in the pursuits of commerce” (Stadtman, 1970: 25). That point of contention remains alive today, as we shall see.

The German approach to higher education incorporated identification and implementation of new epistemologies, such as those in science and philosophy, that would contribute to state power as well as epistemic and material “revolutions” and new ways of explaining and doing the everyday and the exceptional. This goal is reflected in the various late-19th century discoveries and developments in physics, chemistry and medicine, in which German universities held premier positions. (This
eminence might also explain the disproportionate number of Jews who populated these and other scientific and intellectual fields. The class structure of the German states (and Austria) were quite well-established—except, perhaps, for the Jews, who were over-represented in urban trades and businesses—and higher education offered one path to upward social mobility.

For example, the atomic bomb was developed through a new scientific epistemology based on chemical and analytical approaches developed in Germany, which, in turn, created a new and different social epistemology (scientific) than the one that had shaped the American social order prior to the 20th century (religion and property). To be sure, this social epistemology was not widely accepted across the United States then or now, as evidenced in the Scopes Trial and continuing widespread rejection of evolution and other science-based issues.26

After World War II and the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, the dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence led to a transfer of power and influence from bankers and lawyers to scientists and engineers, and a shift in higher education away from the “social improvements” enumerated in the California Constitution to the exigencies of the “political struggle” between East and West, as described in NSC-68 and other national security documents (Gaddis, 1982). Science would win the struggle with World Communism, just as it had defeated Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

Moreover, the lure of Federal funding for defense-related projects—and almost anything could be framed in “defense-related” terms—deeply influenced both research and teaching (in the next chapter, I describe how Cold War anticommunism shaped the new mission for the University of California). The ideology of the struggle had a particular impact on the social sciences, whose practitioners sought to place on a quantitative and data-driven basis, which was favored over more qualitative research by federal funders (this has returned more recently in the form of “Big Data”).

Contrary to virtually all experts and expectations, the Cold War came to an abrupt end. And just like other American institutions, higher education was not prepared to pivot to a new mission. The end of the Cold War portended the larger cultural struggle today splitting the United States and other countries across the world—between national exceptionalism and a more liberal cosmopolitanism. The anticommunist mission served as something of a glue that overrode political, social and class differences, which dissolved with the so-called defeat of Communism. Where universities were contributors to the Cold War mission (as well as providers of loyal officer-rank cannon fodder), education alone could not provide a new or replacement mission, raising all kinds of questions about what college students were learning and what was it good for? Was college still meant to shape obedient citizens

26 This is not to suggest that Germany was, somehow, socially infused or shaped by science and its epistemology, as the history of that country between 1900 and 1945 makes all too clear.
or should it seek to create disruptive entrepreneurs? No one seemed to have very compelling answers to such questions.

V. Return to the logics of political economy

As suggested earlier, in both search and struggle, political economy has played a central role, (re)shaping both institutions and the broader social environment in which they exist, in production as well as education. If we return to the earlier “modes of production” model, colleges and universities such as Oxford and Cambridge, ran along “craft-based” and “apprenticeship” lines, which brought small numbers of student apprentices together with masters who taught them what was necessary to advance in one of the few then-available professions and occupations, e.g., law, clergy, education (?). But this model is a very costly one and only works well when the demand for graduates is low and there are barriers to early entry, often based on class and wealth. What worked for Oxbridge and the Ivies was not tenable for the large public research universities that began to emerge in the late 19th century (although it remains the model for much training and research of graduate students).

Consequently, since at least the early 20th century, public universities have been organized along what I earlier called Fordist-Keynesian lines, to teach, train and graduate large numbers of more-or-less similarly trained students (with, perhaps, “options” required by particular vocations and professions). Under this arrangement, every student would receive a common liberal arts foundation through a set of introductory courses (“general education”), followed by specialization in a major and discipline incorporating required skills and knowledge shared across that specific field. So long as this Fordist-Keynesian model was also dominant in large factories, corporations and law offices, university graduates could expect to find gainful middle-management employment. But something happened: a changing political economy also changed the dominant social order.

The financial and digital revolutions beginning in the 1970s were premised on promises of greater individual “freedom,” aided and abetted by rising neoliberal fervor and computational capacity, and growing public opposition to the “welfare state,” which some regarded as stealing from the respectable and giving to the disreputable. This led to a long-term shift of the social order from a Fordist-Keynesian collective logic to a libertarian market-based individualized logic and the “common sense” that society should not have to subsidize students, who could draw on their future human capital to pay for their present education.

Still, even as the social order around them was changing, universities lagged behind, secure in the belief that their contributions to the commonweal were as significant and important as ever and that state governments would never abandon them. Corporations could be downsized, subject to hostile takeovers, be broken up, or even go bankrupt, but public universities were never subject to pure market discipline and could continue Fordist-Keynesian educational strategies and practices. So long as
resources continued to flow (no state has been willing to completely disestablish their public universities, although a few have come perilously close), they were buffered from the storm. Since the 1990s, however, this buffering has been dangerously thin, forcing universities to come to terms with this new political economy.

The costs of operating a university and educating its students continue to rise at the same time that revenue growth is static or declining—why this is the case is less clear, but research does not entirely fund itself, faculty salaries increase, albeit slowly, costly administrative cadres get larger every year and students are offered new, costly amenities. Furthermore, as universities seek to enroll more students from low-income and under-represented minorities, they must provide some quantity of financial aid from those declining revenues to these new students, further reducing funds available for other purposes. Corporations can raise prices but, in California, at least, public universities are constrained politically from increasing tuition at a rate commensurate with the growth in costs, even as they are required to admit more in-state students with inadequate marginal funding. As operating and capital costs grow, and revenue flows fail to keep up, an organization begins to run a structural deficit. They have not done particularly well in the face of the “scissors” described in Chapter 1.

University students have no buffering under the newer educational logic: college graduates are exposed to an employment environment driven by market forces. Continuation of the Fordist-Keynesian model for undergraduates has led universities to inflate the supply of degrees and diplomas thereby undermining the stability and reliability of post-graduate employment in the face of uncertain demand. At the very same time, students and graduates are being told that they can expect to change jobs and fields as many as six times during their working lives, and that they might find their degree specializations rather unhelpful in their new jobs (hence the trend toward “lifelong education”—perhaps “capitalist re-education” is a better term).

Finally, given the new funding dispensation—paying for education through individual loans rather than state subsidies—students (and their parents and society) have become concerned about “value for the tuition dollar.” Society demands proof that universities are delivering appropriate value to their students as determined by various metrics and assessment methods that demonstrate the fulfillment of course “learning objectives.” The time and labor required to supply the data for these exercises diverts time and money from teaching and research to accountability (leaving less time and money for the former).^{28}

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^{27} Of course, the internal paradox or contradiction here is that one cannot enter upper-income job markets without a degree, even as more and more individuals possess a BA or BS. The Masters degree is the new Bachelor’s.

^{28} There is a further irony here in that no one is sure how to accurately measure such learning metrics. Student course evaluations are regarded as virtually useless, but most other assessment methods rely on student responses, as well. The kind of learning required in the “real world”—an ability to critically analyze situations and formulate responses and appropriate actions is not something that is or can be easily taught in the classroom, much less measured (??).
Universities respond in various ways to the scissors. Many have sought to adjust to the new market regime of scarce resources by devaluing undergraduate education, in particular, developing on-line curriculum, hiring casual instructors rather than tenure-track faculty, closing departments with low enrollments and large apparent “deficits,” and pushing curricula toward experiential learning, innovation and entrepreneurship. The last is being done on the theory that at least a few undergrads will rise to billionaire status and give to the old Alma Mater (and if not a billionaire, then a lot of well-off alumni).

The on-line model was, for a time, touted as the new way of reforming education, reducing the costs of in-person classes and tailored more closely to the worldviews and subjectivities of the smartphone generation. The University of Phoenix was a pioneering model for this (although derided as wholly inadequate it still hands out accredited degrees). Professional-level online classes are quite costly to produce and rarely generate a return commensurate with their costs. The big, online platforms such as Coursera have been able to mount classes that provide a significant return, but no university has yet agreed to accept such courses for credit toward degrees. As I have suggested earlier, the emergency shift to remote instruction as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 might well lead to the triumph of online education.

But to return to our story: Torn between the old Fordist model and the new market logic, with its lean and just-in-time tactics, universities have tried to adapt, maintaining the basic structures of mass production while providing students with greater specialization and more specialized training and skills. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of ever-more specialized and narrow degree programs that allow individual students to tailor their education to their desires (this is a problem, since most students do not really know their desires, and are often directed by parental expectations) and the market. Five biology-related departments, each with 200 majors, are much more costly to run than one biology department with 1,000 majors, but growing specialization demands five rather than one.29 Paradoxically, such particularistic majors lead to highly skilled individuals who lack the intellectual breadth or experience to operate outside of their narrow specialties or solve problems much more complex than those encountered in school (Hart Research Associates, 2013).

None of these matters absolve public universities of the task of satisfying various social goals, some of which are in direct opposition or even contradictory. Ideology, economics, domestic and international politics, at the level of both state and nation, have all had impacts on the internal environments of public universities. For the past 60 years, the range and number of social goals has proliferated, with a few dropping

29 By my count, UCSC has at least six biology-related departments—Environmental Studies (ENVS) Ecology and Evolutionary Biology (EEB); Molecular, Cell and Developmental Biology (MCD); Microbiology and Environmental Toxicology (ETOX); Chemistry and Biochemistry; and Biomolecular Engineering—offering at least ten biology-related degrees. Other universities probably offer many more.
off the list and new ones being added regularly. Many attribute this to the “1960s” and the various student movements that emerged during that decade and the subsequent one to challenge the authority and organization of universities, and which were often met by resistance and repression from administrators, public officials and police forces. But it is not really correct to think that these movements were the cause of power struggles within universities, even if many began there. As suggested above, they were more in the way of early symptoms of the winding down of Fordist-Keynesian logic and the rise of high individualism linked to market libertarian logic.  

As one example of the impact of outside forces on universities, consider the emerging social objective of racial diversity, which came to be reflected in higher education, among other social sites. The notion that a college degree would open the path to white-collar, well-paid jobs was not a new one, but it went well with the idea that upwardly mobile, minority *individuals* would benefit their racial colleagues as a whole (along the line of “a rising [economic] tide lifts all boats”). Pursuing W.E.B. DuBois’ notion of the “talented tenth,” affirmative action was devised to identify minority students who could qualify for admission to elite public and private campuses without disturbing the status quo.

Given the impacts of race, income, family history and high school quality and the reliability of indicators (such as the SAT) of educational achievement on students’ performance (aka, “merit”), it is highly likely that admitting applicants solely on the basis of performance would tilt the table toward high-achieving white (and more recently, Asian-American) students. Even though affirmative action never increased the number of minority students at such universities more than a few percent, it came to be seen as an unfair advantage for minorities, even leading to charges of “discrimination” against equally qualified white applicants (that equally qualified white students might be competing with each other for admission seems not to have been noticed). Both the Federal Government and many states have passed laws forbidding such “affirmative action” and there are many groups and organizations in the United States who judge any attempt to pursue diversity in a student body on the basis of any group characteristic as evidence of bias against “more qualified” *individuals*.

In an effort to avoid appearances of such bias and head off lawsuits by aggrieved individuals, university admissions offices have developed a range of techniques and

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30 Even the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley was motivated, in part, by rising individualism. As Stewart Brand (1968: 3), wrote in the first edition of the *Whole Earth Catalog*: “We are as gods and might as well get used to it. So far, remotely done power and glory—as via government, big business, formal education, church—has succeeded to the point where gross [sic] obscure actual gains. In response to this dilemma and to these gains a realm of intimate, personal power is developing—power of the individual to conduct his own education, find his own inspiration, shape his own environment, and share his adventure with whoever is interested” (emphasis in original).

31 In 2018, Harvard was sued by Asian-American applicants (Hartocollis, 2018a, 2018b) and audited by the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education for supposed admissions bias against those Asian-Americans who would be admitted if educational achievement were the only criterion considered in
tools to designed to assess applicants on a “holistic” basis by incorporating life circumstances, income and high school quality, and not just grades, exams and extramural activities. This has not, for the most part, had the desired effect of increasing diversity, at least not in a balanced way. Many students arrive at college poorly prepared for the demands and rigor of college-level courses—due, in part, to lower quality high school education. Often these individuals, determined to succeed in a science or engineering field, are unable to qualify, and shift to the social sciences and the humanities. This subjects universities to charges that they are not doing enough to ensure student success of these students, even as they are being berated for giving special consideration to minority applicants.

The rising cost of a college education also stands in the way of this social goal, although this obstacle is not purely a consequence of family incomes. The University of California claims that no student, whatever their family income, is denied the opportunity to attend college, and that the university provides financial aid to qualifying low-income students (who are significantly from underrepresented groups). On its face, “financial aid” sounds like “scholarship,” but the reality is much less. The university does redistribute some of its income from tuition in order to provide some support for low-income and minority students, but student loans, work-study and outside employment as well as family contributions are all part of “financial aid.” What’s more, such assistance does not cover the cost of food and housing, which must come from family, work or loans. It’s not only the difficulties in the classroom that discriminate.

Can such contradictions be resolved? One way would be for state governments to step back in and restore lost funding to public universities, but this is not likely to happen. During his second tenure as California’s Governor, Jerry Brown argued that degrees could be completed in three years, rather than four, which would mean lower costs for everyone and higher throughput of students. He went so far as to foster the creation of “CalBright,” an “online” California Community College (St. Amour, 2020), whose success is in doubt. Some argue that college is vastly over-rated and unnecessary (Worthen, 2019), while others propose getting rid of tenure in order to reduce costs and teach more students (these focus largely on production and a Fordist logic—reduce the cost of college and everyone can afford to go). It is important to remember that institutions, like supertankers, cannot be turned on a dime. Indeed, it is not even clear they can really be “turned.”

At this moment, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Great Shutdown, likely to be followed by the Greater Depression, there are many pundits and scholars writing about the future and failure of capitalism and its supporting institutions. There are many others who expect this will pass and life will return to “normal” at some point in the relatively near future. There is a considerable chance that this crisis will have transformative effects on higher education, especially public

admission decisions. The plaintiffs lost their case in federal district court but are appealing (Hartocollis, 2020).
universities, rather like the change in global politics and diplomacy as a consequence of the atomic bomb.

In particular, a massive shift to remote education may result from the decision by most universities and colleges to partially or fully close their campuses and move teaching to the internet. Both universities and students argue that remote education is no substitute for the physical experience of college, on the one hand, but the opportunity to teach from home and avoid long commutes might endear this new dispensation to many instructors. On the other hand, the opportunity to get many students to stay at home means less pressure to increase physical enrollments on campus and construct new buildings, classrooms, labs and offices to accommodate growing numbers of students. If remote instruction were to continue into the 2020-21 academic year, higher education could be greatly transformed.

VI. Is there really a crisis of higher education?

We return to the question: is there really a crisis of higher education? Or is higher education caught up in a broader crisis of political economy? And, if either, how might they play out over the coming years? What I have written above suggests it is the latter which is the cause of the former. That is, internalizing the logic of society as a whole in the institution of higher education is not merely a matter of changing the means and content of production, whether it is cars or calculus. A change in logic also requires a change in the ways a society’s political economy is structured, along with commensurate changes in discourse, subjectivities, practices and social relationships (this should not be construed as an argument about substructure determining superstructure).

To explain this proposition, let me return to the case of baseball as an institution composed of individual organizations plus everything else that makes it baseball. In baseball, there are two sorts of rules: constitutional and regulatory. Constitutional rules define the structure of the game—baseballs, bats, diamonds, pitchers, batters, strike zones, etc.—that distinguish the game from, say, cricket or American football. Regulatory rules define the means of accumulating points while playing the game, that is, what the players can and must do to score runs (and, of course, there are umpires who adjudicate in the event of unclear actions). If there is a “crisis” in baseball—say, too few runs are being scored—the rulers of the game can make constitutional changes—e.g., the designated hitter—which may have regulatory impacts—the DH hits more balls and scores more runs.

In the broader political economy, the same thing applies to institutions and practices. Constitutional rules define the shape of the economy, and there is constant political struggle to define that shape. Regulatory rules define how to “score” in the economy while being constrained by the constitutional rules. The latter are subject to frequent change in response to changes in the former. Thus, direct theft is unconstitutional, while unfairly extracting capital through redefinition of property rights is not, being a legal form of theft. Changes in the governing logic of the
political economy are reshaped—not defined—as constitutional contradictions are worked out (e.g., the change from Keynesian to libertarian logics discussed earlier in this chapter).

This change is reflected in what is called “deregulation,” which is supposed to free capitalists from certain types of state regulation that impose costs and limit profits. In fact, “deregulation” takes place at the constitutional level and actually involves replacement of some constitutional regulations by others that redefine the structure of the “game.” If an interest group (or even individual corporation) can define the structure of the game to their advantage, the game is fixed and competitors will lose and go out of business. There is much more to this, of course, but I will not discuss this point further.

To further develop the synecdoche offered here, remember that “higher education” is an institution operating within the broader political economy. For much of the 20th century, public universities were understood to be a public good to be funded by the state, without much attention to the actual costs and benefits of their operation. For the many reasons I have addressed in this book, universities have become subject to both logic and constitutional rules of a libertarian political economy, that is, cost-benefit in terms of monetized inputs and outputs. The mass production, liberal arts constitutions of the 1950s and 1960s did not fit with this new constitution and subjected them to changes in “scoring” they were unable to adapt to. I am not arguing here that liberal arts are useless in an era of STEM and student debt only that this is the logic to which public higher education has become subject. (Let’s face it: like the military, the public university remains one of the great socialist institutions of the United States, and socialism is anathema.)

If, in a knowledge-based economy, the social mission of higher education is the transfer of remunerative STEM skills to young adults so that they can find high-paying jobs after graduation, then it is not at all clear that four-year universities are the appropriate means. If, however, the social mission is to help young adults learn to think critically, analyze deeply and develop solutions for complex problems, perhaps public universities are one—but not the only—way to achieve these ends. Certainly, higher education should not be expected to resolve the contradictions that have appeared in society and political economy as governing logics have changed.

In all of this, it pays to recall that higher education is a social institution and, as such, plays a role in the production and reproduction of society through teaching the young “truths” about history, the world and all that. In doing this, it also plays a role in sustaining social, cultural and political hegemony of the nation-state. It is a convenient fiction to define knowledge and knowledge production as purely apolitical endeavors: who is supported, funded and rewarded is based on “merit” and returns to research and teaching within the permitted boundaries of that hegemony (the university is not a democracy!). Dissent can be tolerated in moderation; anything more cannot.
When hegemony begins to break down, as it has in many places around the world, social institutions—economy, religion, education, culture—become battlegrounds between opposing forces (sometimes literally, as seen, for example, in Hong Kong where British colonial and Chinese authoritarian hegemonies engaged in deadly struggle on university campuses in 2019). As Antonio Gramsci noted, old hegemonies do not quietly go away while new ones struggle to be born. In such situations, higher education struggles to appear “neutral” and apolitical, but, to the extent that they are expected shape the subjectivities and worldviews of those young adults who will mature into governing elites, it is a losing effort.

STEM is merely a type of “sub-politics” in this struggle, because it seems to foster knowledge-based skills as apolitical. Yet, ultimately, the shift to emphasis on STEM has real political consequences. By valorizing such knowledge in terms of post-graduate income and national competition, a particular type of mindset is embedded in STEM graduates, who choose markets over politics and individualism over social solidarity. This is the crisis in higher education.

III. Reconsidering the crisis of higher education

In the first part of this book, I have asked whether there is really a “crisis” of higher education in the United States and around the world. The Oxford English Dictionary Online defines crisis as:

*transferred and figurative.* A vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a turning-point; also, a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse is imminent; now applied esp. to times of difficulty, insecurity, and suspense in politics or commerce.

It also provides a timelier and perhaps more apropos definition:

*Pathology.* The point in the progress of a disease when an important development or change takes place which is decisive of recovery or death; the turning-point of a disease for better or worse; also applied to any marked or sudden variation occurring in the progress of a disease and to the phenomena accompanying it.

In various discussions of higher education, both senses of the term have been mobilized, although neither says very much about why a crisis occurs. I argue that the crisis—if, indeed, there is one—has more to do with political economy than discontinuous changes in organizational structures and functions and the environments in which they exist and operate. To fully explore this argument, we need to return to the notion of institutions and their social role.

32 The actual quote is “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci, 1999: 556)).
There is no such thing as a “new” institution; all are drawn from earlier forms of social structure and social relations and emerge to address a new or changing aspect or crisis of social production and reproduction. Long-lived institutions, such as the Catholic Church, with its millennia of existence, have tried to adapt internally to changing external conditions and crises such as the Reformation and modernization, albeit not always successfully. It is relatively easy, moreover, to see how the Church of today has descended from that of Saint Augustine’s era and changed, but today’s Church is almost certainly nothing like that earlier institution. Change has often come not as a result of specific decisions but in the wake of struggle, war, economic dislocations and often a great deal of death.

Universities as they exist today have such a history—indeed, for many centuries they were closely wedded to the religious institutions of the time—and their structures and organization have changed with the times in order to sustain their roles in social production and reproduction. Change is not easy and it is often not clear what internal changes might allow the university to continue in this role. When external conditions change, reform and restructuring become very difficult—universities are, by their nature, conservative organizations, seeking new, and sometimes disruptive, knowledge and practices, but never intending to destroy the ontology on which they rest. The problem is that the foundational ontology of universities has been, and is being, destroyed in ways that, like the COVID-19 pandemic, could have been predicted, but probably not prevented or even prepared for.

My explanation rests on two points: the rise of scientific reductionism as a foundational method of analysis, and a commensurate cognitive shift from the wellbeing of the social whole to that of the individual. These cannot be separated from each other, either in historical or ontological terms, and have been the focus of intense struggle since at least the 17th century, if not earlier. During the past couple of centuries, scientific reductionism—the philosophy that the whole is the sum of its parts—has been driven by technology and metricization (the counting of things as opposed to things that count). The cognitive change emerges from the Protestant Reformation and the principle that the individual relationship with God trumps the congregational relationship mediated by the priest. The struggle between these two worldviews—if that is what they can be called—has played itself out in many aspects of Western history and society and has come to colonize the world as a whole.

Over the 20th century, one arena of this struggle has been reflected symptomatically in the shift from Keynesian mass production logic, oriented around the commonwealth, to market logic, oriented around the individual. In keeping with arguments about social structures, relations and practices made in Chapter, I do not

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33 There are, nevertheless, those who would wish to see the Church returned to its earlier forms, practices and purposes as a means of (re)shaping humanity to their ideals. The same is true of all fundamentalists and originalists, whatever the institution.

34 This argument would require at least one, and probably several, additional books to explore. One place to begin an exploration is *Leviathan and the Air-Pump* (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985).
want to get bogged down in discussing why this change has taken place and whether it is “natural” or “engineered” (I could blame capitalism, of course, but I don’t want to go down that particular path). It is impossible to argue, however, that there has not been an epistemological shift in how we, as humans, understand and exist in life, communities and the world, from something like the whole to the atomized individual. This is not meant to idealize the whole, only to point out that shift.

To the extent, then, that the ontology of higher education is based on the proposition that knowledge is a good created, over time, by the social body and constitutes a commons from which everyone can draw, it stands in contradiction to that ontology of the heroic individual creator who produces new knowledge, goods and practices ex nihilo. If it is the latter who generates wealth and benefits to be redistributed out of that hero’s search for tax cuts, any notions of a wider education rooted in social creativity and generosity is lost. Each individual student must receive an individually tailored education, which the collectivist, mass-production method cannot provide.

This challenge is also why online and digitized education and learning have come to be seen as the savior of higher education. There is no need for costly campuses and faculty, the student need pay only for what they want, and all that counts is the student’s direct relationship with learning platforms (no priests needed as intermediaries). It is not a pretty picture for the future of academics and the academy.

VII. Some conclusions

I have not, in this chapter, offered any solutions to the so-called “crisis in higher education.” My argument is that there is no “crisis,” as such, but rather that there are challenges in choosing between competing hegemonies and that there is a difficulty in adapting social institutions operating under one societal logic to a new one. “Privatization” of public institutions and organizations around the world has led to similar conditions and outcomes, and many have not made a smooth or successful transition. As a loosely coupled organization, the university has a particularly difficult time inculcating this new logic in its faculty and staff, most of whom were not hired to assist in privatization and few of whom have the entrepreneurial experience or skills to function in the new educational “market.”

That there is no crisis as such does not mean that higher education and universities are not confronted by fundamental contradictions that will not be easily resolved. The incipient “Greater Depression” looming after the “end” of the pandemic means not only that public funding will further decline, but also that large numbers of students may disenroll from more expensive universities and college, further reducing organizational income and exacerbating the growing gap between resources and needs. Finally, while the decline in stock and securities markets have probably not hit billionaires too badly, it will almost certainly lead to reductions in private donations, as donors recalculate their ability to provide gifts. Many of these matters
will reappear in Part II of this book, which turns to the University of California in general and the specific case of UC Santa Cruz.
Part II

Fiat Lux, Fiat Tenebris
Chapter 5

The University of California: Institution and Organization

Fiat Lux: Let there be light [Motto of the University of California]

I. Introduction

In the framework of analysis developed in the first part of this book, the University of California system is an organizational expression of what I have called the institution of higher education. Within the state of California, the UC system is also an institution manifest in the UC Office of the President (UCOP) in Oakland, and the ten UC campuses scattered (with purpose) around the state. In this chapter, I describe University of California system as both institution and organization while, in subsequent chapters, I will do the same, in greater detail, for UC Santa Cruz.

This is necessarily an incomplete account of UC, and it is syncretic, rather than theoretically or empirically pure in relation to a set of hypotheses, because I aim to tell a story rather than propose some kind of “scientific” analysis or explanation. The rather lengthy, complex and interconnected list of “factors” that appear in Chapters One and Two makes difficult the task of trying to account for specific outcomes, with any great precision or certainty. What happens at one moment in time or space might not seem to matter very much at a later time and space, although historical factors continue to have effects long after the fact.

As the governing logic and mission of an organization change over time, the parts of the organization are expected to change and adapt. In a loosely coupled organization such as a university, consisting of many semi-autonomous parts and functions, it takes time for these changes to percolate downwards, in the form of memos and diktats communicating newly written down rules, relationships and practices (as well as the obsolescence of their predecessors). Because these changes only become embedded in the organization as individual agents and units accept them, percolation can take time, especially where governing logics are concerned.

The UC system and its campuses are no different in this respect. Each campus has a certain degree of autonomy in deciding on mechanisms and procedures dealing with certain functions, but all must hew to a shared set of standards and goals. In other words, the constitution of UC is established at the system level but there is some discretion in terms of regulation (or “playing the game”) at the campus level. Later in this book, I will tell the tale of a wildcat teaching assistant strike at UCSC, an unusual case in which the tail tries to wag the dog.
II. History and organization

The first campus of the University of California was located in Oakland and subsequently moved to its present site in Berkeley. The second campus opened in 1919, when Los Angeles State Normal School was transferred to the UC Board of Regents and designated the “Southern Branch of the University [of California],” being renamed “The University of California at Los Angeles” in 1929 (Stadtman, 1970: 225-27). The UC “system” itself only came into existence in 1952; prior to that, UC had been run as “one university,” with a Chancellor over the whole and Vice Chancellors on the individual campuses. The new arrangement was composed of a system president with Chancellors on the campuses. Robert Gordon Sproul presided over the Northern and Southern Divisions of UC from 1930 to 1952, and the entire UC system until 1957. Clark Kerr, the “first” Chancellor of UC Berkeley after the founding of the UC System, succeeded Sproul as UC President in 1958. There have been nine UC presidents since Kerr, all white males until the current one, Janet Napolitano, took office (and she is stepping down in June, 2020). Kerr was and is important in this genealogy because of his outsized influence on UC in an environment of rapid expansion of higher education. He also played a central role in the design and creation of UCSC, ostensibly fulfilling a vision of a liberal arts college within a research university, a model that failed when tried at UC-Berkeley.

Kerr’s seminal achievement as UC President was, probably, the California Master Plan for Higher Education (1960), of which he was “chief architect and shepherd” (Rothblatt, 2012: ix). According to Rothblatt (id.)

The plan developed new guidelines for the University of California system, for the normal schools and colleges which subsequently became the California State University system and the state’s community colleges. Its reorganization resolved much of the competition between schools and led to expanded educational resources in a public higher-education system known for excellence, accessibility and relative affordability.

The plan also instantiated a higher education class system. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the community colleges, largely regarded as vocational organizations offering two-year degrees to those in the working class and lower income brackets who needed to acquire specific technical skills (e.g., electrician, plumber, nurse) or a credential for employment. Above the community colleges was the California State University System was next, which offered Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees to commuting and already-employed students (and which has struggled for the right to offer PhD programs). Finally, on top of the pile was the University of California, which took only the “cream of the crop” from the almost all-white middle classes and elites of the state. UC was also the only system permitted to offer PhD programs.

Technically, the Master Plan remains in effect six decades later, although many think it is badly outdated and in need of radical, albeit a highly unlikely revision. It is clear that there is no one individual, organization or group who could, as Kerr did, bring together the various factions and interests from the three systems, the state and the
public to undertake a new master plan. More to the point, and for a variety of reasons related to the cost of education and time to degree, the distribution of responsibilities among the three systems has been changing.

Today, there are 10 UC, 23 California State and 114 community college campuses, enrolling almost three million students. More and more students transfer to UC campuses after two years at community college: in 2018, about 46,700 new students and 21,000 community college transfers. And due to the decline of the California public education system, and the reputations of different campuses, the UC system has become, in effect a three-tiered one: Berkeley, UCLA and San Diego at the top; Davis, Irvine and Santa Barbara in the middle; and Riverside, Santa Cruz and Merced at the bottom (UC San Francisco is a medical school and does not admit undergraduates).

Decentralization of the system took place under the banner of “One University,” a concept created by Sproul in the 1930s as a way of preventing UC from splitting into two separate universities (Palfrey, 2016). Sproul, however, was an advocate of centralization; Kerr of the opposite. After 1958, the premises of One University were that a large and decentralized system of campuses, which share the same mission but differ in size, interests, aspirations, and stage of development, can nevertheless be governed as a single university, with a chancellor responsible for each campus and a president responsible for the university as a whole. It operates through a constantly shifting balance of centralization and decentralization, combining (with varying degrees of success) authority at the center with considerable independence on the campuses (Palfrey, 2016: 2).

From the perspective of the UC Academic Senate (Powell, et al, 2013: 8), “One University” means that

no campus is the flagship, a common set of standards for faculty promotion and tenure..., salary scales that reward faculty progress throughout their careers, common admission standards that establish a floor for each campus, and the system of shared governance.... In sum, the University of California is comprised of ten campuses with exactly the same aspirations, at different stages of evolution (emphasis in original).35

The reality of “One University” is somewhat different. Under Kerr’s plan, individual campuses were left to develop their own structures and procedures, and these came to differ significantly in some respects from one campus to another. In particular, the flagship campuses—Berkeley and UCLA (and later San Diego)—had better resources than the rest, a differential that has only grown over time. When, during the 2000s and 2010s, the Office of the President began a process of recentralization of some

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35 This last sentence is somewhat reminiscent of the sentiment expressed in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions.” No agreement has ever been reached on what this means in practice.
processes and functions, reconciling the bureaucratic and procedural differences among campuses provide to be quite problematic.

Robert Sinsheimer, the fourth Chancellor of UC Santa Cruz, who came to the campus from Cal Tech, a much smaller, private institution, was surprised by the complexity of the system. As he relates in his oral history (Sinsheimer, 1996: 77), UC is a huge enterprise...A big bureaucracy.... I was unprepared for the extent of this and the fact that, I would say a quarter of my time was consumed with systemwide, the rest of the system. I didn’t realize how much time it was going to take. There were chancellors meetings, regents meetings, systemwide committee meetings.... The way the system works...is that budget proposals, policy proposals, whatever, originate at the top. But the actual proposal originates at a third level or a second level and works its way up to the top.

This complex and baroque organizational structure (part of which appears in Figure 5.1) is composed of as many as 6 to 8 levels of bureaucracy between the State and the individual on a particular campus, depending on the issue involved. Policies and proposals often go back and forth multiple times, may be commented on by individual campuses and the Systemwide Academic Senate, and take months, if not years, to be put into effect. Often, such documents must also undergo review and approval by the Board of Regents. And both the governor and state legislature of California are often not shy about intervening, as well.

Figure 4.1: University of California Organizational Chart

Source: UCOP, 2017b.
The result is more akin to a (con)federation than a unitary republic, with larger campuses agitating for greater autonomy and smaller ones worrying they might be left to fend for themselves. Those demands and fears have been exacerbated by changes in the way resources are distributed to individual campuses:

Under reforms adopted in 2008 and 2011, intended to give campuses more flexibility and to bring more transparency to the allocation process, each campus is returned the revenues it generates—among them indirect costs related to research, patent revenue, and tuition. State money is now distributed on the basis of a weighted formula intended to create equal support per student across the system. The president still retains the ability to set aside funds from the State budget for systemwide initiatives or special purposes before the campus allocations are made. But the magnitude of this transfer of budgetary control from the center to campuses exceeds anything contemplated under the one-university idea (Palfrey, 2016: 5).

Each campus is notionally governed by a Chancellor, who is appointed, through a closed hiring process, by the UC Board of Regents. The authority and power of the Chancellor are defined by the UC Office of the President and various bylaws and regulations and is also negotiated informally with the Academic Senate of each campus as a new appointee learns the ropes. Some Chancellors are more able to assert their authority; others find it more difficult to do so and a few are sometimes even “fired” by the Board of Regents or the UC President.

The concept and practices of “shared governance,” discussed earlier in this book, at both the campus and system levels, complicate the game of university governance considerably. Given the relative autonomy of each campus, a chancellor can make a decision or institute a new nonacademic policy or program without consulting the faculty, although this is often not the wisest thing to do. Faculty can review and advise on budgets and allocations, but only the Administration can actually distribute or withhold financial resources. Ultimately, moreover, although subject to faculty review and recommendation the Administration has final say over hires, promotions, firings and human-resources policies.

What about the Academic Senate (those bodies that represent ladder-rank faculty)? According to Standing Order 105.2b of the UC Board of Regents (1971), “duties, Powers, and Privileges of the Academic Senate”

The Academic Senate shall authorize and supervise all courses and curricula offered under the sole or joint jurisdiction of the departments, colleges, schools, graduate divisions, or other University academic agencies approved by the Board, except that the Senate shall have no authority over courses in the Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco Art Institute, in professional schools offering work at the graduate level only, or over non-degree courses in the University Extension. No change in the curriculum of a college or professional school shall be made by the Academic Senate until such change shall have been submitted to the formal consideration of the faculty concerned.
Even this is not a wholly free hand. The same standing order (105.2a) also says

The Academic Senate, subject to the approval of the Board, shall determine the conditions for admission, for certificates, and for degrees other than honorary degrees. It shall recommend to the President all candidates for degrees in course and shall be consulted through committees appointed in such manner as the President may determine in connection with the award of all honorary degrees (emphasis added).

Staff, instructors and students are at the bottom of this heap. They may be consulted on matters relevant to them but their plenary authority is non-existent. Some fraction of the staff, along with all instructors and teaching assistants36 are represented by unions that periodically bargain with UCOP over contracts dealing with wages, benefits and what is permitted and prohibited, but they are otherwise voiceless. The UC student body has a voting member on the Board of Regents, who is badly outnumbered by the other 17 appointed and seven ex-officio members. Various student advisory boards to the UC system “provide input to the university” (Tam, 2018), but these have no plenary authority.

Some UC presidents, such as Kerr, have been activists; others (e.g., Charles Hitch) have been content with business as usual. The current President of UC, Janet Napolitano, has attempted some disruption, committing the University to be “carbon neutral” by 2025, establishing a “Global Food Initiative” that appears to be designed to encourage food-related research, education and service by new and existing groups and units across the system and, in response to debates over free speech on university campuses, creating the “UC National Center for Free Speech and Civic Engagement” (which appears to be more of a public relations ploy than a research or policy center). Napolitano provided some quantities of funding to these, and other initiatives, in the expectation that, after an initial seed period, new systemwide and campus-based projects could become largely self-funding through grants and donations.

At the end of the day, however, these are hardly earthshaking initiatives even if they do engage some number of faculty, staff and students across the system. Faculty who are already engaged in these issues tend to have well-developed research programs and may be disinclined to get involved in another bureaucracy-bound project. Faculty who are not doing work on these issues have a steep learning curve. Because a great deal of seed funding is directed toward support of graduate students, they may benefit most, especially if they get involved at an early stage.

Today, it seems safe to say, the most important individual in the UC system is not part of UC at all: the Governor of California. S/he is an ex officio member of the Board of Regents, but this is now where power and authority lie. The Governor

36 Under University policy, teaching assistants are graduate student employees subject to the administrative authority of a campus and UCOP, as distinguished from their role as graduate students, without contractual rights and subject to all of the rules and regulations relevant to them.
exercises the greatest (and most disruptive) agency in terms of the state budget, deciding how much (and how much more) of the state’s general fund should be allocated annually to higher education. During Jerry Brown’s second stint in office, the UC President routinely found it necessary to negotiate with him over levels and conditions of state support for the coming fiscal year. Those were then incorporated into the budget sent to the Legislature for approval. Levels of funding could also be modified during the year in response to new demands and exigencies. It is ironic, perhaps, that Brown’s demands on UC were largely political ones—limited tuition hikes, increases in in-state admissions, more accountability to the public—even as state support per student decreased.

California’s current governor, Gavin Newsom, seemed much more favorably disposed toward UC and higher education in general. His May, 2019 budget revision actually added about $47.6 million to the January budget inherited from Jerry Brown (Newsom, 2019) and the budget for 2020-21 included $217.7 million more for UC (Katewa, 2020), less than half what the University requested. The economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic is wreaking havoc on the state's budget, leading to a reduction of at least $360 million for 2021-22 (and probably more).

III. Mission & Vision of UC

As noted in Chapter 1, the existence and articulation of “mission” and “vision” serve two different purposes, informing what a University offers, to whom and how, as well as the pursuit of goals and objectives enumerated in both. Over time, both missions and visions change in response to the external environment and governing logics. In the case of the University of California, it is difficult to find a clearly articulated vision statement that lays out concrete objectives in the future? The best place to find these are in academic plans and (today) on official UC web sites. For example, the UC Academic Plan for 1965-1975 (UCOP, 1965: 1) offered a general mission statement for higher education writ large and deeply influenced by Cold War ideology:

Universities today play a vital role in the preservation of free societies. They are the principal centers for the discovery and publication of new ideas; they preserve the heritage of the past for future generations; they maintain precious freedoms to explore all points of view; they instruct the young and the mature alike in the most fundamental conceptions and advanced skills known to our civilization. Increasingly, their contributions are being recognized as basic to the vitality of our culture, the prosperity of free economies, and the very survival of freedom.

The following combination of mission and vision appeared in the same plan (p. 55):

The place of the university in society is itself changing in fundamental ways. Once among the most isolated of social institutions, it is being drawn inevitably into a more intense and intimate relation with the society it serves. This is
more than a matter of the degree to which new knowledge through research is necessary for economic progress. It is more than a matter of the astonishing numbers of persons who must be educated to higher levels for the occupations and leisure activities of an increasingly automated industrial economy. The university must meet these challenges and more: It must educate not only the specialist who advances knowledge or provides high expertise, but the generalist who can see the complex interrelations among our specialties and the fundamental continuities in human activity....

Among the most significant effects of recent change is the new greater responsibility of universities for those who provide the specialized services upon which our security, economic abundance, and personal well-being depend. New professional services of many kinds are increasingly demanded today, and the universities are asked to supply them in many cases. Established professions such as law, medicine, and engineering rely more each year on specialized, technical knowledge for their quality; the importance of advanced professional training in the universities is increased concomitantly. As science produces rapid changes in our present knowledge, these professionals can no longer work for a lifetime without refreshing their training through additional university-based study...

This is a broad, liberal arts mission and vision (articulated, if not written, by Clark Kerr) that has since largely disappeared, although even here a slippage toward a more profession-oriented mission is evident.

The most recent explicit mission statement, which is archived on the UCOP web site, comes from the “UC Academic Plan for 1974-1978” (p. 5; there is no more recent academic plan available:

The distinctive mission of the University is to serve society as a center of higher learning, providing long-term societal benefits through transmitting advanced knowledge, discovering new knowledge, and functioning as an active working repository of organized knowledge. That obligation, more specifically, includes undergraduate education, graduate and professional education, research, and other kinds of public service, which are shaped and bounded by the central pervasive mission of discovering and advancing knowledge.

Note that there is no mention of “generalists” or “civic needs” or “obligations.”

A budget document for 2009-10 (UCOP 2009: 16) includes offers this “Vision Statement for the University of California Established by the Long Range Guidance Team”:

Drawing upon the power and promise of its ten campuses, The University of California of 2025 will be:

- Research intensive, with a marked increase in the multidisciplinary, cross-disciplinary, inter-campus, and global nature of our efforts.
• **Student centered** in ways that better leverage the depth, breadth, and diversity of our faculty’s expertise systemwide. UC will leverage unparalleled experimental and research facilities, libraries, research data, and other tools that foster scholarly collaboration on a worldwide scale to create distinctive educational experiences for our students.

• **Responsive to and reflective of California** and its increasingly diverse population, and will be broadly engaged in a myriad of ways with the people, businesses, governments, and the environmental, social, and health-care services of California and the global communities of which they are part. Our campuses will continue to develop as vital cultural centers serving the regions where they are located with the highest-quality programming in the performing and visual arts, and in adult, continuing, and professional education.

By the time of the 2018-19 budget report (UCOP 2018: 39), goals had been reduced to brief bullet points, describing not vision or mission, but function:

• **UC educates the workforce** demanded by high technology, business, agriculture, entertainment, health care, education, and other sectors of the economy.

• **UC conducts research that fuels the State’s economy**, creates jobs, increases productivity, and solves state and societal problems, leading to higher standards of living.

• **UC is a key source of innovation and entrepreneurs**, which are essential to the industries that drive California’s competitiveness.

• **UC improves the health of Californians** by providing an unmatched combination of state-of-the-art patient care facilities and groundbreaking research programs, which are integrated with the nation’s largest medical education program.

• **UC collaborates with K-12 schools** to improve the quality of instruction and expand educational opportunities.

• **UC offers public venues for cultural opportunities**, with dozens of museums, concert halls, art galleries, botanical gardens, observatories, and marine centers that serve as academic resources as well as exciting spaces for broader the community.

This last set of objectives clearly reflects clearly the shift from a mass production to a market-based institutional logic and a primary concern with the institution’s role in the economy.

The social contexts of these statements are quite different, and each reflects a broader “logic” of the time in which they were composed. The California Constitution prioritizes skills as knowledge, while the 1974-78 text emphasizes the acquisition of “advanced knowledge” as a valuable good to be provided to society. The Constitution and the 1965-75 versions both mention notions of freedom and liberty, with the latter clearly a product of the Cold War. Such terms are missing
from the 1974-78 text—because of Détente?—whose mission statement is functional rather than aspirational or visionary. The more recent mission statement encompasses a well-developed system of campuses shaped by a real university so that, in effect, they rationalize what is already there. But we should not ignore the tone of the last two, which seek to justify UC as a “good public investment.” And this connects directly to the problem of funding, to which we shall return, below.

IV. Demographics and the “New” Campuses

During the mid-1960s, three new UC campuses began operation: San Diego, Irvine and Santa Cruz. All three were sited in areas with a white majority population (on which more below). UC was established by the California Legislature to serve a decidedly white population (Table 5.1; those of Mexican descent were not counted as such until 1970), whose composition did not change appreciably until World War Two, when African-Americans migrated from the South to work in the West Coast’s defense industry. Today, of course, the demography of California is quite different from a century ago, but the response to that change only became normative in higher education during the 1970s and after.

Table 5.1: California census data, 1870-1960 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1870</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>3,427</td>
<td>5,677</td>
<td>6,907</td>
<td>10,586</td>
<td>15,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White*</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>1,402</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>5,408</td>
<td>6,587</td>
<td>9,915</td>
<td>14,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian &amp; Pacific**</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>168.7</td>
<td>167.6</td>
<td>183.7</td>
<td>318.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What was the rationale for the new campuses? Within a few years of the end of World War Two, concerns were raised about the ability of California’s higher education system (junior colleges, state colleges, UC and private institutions) to accommodate what was anticipated to be a rapidly growing number of eligible applicants, due to the GI bill, Baby Boom and inward migration. In 1947, California Assembly Bill No. 2273 expressed this concern by declaring the need for “an urgency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety…. [through] increased facilities for publicly supported higher education” (cited in Deutsch, Douglass & Strayer, 1948: 2).

A similarly urgent sense was expressed in several more surveys and studies throughout the 1950s. A “Restudy of the Needs of California in Higher Education” (Holy, Semans & McConnell, 1955: 7-8; actually, an extension of the 1948 study) proposed that
Basic to all other problems of higher education in California is the vast potential increase in college and university attendance during the next decade. This “rising tide,” as it has been called, is the product of such factors as increased birth rate, in-migration, improvement in public health, a general rise in the standard of living, and the demands of a more complicated economy for an increased number of persons with more than high-school education.

“A Study of the Need for Additional Centers of Public Higher Education in California” (Holy & Semans, 1957) appeared and, based on the assumption of rapid expansion in demand, proposed the creation of five new, full-service campuses in the Santa Clara region, San Diego, a “Southeast Los Angeles Campus” to serve LA and Orange Counties, the San Joaquin Valley and the Redding Area, all of which would enroll 103,300 students (id.: Table 18, p. 94). That same year, a special committee appointed by then-President Robert Sproul and chaired by Dean McHenry, proposed Santa Clara, San Diego and Irvine as potential sites for new UC campuses.

In retrospect, it is not wholly clear that there was a crisis (Hall, 1982). Stadtman (1970: 339-40) points out that, at the end of World War Two, there were “seven” UC campuses: “Berkeley; UCLA; the professional schools in San Francisco; the College of Agriculture at Davis; the College of Agriculture (Citrus Experiment Station) at Riverside; Lick Astronomical Department at Mount Hamilton; and Scripps Institution of Oceanography at La Jolla.” Of these, “only two of the campuses—Berkeley and UCLA—offered a complete undergraduate education” (id.). In 1940, UC enrolled 23,000 undergraduates; in 1950, 33,000 (“Brief History of UC”). Various projections estimated 77,000 students in 1965, rising to more than 100,000 by 1970. Yet, this last benchmark was only reached in the early 1980s (“Brief History). If graduate and health science students are included, total enrollment in 1985 was 147,874 (“Brief History”; see also Hall, 1982). The studies of the 1950s focused only on projected undergraduate enrollments, which suggests something else might have been going on.

One “something else” that was likely responsible for the inconsistent projections of student enrollments must be addressed: nuclear weapons and Sputnik. Prior to World War Two, faculty were expected to spend a portion of their time on research, but funding was limited and provided primarily by private sources (Stadtman, 1970: 372). World War Two and the resources the U.S. Government provided to develop new weapons, such as the atomic bomb and radar, provided a Keynesian boost to science and engineering research endeavors. The Manhattan Project led to the creation of the Berkeley Radiation Lab (today the Lawrence-Berkeley National Laboratory), the Los Alamos Laboratory directed by UC-Berkeley physics professor, Robert Oppenheimer, and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, founded in the 1950s by Edward Teller. Through new post-war funding mechanisms like the National Science Foundation and the Office of Naval Research, the federal government provided support for continued university-based military-related research and development. This work spun off into an expanding defense industry, especially in Southern California, which, in turn, created demand for newly-graduated scientists and engineers. Research was no longer a co-
product with teaching. It was now the primary product of highly ranked, well-funded university labs.

Although estimates of demand by potential UC undergraduates might have been overestimated, the mark and status of a “research university” was reflected in the number of graduate students enrolled on a campus. If there were capacity limits to existing campuses—especially Berkeley and UCLA—the solution proposed by UC administration was to expand the other sites into full-service institutions and add new ones, which is what was done. Moreover, it was probably no accident that the McHenry committee proposed three new campuses in 1957, the year of Sputnik. In addition, growth in higher education was driven not by popular demand; rather, it was the project of intellectual, political and business leaders, in both California and across the United States, who pointed to economic prosperity, international competition and status as the reasons for getting a degree and requiring more university capacity. This discourse has not changed very much in the intervening six-plus decades.

Figure 3.2: Timeline for the three new campuses (Douglass, 1998: 2).

The proposed sites for the three new campuses reflected both existing demographic distributions and population growth in particular areas of the state. During the 1950s and 1960s, in particular San Diego, Santa Clara and Orange Counties all experienced high rates of growth and suburbanization from in-migration as white families moved out of city centers to birth the “Baby Boom,” which would begin to enter college in the early 1960s (Nicolaides & Wiese, 2016; Schneider, 2008). This white flight can be seen quite clearly in data from a web site, “Net Migration Patterns for U.S. Counties” (https://netmigration.wisc.edu/), created by the Universities of Wisconsin-Madison, New Hampshire and Michigan Tech) for selected counties near to or hosts of the new universities, as seen in figures 5.3a,b and c, below.

Figure 5.3a: Net Migration by Age in Los Angeles, Orange and San Bernadino Counties, 1950s and 1960s (Source: “Net Migration Patterns for U.S. Counties”)

Figure 5.3b: Net Migration by Age in Santa Cruz, San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties, 1950s and 1960s (Source: “Net Migration Patterns for U.S. Counties”)

[Graph showing net migration by age across different decades and counties.]
These data are not conclusive, only indicative, about the growth of the population centers where new campuses were planned. And they say nothing about demographics, although it is fairly safe to assume most of the in-migration was white. The only real anomaly is Santa Cruz, where UCSC was sited, which was a county with a fairly small population and some distance from the growth centers in Santa Clara and San Mateo counties.

A few points about these graphs are worth noting:

1. Some counties show significant migration in the 25-34 age ranges. The latter is always accompanied by major migration in the 5-14 age range. These are signs of rapid suburbanization and a pool of future college students. This peak is especially visible in Orange County in the 1950s.

2. Others show significant migration in the 20-24 age range, sometimes accompanied by a peak in the 5-14 age range (Santa Clara, 1950s), sometimes not (Imperial and San Diego, 1950s). The former peak might reflect employment in the growing defense sector over in what would become Silicon Valley, the latter might involve military personnel (note that Imperial actually experienced negative migration in the 20-24 age range during the 1960s, which could reflect a base closure or demobilization following the Korean War).

3. Santa Cruz County shows an interesting pattern. During the 1950s, it experienced negative migration in the 20-24 age range and a small peak in the 30-34 age range.
However, during the 1960s, there were peaks in the 15-19 (college students) and 30-34 age (faculty and staff) cohorts, reflecting the opening of UCSC.

4. Except for Sacramento County, which grew along with state government during the 1950s and 1960s, several of the central Sacramento Valley counties experienced population losses, mitigating against building a UC campus there.

By the time the three campuses opened, the bullish environment of the 1950s had disappeared. Moreover, student and the Civil Rights movement were reshaping the political environment. Growing numbers of universities became hotbeds of activism, with student bodies hostile to both administrations and community leaders. Inasmuch as the new campuses were deliberately sited in politically conservative areas, they did not endear themselves to locals, as we shall see in the case of Santa Cruz. Nor did the planners of the 1950s anticipate the coming demographic shift in California, as nonwhite populations grew, a result of immigration from Latin America and Asia, and changes in immigration law during the 1960s. Ordinarily, these migrations are framed in terms of “economic opportunity,” but it is just as true that they represented failures of Empire, especially in Viet Nam and Cambodia but also Central America, both of which became significant sources of political refugees.

Who, then, does UC serve today? Tables 5.2a, b, c and d illustrate the changes in racial/ethnic composition of the domestic and international undergraduate student body over the past 20 years. The data below may be somewhat misleading because of duplications in student reporting (which are counted) and broad definitions about who is included where. What these data illustrate is that, at least since 2000, when there were 141,000 enrolled undergraduates, to 2019, when there were 226,000, the racial/ethnic distribution of the undergraduate body has changed; some campuses, such as UCSC, Irvine and Santa Barbara show greater changes than the systemwide averages in the table.

These numbers can be compared to overall changes in California demography, shown in Figure 5.4 (for earlier data, see Table 5.1.) Some groups of students are over-represented relative to their percentage in the state’s population, while others are under-represented. Moreover, as indicated in Table 5.2d, percentages vary among campuses. Racial/ethnic presentation at individual campuses is a function of a number of variables: high school performance; educational quality; entrance exams; family income; affordability; residence; campus reputations; campus locations; and judgments by admission offices. Some changes may be due to greater opportunities and funding packages elsewhere; others a result of campus climates. Is there an ideal mix, especially one that is not political? How much tinkering can or should UC campuses do in order to ensure “diversity” of students (and staff and faculty)? For that matter, how much diversity can individual campuses afford?

37 I exclude graduate students from this count because they skew heavily white and Asian (both of which categories also include international graduate students).
### Table 5.2a: Fall Duplicated Enrollments for Domestic Undergraduates

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American and Black</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>4,772</td>
<td>6,477</td>
<td>7,410</td>
<td>8,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaska Native</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>2,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>48,411</td>
<td>58,087</td>
<td>66,333</td>
<td>72,746</td>
<td>79,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>17,328</td>
<td>22,183</td>
<td>32,139</td>
<td>45,754</td>
<td>57,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>938</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>1,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Asian/North African</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>11,006</td>
<td>11,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>53,100</td>
<td>55,347</td>
<td>58,045</td>
<td>90,210</td>
<td>65,400</td>
</tr>
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</table>


### Table 5.2b: Fall Duplicated Enrollments for International Undergraduates

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American and Black</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaska Native</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>2,965</td>
<td>5,265</td>
<td>18,865</td>
<td>24,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>1,827</td>
<td>2,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Asian/North African</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>1,130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 5.2c: Percentages of & changes in Race/ethnicity in UC undergraduate enrollments, 2000 to 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total undergraduate enrollment</td>
<td>141,000</td>
<td>226,000</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American &amp; Black</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>+0.9</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaska native</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>+0.4</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>+0.7</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>+13.2</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawai’ian &amp; Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Asian/North African</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>+4.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 5.2d: Changes in student numbers at three UC campuses, 2000-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad category (2000 &amp; 2019)</th>
<th>UC Irvine</th>
<th>UCSC</th>
<th>UC Santa Barbara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in domestic undergraduate enrollment</td>
<td>9,336</td>
<td>11,179</td>
<td>8,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American &amp; Black</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaska native</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3,702</td>
<td>3,594</td>
<td>3,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>5,999</td>
<td>3,198</td>
<td>3,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawai’ian &amp; Pacific Islander</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Asian/North African</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1,666</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>-675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VI. Follow the money!

The last question in the preceding section is not meant to be a cynical one; it reflects the availability of resources, the affordability of a college education, family income and a number of other past, present and future factors. Nor is it detached from the transition to market logic, which demands returns for every expenditure made for education and operations.38

As a state-funded institution, the University of California serves multiple masters, and they have not been shy about wielding their power to shape the institution more to their liking. During its first few decades of existence, from the 1870s to 1900, for example, the University was caught up in populist fervor, as farmers and workers attacked banks, corporations and the rich, and demanded cheap money (silver in addition to gold). As Stadtman (1970: 69) puts it in his history of UC,

38 To the extent that internal units charge each other for service rendered and then receive reprimands if they show a “negative trade balance.”
[Those] caught up in the social unrest of the 1870s, when California’s farmers and working men [who] were challenging established wealth, established authority, and established intellectual values, found the University, even as it then existed, too rich for the needs of the common man. To them, the best education for Californians was one that taught young men the practical arts of farming, building and manufacturing. Everything else was a waste of time.

These populist groups lobbied for replacement of the Board of Regents by an elected panel more responsive to popular demands, and a battle was fought in which UC’s relative immunity from populist agitation was sustained (elite interests, by contrast, were accommodated through the appointed Regents). But the populist effort to wrest control of the university from the establishment came very close to success and badly scared those who ran it (Stadtman, 1970: 71-83).

Nevertheless, for many decades, the University and Board of Regents found it necessary and expedient to recognize and respond to powerful (white and wealthy) groups and interests in formulating and implementing strategy and policy. The watershed moment for UC elitism was, probably, World War Two, during which higher education was drawn into the defense effort through ample funding for weapons research from the federal government. Robert Oppenheimer was director of the Manhattan Project, which made UC the prime manager of Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico—itself a spinoff of the Lawrence Radiation Lab at Berkeley—and which continued to operate Los Alamos and Livermore National Labs until well into the 2000s. After the end of the war, agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense came to rely on research universities, often in preference to private companies who could lay claim to the results of their research and development. Not all of the sponsored work led to applications, of course; the goal of federal funding was primarily pure research that might spin-off applications for big corporations and other entities, both public and private.

UC was established originally on the principle that students would pay no tuition and be responsible only for various use and service fees not directly connected to the academic and research missions. But between 1960 and 1973, per student state support for UC declined by almost 5% or $800 per student (in constant dollars; UC Academic Plan 1974-78: 14), possibly because of a backlash against student activism. The tax revolt of the later 1970s led to an even greater hit on state-provided resources. Historically, a large fraction of funds supporting K-12 education came from county-based property taxes, which were rising rapidly due to appreciating housing values. Proposition 13, passed by votes in 1978, capped rates of annual increase in such taxes. California education took a real beating. The state began to fund K-12 and community colleges through income tax revenues, which notionally cut into resources that might otherwise be allocated to UC and the California State University system (Wildermuth, 2010). To compensate, the California colleges and universities began to impose tuition.

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39 In fact, state funding increased overall but, as enrollments rose, per student funding declined.
The economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s also put pressure on available resources. California has a highly progressive tax system, in which the top one percent of taxpayers provides close to half of state tax revenues (Miller, 2016). Because the one per-centers tend to receive a significant fraction of their income from investments and capital gains, their incomes can vary significantly from one year to the next, especially during bull markets, leading to major reductions in tax collections. The Governor and Legislature then must decide how to distribute funds among the various state priorities and higher education is always a likely target for austerity (as will surely be the case after the current pandemic).

As Figures 5.5 and 5.6. illustrate, state support for UC has risen and fallen over time. Since the 1990s, due to state budget deficits during periodic recessions, public support for higher education has grown much more slowly than during the 1950s and 1960s, even as the number of enrolled students has grown significantly and decreased as a fraction of UC overall budget. It should not be ignored, that this shift has taken place in concert with demographic changes in the state’s population.

**Figure 5.5** UC Budget History: Major Funding Sources as a Percentage of Expenditures, 1900-90.

Source: Douglas & Bleemer, 2018: 10,11.

To complicate matters further, University accounts and spending are quite opaque, even to those responsible for budgets and, while budget presentations and documents are colorful and detailed (see, e.g., UCOP, 2018), they are also masterpieces of obfuscation. For example, UC’s annual revenues are on the order of $35 billion, of which $8.4 billion are “core funds” that “provide permanent support for the core mission activities of the University, as well as the administrative and support services needed to perform them” (UCOP, 2018: 45). Of that sum, $3.2 billion comes from the state, while $3.6 billion comes from student tuition and fees. Things then get a bit tricky, as seen in Figures 5.7 a & b.
**Figure 5.6:** UC Budget History: Major Funding Sources as a Percentage of Expenditures: 2000–2014.*

*Figure 5.5 is somewhat misleading, since it includes revenues from medical centers that are not directed toward teaching or state support per student.

**Figures 5.7 a & b: UC Core Expenditures, 2016-17, by Type and Function.**

“Instruction,” which comprises almost half of core expenditures by function, includes health sciences (roughly $3 billion), leaving about $3.6 billion for “general campus instruction,” as shown in Figures 5.8a & b. These pie charts are somewhat disingenuous because they are not sufficiently disaggregated to, for example, differentiate between expenditures on undergraduates and graduate students, which are very different. Moreover, it is difficult to account for the category of “State and UC General Funds” in Figure 5.8b, comprising 46% of fund sources, or $1.66 billion, with the trend line in Figure 5.4, which shows “state appropriations” as making up only 10% of the total annual UC budget.
Figure 5.8a & b: UC instruction expenditures by fund source and category

State funding to each campus is based on a “weighted enrollment” which

Provides equivalent funding per student based on budgeted enrollment at each campus, where enrollment is weighted by student type: 1.0 for CA undergraduates, postbaccalaureate students, graduate professional students, and graduate academic master’s students; 2.5 for academic doctoral students; and 5.0 for health science students (other than undergraduates and graduate academic students)” (UCOP, 2017a).

Table 5.3: Campus allocations on a weighted and unweighted student basis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campus</th>
<th>2016-17 allocation</th>
<th>2016-17 Campus enrollment (grad &amp; undergrad)</th>
<th>Unweighted allocation per student</th>
<th>Campus weighted enrollment</th>
<th>Weighted allocation per student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>$310,438,000</td>
<td>37,863</td>
<td>$8,199</td>
<td>43,399</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>$301,382,000</td>
<td>33,434</td>
<td>$9,014</td>
<td>42,133</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvine</td>
<td>$263,871,000</td>
<td>32,365</td>
<td>$8,153</td>
<td>36,889</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>$396,900,000</td>
<td>38,938</td>
<td>$10,193</td>
<td>55,482</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merced*</td>
<td>$129,625,000</td>
<td>7,440</td>
<td>$17,422</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>$247,312,000</td>
<td>22,080</td>
<td>$11,201</td>
<td>24,468</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>$324,833,000</td>
<td>33,794</td>
<td>$9,612</td>
<td>38,410</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco*</td>
<td>$196,401,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
<td>$185,000,000</td>
<td>24,305</td>
<td>$7,612</td>
<td>25,861</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>$147,100,000</td>
<td>18,823</td>
<td>$7,814</td>
<td>20,564</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,781,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UCOP, 2017a; UCOP, 2018: 221. *Blank entries indicate data not provided in sources.

Individual campuses are allowed to spend tuition and fees from their enrolled students, but campuses with professional and medical schools earn additional revenues from additional fees charged to those students. Thus, some students are more equal than others, and some campuses have more to spend than others on
undergraduate instruction (Table 5.3). Those with a larger fraction of graduate and medical students relative to undergraduates do better (although Riverside, with relatively few graduate students, receives more than UCSC and UC Santa Barbara in unweighted terms, probably due to its medical school).

All of this depends on the state of the economy and, as the saying goes, “Stuff happens.” Contingent events can have considerable impact on the economy and the state budget. Such events fall into two categories: those that are unpredictable and those that could be foreseen. World War Two was not unpredictable, although it was a contingent event; 9/11 was probably unpredictable (although there were warnings that something might happen); the COVID-19 pandemic was unpredictable but foreseen. At the same time, the impacts of World War Two and the Cold War on higher education in the United States probably could not have been predicted beforehand, while the repeated funding crises facing UC during the 1970s and after were predictable, although no one could say precisely when they might occur. By and large, UC has not been able to prepare for contingencies, either through some kind of scenario-based strategizing or through creation of a “rainy day” fund for future budget shortfalls (in fact, UC appears to be sitting on some sizable sums of money, but it is not clear these could be used to supplement short or long-term budget deficits; Gutierrez, 2017; Asimov, 2019).

In 2009, in the direct aftermath of the Great Recession and concomitant faculty salary reductions (aka, “furloughs”), the UC Board of Regents formed a “UC Commission on the Future,” which was “charged with evaluating how the university could best serve California and its students in an era of diminishing state resources” and “developing a new vision for the university within the context of the university's mission and budget, while reaffirming our commitment to quality, access and affordability” (UC Commission, 2015: Overview & Charge). The Commission’s Final Report was issued in November 2010 and began rather portentously:

> The University of California has come to a crossroads moment in its history. A host of converging forces—fiscal, demographic, cultural and political—demand that the University take a hard, thorough and careful look at how best to brace itself for systematic and enduring changes. The future cannot be avoided. It must be met head on with fresh thinking and firm resolve to change what can be changed for the better and to preserve the standards, practices and values that constitute the core strands of the University’s genetic code. The challenge will be to strike an unerring balance between what to recalibrate or even discard, and what to protect. The goal must be for the University to emerge on the other side of crises fit and ready to serve California as well and as far into the future as it has in the past. The work in this report represents the beginning of an urgent effort to think through this complex but pressing conundrum (UC Commission, 2010: 2).

At stake, according to the Commission, was not only

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40 I use this in preference to the more vulgar variant.
the sustainability of a 10-campus public university system. Rather, it is the future viability of the nation’s most populous and diverse state. If California is to remain a beacon of hope and opportunity for the world, then the University of California must be able, as it has from nearly the birth of statehood, to provide the energy to light the path forward (UC Commission, 2010: 2).

Ultimately, the Commission focused almost entirely on ways of dealing with a future of scarce resources and rising costs—seeking new funding sources, increasing out-of-state enrollments, reducing time-to-degree, offering online instruction, increasing administrative efficiencies, etc.—and very little on a future of contingencies, institutional transformation or social change. This singular focus on money is also evident in the minutes of the Regent’s Committee on Long Range Planning, created in 2007 and disestablished in 2016, to address the same fiscal concerns (for an early critique of the Committee and the Commission, see Schwartz, 2007; 2009).

Over the past couple of decades, as libertarian market logic has become the guiding light for universities, theories of corporate management have also become the de facto models for running campuses. Rather than pursuing the slow and difficult work of building supportive political and institutional coalitions, contemporary management theories start from the entrepreneurial character of Silicon Valley, suggesting that a charismatic leader can disrupt business as usual and implement new strategies, tactics and policies that will re-energize the organization and its staff and, not incidentally, increase profits. But even entrepreneurs have difficulty in making this model succeed—nine out of ten startups fail, even if they follow directions—and the going strategy is to get bought up by a larger company before crashing and burning.

Public universities, by and large, do not have this option.41 Most rely on funding flows (tuition, public funds, donations) rather than funding stocks (endowments) and are in no position to stockpile money now in anticipation of contingent events. To be sure, there are only a few private universities in the United States with endowments that might be tapped in the event of budget problems, but even the wealthiest are loath to draw on them in emergencies (Kroichick, 2020). Most corporations operate on the basis of cash flows, even if they make nice profits, and they can find themselves in as much trouble as universities when business goes bad. In the worst-case scenario, they can declare bankruptcy and come out smelling like a rose. This is not an option available to public universities.

VI. Living with society: Social forces and all that

As noted earlier, UC has come periodically under external social pressures as these have emerged via politics and economic change. During the latter part of the 19th century, various populist trends threatened elite hegemony over politics and economics. UC experienced a “Red Scare” during the 1930s, as leftist student

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41 Which is not to say that takeovers are not possible: in 2010, Middlebury College, based in Middlebury, Vermont, took over the struggling Monterey Institution of International Studies, based in Monterey, California.
movements and organizations were generally denied recognition or access to the Berkeley and UCLA campuses, for fear that sympathizers might “destroy the University by handing it over to communists” (UCLA Provost Ernest Moore, cited in Standtman, 1970: 298). But not until after World War Two, did UC come under external pressures to ensure that no communists, whether student or faculty, were allowed on UC campuses. Even before Joe McCarthy launched his infamous search for Reds in the State Department, conservatives and their liberal allies were launching attacks on higher education. The detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb and the role of the two UC-managed labs in developing the American one raised questions about spies in the ranks and, eventually, resulted in UC professor Robert Oppenheimer being stripped of his security clearance.

In 1949, a number of bills were submitted to the California Legislature designed to “isolate, expose and remove from positions of power and influence persons who are a dangerous menace to our freedom and security” (cited in Stadtman, 1970:322). These initiatives included a proposed constitutional amendment that would bring UC under legislative control so that its employees would be required to declare their loyalty to the nation and the state. In the event, in 1950, the Board of Regents approved implementation of a loyalty oath, presented to them by President Sproul. It read, in part,

[I declare] that I am not a member of the Communist Party or any other organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, and that I have no commitments in conflict with my responsibilities with respect to impartial scholarship and free pursuit of truth. I understand that the foregoing statement is a condition of my employment and a consideration of payment of my salary (“Text of 1950 Loyalty Oath,” 1999).

David Gardner (1967: Ch. 1, Sec. VII) argued that the decision to impose the oath was made not in response to the proposed bills but was, rather, a “catalyst” to action, one further motivated by a disagreement between the President of UC and the UCLA Provost over a speaking invitation issued to a “known Communist” (Gardner, 1969: 126). A number of faculty members refused to sign the oath, and 31 were fired (but eventually reinstated under order from the California Supreme Court). Wrote Gardner (pp. 133-34), “The university lost stature...from protest resignations submitted by other eminent members of its faculties.... And it lost potential strength from the refusal of men to come to California under conditions considered by them to be hostile to scholarship.” But, he concluded (Gardner, 1969: 134) that “contrary...to foreboding forecasts...concerning the university’s future...the University of California survived and subsequently more than regained its academic reputation” (Gardner was President of UC from 1983 to 1992).

Today, new University employees are not interrogated for communist leanings but they must still sign an “oath of allegiance” that reads

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter (University of California State Oath of Allegiance, 2015).

The Red Scare may be long past, but attacks on the politics of the University continue. A common conservative charge today is that most universities are decidedly “liberal”—a not-so-subtle form of red-baiting—and hotbeds of leftish indoctrination. Whether this claim is accurate is the subject of some debate—in any event, while conservatives were engaged in a “march through the institutions” of political authority and power, liberals seem to have withdrawn to the academy, on the principle that today’s young minds could be tomorrow’s political leaders.

The struggle over social norms is most evident today in controversies over “freedom of speech” on university campuses, with UC-Berkeley becoming the poster child for supposedly obstructing conservative and right-wing speakers from campus. Incidents at Berkeley, during which physical struggles took place between supporters and opponents of conservative provocateurs and right-wing speakers supposedly denied a campus platform, tied the University Administration into rhetorical knots. As Chief Tweeter, President Trump did not help matters. Is it a violation of the First Amendment to disallow hate speech, under the principle that all sides to a debate should be given an opportunity to speak to the student body, or is the threat of violence, both verbal and real, sufficient grounds to deny access? Very few seminars, talks or presentations raise these questions, but it takes only a few, highly publicized incidents to generate outrage and headlines.

Feeling the heat from relentless attacks, in 2017 UC President Napolitano sought to demonstrate that UC is truly a “balanced” institution by establishing a “National Center for Free Speech and Civic Engagement” which “explores how the fundamental democratic principles of free speech and civic engagement must adapt to the challenges and opportunities of modern society. Through research, advocacy, debate and discussion, the Center helps ensure that the next generation of leaders is prepared to defend and advance these values” (NCFSCE, 2019). Intended to mollify conservatives, the Center came under almost immediate attack from the left for the very assumption that “free speech” was under threat and for the way in which its Board and policies seemed to be stacked so as to demonstrate its *bona fides*. Moreover, some critics argued that by defining hate speech as free speech, the University was in effect condoning and support such speech (Lee, 2019).

In all of this, universities find themselves in a ticklish position, socially and politically. On the one hand, they are supposed to be purveyors of “truth” and “facts,” with research uncovering or identifying these through non-political methodologies (e.g., survey research—which is hardly free of bias). On the other hand, with certain matters becoming so highly-politicized—think here of climate change research and CORVID-19 hoaxes—universities are accused of carrying out the political agendas of particular interest groups inimical to the norms of those making the complaint (some
of these accusation have a grain of reality to them). Any educational institution can only remain “apolitical” so long as there is a broad general social consensus embodied in the curriculum and reflected in student and faculty behavior. It seems unlikely that such an arrangement has ever existed, although not for lack of trying.

VII. Some concluding thoughts

As this chapter has suggested, the UC system and its operation are the result of large-scale political, economic, social and bureaucratic struggles and processes shaped by a history over which it has had only limited control. But where are the people in the story? The academic literature is split on the role of individuals in shaping and directing large institutions, especially those that are not in “leadership” roles. The written and oral histories of UC tend to focus on the “Big Men” (and they were all men before the current one) who led the institution during various periods, especially UC system Presidents, such as Clark Kerr. Yet, even Kerr, who is regarded as one of the most significant (if not the most significant) individual to occupy that office, could not always have his way.

Moreover, the sheer size of UC meant, and means, that there are many individuals in bureaucratic and academic positions who have the potential to innovate, obstruct or sabotage directives and orders from above and below. Such activities must take place within the organizational and bureaucratic structure of the institution, but because of the density of rules, policies and practices, and subjective interpretations, individual action is often possible. At the same time, however, such agency can only take place in collaboration with others who support and lobby for new initiatives or forms of resistance. Success thus depends on getting colleagues and allies to sign up with a project, and even a substantial coalition may fail in the face of obstacles and obstructions.
Santa Cruz will have the additional advantage of beginning anew, with no entrenched campus powers suspicious of new ideas (Karl Lamb, 1964: 63).

I think it was a little too much of a field of dreams aspect to the first colleges—if you build it they will come (Cowan, 2013: 122).

I. Introduction

In Chapter 5, I offered some context for the creation of UC Santa Cruz; in this chapter, I historicize that creation. As UCSC’s boosters and supporters never tire of repeating, UCSC was and is “special” and even “exceptional.” It was imagined to be special; designed to be special; built to be special; and operated to be special—up to a point. Not everyone has seen UCSC in this way. Writing about it in 1994, Robert Sinsheimer, the fourth chancellor, called UCSC “the anomalous campus” (Sec. 3). He pointed, in particular, to what he regarded as the problematic conceptualization, planning, design and operation of the campus in an unfavorable economic and political environment. And, he tried to change all of those—except location—in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to normalize the university.

I would quibble with Sinsheimer’s word choice, preferring to describe UCSC as an “outlier.” An “anomaly” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (2002) as a “deviation from the natural order” in the biological sense (Sinsheimer was a biologist). As an example, OED draws on Darwin’s *Origin of Species*: “There is no greater anomaly in nature than a bird that cannot fly.” By contrast (perhaps), the OED’s definition of “outlier” (as used in statistics) is “An observation whose value lies outside the set of values considered likely according to some hypothesis (usually one based on other observations).” To put this another way, UCSC is a bird that “can fly” but is rarely seen in “nature,” that is, the universe of higher education.

Why does terminology matter? A bird that cannot fly is presumed to have no local predators with which to be concerned; hence, flight, which consumes a lot of energy is unnecessary. Such a bird, however, would have a devil’s time surviving in an environment into which cats and rats have been introduced (for example). By contrast, the rarely seen, flying bird might have, at one time, been more common, or it might have been seen far from its normal range (or it might have been flightless and is now trying to evolve wings). That bird’s environment is, nonetheless, full of cats and rats—in this instance, other conventional universities. The long-term survival of an anomaly (50+years at this writing) would be difficult to explain, as opposed to an outlier that could, over time, evolve toward the norm, which is what UCSC has tried to do. The question for biologists and philosophers is: was such change due to
(competitive) evolutionary pressures or free will? I suspect the answer might be the former, although such normalization as has taken place has come about only through much kicking and screaming (as we shall see later).

In spite of the many challenges to the “alternative” colleges founded during the 1960s and 1970s, UCSC has managed to survive, if not exactly thrive (Hartocollis, 2019). Survival might simply reflect the tenacity of public institutions, which are rarely shut down. It might be that the changes that have been made have served the campus well. But this change has been something of a hit-or-miss proposition, in part, because many of the organizational features established “at the creation” of UCSC continue to exist, even though some would argue they are like “spandrels,” described by Stephen Jay Gould in Wonderful Life (1989) as not serving a useful function although, at times and over time, adapting to become functional. But there are spandrels and there are spandrels: some might support survival, while others might make it difficult or impossible to thrive. The metaphor suggests something, at least, about the lifecycle of public universities as well as how they cope with problems and structures bequeathed to them by the past and the ongoing competitive struggle.

My objective in this chapter is not, however, to push the metaphor too far. Rather, I offer, first, a broad sketch of how UCSC was “imagined,” second, how the campus was planned and, third, how those early plans were realized (if they were). In subsequent chapters, I will delve into other institutional and biographical elements.

II. UCSC as an organization

At first glance, the three “new” campuses—UC Irvine, UC San Diego and UCSC—appear quite different, even though they were planned and built at the same time. A common tendency in many accounts of the early years of UCSC is a focus on the apparent uniqueness of UCSC as a problem in itself, both within the UC system and without (even though, as previously noted, there were other universities and colleges pursuing similar ideas during the 1960s and 1970s; see, e.g., Grant & Reisman, 1978; Duke, 1996; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010). In such accounts, the contradictions that contribute to organizational dysfunction and are found at nearly every research university are, for the most part, downplayed or elided. Perhaps this is explained by the authors’ ignorance of other experiments and organization theory, as well as a certain blindness to the struggles over power and authority, but a focus on what was special and exceptional obscures the similarities among the new (and old) UC

42 This begs the question of why UC San Diego’s college system has not only survived but thrived. UCSD is certainly not an “anomaly” or even an “outlier.” I will return to this question later in this chapter.
43 A “spandrel” is an architectural feature of a building that is designed to occupy blank space but has no structural function. Gould’s “spandrels” are features that have specialized or even no function and evolved to do something else. Presumably, functional organs can also become spandrels (e.g., the appendix).
44 I don’t want to invoke or evoke Social Darwinism here; James Mittelman (2018) analyzes competition among universities for a variety of goods, many of which are “won” by a small number of elite organizations.
The three new campuses that were of comparable importance in shaping UCSC and sending it on its subsequent trajectory.

UCSC was created as a public university in an expansive state system and was bound to the same strictures and principles as its brethren. As with UC as a whole (and illustrated in Chapter 5) the location of the three new campuses during the 1960s makes clear that UCSC was intended initially to serve the white majority, especially the children of the middle and upper classes of California, who were educated in the state’s public school system—which, in the 1960s was one of the best in the country (today, due to the restrictions on property taxes described earlier, that system ranks near the bottom). UCSC was sited near an “underserved” area of the state—the “Central Coast,” which included San Jose and the future Silicon Valley—on the assumption that many, if not most, of its students would come from that region (which has not been the case).45 During the 1960s, there was general bullishness about the future of funding for higher education, notwithstanding the threats arising from the Cold War and competition over resources for other social needs. Consequently, a small amount of experimentation on a relatively small campus was deemed tolerable, especially with support from the UC Office of the President (but not too much, please).

As one organization in a public system of ten, UCSC was (and is) expected to follow three sets of rules and expectations: (1) those of the society in which it is embedded, reflected in state and federal law, as well as in its image and social positioning in the eyes of “customers” (i.e., students), parents and a broader public; (2) those rules formulated and imposed by the UC Office of the President (UCOP) in response to broad state and federal mandates, environmental conditions and the societal rules and expectations listed above; and (3) those rules that arise sui generis locally from the campus itself, which may differ from one UC campus to the next, but which must be recognizably similar to other campuses in order to be recognized as a research university in the UC system. That these three sets are not necessarily or always commensurate or reconcilable with each other often leads to the contradictions and makes the operation of the organization doubly difficult.

How an organization emerges and develops its own “culture” is largely a function of those involved in its conceptualization (via “vision” and planning), the execution of the plan, and subsequent adaptation to changing internal and external conditions. The “Founders,” in dreaming of fields and pursuing their “Field of Dreams,” were expected to be cognizant of and respond to the larger environmental forces, which enabled certain local features and constrained others. Moreover, in the design and planning, a new university may operate in an “anarchic” and “loosely coupled” fashion (Weick, 1976), under the influence of many individuals, committees and units with different visions, who can exercise a significant or even determining influence.

45 Admissions statistics for Fall 2018 of the Frosh class of 3,701 indicate that 39% are from California from Monterey Bay northwards, while 34.9% are from California south of the Tehachapi Mountains. By contrast, of 1,815 transfer students, 54.7% are from northern California, and only 32.7% are from the southern part of the state (IRAP, 2018).
(and who can also block or sabotage any changes). As a consequence, the actual campus may differ significantly from the dream. Nevertheless, the social structures put in place at the very beginning of operation remain in place for the organization’s lifetime, even if some are demoted or diminished.

It is useful to recall here Michel Foucault’s notion of genealogy, which posits, in my interpretation, that nothing “planned” ever ends up as intended, and that it is an error of many historians to relate the past as a sequence of logically intentional actions and predicted outcomes. In the case of an organization as expansive as a university, the planning period can be quite lengthy as the “heat of battle” takes place over planning and design. Those who win in the short term may, of course, fail in the longer term. We see this, for example, in the early struggles over the physical design of UCSC and the wrenches thrown into the process by external review committees.

Planning for UCSC, both physical and academic, began even before 1961 and continued through and beyond its opening in 1965. Individually, each change in plans seems relatively minor; taken together, they arguably changed entirely the character of the campus. Moreover, in devising “tactics” to address what were seen as specific “problems” (or contradictions), outcomes and consequences turned out quite differently from what was intended or hoped for. We might say that, over time, UCSC was “kludged” together rather than planned.

In what follows, I focus on the early visions and designs of UCSC in order to highlight those plans, and the changes and compromises made around them. The “battles” over imaginaries and designs served to put in place structural features that have, over time, been resistant to change and continue to affect the campus even today, when they may no longer seem or be relevant. As an example (which I will expand on in a later chapter), the Founders put primary responsibility for undergraduate education in the Colleges. They created weak “Boards of Study” to marshal the disciplines and their faculties and established “Divisions” with Associate Chancellors—somewhat like

46 Mittelman (2018: 88) cites Claude Lévi-Strauss’s concept of “bricolage” to describe this phenomenon. 47 Rick Diamond (note to the author) commented on this: “Clearly some structures disappear—chapel, ROTC, all male-eating clubs, have disappeared from many universities—or are these not structures? It seems a pretty sweeping statement that all structures will remain. Does UCSC have a chapel? Where do the godless commies pray?” Note that units appear and disappear; the overall social structure does not change very much, if at all.

48 This is not, of course, precisely what he said (Foucault, 2003: 361), which was: “The forces operating in history do not obey destiny or regulative mechanisms, but the destiny of the battle. They do not manifest the successive forms of a primordial intention and their attention is not that of a conclusion, for they always appear through the singular randomness of event... The world such as we are acquainted with it is not this ultimately simple configuration where events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial and final value. On the contrary, it is a profusion of entangled events.”

49 According to the OED (2002), “kludge” is a “a machine, system, or program that has been improvised or ‘bodged’ together; a hastily improvised and poorly thought-out solution to a fault or ‘bug’. It comes from the German “kluge,” which originally means “smart” or “witty.”
Schools and Deans, but not exactly—to administer funds to and make decisions for the individual Boards. Over the longer term, and even when the campus began to “normalize” during the late 1970s and over the 1980s, the Divisions exercised (as they continue to do today) much more power over the Departments than is the norm at most universities. These Divisions have, as a result, become more like large, self-governing duchies than administrative units, per se, and are able to block efforts at reform and change from both above and below. At the same time, the Divisions don’t exercise absolute power and their initiatives can be stymied by resistance from the Departments (and other campus units).

This is not to put the entire blame for dysfunction on Deans and Divisions; it is simply to suggest that UCSC is not, and was never, organized to facilitate the kind of internal innovation and change imagined by the Founders or seen in contemporary management theories. Clark Kerr (1982: 37) once suggested that the “multiversity is inherently a conservative institution” and is not organized to facilitate change, although some universities may be more amenable to change than others (especially if someone is willing to pay for that change). Arguably, the larger and more complex an organization of many parts is, the more opportunities exist for incremental changes in individual units without much disturbance to the whole. The more global a proposed change or innovation, the greater the resistance from below and the lower the probability of success.

This matters because the initial imaginary and design was the work of one man (Kerr), and a second (McHenry) was given the role of seeing the plan through to reality. The latter was, however, both hegemonic and hands-off at the same time, dictating general forms while putting responsibility for implementation in the hands of faculty and staff. As a scholar of and believer in the democratic process, McHenry was also disposed to let the faculty work out operational details, perhaps believing that this would enhance the legitimacy of the structure. How did all of this come to pass?

III. Genesis

In the Beginning, there was Clark Kerr. A great deal has been written about and by Kerr, including his two-volume memoir (2001, 2003), an oral history (1989), and various volumes on his central role in the shaping of higher education in California and the United States (Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010; Marginson, 2016). In a recent collection of essays about Kerr, Sheldon Rothblatt (2012: xiii) proposed that Kerr was “by any judgment one of America’s greatest university leaders and arguably a seminal figure in comprehending and discussing the salient structural and value changes in higher education occurring in the second half of the twentieth century.” From 60 years on, Kerr continues to loom large for those who remember him. Most know the name but that’s all.

So, from whence came the vision that became UCSC? The legend of its origins, as reflected in the minds and experiences of Clark Kerr and Dean McHenry, and the stories they and others have told, is today somewhat shrouded in the fog of history.
and mythology, for their success in shaping the campus tends to hide the early struggles over design and planning. Moreover, while the conceptual origins of UCSC are somewhat cloudy, my conclusion is that Kerr played the dominant role in their genesis. McHenry is usually given co-credit with Kerr for UCSC’s origins, but the story is more complicated than that. Moreover, it is less than wholly clear (to me) that McHenry had much, if any, pre-existing commitment to the collegiate form that was basic to UCSC or, for that matter, a very clear vision of what it might entail. McHenry was regarded by some as an able administrator, but no one has accused him of being a true visionary. The credit and blame are all Kerr’s.

According to most accounts, on becoming Chancellor of UC Berkeley in 1952, Kerr began to express particular concerns about the alienating nature of the large public university campus for students as well as the growing challenges to a liberal arts education in the face of rising Cold War demands on science and engineering. Randall Jarrell (1989: ii), who interviewed Kerr in 1987, observed that “At UC Berkeley he [Kerr] realized that in spite of the enriching benefits of an immense research university, many undergraduates suffered from lack of community and inadequate contact with faculty.” In reaction, Kerr began to imagine “a research university built around small residential colleges, with an emphasis on undergraduate education, close student-faculty interaction, and human-scale community life.”

With this vision, continues the canonical story, between 1952 and 1957, Kerr asked two faculty committees to consider how Berkeley might implement residential colleges (Noreña, 1999: 19-21; Chancellor, UC Berkeley, 1953-57). Two faculty groups were created to develop proposals that envisioned students living and learning together, with a significant fraction of their coursework taking place within a “college” unit. Close inspection of the two proposals, and associated communications among various parties, raise doubts about this simple narrative. It appears that the notion of a college system within a large public university was more the brainchild of social scientists and humanists at Berkeley than labor economist Kerr. Indeed, there are no letters in the archival files of the Berkeley Office of the Chancellor (Chancellor, UC Berkeley, 1953-57, 1957-60) to suggest that Kerr played any role in establishing the two committees, although he was certainly apprised of their deliberations.

On October 16, 1953, UC Berkeley philosophy professor and department chair, Stephen Pepper, (Pepper, 1953) wrote to Kerr, asking “Would it be possible to construct the new student housing units under contemplation in such a way that they could serve as small liberal arts colleges coordinated with the activities of the university as a whole?” Kerr responded favorably (Kerr, 1953) and met with Pepper in late 1954 to discuss the idea (VN, 1954). Little more happened until October 1955, when Pepper (1955) sent Kerr a more-detailed “memorandum developed by an ad hoc Faculty Club lunch table group who have discussed the project with enthusiastic interest and constructive suggestions... The main outline for the organization [of colleges] as an adaptation of the English College in Oxford or Cambridge to present
conditions in Berkeley....” The group’s proposal closely tracks the organization of the UCSC colleges as subsequently developed by Kerr and McHenry.

Kerr remained interested in the lunch table’s ideas but, when Pepper proposal made its way upward through various academic senate and university committees, their members raised objections that, by 1957, effectively killed the plan. Instead, it was proposed that the new Residence Halls should have “members of the faculty affiliated with them so as to furnish students closer ties with the academic life on a personal and informal basis... [that] might well furnish something of the climate which... faculty members provide” at Yale and Harvard (Hart, 1957). But no academic role was envisioned for either the faculty or the halls in this suggestion. Not until almost 50 years later, in 2005, was a small “Resident Faculty Program” was put into operation in several Berkeley residence halls (DeGuzman, 2018).

In 1957, the “Sanford-ten Broek” proposal was sent to Kerr by Berkeley Professor of Public Speaking Jacobus ten Broek and Stanford Professor of Psychology Nevitt Sanford (Chancellor, UC Berkeley, 1957-60; it is not clear from the archives whether they were aware of the Pepper plan). Sanford and ten Broek imagined a “one year experimental liberal arts program... to be in the hands of the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research.” The scheme was literally a psychology experiment, designed to allow a comparison between Berkeley’s conventional liberal arts approach and their program which would be “administered in accordance with stated hypotheses concerning the conditions of intellectual growth...[with] controls would be introduced and maintained in such a way to test the hypotheses” (Sanford & ten Broek, 1957: 1).

A subsequent version of the full Memorandum proposed a “two-year experimental liberal arts college” (Sanford & ten Broek, 1958; my emphasis) in “the hands of a research group or team” that would pursue goals similar to those in the initial proposal. Sanford and ten Broek sent their first memorandum to Kerr in August, 1957 and the edited version to the Executive Committee of the College of Letters and Sciences in April 1958 (Sanford & ten Broek, 1958). The Committee responded with “grave misgivings” and uncertainty as to how the program might be implemented (Cline, 1958). Three days after receiving this response, Sanford (1958) sent the new proposal to Kerr, urging him to consider an “independent experimental college,” autonomous of Letters and Sciences.

Kerr was on the cusp of becoming UC President and kicked the can to Vice-Chancellor E.W. Strong (1958). He assembled a “resumé” (Strong’s term) of the proposal, dated June 18, 1958, listing reasons for rejecting it, to which Kerr responded “I agree.” Sanford did not give up; in March 1960, he sent the proposal (Sanford, 1960) to the new Berkeley Chancellor, Glenn Seaborg, who reviewed it and, drawing on Strong’s summary, rejected it (Seaborg, 1960). Seaborg wrote that “a number of serious objections had been raised, which would be indicative of the difficulties to be overcome.” And there matters stood, until the late 1960s, when an experimental
college based on an entirely different scheme was launched at Berkeley (Tussman, 1969).

In his oral history of UCSC (McHenry, 1974), McHenry reports that Kerr asked him to draw on the Pepper and Sanford & ten Broek proposals for one of the new campuses and, in a 1958 memorandum (McHenry, 1974b: 82), proposed to Kerr that the new campus at Santa Cruz “be developed on a collegiate basis” (in 1958, however, the site in Santa Cruz had not yet been selected). McHenry says (1974b: 78) that in early 1961, “after the decision [for the Santa Cruz site] was made, then my imagination soared, and I began to get out little bits and pieces that I’d stored up over the years out of my mind and out of my files.”

A handwritten, undated note (McHenry, n.d., 1974a: 78) for a never-completed memoir, may shed some light here; in that note, McHenry cites an apparently influential 1957 letter from Dyke Brown (1957), described as the “Vice President of the Ford Foundation, graduate of the University of California, and a Rhodes scholar to the then President of Occidental College, Remsen Dubois Bird” (Bird, 1961). Brown argued that

> There is much to be said for trying to organize an American college on the Oxford system—especially one which is part of a state-supported university. The larger enrollments are falling increasingly on state institutions and the bigger they get the harder it is for anyone to get an education. If someone is willing to exercise a little imagination it should be possible to develop a campus as a confederation of smaller units, like Oxford. This has the advantage of keeping the units small, at the same time that indefinite growth is possible.... And I have a hunch that this could be done at a cost which is not out of reason (Brown, 1957).

McHenry exercised his “imagination” in a four-page memo to Kerr, dated June 26, 1961, entitled “Residential College Proposal for the Santa Cruz Campus,” (McHenry, 1961a). McHenry compared the Pepper and ten Broek/Levitt proposals and described the organization and operation of a “Cowell College” (which, of course, did not yet exist). The following year, he prepared a more-polished proposal (McHenry, 1962), entitled “A Tentative Proposal for Residential Colleges [at Santa Cruz].” In response to the question “what is a residential college?” McHenry wrote that it is “an educational unit of a university that combines to a substantial extent the functions of an academic unit of administration with co-curricular aspects of undergraduate student life—living, dining, social, athletic, and other” (McHenry, 1962: 1). One of the goals of such a college would be “To elevate the prestige and importance of undergraduate teaching” (id.).

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50 I have not been able to find this memo in the McHenry archives at UCSC and it is not clear that such a memo ever existed.

51 Remsen Dubois Bird (1961), by the way, thought Monterey a much better site than Santa Cruz.
McHenry’s proposal also mentions “schools” in “Humanities, Social Sciences, Physical Sciences or Life Sciences…to which the discipline of the major is assigned.” Moreover, “the colleges would be closely related to the schools, each college faculty member would be on joint appointment with the school that included his discipline” (McHenry, 1962: 2). This arrangement presaged the eventual creation of the “Divisions” and Boards of Studies.

The archival memos, proposals and discussions between Kerr and McHenry suggest there might have been something of a struggle over both college structure and physical design, and the relationship of the latter to the academic organization of the university. Kerr preferred a more dispersed layout, which would facilitate the relative autonomy of the colleges by making movement among them more difficult. McHenry opted for more clustering of facilities and (Kerr, 1962a; McHenry, 1962; Kerr, 1962c). In the former instance, the separation would encourage each college to develop a more comprehensive curriculum—at least for lower division students—while the latter would make sharing of facilities more feasible and reduce overall costs. Left largely unmentioned in all of this was the question of the relationship between the Colleges and the university administration, which later became a point of struggle.

IV. Oxbridge or Swarthmore?

What was the model or inspiration for the UCSC Colleges? The usual answer is “Oxbridge,” the collegiate system of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, about which much is imagined and little is known (by the wider public, at least). Here, I offer my very shallow understanding of the Oxbridge system, which is heavily informed by accounts of the origin of the UCSC colleges and several sabbaticals in the UK (albeit not at either Oxford or Cambridge). Those two English universities are composed of a number of old, mostly wealthy colleges that provide residence for undergraduates and “dons” and offer small, specialized “tutorials” conducted by the latter for the former. The dons seek to cultivate the particular strengths and talents of their students, playing an outsize role in shaping the future characters and trajectories of their charges. There is also a larger organization outside, in which the colleges are embedded, in which students pursue academic and technical specializations. The Oxbridge colleges pursue a craft-based approach to education; the rest of the two universities is a good deal more Fordist.

The UCSC colleges were never really designed to provide such craft-based instruction—although it was hoped their faculties might be able to provide direct supervision of qualified students. Craft-based education and small tutorials at a large institution require more faculty, which is quite costly. Oxbridge has a further advantage: more than 80% of the students they admit come from the “top two socio-economic groups” in the United Kingdom (Weale, Adams & Bengtsson, 2017; Oxford, 2019: Table 3.1), and wealthy students from upper class families have deep pockets.
This cannot be said of the newer “red brick” universities that, like UCSC, were only opened during the 1960s.

The second edition of Ted Tapper and David Palfreyman’s (2011a) magisterial study of Oxford, _The Collegiate University_ delves deeply into definitions of “college.” Among other sources, they cite the OED (2002), which describes a college as

> A community or corporation of clergy living together on a foundation for religious service, etc. Now chiefly Historical; A society of scholars incorporated within, or in connection with, a University, or otherwise formed for purposes of study or instruction: esp. An independent self-governing corporation or society (usually founded for the maintenance of poor students) in a University, as the College of the Sorbonne in the ancient University of Paris, and the ancient colleges of Oxford and Cambridge.

The Oxbridge colleges were founded largely to teach clergy in small groups; they were never intended to provide undergraduates with a refuge from a research university (Jarrell, 1989: ii). Only over the last 150 years or so did they begin to take on secular education (this matters because religious practices are deeply woven into the “traditions” of the colleges). Most of the Oxbridge colleges are well funded, holding sizable endowments and valuable real estate, which allows them to cover operations and maintenance as well as salaries.

Was Oxbridge the model for UCSC? The similarities between UCSC and Oxbridge appear to have more to do with the term “college” than anything else. In _Importing Oxbridge_, Alex Duke (1996) argues this point unequivocally. In his oral history (1989: 7), Kerr states that “one alternative was to have a campus which was on the British model which Santa Cruz is.” But there is nothing more there about the model; all that Kerr says (1989: 9) is that he and McHenry

> saw eye-to-eye on the idea of trying a campus which would have the advantages of a big university in terms of the library, cultural programs, laboratories [but] also the advantages of a series of small colleges with [a] sense of community and a better opportunity to make friends than on a big, homogenized campus.

Tapper and Palfreyman (2011b) are less certain about the Oxbridge origin than Duke, citing a personal communication from Sheldon Rothblatt that

> The Swarthmore ideal of liberal education with a stress on ethical conduct remained with him [Kerr] forever, best illustrated by his dream of making the new University of California at Santa Cruz, which he founded, into a west coast version of collegiate Cambridge University. What he had in mind was a publicly financed ‘Swarthmore in the redwoods.’
Indeed, in the first volume of his memoirs (2001: 300), Kerr writes that “The Santa Cruz dream lives on in their lives, as Swarthmore 1932 does in mine - ‘Swarthmore in the Redwoods’ did exist for at least those years.” Arguably, Kerr’s dream was driven more by emotion and youthful experience than any particular drive to replicate Oxbridge. But Swarthmore was a small college, whereas the Oxbridge colleges were embedded in a larger organization, as would be UCSC.

The source of Dean McHenry’s model for the UCSC colleges is less clear. He relates (McHenry, 1974b: 82) that Kerr alerted him to the Pepper and ten Broek and Sanford reports, of which he was previously unaware (id., p. 81). But neither his 1961 memo to Kerr (McHenry, 1961a) nor a second one written a year later (author unknown, 1962a) says anything about either Oxbridge or Swarthmore. It was not until 1963, two years after being appointed Chancellor of UCSC, that McHenry travelled to the United Kingdom to inspect Ruskin College at Oxford as well as a number of the new, “red brick” state-supported universities (virtually all universities in the UK are now “state-supported” but they differ considerably in wealth and income).

McHenry’s notes (1963) from the trip are fairly dry and matter-of-fact, but what is striking is that most of what the British called red-brick campuses—to distinguish them from the old “stone” universities—were committed to avoiding departments and several were planned around “residential colleges.” The University of Lancaster, for example, planned for both “Colleges and the Boards of Studies,” this before the latter was even thought of at Santa Cruz.

Tapper and Palfreyman (2011b: 201) suggest, therefore, that it was the new state universities—especially Kent, Lancaster and York—and not Oxbridge, that provided the model for UCSC:

Three of the new universities (Kent, Lancaster and York) established residential colleges, which performed essentially cultural, pastoral and social functions. Although the content and structure of the degree programs and the pattern of examinations at all nine foundations were the responsibility of the university (which, as we have noted, was not the case at UCSC in its early years), the most common academic administrative model was a sharing of the obligations that these generated between a department and a school of studies, with the departments having an established disciplinary focus and the schools of studies embracing either a broad academic approach or a field of studies (see also Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010: 59-74).

Tapper and Palfreyman argue, however, that an important (if not the most important) factor in sustaining an effective collegiate arrangement—which the British universities have, for the most part, not succeeded in doing—is a form of administrative federalism.

By the ‘federal principle’ is meant the habit or practice of relating different segments of a higher education organization or system to some larger whole or centre. It is possible to dispose of the federal principle altogether and simply have a centre, or what is called a ‘unitary’ model, but the federal principle has features that, for historical and other reasons are considered desirable, have proven valuable, and are regarded as indispensable.

In this instance, the key “federal” issue would be the distribution of academic authority and responsibilities among colleges, divisions, boards of study (later departments) and administration. McHenry was a staunch Federalist but, at the Founding, this “balance-of-powers” was poorly understood and not well defined and that lack became the rock on which the UCSC ship of education eventually foundered.

V. Physical design

The Colleges were at the core of the UCSC vision, designed as near self-contained instructional entities that would provide a liberal arts education for undergraduates in the context of a large public research university. On most campuses, the unit responsible for undergraduate education is a College or School of Arts and Letters (or Sciences) that enrolls students not pursuing professional tracks (e.g., engineering, business, medicine), includes appropriate departments and fills general education requirements. The conventional model was deemed too big and impersonal by Kerr, McHenry and others, mesmerized as they were by a pastoral vision of trees, green lawns, tutors and gowns.

A typical college of letters and sciences may enroll 10,000 or more students, whereas the UCSC Colleges would be, at most, composed of 1,000 students (of whom only a fraction would be lower division). Furthermore, typical undergraduate colleges provide important administrative functions, with departments physically dispersed among many buildings. The UCSC Colleges, by contrast, were imagined as unitary operations, each with its own curriculum, advising, housing, student activities and administration.

Consequently, two primary considerations shaped the layout of the campus: the physical design of the Colleges and other necessary buildings, and instructional planning within the Colleges and outside of them. The first was largely a matter of cost considerations, decisions about landscape and the propinquity of the physical colleges to other facilities and buildings; the second required developing and implementing a viable undergraduate curriculum. A third was how the Colleges and campus would be organized and administered, but this consideration was given short shrift at the founding. No one had any experience in creating the institution of which they dreamed, which meant a great deal of pushing and pulling. Moreover, there was considerable skepticism of the vision from external reviewers.

52 The colleges at UC San Diego enroll on the order of 4-5,000 students and are large enough to offer their own curricula and house departments.
Physical design and planning for the campus began almost as soon as the Santa Cruz site was chosen. It was not an easy one to work with, given the terrain, forests and geology (Warnecke & Associates, 1963; LRDP, 2005). Below the treeline were open meadows; above it, as Jack Wagstaff (1977:626), the first campus architect, put it, “a number of knolls, and arroyos, and then more knolls, and the buildable sites are in the minority....” The site was underlain by beds of limestone and marble, and there were sinkholes across the site, which made building a risky endeavor.

The original design, moreover, was fairly banal and sought to avoid the knolls and holes; as Jim Clifford (2015:14) describes it

> The earliest plans for the university placed it in the meadow. Construction there would probably have been simpler and less expensive, with shorter sewer and utilities lines and fewer bridges. Initial sketches show a rather conventional campus, with clustered buildings, esplanades, and a bell or clock tower.... accompanied by residential and commercial developments. UCSC was conceived as an outgrowth of the urban structure.

This design was rejected by Thomas D. Church (1962), the consulting landscape architect for the campus. He counseled building in and with the redwoods and topography. His proposal for the site became the basis for UCSC’s design and construction.

Church’s proposal was a general one; specifics were more complicated: how would the colleges be sited in relation to one another? In June 1962, as the educational and academic plans were being bruited about, a preliminary physical plan for the campus was presented to the Regents. This triggered a series of exchanges between Kerr and McHenry about the location of the colleges and other facilities proposed by the campus architect (some of the essential documents are not in the McHenry archives). By this time, Kerr seems to have rethought his earlier notion of spreading out the colleges, favoring instead clusters of three or four colleges that, together, would provide everything required for undergraduate education. But McHenry (1962a) was dubious about Kerr’s approach, writing that

1. 100% of instruction in the college would deny the student the advantages of a university (superior laboratories, great lecturers, stimulus of grad student contacts, identification with a discipline, access to unusual languages, etc.)

2. A self-contained cluster of 3 or 4 colleges would provide a poor basis for future research and graduate distinction. Separate (by cluster) but equal (to campus-wide) laboratory and library facilities are bound to cost more.

McHenry (1962a) concluded “We should strive for a balance between the central whole and self-governing parts, the classic problem of federalism everywhere” (federalism does not normally concern itself with physical planning). He wanted the Colleges to be built around the core campus, providing easy access to labs, the library and administration.
Kerr (1962a) was not happy about giving up his clusters. He reacted to the centralization proposed in the initial physical plan by expressing concerns about the apparent relationship between campus design and academics:

> You can imagine how surprised I was to see the plan! We had talked about a series of colleges like Cal. Tech., Swarthmore, Williams, Reed, Carleton, Pomona—each with its own individuality; we also talked about Oxford and Cambridge. The emphasis was to be on close faculty-student relationships within a face-to-face group, on undergraduates initially, on teaching; and I was enthusiastic. What I saw as the most prominent feature of the place was a huge parking lot that looked like a couple hundred acres.... This looked more like a Berkeley or Los Angeles in the woods...

He followed up with a memo (Kerr, 1962b: 1) on August 2 about “how to get started without the physical ‘core’ that appeared in the plan, suggesting “that a series of ‘Claremont Colleges’ would be our closest model,” with each college functioning as a substantially autonomous unit.

McHenry was not pleased with Kerr’s idea. He responded (McHenry, 1962b: 1) on August 5 that “What surprised me [in your two memos] was your disagreement with the academic assumptions, each of which had been furnished presented to you in memos over the past thirteenth months” (strikeout and emphasis in original). In particular, he feared that college clusters would interfere with students’ loyalty to the individual colleges and “prevent the advantages of intimacy from being realized.... What would be left of states’ rights in Maine, Vermont et al. if from the beginning there had been a New England Confederation standing between states and nation?” (id.: 2).

McHenry (1962b: 3) was also concerned that college clusters would tilt the campus balance toward undergraduate education at the expense of research and graduate students: “Perhaps Claremont group is our nearest model in USA, but I am inclined to think Oxford and Cambridge are worthy of equal attention.” He pointed out that three decades of graduate work at Claremont had “achieved little distinction; neither has research and other creative work been outstanding. They have done a good job with undergraduates. That we can imitate.” McHenry worried that Kerr seemed “to be shifting the center of gravity so far toward the undergraduate function that we may be unable to attract an academic staff of the professional competence required for graduate leadership” (McHenry, 1962: 2-3). Kerr responded (Kerr, 1962c) “Just for the record—I have supported the central concept of the Academic Plan at all times. My objection was that the Physical Plan you presented to me was at great variance with the Academic Plan.”

The differences between the two visions appear in a document “received” by McHenry on October 5, 1962, entitled “Dispersed vs. Centralized Resume, Kerr-McHenry Problem Resume” (author unknown, 1962b; a more detailed listing can be...
found in author unknown, 1962c). According to the list, Kerr preferred greater distance among the colleges in order to cultivate student loyalty to each one—which seems to contradict the exchange above—whereas McHenry wanted the colleges near a campus core, so that students could get from one class to another within 15 minutes. Physical design became an enduring contradiction for the campus. Building an academic core as the locus of both teaching and research would undermine college autonomy, whereas postponing construction of a core would allow the first colleges to develop more self-sufficient curricula while, possibly, obstructing research and graduate programs as resources were diverted to undergraduate instruction.

In the end, McHenry’s preferences won, in the interest of economy rather than pedagogy. This was reflected in the placement of colleges in pairs, back-to-back, in order to share kitchens, and the construction of core facilities, such as a central library and core research facilities, rather than the college-specific services and functions preferred by Kerr. It is not too much to say that the physical design and early construction of the campus had unanticipated impacts on the organization and operation of the university, but it almost initiated a move away from functional and symbolic decentralization. Had the colleges been sited at a distance from each other, with college-specific services and functions, the costs would have been higher but the autonomy and authority of each college somewhat greater and perhaps more difficult to diffuse and eliminate in the longer term (as related in Chapter 9).

VI. The devil in the details

Physical planning was one task while academic planning quite another. How would this newly imagined campus develop and put its instructional goals into practice? An academic plan was required, one that provided, at least, the bare bones of curricular design and college operation. Despite the term, there is normally little that is academic in “academic planning” (see Chapter 9). In the earliest documents, there was little or nothing about courses, curricula or majors and no one was asked to provide a detailed schedule of classes to be taught over the following one or two or five years. That level of granularity might have been too much to expect.

As a general rule, development of a new academic program is a slow, laborious process, especially if more than one person is involved. Once the focus or the discipline has been defined, the particular sequence of courses that will “deliver” specialized instruction must be worked out. While there are many templates from other universities available for more-or-less conventional disciplines—sociology, psychology, etc.—these must be tweaked to the particular goals and aspirations of the new program. Academic epistemologies are not fixed and there are often struggles over the “correct” way to teach a discipline. Moreover, faculty designing the curriculum for new programs are often inclined to prioritize their individual specializations leading to struggles about what to offer. At public universities, there are usually multiple levels of review, modification and approval, and it can require three or more years to move from conception to operation.
An academic plan encompassing multiple educational units must be seen, therefore as something of an *aspirational* document, offering visions, missions, organizational goals and objectives, and how to get there. It is closer to an architectural schematic design than working designs that specify connections and connectors. Most such plans are never fulfilled to the letter (even approximately), since the environment in which implementation takes place is uncertain and subject to external shocks and pressures as well as internal sluggishness and resistance. At the same time, it is critically important that the leadership of an organization demonstrates its competence and inspires confidence in its ability to plan for the present and forecast the future. In Chapter 9, I examine how this contradiction plays out in planning; here, I tell the story of UCSC’s and Cowell College’s first plans and pushback by critics.

Provision of a plausible plan was essential, because early approval by the Board of Regents was required in order to proceed with the campus development (see Kerr, 1962c). To assist him in this task and because no faculty had yet been hired, McHenry sought outside help (nd: 2; 1974b). During the summer of 1962, he brought in two consultants whom he believed had useful experience with and insights into developing a college-based academic plan, Neill Megaw from Williams College and Karl Lamb from Michigan, which was also experimenting with residential college forms. According to McHenry (n.d.), “Megaw had written a prize-winning essay describing a model small college. Lamb had doubly pertinent experience as a Yale undergraduate and as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford” (on Megaw’s essay, see McHenry, 1961b). As knowledgeable as the two might have been, neither had more than limited administrative and teaching experience, especially in small residential colleges of the kind envisioned for Santa Cruz. Nor had they previously worked on any academic plans.


> we worked the summer sitting around our dining room table most of the time and shooting the breeze and then writing memoranda...many of the ideas that got incorporated in the academic plan, ultimately, came from these discussions of what it would be like to have Susan B. Anthony and George Bernard Shaw and Kim College [sic] and so on.

Two documents emerged from this “shooting the breeze.” The first, a 37-page “Educational Plan” (Megaw & Lamb, 1962), focused on both the rationale for and organization of the new campus. The second (Megaw, 1962) was philosophical and practical, with the title “Educational Objectives.” Both documents proposed thematic or disciplinary orientations for the colleges; the latter included details on possible student course requirements.53

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53 This document included a long list of hypothetical college names and themes, including Heller (public affairs), Huxley (scientific and humanistic), Kim (foreign language), Anthony (liberal arts for women), Shaw (liberal-arts education for those over 40), Wright (creative arts), Gibbon (History and Classics), The Chateau (International House), Paine (“unconventional and even rebellious”), Audubon (Biology, premedical, forestry, the out-of-doors), Mead (Anthropology. Comparative society, Human
The first draft of the “Provisional Academic Plan for the Santa Cruz Campus” is dated October 12, 1962 and bears little resemblance to the documents produced by McHenry, Megaw and Lamb. This was submitted to the Board of Regents on November 16, 1962 and “provisionally approved.” The final Academic Plan (1965) was approved by the Regents in January 1965 “in principle as a guide for the development of the campus, without commitment proposals contained therein which require further review and approval.” The draft and final versions did not differ significantly, but the archives suggest that the struggles to shape the campus and academics over the intervening two years were fairly serious.

As the Provisional Academic Plan was being revised during 1963, it underwent close scrutiny by outsiders. In late 1963, apparently concerned by the slow progress of the revision process, Kerr appointed an “Academic Advisory Committee for Santa Cruz.” The committee was chaired by UCSD Medical School Dean Robert Tschirgi, with UCB Professor of Nutritional Sciences Gordon Mackinney and UCB Professor of Linguistics Murray Emeneau as members. Over February and March 1964, this committee convened six times, and made several visits to Santa Cruz to meet with McHenry and his staff. A March 6 memo (author unknown, 1963: 2, possibly from Karl Lamb) to McHenry reported on a meeting of the “Tschirgi Committee,” as it came to be called, observing that “the committee is not really sure what President Kerr wants” and suggested that their eventual report could be quite detailed and

might contain the following: 1. A description of curricular structure...; 2. A schedule of faculty time...; 3. Description of kinds of programmed instruction and self-learning devices which might be used; 4. Use of personnel, both faculty and students, which might be borrowed from other campuses to help us in the initial program...; and 5. Some statement as to exactly how the application of the criteria for promotion will be changed at Santa Cruz so that other matters in addition to research and publication will be counted (id: 2-3).

Gordon Mackinney, according to the memo’s author (id: 1), openly expressed “a feeling of no confidence in the Santa Cruz staff,” especially where costs were concerned. Tschirgi thought that too “many important decisions shall be deferred until the faculty members are on hand,” a point he continued to emphasize throughout the following months.

On March 23, Tschirgi (1964a: 1-2) wrote to Kerr that

the committee is uneasy about the success of the Santa Cruz dream...because the committee does not believe that a sufficiently explicit statement yet exists of how this is to be achieved... The generalizations and grand strategy about

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Evolution), Einstein (Brainville), and even “Vocational Colleges” (professional schools). For some reason, Darwin was left out. Cowell was never mentioned.
the proposed system are useful and exciting, but as yet there appears to have been little investigation of the difficulties of implementation.

He also expressed doubts that the new campus would be able to find and hire appropriate faculty because “If the philosophy for Cowell is to be undergraduate education as a way of life with carefully designed, integrated survey courses, semi-tutorial instruction—a ‘redwood lyceum’—it will require initial faculty members willing to dispense largely with their research efforts for a time…. Tschirgi did not think that “academicians who are primarily active in research and have thereby received high public acclaim” would be willing to do this (Tschirgi, 1962a: 2).

The “Tschigi Report” submitted to Kerr on May 19, 1964 (Emeneau, Mackinney & Tschirgi, 1964) ran to almost 30 detailed pages, and included “recommendations regarding”

1. a suggested undergraduate curriculum for Cowell College, with major fields and required courses;
2. estimates of teaching staff needed by October 1, 1965, in each subject-matter area;
3. a schedule of faculty recruitment;
4. the qualifications, interests, and commitments of faculty members appropriate to the needs of Cowell College;
5. policies and practices regarding faculty appointments, promotions and honors;
6. the establishment of undergraduate degree requirements;
7. proportions of freshman and junior students admitted in 1965; and
8. specific plans which must be made soon beyond those for Cowell College.

Those at UCSC were not pleased; according to McHenry (1974b: 235), the Tschirgi Report “just [arrived without notice]…there was a dull thud, and that was it…. we got this darn thing special delivery, and we looked at it, and we were just sick.” Byron Stookey, hired by McHenry to oversee academic planning, observed (Stookey, 1964: 1) that “the commendable thing about the Tschirgi report is the conciseness of its confession that the University of California, though skilled in logistics, is insensible in the planning of education…. The report is full of asphalt playgrounds—empty, self-satisfied gestures in the direction of a better life.”

Karl Lamb (1964: 1) thought the report was “hostile to Santa Cruz and its purposes,” and asked McHenry “How much of the Tschirgi Committee report must be reflected in any revisions of the academic plan… [because] it seems clear that the Committee has no confidence in the competence of the present Santa Cruz staff, or any staff which might be recruited for Santa Cruz…. The committee, Lamb complained, “presumed to make a lot of decisions for us which we have felt could only be made by the faculty which is on hand to implement them.” The level of detail demanded and provided in the Report left the new UCSC staff feeling (perhaps justly) that their competence and judgment were being challenged.

What does one do when faced by such a situation? The Santa Cruz team’s response to the Report was, for the most part, to downplay or even ignore it (Lamb, 1964;
This did not make Tschirgi happy, writing that that [McHenry’s] Academic Plan was promised for August, but had not been made available to the [Tschirgi’s] Committee. This led Tschirgi to suspect that little or no planning had been done for Cowell, and that “it is Dean’s [McHenry] sincere conviction that very little planning should be done before the initial faculty is on hand” (Tschirgi, 1964b). On August 19, Tschirgi (1964b) reported to Kerr that he had visited Santa Cruz on August 3, 10 and 17 and given the runaround, seeing no indication of any further movement on the Academic Plan. Moreover, he suggested, “perhaps I am being paranoid, but I seem to feel that I am being gently and graciously guided into other channels at Santa Cruz.”

In the event, the first published plan for “Cowell College—A Statement of Aims” (Smith, 1964), with the label “Confidential Draft,” did not appear until that November. In that document, recently appointed Cowell Provost Page Smith wrote (p. 3)

I believe the basic and most important general mandate to the University of California at Santa Cruz is the mandate for openness and flexibility, for far-sighted and imaginative experimentation based on the need “to make the university seem smaller as it grows larger,” the need to create, in other words, a number of communities of scholars within the larger boundaries of the university. Cowell College will be the first of these intellectual communities.

And, he continued (Smith, 1964: 3-4; emphases in original)

The initial charge to the faculty of Cowell [NB: which did not yet exist] is to develop a “distinguished program in the liberal arts which challenges traditional habits of teaching and curricular organization.” The promise of meeting that challenge begins with the physical size of Cowell: six hundred students and thirty-five “fellows” or faculty members. In the vast conglomerate of most modern universities, efforts to create intellectual communities on a human scale have to fight against the architecture, against the scattered and largely incoherent miscellany of buildings that make up the university campus. At Cowell the architecture will work for the kind of curriculum, and the kind of relationship between people, to which the Santa Cruz venture is committed. Here, bricks and mortar will represent the College’s determination to place the undergraduate in the center of the educational process.

Smith then offered a general description of the curriculum and, in an appendix, enumerated the teaching methods and specific course lists and programs for a typical Cowell undergraduate. But all of this was expressed in fairly general terms; specifics would have to wait until the faculty arrived.

The Cowell Plan annoyed Tschirgi (1964c), who expressed misgivings and told Kerr, “I do not know if the existing plans are sufficient to orient the accumulating faculty toward a common goal or whether the structure is too vague to prevent the formation
of conventional largely autonomous educational and research fiefs.” And, he continued,

I would personally prefer somewhat more acute and refined planning, and trust that faculty could be recruited to function within these preconceived directives. The alternative, which is being followed at Santa Cruz, is to minimize predestination and trust that the accumulating faculty will, in concert, develop solutions to the organizational and academic problems.... Will they at Santa Cruz? I don’t know, but I tend to worry.

Tschirgi was further concerned that the degree of “freedom” desired by Smith was “utopian.”

to achieve the greatest freedom of academic action requires the maximum care in planning and organization. For every free choice given to student or teacher within prescribed student-faculty ratios, budget limitations, degree requirements, societal restrictions, etc. there must be a quantum of organization to permit this freedom without jeopardizing the opportunities of others.54

To clarify these matters, in late summer or early fall 1964, Tschirgi (1964d) sent to McHenry a series of “Questions Which Might Be Profitably Explored in the Santa Cruz Plans,” to which McHenry responded somewhat laconically (McHenry, 1964a). Tschirgi (1964c) then complained to Kerr that he did not “find Dean’s answers entirely satisfactory,” perhaps hoping that this might put pressure on the Santa Cruz staff.

On November 11, Kerr asked McHenry to provide more detailed answers to Tschirgi’s questions. After consultations with Provost Smith, McHenry (1964b) replied to Kerr on November 30. In that letter, McHenry (1964b: 1) laid out the proposed process for curricular and academic matters and who would be responsible for what, explaining that “Curricular matters relating to a particular field would be handled by the faculty fellows of the discipline or disciplines involved, subject to review by the provost and the body of fellows of the college, and subsequently by the campus-wide Academic Senate.”

Budgets for instruction and research would be within the purview of the divisional deans and subject to approval by the Chancellor. Curricular plans and programs “might initiate from a variety of sources,” including provosts, colleges, the Academic Senate and various administrative offices (id.: 2). Faculty appointments would be made jointly between the colleges and divisions, subject to Senate review and approval by the Chancellor. “It will be the responsibility of the deans, with jurisdiction over the disciplines, to convene the faculty members of that field from time to time in order to secure advice on matters of interest to the disciplines.”

54 This is reminiscent of Karl Polanyi’s observation (1944/1957) in The Great Transformation that “the free market was planned; planning was not.”
It was in this letter that the term “Boards of Studies” first appeared:

As faculty members in the disciplines get too numerous, a committee system might emerge, or the discipline might be represented by a “board of studies” composed of those elected or appointed. A determined effort will be made, however, to avoid the rigidity and bureaucracies that are commonly associated with academic departments (id: 3).

McHenry (id: 3) acknowledged that the colleges would exercise outsized influence during the campus’s early years “by virtue of [their] role in appointments and promotions.” It would be necessary, therefore, to “develop some countervailing power in the bands of the groups of disciplines, as represented by the divisional deans, to ensure that the tasks of research and graduate education are not subordinated permanently.” (One imagines feral disciplinary “bands” wandering around the campus in search of countervailing power.)

The final version of the Academic Plan (1965: 1)—which did not include the Cowell Statement of Aims—remained mostly unchanged from the provisional one (1962), saying that

The plan that follows sketches broad outlines, indicates general directions, states purposes and goals, and suggested some means of implementation. Because of the unusual nature of the academic program proposed and the need for experimentation with new methods and procedures, much latitude must be left to individual colleges and those who staff them.

Tschirgi (1965) did manage to get in one final blow. In late January 1965, the UCSC administrative staff convened a four-day conference for the faculty to develop curricular plans for the colleges. Following a keynote by McHenry, attendees met in small, discipline-based groups. Tschirgi (1965: 1) joined the “natural science team” of four faculty members. But, he complained, McHenry “made no mention of what these groups were supposed to consider. He laid no ground rules, defined no boundaries, and gave no orientation.” And the group came to no firm conclusions, at least on the day Tschirgi was there. He wrote (1965:2), “In general, the outcome of this group discussion was disappointing—though expected.”

After all, most of these scholars are research scientists who have had little occasion to spend much time considering new approaches to undergraduate education. They are relatively naive and untutored in this area and cannot be expected to bring forth exciting non-traditional curricular plans de novo. That is why, all along, I have advocated more specific planning by more knowledgeable educators for these new faculty to react to. Far from resenting such suggestions, they would have welcomed more orientation.
The overall paradox in all of this was that the Tschirgi Committee took the asserted commitment to undergraduate education in the colleges quite seriously and was willing to put research and graduate education in second place, for a time. But Committee members also seemed to believe that curriculum development was not something that just any academic could do, at least not without some guidance from people more experienced in the process (as Tschirgi, at least, claimed to be). In the long run, the Committee’s concerns were borne out: at UCSC, intense undergraduate education in the Colleges could not be reconciled with the research university and graduate education, as we shall see.

VII. Concluding thoughts

How did these plans turn out? In the following chapter, I offer a broad “potted history” of UCSC, organized around individuals rather than units or the system, that addresses the question. Here, I consider the tensions that arise from the development and implementation of an educational “imaginary” (see note 6) that seeks to break the higher education mold, as UCSC tried to do. The relevant sociological and institutional question is: how do we get from the idealistic vision to the material reality? Actual practice involves dealing with a host of obstacles, detours and contradictions that inevitably emerge in creating an organization. Three points seem germane.

First, whatever the origins of the UCSC imaginary—the two Berkeley proposals; Oxbridge, Swarthmore, Claremont or the British red brick universities—conditions “on the ground” in the UC system were not especially auspicious for implementation. Standing in the way were the broad norms and specific rules and regulations governing a UC campus, the experience and opinions of those who thought they had a “better” idea, the resistance of various participants who also thought they knew better and even the physical landscape itself.

Second, no one involved in the design, construction and operation of the UCSC imaginary had any prior experience with such an outlier. Kerr had his undergraduate experience at Swarthmore, McHenry had his orders from Kerr, and the staff and faculty had vague notions of what they wanted. Rather than having a clear strategy based on prior efforts, as Tschirgi wanted, they had to improvise and, as genealogy warns us, sometimes had to backtrack or change trajectory.

Third, as we shall see in Chapters 7 and 8, within a few years of opening its doors, the vision collided with the reality of operating a real university and the difficulty of staffing it with faculty willing to eschew the *habitus* learned in graduate school and prior postings. One might even go so far as to say that UCSC was “another country,” whose mores, practices and languages had to be created and learned. Some faculty were able to integrate and become fluent members; others never quite fit in and struggled to make the campus more “normal” and comprehensible.
Does any of this still matter today? After all, today UCSC functions more or less normally, the socialization of the early years is quite weak, if it exists at all, and the impetus to change is stronger than ever. Organizations cannot wholly escape their origins. Topography and geography remain the same. Imaginaries don’t go away. The past is never dead.
Chapter 7

A Potted History of UCSC

“It must be recognized that the sheer magnitude of the task of starting an institution on a cow pasture accounts for much of the lack of coordination in planning” (Adams & Michaelsen, 1971: 41).

I. Introduction

While there are numerous accounts of the founding of UCSC and its first couple of decades (see, e.g., Adams & Michaelsen, 1971; Dressel, 1971; Grant & Riesman, 1978: 253-90; Von der Muhll, 1984; Noreña, 1999; Sinsheimer, 1994; Kliewer, 1999; Rogers, 2011; Tepper & Palfreyman, 2011b), little has been written about the period since about 1990. This chapter is my attempt to fill that lacuna, although it is a fairly selective “filling.”

I argued in earlier chapters that an institutional biography of an organization is better understood in genealogical (Foucault, 2003) rather than purely narrative terms. An institutional history is not the same thing as a “history of events” or “significant dates.” Nor is it a social history of the people and groups that comprised an organization’s members. In the sense that I apply it here, an institutional biography is a story or narrative of how an organization came to be, the structural and power relations over time, and who and what played a role in that process.

There are two ways to present such a narrative. One is roughly chronological, based on the premise that periodization is a useful organizing tool which reflects those significant forces and factors at work in and on the organization over time. The other is roughly functional material, based on the premise that the evolution or development of particular features of an organization have distinct effects and can be treated separately from others—hence my use of the term “potted history”. In practice, these approaches are crosscutting, in the sense that neither can be wholly distinguished from the other. In this chapter I attempt to weave these two narrative approaches, the chronological and the functional, into UCSC’s history of the past 30 years.

Building on my reading of various literatures, my 30 years of experience at UCSC, and Figure 1.1, I propose the “factors” in Table 7.1 as playing roles in shaping UCSC as a university (such factors can, of course, be generalized to other universities, with their particular histories and conditions). For historical purposes, I propose five periods for “the times of UCSC,” as shown in Table 7.2. Some might disagree with this categorization, but this division seems, to me, to reflect trends, tendencies and logics. I have also associated certain characteristics as well as chancellors with each

55 The OED Online defines “potted” as “figurative: Of a piece of information, work of literature, historical or descriptive account, etc.: put into a short and easily assimilable form; condensed, summarized, abridged.”
of these periods. Each particular chancellor has had contrasting ideas of what UCSC should be, varying management styles, and degrees of authority.

Table 7.1: Factors shaping UCSC as a university campus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Internal or external</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Institutional context (UC system)</th>
<th>Organizational response (UCSC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historical &amp; institutional</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>Reasons for creating new campuses &amp; supporting them</td>
<td>Cold War, Baby Boom, public university expansion</td>
<td>New UC campuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>Demand for educational opportunities</td>
<td>Expand California higher education systems</td>
<td>Meet South SF Bay demographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>Selected location</td>
<td>Equitable distribution of campuses across state</td>
<td>Attractive rural site at low cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional shape &amp; logic</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>What a university must do &amp; how to do it</td>
<td>Fordist mass education moving into market-based education</td>
<td>Craft-based in mass higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social norms &amp; pressures</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>Changes in power relations across society over time</td>
<td>Response to demography, social change, politics</td>
<td>Student movements, state interventions &amp; administrative responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources &amp; funding</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>Business cycle, state financial conditions &amp; capital flows for operation &amp; building</td>
<td>Provision of funding &amp; access to financing mechanisms according to individual campus needs</td>
<td>Constraints on funding &amp; capital flows: “cheap campus”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent events</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>Unanticipated events &amp; forces (e.g., Great Recession, Great Lockdown)</td>
<td>Adaptation through changes in organization, funding, provision of services &amp; goods</td>
<td>Budget cutting; big initiatives to bring in private donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>External &amp; internal</td>
<td>Rules &amp; regulations governing administration &amp; operations</td>
<td>Promulgated at system level, reshaped &amp; deployed locally</td>
<td>Local rules, procedures &amp; “get arounds”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission &amp; vision</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>What university should provide to students; UCSC exceptionalism</td>
<td>Training population for required skills &amp; services; provision of a public good; special education</td>
<td>Educational innovation in a large public university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning &amp; design</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>Efficient spatial layout &amp; architectural design</td>
<td>Link spaces &amp; buildings for easy access &amp; interactions</td>
<td>Design infrastructure to fit in landscape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational structure</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>Academic &amp; service units; power &amp; authority; relationships to each other</td>
<td>Situate faculty &amp; students in disciplines &amp; departments, and schools of disciplines</td>
<td>Situate faculty &amp; students in colleges &amp; boards of study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency &amp; individual autonomy</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>Individuals implement &amp; develop specific practices to meet requirements</td>
<td>Faculty &amp; staff inhabit roles with responsibilities, governed by rules &amp; regulations</td>
<td>Faculty &amp; staff initiate, resist, sabotage, innovate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

Table 7.2: The Times of UCSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period &amp; description</th>
<th>Institutional logic</th>
<th>Educational logic</th>
<th>Funding source</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Self-Identification</th>
<th>Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958-65: Genesis</td>
<td>Craft-based</td>
<td>Tutoring</td>
<td>UCOP</td>
<td>Imaginary</td>
<td>Field of Dreams</td>
<td>white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-74: Startup</td>
<td>Craft/Fordist</td>
<td>Liberal arts</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td>Pioneers</td>
<td>mostly white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-87: Retrenchment</td>
<td>Fordist</td>
<td>General education</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>Educators</td>
<td>mostly white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-2006: Crisis</td>
<td>Flexible Fordist</td>
<td>GE + STEM</td>
<td>Public &amp; private*</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>transitional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2020: Privatization</td>
<td>Market</td>
<td>STEM+</td>
<td>Mostly private</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>3 dominant minorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

*Growing fraction of funding from student tuition, extramural sources, donors
1. “Genesis” (chapter 6) begins in the late 1950s and ends in 1965, when UCSC opened for business. This period incorporates the conceptualization of UCSC, from its roots in proposals at UC Berkeley to create small colleges all the way to the final academic plan presented to the Regents in 1965. During most of this period, Dean McHenry was Chancellor.

2. “Startup” extends from 1965 to 1974, ending when Dean McHenry stepped down as Chancellor. This period was characterized by the effort to implement a liberal arts curriculum and radical pedagogy, and by a pioneering spirit and somewhat countercultural ethos. The campus was composed of a largely white, well-off student body.

3. “Retrenchment” (or “Refounding”), runs from 1974 through 1987, during which two chancellors (Christensen and Taylor) served relatively brief terms and a third (Sinsheimer) served for 10 years. Growth was limited, resources were fairly stagnant, the academic role of the colleges was severely eroded, a shift from liberal arts to science and research began, and the administrative bureaucracy expanded as new issues and problems appeared. Neither Christensen nor Taylor were strong Chancellors, while Sinsheimer sought to assert power to remake the campus in his own way.

4. “Crisis” begins around 1987 and runs through 2006. Over this period, there were repeated budget crises, state support declined while tuition as a funding source grew, campus demography began to change in major ways, with a concomitant shift toward multicultural campus politics, and the first stirrings of market logic appeared. Six Chancellors served during this period (Stevens, Pister, Greenwood, Denton, Chemers and Blumenthal).

5. “Privatization,” took off around 2006 and continues today, with further increases in tuition and a move toward privatization of support, growing emphasis on STEM education, graduate growth and research, a trend toward entrepreneurialism and innovation as a skill and strategy, mimicking the start-up culture of Silicon Valley, and rough equalization of Latino, Asian-American and white student enrollments. One Chancellor (Blumenthal) served during this period.

The “functional” principles guiding the campus, and changes in them, appear in Table 7.3. These goals reflect tensions and contradictions in the original vision and mission of the campus and the struggles to shift the principles (and practices) toward a more “normal” campus.
Table 7.3: The Tides of UCSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional area</th>
<th>Original plan/design</th>
<th>Change in plan/design</th>
<th>Consequences/impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogical principles &amp; practices</td>
<td>Liberal arts in the colleges; Specialization in the Boards</td>
<td>Shift away from liberal arts toward specialization</td>
<td>Broad education replaced by narrow competences in Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions of labor</td>
<td>Colleges responsible for lower division education &amp; interdisciplinary majors</td>
<td>Boards of Study responsible for upper division &amp; disciplinary education</td>
<td>Weak Boards dominated by Divisions responsible for almost all education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational focus &amp; purpose</td>
<td>Faculty selected for teaching skills, commitment to students, then research</td>
<td>Faculty selected for research skills &amp; visibility, then teaching</td>
<td>Shift to research emphasis &amp; away from teach, w/ casual lower-division instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical design</td>
<td>Decentralized to support college role &amp; instill loyalty, with central facilities</td>
<td>Construction of central core with colleges around the periphery</td>
<td>Research, disciplines, student housing are physical &amp; academic planning priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority, governance, administration</td>
<td>Provost &amp; Faculty responsible for running colleges; weak administration</td>
<td>Provost weakened &amp; administration expanded &amp; centralized; struggle over shared governance</td>
<td>Fractious faculty w/ fear of leadership; diminution of shared governance; expansion of bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author

1. **Pedagogical principles and practices**: A central goal of UCSC was the provision of a lower division, undergraduate liberal arts education through the Colleges, followed by disciplinary specialization. With changing economic conditions during the 1970s, the demand for disciplinary and professional training pushed liberal arts out of the picture, to be replaced by an inchoate notion of “general education.” Today, there is a strong emphasis on STEM disciplines, without any broader notion of the role of education in life and society. This lacuna has pretty much extinguished notions of a truly-interdisciplinary approach to scholarship and teaching.

2. **Divisions of labor**: The original design principle of UCSC placed responsibility for lower division, and some upper division, curriculum in the Colleges, with major specializations in the Boards of Studies (which were not formally established until the end of the first year of operation). Faculty were hired by both Colleges and Boards via the Divisions and were expected to teach in both. Over time, the academic role of the Colleges has almost vanished, even though they offer core courses and a wide range of electives, while departments have become the basic functional units.

3. **Organizational focus and purpose**: The contradiction between the principles of undergraduate teaching in the Colleges and research accomplishments as the currency of merit increases and promotions, at a research university, generated struggle during most of “Startup.” The primary focus tilted rather quickly toward research, especially since the rewards from the former were so meager. Today, quality of teaching is still part of regular personnel reviews but few, if any, faculty are denied salary increases as a result of poor teaching, whereas those with poor research records are almost guaranteed to be denied tenure, merit increases or further promotion.

4. **Physical design**: The original plan for UCSC was college-focused, envisioning as many as 20, spread out over a good portion of the campus’s 2,000 acres. Presumably, each of these colleges would have offered both housing and classrooms (and, potentially labs and studios). The first eight colleges were built in two clusters, a tight one on the east side of campus and a loose one on the west side. The last two colleges were built in the campus core. The Long Range Development Plan for 2020-
2040 envision up to four new colleges for a campus with 28,000 students, but this seems an unlikely scenario. As student enrollments have grown from 7,000 to almost 20,000, it has become more and more difficult to build on the Main Campus. A new "Coastal Campus," several miles away, now houses Ocean Sciences and Ecology and Evolution(ary Biology), to which students must commute for classes and lab work. An administrative satellite has opened in Scotts Valley, about five miles from the main campus. Efforts to create a satellite campus in Silicon Valley are recounted in Chapter 9.

5. Authority, governance, administration: Early administrative responsibilities were divided among College Provosts, Divisional Vice Chancellors and the Office of the Chancellor. The Academic Senate and Administration "shared governance" but, over time, and with the proliferation of administrative heads and units, power and authority has shifted toward Administration. The faculty can block or sabotage Administration initiatives and decisions but has limited power to initiate new projects and programs in the absence of Administration "champions."

Table 7.4: What mattered? What matters?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Genesis</th>
<th>Startup</th>
<th>Retrenchment</th>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Privatization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Historical</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political economy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Geography</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Institutional logic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social norms &amp;</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pressures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Resources &amp;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- to 0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funding</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bureaucracy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mission &amp; vision</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Planning &amp; design</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Organizational</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Agency &amp; individual</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Contingent events</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

++ Means very important; + means important; o means relevant; - means unimportant
Finally, the twelve external and internal factors listed in Table 7.1 have had significant impacts on UCSC. My subjective, periodized assessment of the relative importance of each of the 12 factors listed in Table 7.1 appears in Table 7.4. At the end of the day, I would argue, UCSC has been largely reactive to its external environment, with internal factors being strongly influenced by the pressures of and demands from the external environment. As a result, the campus has never been able to exercise the kind of autonomy or take the kinds of risk that would allow it to fully chart its own destiny.

II. Startup (1965-74)

“Startup” was not a very propitious time for either the University of California or a new experimental campus. “Genesis” took place during a period of prosperity, expansion of higher education, and ample Cold War funding. If there were limits and constraints on University expansion, these were not obvious. By 1965, however, these conditions had begun to disappear (Cowan, 2013: 93).

The “new social movements” for civil rights and free speech, antiwar and environmental mobilization, and hippies and yippies were gaining visibility and influence. The riots and uprisings, assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy and the invasion of Cambodia called into question the wisdom and legitimacy of the country’s leaders and elites. Finally, the Energy Crisis and business recessions of the early 1970s put a definitive end to the post-War economic boom. As students and parents became more concerned about post-graduate employment, and more wary of experimental pedagogies, applications to UCSC began to decline in number. The reputation of the campus came into question, and there was even fears that the campus might be closed.

The greatest impacts on UCSC during this period came from the external environment, where a conservative backlash was building against student activism, culminating in the gubernatorial election of 1966. Edmund (“Pat”) Brown, Governor of California from 1959 to 1967, was a Democrat fairly supportive of UC (although he shifted his commitment to the California state colleges; McHenry, 1974a: 103). Brown’s successor, Ronald Reagan, attacked UC and UC Berkeley in particular, tapping into what Richard Nixon later called the “silent majority” and carrying him to victory over Brown (De Groot, 1996). One of Reagan’s first actions was to ask the Board of Regents to fire UC President Clark Kerr, holding him responsible for student unrest at Berkeley. Kerr’s replacement, Charles Hitch, was no more able to impose calm than Kerr but, in contrast to Kerr, Hitch was a scientist and a somewhat colorless technocrat, thought to be relatively conservative and apolitical, and more to the Governor’s and Regents’ liking. Hitch was not interested in the Santa Cruz experiment and did not intervene to protect it, as had Kerr.

Throughout his tenure as governor, Reagan carried on attacks on higher education, and especially UC-Berkeley, viewing both as a waste of time and money. In a 1967 press conference, for example, the Governor expressed the view that taxpayers
should not be “subsidizing intellectual curiosity,” a position excluding essentially everything that did not focus on post-graduate employment (Berrett, 2015). Reagan found that attacks on UC were quite popular with conservatives and garnered even greater public support when he sent in local, county and state police and the California National Guard into Berkeley to put down student protests over the university’s plan to build housing on what came to be known as “People’s Park” (Pichirallo, 1969). Reagan was not shy about cutting state support for higher education, especially UC, a practice carried on by his successor, Jerry Brown, who was elected Governor of California in 1974.

To make matters worse, UCSC was hit especially hard by the period of relative fiscal austerity that began in 1964, for several reasons. First, McHenry had promised the Regents that UCSC would not cost, per student, more than any other of the new campuses, but there were significant startup costs, especially for capital projects, whose state funding would soon disappear. McHenry managed to keep to this commitment, but possibly to the detriment of the campus. Second, during the later 1960s, UCOP changed the formula for allocating state funds to individual campuses. Henceforth, graduate students would be counted as equivalent to 3.5 undergraduates. Because there were so few graduate students at UCSC, the new formula was to the campus’s disadvantage for many years. Third, although not yet recognized in the late 1960s, the economic prosperity of the post-war expansion was coming to an end, to be followed by the tax revolt of the late 1970s.

For a long time, there was a widespread belief that the founders of UCSC were fleeing unrest, repression and academic conservativism at Berkeley for academic freedom in Santa Cruz. This hardly seems likely with Dean McHenry as Chancellor. A popular but also incorrect myth passed around UCSC for decades was that the campus was designed without a central gathering place, such as Sproul Plaza at Berkeley, in order to deprive students of a focal point for their protests (Cowan, 2013: 149-50; even if true, it did nothing to prevent such protests). Decentralization was built into UCSC, via the placement of the colleges and other buildings and protection of the landscape. That there was no “center” to the campus was intentional (Church, 1962; Clifford, 2015); that this was a plot to disempower students was not part of the plan (even if it may have had that effect).

It may also be important to recall that the various movements of the 1960s and 1970s—social, technological, political—marked the beginning of the “high individualism” that characterizes American society today. The new social movements were more focused on individual freedoms and rights, rather than solidary group or collective rights. The solidarity and collective gains pursued by the “old” social movements—labor and civil rights; socialism—was not necessarily a goal of the “new” ones. Fred Turner (2013: 43, 44) has argued, for example, that some portion of the counterculture, especially in Silicon Valley, was part of a “world whose citizens…largely turned away from the traditional political mechanisms of law making and institution building toward the building of communities based on shared [individual] tastes and social networks…. ” (see also Marcuse, 1964). The rise of free
market libertarianism on the right paralleled this tendency on the left. High individualism subsequently came to permeate U.S. society and later, much of the world.

Many of the students who applied and came to UCSC during its first few years might be characterized as radical, freethinking and individualist and many who did not arrive in this frame of mind were converted to it. The 1960s and ‘70s were an era of “do your own thing,” and students and faculty did theirs. Various practices on campus, such as drug taking and “intervisitation” (i.e., members of the opposite sex in dorms) did not endear students to the residents of the City of Santa Cruz who were, at the time, quite conservative (Ronald Reagan received 61.5% of the Santa Cruz County vote in 1966; Leip, 2016, but see Gendron & Domhoff, 2008). The City Fathers welcomed UCSC in 1960 but were less sure about it by 1965. McHenry (1974a: 393-96) tells the story of a group of mostly underage Cowell students partying on the beach, several of whom were arrested for possession of alcohol (and later released), and his fear that the City Police and Sheriff’s Department might stage a raid on the campus in a search for illegal drugs.

The period from 1965 to roughly 1971 was one of building: a new college opened almost every year and the infrastructure expanded. Even so, the struggles over the organization of the campus began early and continued, manifest primarily in the division of labor between Colleges and Boards of Studies (which were not part of the original design, at least not as the “proto-departments” they became). These struggles focused on control of the curriculum as well as the perennial problem of research vs. teaching, which raised questions about faculty roles in the Colleges (see Chapter 9).

Despite the strenuous efforts of the College provosts and fellows, by the beginning of the 1970s, the Colleges were already losing their central proposed role in providing a liberal arts education (Academic Senate, 1971; see also Chapter 6). Boards of Studies began to take up more and more of the instructional burden, even as the Colleges sustained their role in hiring, personnel reviews and faculty salaries. Some of the oral histories suggest that this arrangement could not be sustained, but Dean McHenry was so committed to the original plan that he met any and all suggestions for change or reform with hostility (Marcum, 2014: 7; Ellis, 2014: 228). Consequently, the period between roughly 1971 and 1974 saw general stagnation.

III. Retrenchment & Refounding (1974-87)

In 1973, Dean McHenry announced that he would retire at the end of that academic year. The early enthusiasm for and interest in the Founders’ plan was in decline, especially with the arrival of new faculty trained in conventional universities. The workloads placed on faculty divided between College and Boards were considerable, since both, as well as the Academic Senate, each had committees that required filling. Even as they were sitting in endless meetings, faculty were also expected to
conduct high-quality research, which gradually became the primary currency for merit increases and promotions. The goals of the founders were beginning to look dated, dysfunctional and even utopian.

At the same time, the external environment imposed severe pressures on students and finances. First, as noted earlier, economic recessions hit hard during the early 1970s as the dollar was delinked from gold, oil prices rose and high inflation rates began to kick in. Second, the Vietnam War, which had motivated a great deal of student protest, was winding down and the conservative counterrevolution was winding up. Third, the market for “experimental” campuses was softening, especially as the weak economy drove students and parents to look more closely at pre-professional education. Finally, the flow of applications to UCSC began to decline, leading to short-term uncertainties about academic planning and long-term ones about campus enrollment targets.

The result was an internal crisis, reflected in Academic Plans (see Chapter 10), power struggles between Colleges and Boards of Study, and major turnovers in Provosts and administrators. Some of the Pioneers hired by McHenry left and senior faculty were beginning to retire. It was difficult to find faculty willing to serve as college provosts. Between 1974 and 1979, the campus had four Chancellors: McHenry, in his final year; Mark Christensen, who was forced to leave in 1976; Angus Taylor, who was interim Chancellor and then Chancellor from 1977-78, and Robert Sinsheimer, who served from 1978 to 1987.

The unpromising state of campus affairs can be seen by comparing the “Academic Plan for 1970-80,” which appeared in 1970, with the “Academic Plan” of 1975, which was finally released in 1977. The former was described by McHenry as a “progress report” rather than a view to the future, recounting both “failures and successes” (Clark, et al., 1970: I). The latter (1977: “Longer Term Directions,” p. 1), was delayed by several years due to the Christensen “episode,” (see below) reported that “The question to be raised is not whether the campus should have been prepared for changing external circumstances, but whether full realization of the initial plans is possible....” The implied answers were “it was not” and “no.” But the structure of the organization, administrative turnover and bureaucratic inertia made it very difficult to engineer major changes.

On top of the unpropitious environment and internal struggle, a “succession crisis” developed with the appointment of McHenry’s successor, UC Berkeley Vice Chancellor and Professor of Geology and Geophysics, Mark Christensen. Christensen stepped into a situation not of his own making, not understandable to him and certainly not under his control. Across the campus, there was widespread skepticism of his qualifications, a feeling that faculty had been ignored in his selection and suggestions that he was a

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56 Paul Niebanck (2014: 234-35) suggests that, while the UC system expected regular academic plans, as a “bureaucratic and administrative requirement,” it was not interested in anything “substantive,” which I read as meaning such “plans” should offer no explicit planning and programming for campus units.
“handpicked candidate” (McFadden, 2012: 27) sent to UCSC because Berkeley was looking for a way to get rid of him (see Marcum, 2014: 23-27).

According to Daniel McFadden (2012:28), his assistant at UCSC, Christensen “had mixed reviews at Berkeley...[and] was not known for decision-making... there were some who felt he was not a good administrator.” On the plus side, Christensen “was known for being interested in experimental education, undergraduate education, and for being a very likable, bright, young articulate person” (McFadden, 2012:28). People liked him personally but did not like his *modus operandi*. 57

At UCSC, Christensen was viewed as a poor administrator who failed to consult with faculty on the changes he thought needed to be made and who was more interested in talking than acting (Marcum, 2014: 32). His inaugural address in Fall 1974 was, by all reports, both too long and too meandering (Marcum, 2014: 33) and he did not provide the leadership the campus required. According to Politics Professor and college provost John Marcum (2014: 34-35), Christensen was unable to face up directly to choices and he would find ways of evading and coming to grips with things.... You could ramble and open up and discuss and enjoy things as kind of exercises, intellectual exercises. He had excellent qualities as a faculty member in that respect. But he lacked that decisiveness, that, I think is indispensible [in a Chancellor].

In a January, 1975 speech to the Academic Senate, Christensen (1975a) presented his comprehensive program covering, among other things, the budget, enrollment trends, resource constraints and the external funding environment, the approach of a “steady-state” on campus, administrative reorganization and authority structures, the state of the in-progress academic plan, the forthcoming Long Range Development Plan, institution of regular reviews for programs, and the academic role of the Colleges. He ended the discourse with a poem by Robert Frost. It was not regarded as an upbeat presentation, with its warnings that budgets and “trends in applications clearly indicate that growth at Santa Cruz beyond College VIII is not in the cards for the foreseeable future (Christensen, 1975a: 2).

Whatever the merits of his proposals, little action followed and relations with the faculty started to go downhill. By fall 1975, the faculty was convinced Christensen had to go, and asked UC President Charles Hitch to facilitate his resignation (Christensen, 1975b, 1975c; Nauenberg, 1975; McFadden, 2012: 40-49). At first, Hitch resisted but, by the time the Academic Senate voted “no confidence” in Christensen, his relations with faculty were so frayed that few were sorry to see him leave in early

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57 Full confession: after he was “fired” from UCSC, Christensen (“Chris” to those who knew him) returned to UC Berkeley and became a Professor of Energy and Resources, the program from which I received my PhD in 1987. Chris was a thoughtful, but sometimes inarticulate, person, whose lectures and talks tended to meander. Fairly often, these were interesting but did not end up where he or his audience expected, leaving students befuddled. At the time, I was not aware of his troubled tenure at UCSC, but the complaints expressed in various oral histories certainly comport with the Chris I knew.
1976 (Puknat, 2014: 85-104). This particular episode was the source of the notion that UCSC was “ungovernable,” a view still held in UCOP (Ibarra, 2019), especially with the wildcat TA grade strike of 2020.

Following Christensen’s departure, Angus Taylor, a retired professor and administrator, was appointed Acting Chancellor and then Chancellor. He remained in the job only through mid-1977. While Taylor brought a sense of relief and stability to the campus and managed to oversee the publication of the long-delayed Academic Plan in 1977, he was not able do very much in terms of restructuring. Only with the arrival of Robert Sinsheimer, a well-known and highly-regarded biologist from Cal Tech did restructuring go into full swing.

In retrospect, it appears that neither Christensen nor Sinsheimer were fully prepared for UCSC; at least, no one seems to have told them exactly what they were getting into. The failure to reveal problems to new hires is an ongoing practice at and problem for UCSC. Whether this is the case at all universities is unclear (to me), but probably quite common. External candidates for high university positions are shown and told the best about a prospective employer. No one wants to hang out dirty linen in public. No one wants to reveal a troubled history or provide a briefing about factions and conflicts on campus (although stories do get about). No one wants to discourage an attractive and promising job candidate by warning that the faculty may be difficult to work with. As a result, new hires, excited to be coming to UCSC learn only after it is too late that the campus is not the Paradise they were promised. Some throw in the towel and leave; others stay and struggle. But it takes a long time to settle in, and there are many opportunities to become disillusioned.58

Until he arrived at UCSC, Robert Sinsheimer had been at Cal Tech, a relatively small private institution, for 20 years, where he had risen to become chair of its Biology Division (one of six). UCSC was an entirely new experience for him; as Randall Jarrell (1996:ii), the interviewer for his oral history, put it,

When he [Sinsheimer] arrived he was unfamiliar with the thick bureaucracy of the University of California system and knew little about how the campus worked administratively. As an outsider he soon became aware that there were what he termed serious systemic problems plaguing the institution, intrinsic contradictions between what he came to characterize as the “anomalous” UCSC campus and its relationship to the larger system of which it was a small and rather insignificant member.

These contradictions included:

1. That between the “colleges as the center of academic life” and the requirements and norms of being a research-oriented UC campus (Sinsheimer, 1996: 21);

58 For example, in 2017, a new University Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor (the person who runs the campus) was appointed. She lasted all of two years, leaving to become President of Idaho State University in 2019. More on her later.
2. The “stalemate over appointments and promotions” arising from the division of labor between the Colleges and Boards (id: 22);
3. The excessive “democratization” of the campus arising from its history and shared governance (id: 13);
4. The “precious” attitude on campus regarding its general orientation and distinctiveness compared to other UC campuses (id: 23);
5. The “very bad” image of UCSC as a hippie school with students flaking out under the redwoods and smoking pot, and taking drugs (id: 9); and
6. The absence of strong leadership and faculty resistance to being told what must be done (id: 126).

Two years after he was appointed, in September, 1979, the student-run City on the Hill Press published a six-page manifesto under Sinsheimer’s byline (Sinsheimer, 1979), entitled “Santa Cruz in the 80s: Responding to a changing environment.” He noted that, in their academic planning for 1980-85, UCOP had requested that all UC campuses consider three challenges to the system over the coming decade:

1. The sharp decline projected in traditional college-age population by the mid-1980s;
2. The marked shift anticipated in ethnic mix and the need to provide programs for a population whose educational needs are showing signs of change; and
3. The necessity of finding effective new ways to continue growth in quality without the help of quantitative growth [i.e., new funding] (Sinsheimer, 1979: 1).

In his manifesto, Sinshiemer listed a number of “notable imbalances and structural problems” facing UCSC. These included: fragmentation of existing programs; lack of professional programs or schools; a limited graduate and research program; limited specialized facilities; limited curriculum and lack of a coherent general education program; continuing turnover in leadership; and the “rapidly changing [external] environment” (id: 2). Looming over all of this was the perennial problem of inadequate resources, exacerbated by a chronic inability to raise external and extramural funds, which he attributed to UCSC’s location and the character of its alumni, most of whom had not come to the campus with an eye to making money after graduation.

To address these matters, and others he found problematic, Sinsheimer proposed a “reorganization” of academic responsibilities across campus, moving most teaching out of the Colleges, and “reaggregation,” which would move faculty out of the colleges in which they were fellows and bring them together with their disciplinary colleagues. At the same time, a resolution was presented to and passed by the Academic Senate to permit students to request letter grades (along with narrative
evaluations) in all courses, rather than just those in the sciences, as had been the practice since the early 1970s.59

While the Academic Senate strongly supported Sinsheimer and approved his plan, reorganization was not without opposition from many faculty, staff and students who saw it as an abandoning the campus’s founding principles and practices (Coalition, 1980). And, although the Academic Senate supported the change to the grading system, students and alumni were strongly opposed (and remained so until the early 2000s). The “Coalition to Save the Campus” (1980) argued that campus ideals were “under attack” and that letter grades would “do violence to the innovations which mark UCSC as unique...and alter significantly, the quality of UCSC education.”

John Halverson (1979), a founding fellow of Stevenson and Professor of Literature, expressed some doubts about the objectives of and benefits claimed for Sinsheimer’s reorganization plan, suggesting that the proposal to move faculty around was “a scheme which seems to have been designed primarily to enrich a moving company” (id: 3). He argued that, while some features of reorganization, such as eliminating colleges from personnel issues, merited support, the plan also represented a “de facto disestablishment of the colleges” (id: 5) and a “divisional-interdivisional-pseudodivisional...muddled compromise.” And, argued Halverson

At some time in the near future, Santa Cruz should decide whether to be the alternative collegiate campus it was meant to be... or a departmentalized clone of the rest of the system. Either would be preferable to the shamboling recombinatory creature now threatening to come to life (id: 6).

Veronica (“Ronnie”) Gruhn, a Professor of Politics, thought (2013: 65-66)

some reorganization was necessary. But I think they went too far. I think what they did was to undermine the possibility of the architectural structure of this campus allowing for more direct contact between students and faculty. Because we had the colleges, and they were meant for a purpose, and they were not going to work like Cambridge and Oxford, and they weren’t even going to work the way McHenry thought they should work. But they could be made to work for something. They threw out the baby with the bathwater, I think.

Gruhn (2013:66) also argued that “as soon as you started having faculty reaggregating all over the place, you lost the interdisciplinary nature of the departments, you lost the benefit of inputs across divisions.”

As we shall see later in this book, reorganization and reaggregation did nothing to clarify the “academic role” of the Colleges on the campus, although it did remove

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59 Sinsheimer and others reported anecdotally that many graduate and professional schools did not even bother to look at applications from UCSC graduates because of the difficulty of interpreting the narrative evaluations.
them from their central place in the curriculum, where they had resided since the Founding. Applications and enrollments began again to grow, perhaps in response to better marketing of the campus but also, no doubt, as a result of the state’s growing high school population. Reorganization did nothing to solve the perennial resource problem. It did not increase the graduate student fraction of the student population or growth in non-state funding sources. Moreover, the malign effects of Proposition 13 and the Reagan Recession of the early 1980s were beginning to impact state funding for UC in a serious way.

As he imposed changes and proposed more, however, the faculty’s favorable opinion of Sinsheimer began to decline. In 1982, as a result of a dispute over his decision to deny tenure to a faculty member, the Academic Senate came close to a vote of “no confidence, further exacerbated by an October article California Higher Education (I have not been able to find a copy of the article). There, according to The City on the Hill Press (Walsh, 1982: 3), Sinsheimer “characterized the [UCSC] faculty as ‘mediocre’” and claimed that “a number of people were given tenure here who had not merited it on academic grounds” as a result of the time they had invested in the colleges (id.). While the Chancellor denied he had used exactly those words, he neither apologized nor walked back his remarks, further antagonizing the faculty. Here, again, the perennial tension between teaching and research raised its head, especially insofar as Sinsheimer’s emphasis on research accomplishments alone seemed to contradict the founding principles of UCSC and the commitments of many faculty members and instructors (Walsh, 1982; Lipson & Stroshane, 1982: 23).

In 1983, another struggle broke out between Sinsheimer and the faculty over sexual harassment, when he refused to hold a formal hearing on a charge against a UCSC faculty member made by the Committee on Sexual Harassment, leading its members to resign en masse. The Chancellor called the committee’s members “overzealous,” charging them with a “definition of sexual harassment... ‘that is simply not widely shared’” (McNicholas, 1983: A-6), this in the face of his approval of that same definition three years earlier. The Senate voted 80 to 23 (with 20 absentees) to support the committee over Sinsheimer, but with only limited affect.

Overall, Sinsheimer seems to have been widely respected, but he was not loved. This might have been a result of his effort to assert chancellorial authority over the campus, which was not widely accepted by the faculty. As he later put it (1996: 125), “the basic problem with the job is I think the chancellor has far more responsibility than he has authority. And this to a degree that is close to being unworkable, more so perhaps on this campus than on some others.” And

The chancellor can veto if he’s got control of the money; he can propose, but he can’t implement unless the faculty agrees with him. You can say well that’s the job of leadership to persuade the faculty to agree with him. Then that gets back to the question of can you do that, and particularly on a campus like this which is very fractured (id.: 126).
Even so, Sinsheimer accomplished much of what he set out to do. The most consequential, in would seem in retrospect, was to transform UCSC from a college-based to a department-based university, in which research and graduate study were given priority over teaching and undergraduate education. Whether he succeeded in bringing the “anomalous” campus closer to the UC norm is less clear.

This period of “Retrenchment” was not all gloom and doom. Notwithstanding an ongoing resource shortage, the campus grew from about 6,000 students in 1978 to 8,000 in 1988, with the prospect of much greater increases in the near future. The University imposed more rigor and order on curriculum and completed construction of the College Eight campus. New degree programs, some of them coming out of the colleges, were instituted, such as American Studies and Feminist Studies. Sinsheimer left in 1987, with the campus seemingly poised for a new start. But, then, stuff happened (again).

As noted previously, the funding crisis in higher education—and for California education in general—did not begin in the 1980s but was almost certainly exacerbated by trends and events set in train during the previous decade. Proposition 13 led to the reallocation of state income tax revenues among K-12 and universities and colleges as part of the so-called tax revolt launched in the 1970s, even as the country experienced a broader transition from Keynesian to market-based social logics (often called “neoliberalism”). In essence, taxpayers were informed by free market and libertarian ideologues that they did not have to pay for social and public services that provided no individual benefit to them, and that the provision of social and public services to those who could not afford them was a form of theft and amounted to “socialism” (of course, subsidies to the better off were not regarded as theft or socialism). That this change took place in parallel with a broader demographic shift in California and across the country was probably not coincidence; the politics of race has lurked below the surface of virtually all public policy debates and programs since the 1960s.

Market logic, or “marketization,” was characterized by several social and economic trends and practices:

1. **High individualism and individual responsibility for the self:** During the 1970s and 1980s, the principles of libertarianism—associated with Ayn Rand, Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman—began to diffuse into public consciousness and institutions, through a “long march through the institutions” undertaken by conservative forces and organizations. In particular, the reification of the individual as the font of all value, on both the left and right, came to replace an arguably more social and collective post-war view of society. The apotheosis of high individualism was expressed by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1996 when she stated “There is no such thing as society” (Keay, 1987). An individual’s value was to be determined largely by what she or he could accumulate in the market and keep from others. For higher education as it was organized, this meant that, because the social value and benefits arising from university education and research was distributed over time, space and people, it could not be easily monetized and had no value in the market. As a result, it was intimated (when not stated outright), Individuals ought to pay for their own education since they would realize its future returns as *individuals* (and could then decide whether or not to contribute to the social good). This rationalization justified financialization of education through student debt—effectively borrowing against that future value—and increases in privately paid tuition at public institutions.

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60 According to left libertarianism, human and civil rights applied to individuals, whereas right libertarianism regarded all labor as an individual’s private property (a principle rarely honored).  
61 In fact, she said this same thing three times, the first asking rhetorically “who is society? There is no such thing” and the third asserting that “society as such does not exist except as a concept” (Keay, 1987).
2. The rise of the speculative economy and taxation: Capital gains from investments have long been taxed at lower rates than income from labor, in the view that such investments are good for the economy as a whole and that investors who realize such gains should reap most of the benefit of their “intellectual acumen” and willingness to take risks. As described in earlier chapters, during the 1990s, the speculative economy expanded enormously, as holders of capital sought higher returns than were available from more stable blue-chip investments. During periods of economic boom, the wealthy tended to realize greater returns and, in California, provided a significant fraction of tax revenues. When recession hit, investment gains declined and so did tax revenues. Budget cuts were applied to public sector funding, and higher education was not immune. In California, growth in state support for UC, the California State University system and the community colleges stagnated and began a decline in funding per student for which most institutions were not prepared.

3. The search for miracle funding: For a long time, higher education officials hoped that states and publics could be “educated” about the broad economic benefits provided by research and teaching, and restore cuts made during lean times, but this has never happened. Nor is it likely to happen in the future. State-supported institutions vary greatly in their access to new public and private funds. “Flagship” campuses, such as Berkeley and UCLA, are more competitive in the struggle for research grants and foundation largesse and in the size and wealth of their alumni. Lesser campuses, such as UCSC, with shorter histories and fewer younger and rich alumni, are often less competitive where large funders and grants are concerned. Over time, university administrations began to regard campus units and faculty in terms of profit and loss, to impose “recharges” on services provided by one unit to another, and as fundraisers who must find money elsewhere to pay for their programs and activities. These three trends and practices affected higher education across the United States as well as all UC campuses but, given its historical and institutional peculiarities, UCSC was hit especially hard.

It did not help matters that Robert Sinsheimer’s immediate successor was a law school professor and historian of higher education, Robert B. Stevens. He arrived at UCSC after almost a decade as President of Haverford College, a small and highly regarded private liberal arts institution near Philadelphia. Stevens had never taught at a public institution and, much like Sinsheimer, was not at all familiar with how a UC campus operated. Stevens’ (1999: 8) initial impressions of UCSC were not especially favorable, either. He observed that

relationships with the city were obviously very, very serious. The college system was probably in worse shambles than had been reported to me. The conflict between teaching and research was I think more acute than I would have imagined. I think the things that appalled me about Santa Cruz were actually not specifically there—the fact that we had no real budget or budgeting procedure. The quality of administration was in general appalling. I was unimpressed by at least some of the vice-chancellors and deans and I just
thought the quality of administration was dramatically lower than in any of the
private institutions with which I had been associated.\textsuperscript{62}

In addition, he reported (Stevens, 1999: 9] “that while there were some good
students here [at UCSC], they were just much less bright and less well educated
than I’d been accustomed to.... I found that they were just less sophisticated and
less educated and less smart.” Stevens was not especially impressed by the faculty,
either [id.].

Stevens arrived in Santa Cruz determined to: increase access to low-income and
minority students, during a period in which enrollments were beginning to grow;
build up the graduate component of the campus; strengthen the role of the
colleges; and standardize teaching loads in order to address overcrowding in classes.
New controversies also emerged over the proposed Colleges Nine and Ten and it
became clear that there would be no new colleges after those two went into
operation.

Stevens, in particular, sought financial clarity. Arguably, budgetary reform had both
positive and negative consequences. UCSC has never been especially strong in terms
of transparent budgeting—some would argue that coherent budgeting simply does
not and cannot exist— which makes it difficult to move resources around. Indeed,
some might argue that the Administration prefers opacity in order to avoid funding
food fights. By giving each academic unit a clearly stated budget plan, Stevens
tried to make clear what various units had to spend, leaving it up to them to decide
how and where to spend. His reforms also gave the academic deans considerable
authority in terms of resource allocation. Departments continued to receive
relatively small budgets, too small to start significant programs or hire staff and
faculty. Any proposed program or project was forced to ask deans for money, and
the deans usually had their own priorities that did not extend to faculty initiatives.
Often as not, such requests were denied for no clearly stated reason.

Stevens’ operating style was markedly different from Sinsheimer, who made
decisions over the head of the Academic Senate and then dealt with the fallout.
Stevens tried to avoid conflict, preferring to delegate authority to his subordinates—
he called this “decentralization.” In doing this, however, he ran into resistance
from Senate committees and faculty who were loath to deal with his underlings
rather than with him directly. But Stevens tended to back down in the face of
opposition and resistance (Gruhn, 2013: 80) and, according to others, also ignored
shared governance and consultation with faculty. Nor was he popular with the City
of Santa Cruz, which strongly opposed the new campus growth target of 15,000
students by 2005.

After just three years, in 1991, Stevens left UCSC to return to the United Kingdom.
He was slated for a fourth-year review (Kimura & Long, 1990) and apparently fearing
a negative one due to faculty unhappiness with his tenure, decided to opt out.

\textsuperscript{62} Confirming my earlier claim that new hires are virtually never told about the flaws and foibles of the
place where they have been hired.
Whether this was a voluntary separation, as he claimed, or he was pushed out, as others seem to suggest, is not wholly clear—but it was probably some of both (Clark, 1991a). And, while he took up several important issues and problems, his tenure was too short to accomplish very much. Many faculty members were happy to see him leave. Indeed, some even tried to have him removed from his position, reinforcing the broadly held notion expressed by UC President David Gardner that UCSC was “ungovernable” (Pister, 2000: 2; Kliger, 2012: 30-31; Domhoff, 2014: 152; Clark, 1991b).

At that point, Gardner had to find someone to take the job. Rather than go through an onerous external search, he asked UC Berkeley Dean of Engineering Karl Pister to serve as interim chancellor of UCSC until a permanent appointment could be made. In 1992, and without any kind of search, Gardner recommended to the Board of Regents that Pister be appointed Chancellor of UCSC. He served in that position until 1996.

Pister took over a badly fragmented campus—hardly a new state of affairs—confronted with a deteriorating economic environment, a national movement against affirmative action in admissions and, yes, the perennial “problem” of what to do with the Colleges. Pister was generally regarded as a great improvement over Stevens, and his lengthy teaching and administrative experience in the UC system was undoubtedly a great help to his being accepted. On the one hand, he was more involved in campus issues and more engaged with faculty; on the other hand, he was something of a “hands-off” manager, transferring responsibilities for campus operation, management and budgeting to an “Executive Vice Chancellor” (EVC). This, claimed Pister (2000: 16, allowed him to accomplish “the things that I needed to accomplish outside the campus.” Pister readily acknowledged that the EVC came to be seen as the Chancellor’s “hatchet man,” the individual who presented executive decisions and bore responsibility for things that did not work out. The Chancellor, by contrast, became the “public face” of the campus, more concerned with external relations and the search for money. This became the generic model followed by subsequent UCSC Chancellors.

The effort to expand graduate enrollment came largely to naught, even as the University began to grow from 7,000 students toward its 2005 enrollment goal of 15,000. Much of this failure can be attributed to the repeated budget crises of the 1990s, during which undergraduate education was prioritized. Even though UCOP revised its per student funding policy, treating graduates and undergraduates as equal units, this did not affect the historical advantages realized by larger campuses from the unequal funding formula that had been in place since the 1960s. To make matters worse, the fraction of the UC institutional budget covered by state funding continued to decline relative to earlier growth rates, even as UCSC remained considerably more dependent on state support than other UC campuses.

The march to privatization began in the 1990s. Historically, UC had had a “no tuition” policy, charging students service and use fees that amounted to much the
As late as 1989, the cost of attending UC was only about $1,500 per year for in-state students. But, beginning with the recession of 1991, these fees began to increase rather dramatically (UCOP, 2018b), rising to more than $15,000 per year today (a sum that does not include room and board). As noted in Chapter 3, during the 1980s, the state provided about $25,000 per student in funding (adjusting for inflation), dropping to less than $20,000 by the early 1990s and below $10,000 today (Douglass & Bleemer, 2018: 21; Table 3.2).

One consequence of the growing funding crisis was the turn to federal and private sources of support (see Figure 7.1). In many ways, however, the pie charts in this figure are misleading, since they apply to the total UC budget, rather than just instruction (see Figures 5.8a & b). While it is difficult to allocate various costs of functions that support undergraduate education, the fraction is likely to be no more than 30-40% of those revenues shown in the figures below (see also Figures 5.7a & b).

**Figure 7.1: UC Revenue sources, 2000 and 2015**

![Pie charts showing UC revenue sources for 2000 and 2015](image)

Source: Douglass & Bleemer, 2018: 20; does not include lab or medical center funds; auxiliary funds includes income from licenses and patents.

Pister was not shy about acknowledging his role in fundraising. As Dean of Engineering at Berkeley, he had raised “almost 150 million dollars in all kinds of gifts from industry . . . individuals, endowed chairs, you name it” (Pister, 2000: 92). At UCSC, the task was not so easy. He found the development office to be in “utter disarray” (id.) and took on the job of “vice chancellor for advancement; I removed that position from advancement [i.e., university relations, aka, development], took the money in salary savings . . . and basically took on that responsibility given the experience that I’d had already” (id.: 92). He created an “advisory board for development” that included, in addition to himself, “the executive vice chancellor, the academic deans, the vice chancellor for business, the vice chancellor for student affairs..., the University librarian... [and] the president of the Santa Cruz Foundation as
well” (id.). What is conspicuously missing from this list are any faculty members (at the time, faculty were not expected to be fundraising entrepreneurs).

I had had fundraising experience from my PhD and nonprofit work during the 1980s, and after arriving at UCSC in 1990, I well recall that, among the social science faculty, there was little, if any, familiarity with or interest in seeking external funding. Indeed, some of my colleagues saw such efforts as pandering to the market and steadfastly opposed them. Pister does not report on his success in raising external funds, but it almost certainly brought much less to UCSC than had been the case at Berkeley. Market logic was beginning to manifest at UCSC, but was far from becoming dominant.

By the mid-1990s, UCSC began to recognize the limitations of being on the Hill in Santa Cruz. Not only were there ongoing conflicts over expansion with the city and its residents, there was also a growing body of opinion that “satellite” sites might be able to raise revenues, increase UCSC’s visibility and sidestep some of the local obstacles to growth. During the 1980s, Robert Sinsheimer had proposed building a research park in the northern part of the campus in order to attract companies that might want to work with UCSC’s scientists. Campus and community opposition put an end to that notion, but another, more attractive opportunity arose in the early 1990s, with the closing of the Army’s Fort Ord, near Monterey, and its transfer to civilian use.

With the help of U.S. Congressman Leon Panetta, UCSC took title to some 1,000 acres of the site, planning to put about half of the land into its natural reserve system with the rest dedicated to research and technological enterprises. A new institute, the Monterey Bay Education, Science and Technology Center (MBEST), was launched. Its official mission was to develop and promoting “collaborative and cooperative interaction between private business, government research agencies, public and private education and research institutions, and policy makers in strategic alliances to address the environmental opportunities and challenges of the next millennium” (MBEST, 1996: 2). But MBEST came a cropper (see Chapter 11).

Finally, Pister was Chancellor during what was, arguably, the penultimate attempt to identify an academic role for the Colleges. Toward the end of the Stevens chancellorship, the Academic Senate voted to require all faculty to teach a one- to three-unit course in a college, or an appropriate equivalent in their home departments, on a topic relevant to a college theme. Initially, faculty were provided with a small research stipend in compensation for this course overload, which was later eliminated (CEP & CPB, 1999). While some faculty members did meet this requirement (including this author), most did not, regarding it as an unjustifiable, additional burden on their already-limited time. The initiative gradually died out and was officially eliminated a few years later. More about this in chapter 8.

In mid-1996, UC Davis Professor of Nutrition and Internal Medicine M.R.C. Greenwood was appointed Pister’s successor. At Davis, Greenwood had served as dean of
graduate studies and vice provost for academic outreach and, just prior to her arrival at UCSC, was associate director of science in the Clinton White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. As a mover and shaker in national policy circles, she was regarded as someone who could revitalize the campus and bring it to national prominence. Indeed, Greenwood accomplished a considerable amount as Chancellor, among which was her success in external fundraising, oversight of growth in graduate programs, approval and start-up of MBEST, enrollment increases to 15,000 students, opening of the School of Engineering, and the establishment of a Silicon Valley center (about which more in Chapter 11). While the California economy was booming when she took office, the Dot Com Bubble burst in the middle of her tenure and brought budget woes back to the campus. Not everyone was enamored by her operating style, especially her tendency toward single-mindedness and control. This style was to create difficulties for her after she left the campus.

One of Greenwood’s foremost goals at UCSC was to transform the campus into a research and STEM-focused university. This was manifest in the opening of the Baskin School of Engineering, which, it was hoped, would enable the campus to establish close ties with Silicon Valley companies and to provide those companies with engineering graduates. In 2001, the MBEST Headquarters Building was opened with much fanfare (Stephens, 2001), (more on MBEST in Chapter 9). In 1999, the campus began to discuss a proposed “Santa Clara Valley Regional Center” (later the “UCSC Silicon Valley Center”), which was variously envisioned as a satellite campus that could accommodate spillover student enrollment from the main campus or a “targeted upper-division and graduate model” (CPB, 2000:4). It received a commitment of $20 million from UCOP in support of the project (not all of which was, ultimately, provided). Partly on the strength of a proposal to develop the new center at NASA-AMES in Silicon Valley, the campus won a $330 million, 10-year contract to manage a research institute at that site. But the struggle to populate the center continued long after Greenwood’s departure, and UCSC eventually lost the contract when it was renewed (details in Chapter 11).

As part of a long-term strategic planning effort, in 1997, Greenwood established a “Millennium Committee,” composed of faculty, staff and administrators charged with working “toward the goal of positioning UC Santa Cruz to identify the opportunities and meet the demands of the new century” (Greenwood, 1997). The report of the Committee (Hershatter, et al., 1998) then became the basis for a subsequent 10-year planning process overseen by EVC John Simpson (2000), from 2000-2004. These are discussed in in Chapter 10.

During Greenwood’s tenure, both the Administration and the Academic Senate commissioned separate reports on the status of the colleges, in part as a result of the opening of Colleges Nine and Ten. The “Advisory Group on the Colleges” was convened by EVC Simpson in mid-2000 and the “Special Committee on the Colleges”

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It should be noted, however, that the Baskin School was more of a boutique than a full engineering school, since it offered degrees in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science and Computer Engineering and some closely-related specialization, but lacked civil, mechanical and environmental engineering.
was authorized by the Academic Senate in 2002, submitting its report in 2003. These are addressed in Chapter 9.

Finally, Greenwood and the campus had to deal with the consequences of the 1995 UC Regents’ decision to “ban UC from using race, religion, gender, color, ethnicity or national origin as criteria in its admissions, hiring and contracting” (Wallace, 1996). This happened in concert with the subsequent passage of California Proposition 209, which amended the state constitution to read that “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting” (Proposition 209, 1996). Both the Regents’ resolutions and the constitutional amendment gave rise to a great deal of soul-searching, since they led to a decline (albeit a temporary one) in minority enrollments across the system, especially for African-American students. Never shy of committees, in 1997 Greenwood appointed a commission of approximately forty faculty, students, staff, administrators, and community members charged to consider the implications of Prop 209 and to develop recommendations as to concrete ways in which the campus could continue to diversify its membership and to make educationally effective use of such diversity while complying with State and Regential mandates (Office of the Chancellor, 1997: 1).

The commission’s report led to at least one initiative by EVC Simpson to allocate “eight faculty positions that would be aimed...at defining a curriculum that deals with present-day societal issues related to gender, ethnicity and culture” (Cowan, 2013: 374), with the idea that these hires would increase faculty diversity, as well. The effort was only marginally successful and, 20 years later, faculty diversity remains low.

In 2004, Greenwood left UCSC to take up the position of Provost and Senior Vice President of Academic Affairs in the UC Office of the President. At almost the same time, EVC John Simpson left to become President of SUNY Buffalo. For a year, Psychology Professor Martin Chemers was Acting Chancellor. Despite his reported desire to being chosen for the permanent position, the Regents instead appointed University of Washington Engineering Dean and Professor of Electrical Engineering Professor Denise Denton, who took office in 2005 (there was some suggestion at the time that Denton’s appointment was engineered by Greenwood). Denton was committed to diversity and encouragement for women in science and engineering but, unfortunately, got off on the wrong foot with some members of the University.

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64 In 2001, the Regents rescinded its affirmative action ban (Cockrell, 2001), however, the University remains subject to Proposition 209, although it has devised some workarounds (UCOP, 2015).
65 Greenwood did not leave without controversy, however, and after only one year in her new job, stepped down in the midst of charges of favoritism in hiring (Wallack & Sheviz, 2005). In 2009, she was hired to be President of the University of Hawai’i but resigned two years early under another cloud (Zimmerman, 2013).
In mid-2006, she committed suicide (Vega and Jaxon VanDerbeken, 2006). Following this, Astronomy and Astrophysics Professor George Blumenthal was appointed Acting Chancellor and, in 2007, Chancellor of UCSC.

VIII. Privatization (2007-present)

Throughout the first half of the 2000s, both UC and UCSC continued to struggle with the impacts of the Dot.com bust and the recessions that followed. Roughly speaking, between 2000 and 2005, the campus experienced cuts in its core budget of about $25 million—out of a total of about $400 million—distributed over academic and administrative units. State support dropped from about 45% of the total budget in 2000 to 35% in 2005, with greater impacts on undergraduate education than this reduction suggests. The campus budget includes administrative and “infrastructural” expenditures that, arguably, do not support undergraduate education or faculty salaries that, for the most part, cannot be reduced. The impacts of state revenue instability were several times greater after the Great Recession began in 2008. At that time, the state reduced in funding for UC by several hundred million, distributed among UCOP and the campuses, triggering significant tuition increases (which still did not make up for the shortfall). Again, although the campus administration consulted with the Academic Senate on where to make budget cuts, the final decision was up to the Executive Vice Chancellor, who mandated specific amounts for each Division.

Such action is probably not uncommon at universities and whether UCSC is normal or unusual in this regard is beyond the scope of this work. What can be said, with some certainty, is that three factors were critical to “muddling through.” First, notwithstanding budget cuts imposed on various units, either voluntarily or not, it was never very clear what those units were actually spending. This might seem odd, given that each year, units are allocated specific sums to spend on operations. But units are also allowed to carry over funds not spent or obligated in a particular budget year to the next and beyond, and the magnitude of these monies was never very clear. Units thus had an incentive to overstate their needs and husband resources as much as possible.

Second, while the campus has sought to develop a means of making cuts strategically in order to realize savings from increased efficiencies and elimination of useless or duplicative services, it has proved very difficult to disentangle and agree on what might be cut or eliminated. As a result, cost reductions from such efficiencies have not been realized and cuts have often been made in essential services that were easiest to identify.

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66 This is not entirely true: in 2010, UCOP required faculty to take a 10% furlough, that is, a reduction in working hours. This was, in effect, equivalent to a 10% reduction in annual salary that was subsequently restored.

67 Periodically, there would be warnings that carryovers would be forbidden, at which time there would follow a frenzy of spending to zero out accounts before the end of the fiscal year.
And, third, in the absence of reliable revenue projections, academic planning was been conducted without much regard to varying projections of available or potential funding. Units always planned for their ideal, desired future—and continue to do so—whose costs far exceeded revenues that would likely be available under any economic scenario. This led to a repeated scramble for initiatives to procure extramural and “private” funding, on the principle that new, interesting and innovative projects and programs were more likely than existing ones to engender external interest and support.

This somewhat scattershot approach to budgeting also led to a tendency to dream about a possible future with ample funding and to respond with blunt axes and knives when funding failed to appear or was cut. When things are good there is little inclination to plan for possible bad times. The unreliability of state funding, and UCSC’s still heavy reliance on the state for core funding has, thus, increased the urgency of finding support from “private” sources, such as student tuition, extramural grants, private donations and so-called auxiliary enterprises (i.e., patents, licenses and intellectual property). These, it is believed, will be more reliable (even though they are not).

Many researchers at UCSC have received grants from private entities, which expect some sort of return on investment, either social or monetary but, despite extensive efforts to increase such external funding, they have never constituted a major source of support. Private donors have provided building funds and endowments to pay for specific construction projects and units. And so-called research parks have been proposed periodically but have never come to fruition. The search for extramural funds has met with only limited success.68

In all these respects, UCSC has long been at a disadvantage. In the “private” research market, comparative advantage, university brand and economies of scale are as important as they are in commercial markets. Although UCSC’s faculty is as high quality as that at any other university, the campus often loses out on external opportunities due to competition with other, better-funded institutions that are more able and willing to provide matching material commitments to proposed new programs and projects. These other places often have a longer track of extramurally funded grants and projects and a larger plant to accommodate them. Moreover, what might seem “new” at one university might also be happening at others—fashion and cutting-edge research are social products, not the result of heretofore unheard of ideas and experiments. And, even though one institution might pioneer research in a particular area, such as genomics, it is not unheard of for funders to transfer their affections to other, more visible organizations from which they will get more bang and publicity for the buck.

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68 Between 2009 and 2017, UCSC conducted a capital campaign, which raised $335 million (Springhetti, 2017). According to some people with whom I spoke, however, this sum included all extramural income to the campus, including various federal grants and others that were not privately donated but would have been provided notwithstanding the campaign.
Of course, the “privatization” of funding is, as explained previously, nothing new and has been going on for decades throughout American public higher education, especially in the sense that state governments across the board have disinvested from colleges and universities. Some universities have compensated by relying almost wholly on student tuition, increasing out-of-state and international student enrollments, implementing collaborations with large corporations, soliciting wealthyphilanthropists and finding other ways of generating private support. Others have supported applied research that can generate patents that can be licensed out. Some have developed “public-private partnerships” (P3) whereby universities provide plant space and student bodies, and corporations provide infrastructure and plant, returning some portion of revenues to the campus.

One example of this is construction, operation and maintenance of new student housing. The state of California requires that all student housing be “revenue neutral”—that is, not drawing from instructional funds—and that capital, financial and operating costs be paid through student rents. Smaller universities may lack the capital and public bond capacity to pay for such facilities and contract with a private developer to build and maintain student housing, in return for a reliable and predictable flow of revenues from student rents. The capital to pay for the project is raised through tax-free, 40-year revenue bonds, repaid by those rents, issued by a newly created non-profit management entity, distinct from the university. At the end of the loan, the non-profit shuts down and property ownership reverts to the university, which is then wholly responsible for management, operation and maintenance. The university itself takes on no new capital debt that might affect its credit rating and loan capacity (which is better spent on academic infrastructure). This is the model for UCSC’s latest student housing project, Student Housing West (SHW EIR, 2019), slated to provide almost 3,000 new beds to upper division and graduate students (but which is on hold due to lawsuits). Such full-scale P3 is common at other UC campuses but represents a new step for UCSC, which has long prided itself on keeping corporate privatization at arm’s length.

It is worth noting that one area in which UCSC has done fairly well in terms of extramural funding is with respect to support for minority, low-income and first generation students, where it does have a significant comparative advantage. In 2012, the campus was designated by the U.S. Department of Education as an “Hispanic Serving Institution” (HSI) as its Latinx enrollments reached 25%. Since then, the campus has received over $10 million in federal grants to support minority student success (HIS Initiatives, 2020). Still, HSI status is not a result of any deliberate strategy or policy; rather, it is a consequence of state demographics and the UC admissions system, which allows students to indicate multiple campus preferences on a single UC application. Top students are admitted to Berkeley, UCLA and UCSD; many who qualify for UC but are less well prepared find themselves at UC Riverside or UCSC.

George Blumenthal’s tenure as Chancellor, which ended in June 2019, had both ups and downs. By 2006, as California tax revenues began to grow again, state funding for
UC stabilized. This was a short-lived reprieve, as the Great Recession took hold in 2008. Campus enrollments climbed past the 15,000 student target growing toward 19,500 student enrollment by academic year 2019-20—which required delicate negotiations with the City of Santa Cruz in the face of widespread public opposition to further growth. The Silicon Valley Center, which was expected to accommodate some number of students within that cap, did not take off as hoped and remained a continuing problem (see Chapter 11). Solicitation of proposals for programs in Silicon Valley in the early 2010s led to approval of a “School of Management,” whose mission was never clearly defined and for which private funding was never obtained. Two strategic planning exercises were undertaken during Blumenthal’s tenure, resulting in documents that ended up on the shelf (see Chapter 10). Efforts to increase the percentage of graduate students to 15% and later 12% were unsuccessful, as financial support lagged and state-mandated increases in undergraduate enrollments made those constantly receding targets. Today, graduate students make up about 10-11%. Reaching that goal requires that proportionally fewer frosh and transfer students be admitted. Graduate students do receive greater funding from UCOP than undergraduates, but the resources to bring in additional grad students come only from increased undergraduate enrollments. Indeed, it may become necessary to reduce graduate enrollments due to the high costs of supporting them and the lack of available funding.

There is more to be said about Blumenthal’s tenure and the structural obstacles to fulfilling the goals and dreams set out over the past few decades, but these will be treated in later chapters. Blumenthal retired at the end of June 2019 and Cynthia Larive, Professor of Chemistry and Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor at UC Riverside was appointed his successor. Of course, the deliberations, recommendations and decisions of the Search Committee, UCOP and the Board of Regents are all confidential, so the particular basis for choosing Larive is not available. Her first year in the post proved difficult, as graduate TAs went on a grade strike and the COVID-19 pandemic led to campus shutdown and mass movement to online remote instruction.

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided a broad summary of the interplay between high-level individuals and structural issues and obstacles over UCSC’s 50+ years of operations. Administrations and their occupants change and each new appointee brings to the job a different set of skills, experience, expectations, visions and proclivities, often with the intention of instituting change. Virtually all of UCSC’s chancellors have come from outside the campus (with the exception of McHenry and Blumenthal) and, as such, needed time to identify and accommodate the operations and structural contradictions of the organization. Frequently, new chancellors have failed to do so in a timely fashion and, sooner or later, seek to impose their visions (e.g., Sinsheimer, Greenwood) often in the face of resistance, with greater or lesser success. Alternatively, chancellors have decided to go with the flow and let the currents take the campus where it may (e.g., Stevens, Pister). Either way, a pattern of skepticism
and suspicion about what can be done and who is affected emerges between Administration and faculty, with the result that not much gets done.

Aside from consultation with the Academic Senate where deemed necessary, UCSC administrations have found it more expedient to minimize direct participation of faculty, staff and students in decisionmaking. That is, those who, through *habitus*, populate the institution, fulfill its needs, requirements and demands, provide the services, pursue its mission and make it work are heard but rarely listened to. Some of these individuals rise through the ranks and, eventually, reach the rarified heights of administration where, they often discover, there is much responsibility and only limited power and authority. Even knowing what they know, they can no more escape campus history than anyone else. Please note: this is not a Marxian argument about history or teleology; it is more an acknowledgement of William Faulkner’s (1951: 42) observation that “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” More of that past appears in the chapters that follow.
Chapter 8

Running UCSC: On paper and in practice

Everyone knows the realities of trying to run a college or university and the actual behavior of organization executives are opposed to the near-heroic and rationally decisive normative behavior drawn in textbooks about management (Keller, 1983: 171).

I. Introduction

Like all universities, UCSC is a highly bureaucratized organization. And like all organizations, there is often a gap between what is prescribed by rules and regulations and actual practice. This chapter represents my effort to describe and characterize the organizational structure of UCSC over its 55 years of operation—based on archival documents as well as 30 years of “participant observation.” This exercise can tell us much about the dynamics of an organization’s operation and illustrate the difficulties arising from an unclear and contested distribution of power and authority that I have alluded to in earlier chapters. The consequence of these struggles has been not a tightly run, corporate structure but, as I have suggested, something more akin to a “Holy Roman Empire,” composed of many duchies, bishoprics, principalities and margravates, each holding various authorities in the larger entity that are always ready to assert what power and autonomy they might possess, even if such actions work against their interests. This chapter is primarily a description of the various branches and characteristics of campus structure and administration, rather than an analysis of the manifest contradictions that arise in an organization as complex and “loosely coupled” (Weick, 1976) as a university.

II. In the beginning

Although there was considerable vision and planning for UCSC, what seems to have been missing or forgotten was how the campus was to function and operate. To be sure, there were organizational charts (see below), with nominal hierarchies represented by boxes and lines, but these had to be filled with content and practice. In situations where neither social nor practical norms for component units have been developed, as is the case when an organization is being founded, they must be copied from elsewhere or created from scratch. Usually, the founders of an organization look to similar, existing entities or units to identify structure, bureaucracies and agents on which the new one can be modeled. This, at least, was the founders’ intention in looking to Oxbridge, Swarthmore and other campuses with college-like entities. But none of these models were well-suited to a campus in the UC system and none of them provided much direction in how the new campus might be run. As a result, UCSC’s organizational structure emerged in a largely ad hoc fashion and in response to short-term needs and demands.
According to some observers, McHenry’s work on U.S. political theory and history informed his organizational model for UCSC, based on the three branches of the U.S. government, imagining his new university as a kind of “federal” system (Cowan, 1981:40; Von der Muhl, 1984:62). Such an arrangement would be characterized by both separation of powers and balancing among functional units, which would provide or generate rules of authority and practice and lead to efficient functioning.69

McHenry did not shy away from the contradictions thrown up by his model. On the one hand, he seems to have regarded the university as constituting something of a “democratic community,” in which policies would be proposed, debated and ratified or defeated by faculty and staff, and then implemented or dropped by the Administration (a more robust version of shared governance). This process would arise more out of “common sense” and a “general will” than careful planning, analysis and discussion (as later came to be the case), with the results supporting the logical wishes and desires of McHenry (and Kerr).

On the other hand, McHenry wanted to ensure that his wishes and desires were not thwarted, which led him to maintain close control over the new organization. He was loath to intervene in the process but did not hesitate to issue authoritative rulings when outcomes might create internal and external problems for the campus (in effect, combining the executive and judicial branches of his federal system).

Politics Professor George Von der Muhl (1984: 62) blamed the early struggles between faculty and administration on “matters of procedure” formulated by McHenry: “With its careful allocation of administrative resources, its deliberate structuring of incentives, its checks and balances, its efforts to dissipate unwelcome pressures it could not altogether suppress, the plan strikingly resembles the cunning contrivances of eighteenth century constitutional inventors.” According to long-time American Studies and Literature Professor Michael Cowan (1981: 40),

Chancellor McHenry was a shrewd politician as well as an educational idealist. A life-long student of checks-and-balances and strong executives, he liked his line officers—the Divisional Vice Chancellors and Provosts among them—to report directly to him rather than to consult horizontally with each other, and he liked these officers to be in the dark about the resources that were flowing to units besides their own, as well as dependent upon his own judgment rather than upon publicly derived and visible policy for whatever resources as authority he allocated them.

In fact, those “ingenious alignment[s]” that sometimes appear to be “cunning contrivances” are as often the result of ad hoc patches as intentional planning. Consequently, “although... administrators bemoaned their own lack of clear authority, many resisted efforts to clarify authority if it might mean a loss of whatever power

69 This seems an especially ironic notion in a time of dysfunction among and political struggle within the three branches of the U.S. government, and the endless assertion of Presidential authority via executive orders (most of which end up in courts).
they already possessed” even as they developed adversarial relationships due to “competition for hidden Chancellorial resources” (Cowan, 1981: 41).

The contradictions between plan and practice remind us of Foucault’s genealogy as well as Karl Polanyi’s (1944/1957) dictum that the “free market” was planned while planning was ad hoc. There are usually many prototypes between the idealized vision of a machine, for example, and the actual device that eventually emerges. Thus, it was for UCSC, whose early vision required many unanticipated and unintended kluges to keep it moving toward something resembling the original vision. In retrospect, people tend to forget the fixes and compromises required to do this and remember only the myths and legends, which obscure the realities of the past. How McHenry could have missed this dynamic is something of a mystery (to me, anyway).

McHenry idealism extended to management, putting in place a fairly small administrative staff, consisting of a few individuals with whom he would want to “associate with… the rest of my days at Santa Cruz” (McHenry, 1974a: 255). According to Michael Cowan (2013:96), McHenry tried to appear a somewhat “hands-off” administrator but, he “cared so much about it [the campus], that like a proud father he was a little overprotective,” attempting to maintain control from behind the curtain, so to speak. Cowan notes (1981: 40), “When McHenry retired in 1974, he left few experienced middle-level administrators to provide continuity….” Wheels had to be reinvented, over and over.

Some years later, a member of McHenry’s administrative staff (Barnes, 1979: 2) reflected that McHenry “put [UCSC] together piece by piece. He was on the one side the utopian and educational dreamer, and this [sic] hobby was utopias.” But his utopia was not a democracy:

> Everything had to come to him to be resolved. There were 26 people reporting to him when I got there…. He would delegate responsibility but never authority, and he set up the Board-College dialectic which was alsmot [sic] designed so that nobody would be in charge. Nobody was responsible for any decision, so things flowed to him…. He controlled everything…. (Barnes, 1979: 2-3).

Cowell Provost Page Smith (1996:49) reported that McHenry’s personal intelligence system served to keep things under control: “[He] always seemed to know every little undercurrent and eddy and every dissatisfied faction, all these things which considered in the whole sweep of things might often have been completely unimportant.”

McHenry seemed to believe that negotiations and bargaining among the various academic and administrative units would “fill in the operational blanks,” fulfilling his desires and preferences without resistance to or their sabotage by “strong leaders” elsewhere on the campus (again, contrary to the U.S. federal system). One former
UCSC professor, who arrived in 1969 and left for an Ivy League institution in 1972, is quoted in a 1975 study of “academic quality” at UCSC (Lamb, et al., 1975: 37) that:

The major problem seemed to me to go much deeper than administrative arrangements. It had to do with the lack of definition throughout the institution. This vacuum extended to most of the fundamental matters that constitute an educational institution: from the content of undergraduate education to standards of faculty performance; from the kind of excellence expected from students to the meaning of a board major. In all of these matters and in many others, the definition prevailing did not seem wrong, merely invisible....

So long as he was Chancellor, McHenry was able to exercise considerable control of the struggle, perhaps due to his authority as The Founder. By the early 1970s, however, he had become exhausted by constant struggle and contrary outcomes. Notwithstanding McHenry’s commitment to both the separation of powers and negotiation and balancing among units, the power struggle over UCSC’s structure came to be “baked into” the organization’s DNA, and no amount of recombinant genetics or CRISPR has ever been able to eliminate or even reduce such struggle.

Opposition to Administration initiatives was expressed, then as now, through the Academic Senate and various reports and papers, especially from the Committee on Planning and Budget, which offers the most global view of campus operations from the faculty perspective. Over the years, as the Administration has proposed and funded various efforts and initiatives (see Chapter 9), many have been approved, but committees of the Academic Senate have often responded with sharp critiques, with limited effect, leading faculty to grumble about being ignored or left out. While input is always (or usually) “welcomed,” it is not often taken into account or incorporated into design, planning and execution. Recall that, under the principles of “shared governance,” the Administration is expected to “consult” with the Senate, but it is under no obligation to respond to Senate concerns or demands.

As might be expected, as an organization grows in terms of “inhabitants,” units and functions, so do mechanisms of management, regulation and oversight. Theories about divisions of labor suggest that specialized functions require managers with appropriate training and experience, who can execute their responsibilities more quickly and efficiently than those who learn on the job. Greater complexity requires more managers and more expertise, and it is not unusual, especially in the case of organizations such as universities, for the managerial cadres to increase more rapidly than rank-and-file employees. The question that must be asked—but cannot generally be answered—is whether growth in management leads to better or more efficient functioning of the organization. As often as not, it is easier to expand management than to restructure management functions and responsibilities, which is likely to trod on unit interests and lead to struggle and resistance. The cost of such expansion may, of course, be duplication of functions—which means that both efficiency and effectiveness can actually decline.
Universities frequently seek to fill high management positions with external candidates rather than experienced internal ones. “New blood” can bring in new ideas and methods. But new blood can also degrade operating efficiency, especially if a hire from outside the organization begins to put into motion new procedures that fit poorly with existing ones or that, for whatever reason, antagonize or confuse staff and faculty. It is also frequently the case that established bureaucratic and organizational practices and procedures cut across unit and program lines—whether by design or not—in ways that are not evident or transparent.

III. UCSC’s operating structure

Hierarchy and management

UCSC began with a fairly simple and straightforward organizational system. As noted earlier, Dean McHenry opted to play a strong role in running the campus but without appointing strong subordinates to handle subsidiary functions. The first chart, from 1967-68 (Figure 8.1a), lists four vice chancellors (three of whom would later be reclassified as “Deans”) and two assistant chancellors. By 1991 (Figure 8.1b), there were four vice chancellors, three associate vice chancellors, seven assistant vice chancellors, and five deans. In 2019 (Figure 8.1c), there are six vice chancellors (including the executive vice chancellor), two associate chancellors, five associate vice chancellors, seven assistant vice chancellors, four vice provosts (not college provosts), one assistant vice provost, six deans and no less than 15 associate and assistant deans, according to my count. Table 8.1 compares totals for the three years, while Table 8.2 shows numbers of academic and administrative appointments since 2000.

Figure 8.1a: UCSC Organizational Chart, 1967-68 (McHenry, 1991)
Figure 8.1b: UCSC Organizational Chart, 1991 (McHenry, 1991)


Figure 8.1c: UCSC Administrative and Academic Leadership Organizational Chart, 2019

Table 8.1: Administrative leadership at UCSC, 1968, 1991, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chancellor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate chancellor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Chancellors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Vice Chancellors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Vice Chancellors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Provosts (not college)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Vice Provost</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deans</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assoc. &amp; Asst. Deans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total admin. leadership</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student enrollment</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>19,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2: UCSC Academic and managerial statistics from selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>FY 03</th>
<th>FY 08</th>
<th>FY 13</th>
<th>FY 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faculty FTE</td>
<td>441.3</td>
<td>496.0</td>
<td>487.7</td>
<td>564.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer FTE</td>
<td>148.4</td>
<td>146.0</td>
<td>140.8</td>
<td>156.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other academic FTE</td>
<td>192.0</td>
<td>284.2</td>
<td>236.2</td>
<td>225.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total academic FTE</td>
<td>781.7</td>
<td>926.2</td>
<td>864.7</td>
<td>945.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA &amp; GSR</td>
<td>382.2</td>
<td>437.4</td>
<td>440.0</td>
<td>504.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr. Mgmt.</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP-Managers</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>144.8</td>
<td>147.7</td>
<td>202.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP-Sr. Prof.</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>175.2</td>
<td>200.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total management</td>
<td>183.0</td>
<td>290.9</td>
<td>332.7</td>
<td>412.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students enrolled</td>
<td>14997</td>
<td>16615</td>
<td>17203</td>
<td>19700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/Acad. FTE ratio</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/Faculty FTE ratio</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/Mgmt ratio</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UCOP, n.d.

Over time, top-level administration (excluding department chairs) has remained fairly constant relative to student enrollments. Over the period between 2003 and 2018.
(for which UCOP data are available), however, the management cadre has increased by 225%, even as faculty FTE and total academic FTE have only grown by 28% and 21% respectively (see Figure 8.2). This is even more visible when staff statistics are plotted as ratios relative to student enrollments.

According to UCOP (n.d.), there has been some reclassification of positions to and from managerial categories, however, these changes seem to have been relatively minor. The growth in management has, probably, been concentrated mostly in Student Life, Student Affairs and Student Success, all of which have grown with enrollment increases and changing demographics.

Figure 8.2: Student ratios per academic FTE and management for selected years

![Graph showing student ratios per academic FTE and management for selected years.]

Source: Data in Table 8.2
Note that a decline in ratios implies fewer students per management individual, or a rising number of managers.

Disciplines, Departments & Other Units

Notwithstanding the commitment of Dean McHenry and Clark Kerr “never” to have departments at UCSC, the Boards of Studies were able to wrest away authority from the Colleges, with the help of then-Chancellor Robert Sinsheimer and the support of a significant number of faculty (see Chapter 9). This coup did not, however, greatly empower the Boards of Studies (or “Departments,” as they were renamed in the 1990s), which remain poor and weak relative to the Divisions. As described previously, a great deal of academic and budgetary authority rests with the Divisions, which tend to dole out relatively small quantities of money to the Departments.
Because faculty and staff positions in departments are “held” by the Dean of an Academic Division in which the appointments are based, departmental budgets—which are also decided by the Dean—cover administrative expenses and little more, and departments have only limited discretion over how these funds are expended. All faculty and staff searches and hires, interview short-lists, and departmental choices and offers must be approved by the Divisional Dean (as well as various levels in the upper Administration). Depending on the position, a faculty committee, or the entire department, will participate in some part of an interview process and make a ranked list of choices, but the Dean, Committee on Academic Personnel and the Executive Vice Chancellor must approve an offer to the first-ranked candidate. Departments conduct personnel and promotion reviews but, depending on the level of review, these must be vetted and approved by a Dean, an Academic Senate committee and the Administration.

Departments do have a certain degree of freedom in terms of the courses they offer and the graduate students they admit, although new courses must be reviewed and approved by a committee of the Academic Senate. The sciences and engineering can provide funding for graduate students on their own, but those enrolled in other Divisions are highly dependent on teaching assistant positions, grants and fellowships, all of which must be reviewed and approved by the Graduate Division.

There are more disciplines and majors on campus than there are departments. While students are allowed to create an independent major, if they can find faculty sponsors, degree programs not connected to a department are highly discouraged and rarely funded. Any new academic program must have an administrative “home,” either a department or a college (programs in the colleges are rare nowadays). This means that, depending on administrative arrangements, the faculty of a department in one discipline may be responsible for oversight of another. For example the Politics Department administers Legal Studies, and the Politics faculty is responsible for new hires and personnel reviews for instructors in Legal Studies.

A few majors consist of one or two core faculty and a group of affiliated faculty from other departments, or are administered by one or more departments. As new academic and research fields proliferate, such Rube Goldberg arrangements are one of the only ways that new programs can become full-fledged, degree-offering majors. Some departments are loath to allow their faculty to teach in those new majors, even if compensation (course relief) is provided, since it becomes more difficult to staff core courses in the home department.

Faculty & the Academic Senate

To function, a university must have students, managerial and operational staff and faculty (and, of course, money), but which actually holds dominant power in the organization? Without instructors, of course, there is no university, but there is only tradition and habitus to sustain reliance on full-time, ladder-rank faculty members. Over the past few decades, tenure has come under fire for being too costly to
universities, students and their families (and the public, by extension). As a result, growing numbers of undergraduate courses are taught by “casual” instructors, individuals who possess degrees, experience and skills required to teach but are hired on a “per-course” basis. Full time casual instructors may be required to teach up to eight classes a year (compared to four to five for ladder rank faculty) and are neither expected nor paid to conduct research (although some do). And, to make a living, many instructors find it necessary to teach at more than one college or university, making them “freeway flyers.”

What is required to create a new undergraduate program? First, there must be a group of faculty members who want to propose, participate in and launch it. The organizers must write a program proposal, with bylaws and a charter and solicit letters of commitment from the organizers and other faculty affiliates and their departments. They must submit the proposal to both the Senate and the Administration for review and revise the proposal as directed by reviewers. They must develop courses or make arrangements with other programs for students to take the latters’ classes. New courses must be reviewed and approved by the relevant Senate committee. They must make clear how much the program is expected to cost and how it will be financed. If funding commitments have been made by another unit or a Division, these must be approved.

This may not be the end of the review process: a proposal for a new major degree or graduate level program must be sent off campus for systemwide vetting and approval—including UCOP and even the Regents—especially to ensure it does not impinge on or compete with programs offered at other campuses (on the principle that the demand for new degrees may be limited). Such proposals may go back and forth for years on campus before launching (the Politics PhD program took ten years from start to launch). The administering department may decide it cannot afford a new program if it is not provided with new core funding by a Division or the Administration. Although the Administration does not have the authority to approve, terminate or suspend academic programs—that is within the purview of the Academic Senate—it can reduce or eliminate funding for a program, which may lead to its closure. In this, and in many other matters, the faculty and Senate rely on Administration approval and support and conflict in one area can easily spill over into another.

During the first few decades of its existence, the UCSC Academic Senate seems to have been a good deal more combative and “ungovernable” than it is today. The founding faculty and their successors felt that they had a much greater stake and role in enacting the vision of Kerr and McHenry, and they were much more willing to go to the wall if a Chancellor sought major restructuring and reorganization. In more recent decades, as UCSC has been “normalized,” many of the early struggles have come to be regarded as less important or even irrelevant and, although there have

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I draw here on my experience with the creation of the Politics PhD program during the 1990s and the Sustainability Studies minor in Rachel Carson College during my tenure as Provost (2012-18).
been periods during which the faculty and Senate have fought with the Administration, these episodes have become increasingly rare, especially when faculty and Senate are ignored. Today, the Senate frequently goes along to get along. The faculty has precious few tools with which to fight for its needs and desires. They are not unionized, unlike graduate students, instructors and many staff members. They are not allowed to boycott classes or withhold classroom labor (a research “strike” could affect future salary increases). Faculty may organize forums, town halls, panels and discussions about any number of matters of concern to the University, and they can support student actions so long as these do not interfere with their responsibilities. For the most part, however, such initiatives seem to have little or no impact. There is a widespread feeling that many things ought to be fixed, but only limited agreement on how to fix them, or who is going to do it, or can do it. If UCOP imposes furloughs on faculty during academic year 2020-21, however, it is entirely possible that faculty will organize for union certification to protect their rights.

The Academic Divisions

This discussion would be incomplete without considering the role of the Academic Divisions on the campus. Over UCSC’s lifetime, the Divisions have been, and continue to be, linchpins of daily operation, inasmuch as that is where academics and administration usually meet. Recall that Dean McHenry’s desire to avoid departmentalization led him to invest the then-Divisional Vice-Chancellors with significant budgetary and personnel power over the Boards of Studies. In the early days of the campus, the demands from the Colleges also limited funding to the Boards. When the Colleges were removed from the academic funding equation (Chapter 9), however, the power of the Divisions was not adjusted accordingly and, as I have already suggested, the Divisional Deans remain gatekeepers for virtually all financial and budgetary matters where departments are concerned.

This might not matter were it not for the way in which academic programs have been divided—Arts, Humanities, Social Sciences, Physical and Biological Sciences, and Engineering (Graduate Education is a Division of its own, but it has almost no resources). At many universities, the first four are grouped into Schools or Colleges of Arts and Sciences—or something similarly named—which are responsible for undergraduate education (“professional” fields, such as Engineering, usually have their own schools). These schools are governed by deans who must take into account the needs and demands of all of the disciplines within their purview and provide departments with some budgetary and decision-making autonomy in order to

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71 In fact, UCSC has the only bona fide faculty “union” in the UC system, having voted in the 1970s to from a “Faculty Association” with the power to negotiate on issues local to the campus. But the FA cannot negotiate over salaries or authorize a faculty strike, and its membership is a fairly small fraction of the ladder-rank faculty at UCSC.
function. Such schools and colleges also make easier cross-departmental collaboration.

By contrast, the Deans of the five UCSC divisions are interested primarily in the departments they govern and in receiving funding and faculty lines from the Administration only for those departments. Faculty who seek support for new projects are normally told by the Administration to send their proposals and initiatives to their Divisional Dean, who will decide whether to provide seed support from a limited discretionary budget, while Deans will tell a faculty group to appeal to the Administration. An inter-Divisional or interdisciplinary initiative must often be pitched to two or more Deans, who are expected to consult and decide whether their individual constituency will benefit from the new project and whether any support will have negative budgetary impacts on their departments. Any kind of proposed funding collaboration among Divisions is thus liable to be smothered in the cradle since each Dean views every other Dean as a competitor in a zero-sum budgetary game.

The Administration has its own discretionary budget but refuses to support any bottom-up initiative proposed that is not sponsored or supported by a “champion” in the top management tier. Very promising and competitive grant proposals that could be strengthened by cost-sharing commitments from the Administration are routinely refused such support and told to ask the Deans or to come back after funding is procured. Finally, the kind of long-term administrative support that many initiatives and projects require to get past the “Valley of Death”—when labor costs are rising but extramural funding has not yet been procured—is scarce, if not wholly lacking, in part because new projects are regarded as high-risk investments that might not pay off (better not to lose by not spending than to spend and risk losing). Taking a leaf from neo-classical market theory, the higher ups also worry that providing adequate funding to new programs might result in a lackadaisical search for extramural funding.

The struggle to find funding to support new initiatives can become an end, rather than a means to an end, and very costly in terms of time and labor. For example, the Administration decides it is going to launch a project and demands participation by faculty and staff in scoping out (and perhaps designing) project elements, with the promise of resources at the other end. If one does not participate, one is guaranteed not to benefit from anything that might happen; if one does participate, valuable time must be diverted, from research and teaching, to develop a speculative project that might or might not provide a return on investment. If one must also compete for the limited seed funds associated with or coming from the project, the odds of acquiring faculty input decline, as they make cost-benefit calculations. If you don’t play, you get no pay, but even if you do play, you might not get paid.

To be sure, there are interdisciplinary programs that are supported by more than a single Division, such as the relatively new Coastal Science and Policy Program, which is administered by Ecology and Evolutionary Biology (EEB) and receives significant extramural funding from private foundations. It draws on faculty appointed in
Environmental Studies and Economics, in the Division of Social Sciences, and Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, and Earth and Planetary Sciences, in the Division of Physical and Biological Sciences, and has no faculty appointments of its own.

Could this system be changed or transformed? One option would be the creation of a new School of Arts and Sciences incorporating the conventional range of disciplines now scattered among Social Sciences, Arts, Humanities and Physical and Biological Sciences. Another is for the Administration to retain more control over discretionary funds, allocating them to successful projects and worthwhile “startups.” A third is to force Divisions to work with each other by making funding conditional on such collaborations. None of these is likely to garner the kind of broad faculty and campus support required. The simple answer is, consequently, “probably not.”

Might a charismatic new Chancellor be able to exercise compelling leadership and make a case for such campus reorganization? Perhaps, but the history of UCSC’s Chancellors suggests this is not likely. Strong leaders, such as Sinsheimer, tend to alienate the rank and file by insisting on their prerogatives; weak leaders, such as Blumenthal, simply go with the flow and don’t try to change anything. Any major reorganization of this type would be a multi-year project of planning and implementation, not without short-term costs and fairly disruptive. Given the unpredictability of financial support from the state, planning exercises have often been sidelined by unanticipated budget cuts (see Chapter 10). Fine dining does not matter if the restaurant is on fire.

Lest this gloomy view be taken to mean that nothing new is possible, it is worth noting that, over the years, a number of projects and programs have been launched by faculty, sometimes with marginal or no support at all from the Administration, and successfully sustained by dint of faculty commitment and funds squeezed out of research budgets and limited “seed funding” from Divisional Deans. Some of these were created and directed by charismatic or well-connected individuals who were able to acquire external funding through grants and private sources and sustain the program through close control of operations. Yet, were that person to leave, for whatever reason, it is rarely the case that her successor possesses similar charisma and skills or is able to maintain funding and connections and sustain the program (I am thinking here, in particular, of the UCSC Center for Tolerance and Justice, but this is only one of many examples).

IV. Budgeting & finances

As I have suggested throughout this book, obtaining accurate finance and budgeting information are near-impossible tasks for UCSC staff, faculty, and students, especially in light of uncertainties about future finances, changes in resource allocation processes and limited ability to assess changing student interests in response to changes in the broader career environment. Developing transparent budgets is further complicated by an opaque and multilayered accounting system imposed on all UC campuses that nonetheless differ from one campus to another in operational details.
There is no clear documentation about how system or campus budgeting actually works (although, see UCOP, 2017c) and the accounts available in public documents make budgets seem very *ad hoc*. Indeed, any history and analysis of finance and budgeting at UCSC would probably occupy several volumes, so what is offered here is a limited and very abridged exploration.

Technically speaking, the UC Board of Regents is the fiscal agent for UC and must approve large-scale projects and expenditures. Until quite recently, funds for basic academic and operating functions from the state were distributed to individual campuses through the UC Office of the President according to enrollment-based formulas (e.g., the 1 grad student = 3 undergrads formula instituted in the late 1960s and since replaced; see below). Other revenues, such as tuition, grants and private donations, are generated by specific campuses but flow through the Regents and UCOP. Some programs and units (e.g., medical and professional schools) generate significant resources, which may or may not be shared with the rest of their campus. The result is that that campuses with significant international enrollments, long histories, wealthy surroundings and medical and professional schools are able to provide some supplement to the basic core allocations available to each campus (Academic Senate, 2007; CPB, 2007).

UCSC has not done well in this respect.

First, it has no medical, law or other professional school that could provide some support to core expenses.

Second, its graduate enrollments have long been a smaller fraction of total student population than other campuses, which meant less money under the old “3=1” system and more recent formulas and extramural research funding.

Third, UCSC is located in a community that is only moderately wealthy in comparison to, say, Santa Barbara or Orange County, and has not been able to tap into Silicon Valley donors with any great success.

Fourth, average family income of UCSC students has been in decline since the 1990s, when it was the highest among the UC campuses, as a result of the changing demography of the campus, from mostly-white to greater racial diversity and more first generation students. Today, that average is among the lowest.

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72 It appears that all monies “reside” with UCOP, flowing into and out of centralized accounts, especially since everything is payable to the UC Board of Regents as the University’s fiscal agent.

73 Although robust graduate programs are thought to bring in significant revenues, these are actually generated by faculty and research staff. Graduate education itself operates at a net loss.

74 Chancellor Greenwood was especially interested in professional schools and proposed purchase of the Monterey Institute of International Studies as a potential site of professional master’s degrees. UC master’s students in professional programs are generally self-funded and must also pay fees above and beyond standard tuition.
Fifth, along with three other campuses, UCSC has received less support per student from the state possibly due to its ethnic and minority composition (See Table 8.3 below; California State Auditor, 2011: 37-38).

Sixth, UCSC remains more dependent on the state for base funding than any other campus, and relies heavily on tuition increases to fill out its budget (currently, that level appears to be around 25% of the total UCSC budget, but as much as 43% of core funds, which include student tuition and fees).

Three major modifications to the student financing process have been made over the past 55 years. First, the “3=1” enrollment-based allocation formula instituted in the late 1960s was changed to make all students equal (i.e., one grad student now equaled one undergraduate), a change that shifted graduate students costs to the individual campuses (in other words, the 2/3 reduction in graduate student funding had to be back-filled by the campus).

Table 8.3: University of California Campuses’ Share of the General Funds and Tuition Budget Per State-Supportable Student. Ordered by percentage of under-represented racial or ethnic groups. Fiscal Year 2009-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campus</th>
<th>University general funds &amp; tuition budget per state-supportable student</th>
<th>Enrollment budget over/under share $000</th>
<th>Underrepresented racial or ethnic group [difference from UC-wide average proportion of 18%] (a)</th>
<th>Difference (over/under) share from average budget per state-supportable student (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
<td>$12,309</td>
<td>$(94,465)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>$(3,337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>12,846</td>
<td>(62,812)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(3,337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>14,319</td>
<td>(42,412)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(3,337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merced</td>
<td>16,550</td>
<td>(315)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(3,337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvine</td>
<td>14,008</td>
<td>(70,103)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>15,670</td>
<td>(26,861)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>19,529</td>
<td>99,232</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>17,010</td>
<td>11,469</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>17,660</td>
<td>30,197</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>55,186</td>
<td>156,250</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) “Underrepresented racial or ethnic group” (averaged over high/low enrollment campuses) from Table 7 in auditor’s report

(b) “Difference from average budget per state-supportable student” (averaged as above) from Table 7 in auditor’s report


Second, in 2011-12, in an effort to give individual campuses more control over their finances, UCOP instituted what was called “funding streams,” which replaced the then-current, complicated system of cross-subsidies and reallocation of various revenue streams from one campus to another with a new framework that, with the exception of return-to-aid cost, leaves all revenues generated by a campus—tuition, non-resident supplemental tuition,
indirect cost returns, and others—on that campus. Thus, campuses directly receive the benefits from increased effort in generating these revenue streams (CPB, 2011-12: 3).

Third, was something called “rebenching,” which reinstated a weighted enrollment scheme for distributing state funding to the campuses in such a way as to equalize funding for each undergraduate across all ten (1 undergraduate = 2.5 PhD students = 5 “health science students,” i.e., medical professionals). In addition, any campus with less than 12% academic doctoral student enrollments would receive funding equivalent to having reached this 12%. However, this added support was contingent on those campuses actually achieving the 12% level within five years. Any campus that did not, would have to return the additional funds to UCOP at the end of the rebenching period (UCOP, 2017c: 2.5; Gillman & Chalfant, 2012). Table 8.4, reproduced below from Table 5.3, illustrates the consequences of this formula.

Rebenching funds were allocated wholly to “graduate growth” at UCSC, in the form of new faculty and graduate student support.75 Unfortunately, the cost of reaching the 12% benchmark has proved much greater than the new monies received through rebenching, and UCSC has not been able to meet the 12% requirement by the stipulated deadline (Graduate Council, 2017).

Table 8.4: Campus allocations on a weighted and unweighted student basis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campus</th>
<th>2016-17 allocation ($million)</th>
<th>2016-17 Campus enrollment (grad &amp; undergrad)</th>
<th>Unweighted allocation per student</th>
<th>Campus weighted enrollment</th>
<th>Weighted allocation per student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>$310.4</td>
<td>37,863</td>
<td>$8,199</td>
<td>43,399</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>$301.4</td>
<td>33,434</td>
<td>$9,014</td>
<td>42,133</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvine</td>
<td>$263.9</td>
<td>32,365</td>
<td>$8,153</td>
<td>36,889</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>$396.9</td>
<td>38,938</td>
<td>$10,193</td>
<td>55,482</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merced*</td>
<td>$129.6</td>
<td>7,440</td>
<td>$17,422</td>
<td>$17,422</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>$247.3</td>
<td>22,080</td>
<td>$11,201</td>
<td>24,468</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>$324.8</td>
<td>33,794</td>
<td>$9,612</td>
<td>38,410</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco*</td>
<td>$1964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara</td>
<td>$185.0</td>
<td>24,305</td>
<td>$7,612</td>
<td>25,861</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>$147.1</td>
<td>18,823</td>
<td>$7,814</td>
<td>20,564</td>
<td>$7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$2,781</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UCOP, 2017a; UCOP, 2018: 221. *Blank entries indicate data not provided in sources.

From the perspective of someone who is outside of the budget and planning process (as I have been), UCSC’s books are especially opaque.76 Such documents as are available are highly aggregated and provide no insights into how differentiated resources are assigned to specific functions. In the budgetary information provided to

75 In reality, because all revenues go into a “general fund,” it is difficult to trace the actual flow of rebenching and core monies to graduate and undergraduate students.

76 In my experience, even the Office of Planning and Budget does not always know how revenues are being spent.
the public, the campus treats all revenue streams as flows into a general revenue fund and all expenses as coming from that same fund. Tables 8.5a and b illustrate this point.

Revenues from all sources are summed into a single figure ($789 million in 2018-19) while functional spending and expense categories are all summed to the same total ($789 million). But this begs the fact that some funds are not so-called general revenue funds and are obligated to specific purposes (e.g., research grants and contracts) while others, such as student affairs, are a mix of state funds, tuition and student fees. It is not possible to determine exactly whether tuition is being used specifically to support undergraduate education or whether non-resident tuition might be going to graduate education. One could claim that the revenue sources do not matter, since everything contributes to the University’s mission, but this is not quite correct. If funds are not fungible, they are not available for basic teaching, and the actual allocation for “instruction” is less than advertised.

Table 8.5a: UCSC revenue sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Funds</th>
<th>2017-18</th>
<th>2018-19</th>
<th>Explanation of category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State of California</td>
<td>199 914 421</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>199,603,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Tuition and Fees</td>
<td>241,330,223</td>
<td>32.13%</td>
<td>255,072,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts, Grants, and Contracts</td>
<td>125,544,706</td>
<td>16.50%</td>
<td>139,150,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary and Service Enterprises</td>
<td>153,700,500</td>
<td>20.43%</td>
<td>157,774,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UCSC Planning & Budget Office

Note the category “recharge,” which shows up as a negative number. As the table explains, units charge each other for goods and services, and these revenues become part of a unit’s budget. What is happening, in fact, is that money is being taken out of one pocket and put into another.
Table 8.4b: UCSC expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>How funds are used by function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instruction, Research, &amp; Library</td>
<td>54,478,912 0.44% Academic, staff, student salaries, benefits, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC &amp; Public Service</td>
<td>10,000,000 1.0% University extension &amp; outreach activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Affairs</td>
<td>77,567,794 0.6% Academic, staff, student salaries, benefits, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of Plant</td>
<td>54,579,480 0.4% University extension &amp; outreach activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Support</td>
<td>36,656,700 0.3% Operating costs (including salaries) of administrative units that support the campus mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Enterprises</td>
<td>13,310,135 0.1% Change to support UC-wide initiatives and UCOP operational costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Aid</td>
<td>66,547,787 0.5% Financial assistance to student tuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major expense categories (in millions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Salaries</td>
<td>136.2 14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Salaries and General Assistance</td>
<td>177.9 17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees Benefits</td>
<td>177.3 17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies</td>
<td>170.0 17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>170.0 17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Oustasis</td>
<td>209.9 21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCOP Assessment</td>
<td>16.9 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recharge</td>
<td>57.9 5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UCSC Planning & Budget Office

According to the “UCSC Budget Handbook” (2014), which has undergone frequent, but limited, revision over time (but not since 2014)

The annual budget process focuses on incremental changes in the resources available to the campus, recognizing the need to undertake a closer review of base budgets over time with an eye towards understanding the adequacy of the base... Among the primary goals of the campus is to ensure that our core academic programs and our core administrative services can, over time, become sufficiently robust. A balanced approach that considers current and new programs must be considered (UCSC Budget Handbook, 2014: 12)

Thus, for each fiscal year, funds are allocated to individual units, based on departmental needs, resource requests and administration judgments of what a unit actually must receive to continue functioning adequately (with as much as 75% tied up in salaries). Such allocations are made not only in the context of current and next year needs and requests but also whether the required resources, whether incremental or not, will still be available in the future.
Thus, according to the Budget Handbook,

> Multi-year resource projections are updated annually to reflect anticipated incremental revenue from tuition and fees, nonresident supplemental tuition, funding due to growth in summer session enrollments, and new state funds. Expense projections are updated to take into account required obligations for mandatory cost increases for bargained increases, faculty and staff merits, employer contributions to the retirement system, and other employee benefit increases. After funding required obligations, new core resources may be used to support academic, academic support, and institutional support divisions as well as for strategic investments, budget cuts, unforeseen expenses, campus infrastructure and other one-time purposes (id.: 14).

But, although “the Campus Provost’s decision about how to utilize these funds is informed by a consultative process that involves the identification and setting of priorities” (id: 14), in discussions with Academic Senate committees, department chairs and other units, final decisions rest with the Provost/Executive Vice Chancellor. The goal is to rationalize the process and outcome. Rationalization rarely follows.

Every department and unit would like more funding than they usually receive, but there seems to be little or no obvious way—short of making repeated requests for information—to compare what funding different units actually do receive. The unavailability of more finely grained accounts and unit-level budgets does not mean they do not exist—but it is possible they are regarded as “confidential,” perhaps in order to avoid fights among departments and units over “fair shares.”

In the context of what is largely a zero-sum game, arguments over “fair shares” may also raise questions about “profits” and “losses” of individual programs and units. Outside of auxiliary units that receive subventions and go into debt (e.g., the Arboretum), however, there are not, as yet, any obvious efforts to allocate resources based on how much revenue a particular unit “brings in” or earns (based, for example, on the tuition and state support accrued by majors in a particular department). Nonetheless, departments and units are sometimes classified according to whether they are net earners (with surpluses returned to the general fund) or losers (which generate “deficits” that must be repaid).

According to this logic, STEM disciplines are net revenue earners, because they receive significant extramural funding, while most non-STEM disciplines are net revenue losers, because they cover, at best, only the costs of educating students and bring in little external funding. This logic obscures that fact that the cost of non-STEM faculty tends to be less than STEM faculty, who require significant startup funds, expensive labs and costly graduate students. There generally appears to be only limited interest in changing or reforming this system, since that would require a great deal of time, extended negotiations with various constituencies, many meetings to
hash out details, with a significant probability that little or nothing would be accomplished.

Eventually, the piper must be paid. During 2019-20, a number of factors have arisen in what can only be described as a perfect storm. These include housing stipends for graduate students, salary increases for lecturers and staff and faculty. In March 2020, the Committee on Planning and Budget (CPB, 2020: 8) issued a report on the “storm”:

CPB estimates that the various impending sources of compensation pressure, if realized, will require an increase in the annual outlay for campus faculty and staff of approximately $27M per year. Other identified budgetary pressures will require an additional $16M in permanent funding. Lacking additional State support beyond inflation, flat tuition will effectively reduce campus income by an additional $5M for every year tuition is not increased. Finally, the aging state of UCSC buildings and infrastructure (excepting housing, which is required by State law to be self-supporting) threatens to apply a burdensome additional level of further pressure to campus budgets.

To provide some scale of the magnitude of these pending budgetary obligations, the $43M in enumerated impending calls on the campus budget needed under these various assumptions to maintain our current level of effort, represents approximately 10% (6.5% from compensation pressures and 3.9% from other liabilities) of the $413M “core” budget (net of undergrad financial aid) that supports teaching and learning and associated support functions on our campus. It can also be compared to the “rebenching bump” (total increase in funds awarded to UCSC over a five-year period beginning in 2012-2013 as a result of a consideration of systemwide equity) of $24.3M.

The COVID-19 crash will only make the situation worse, as not only will it be more expensive to operate in the post-pandemic world, but also that State funding is being cut—as will funding from other sources, such as the federal government and donors.

IV. Big data as a management fix

A recent fly in the university ointment, so to speak, is the arrival of “big data” (BD) as a management tool. BD merits its own section in this chapter because it is regarded as essential to privatization and marketization as institutional logics (as defined in chapter 2). BD has also acquired an actor network quality of its own, in the sense that data collection becomes an “actant” driving behavior rather than a means of evaluating the success of the teaching enterprise (for which most of the BD is collected). The contradiction here is that BD is claimed by some to have “predictive powers” that can be deployed to advise and guide both managers and students whose performance has deviated far from the “norm” produced by BD. More on this, below.

As with most universities, UCSC has become heavily dependent on digitalization of operations, which has also had a singular impact on how the campus is run. This is
manifest in the will to quantify and the belief that what cannot be quantified has no value since it does not allow comparison, normalization or monetization. At the same time, and notwithstanding arguments that digitalization can result in new efficiencies and cost savings, there is some notion that it actually increases workloads. This paradox (or contradiction) is captured in the push to define educational objectives and measure educational outcomes, down to the course and student level, and to develop new methods and metrics for assessment of student learning.

Institutions of higher education are increasingly being pressured to show that students are “learning” substantively (whatever that means) when they earn a college degree. That is, are they receiving a commensurate “return on investment,” however understood, that justifies the high tuition they or their parents must pay and borrow to finance a degree? There is something of an irony in this, insofar as the decline in state support for public institutions would seem to make ROI of less importance to the general public and taxpayers. But that is exactly the point of privatization and marketization: placing a monetary value on individual time and effort in college so as to be able to compare it with returns from particular disciplines and other available forms of employment (thus the question: is college worth the cost?).

Measuring progress and achievement is not the same as deciding what is to be measured. Exams, quizzes and papers are no longer regarded as viable methods of measuring student performance, since they may be biased in particular ways that disadvantage minority, low income and first-generation students and reflect memorization and formulas rather than learning. Alternative assessment techniques offered by experts tend to rely heavily on student self-evaluation and reporting and are better measures of “customer self-satisfaction” than achievement. Nonetheless, instructors must hew to the new norm. They are expected to, first, revise their in-class pedagogy in such a way that assessment becomes possible and, second, to deploy assessment methods in order to demonstrate that students have “learned” the “course learning objectives.” At the end of the day, however, student achievement in the class is expressed in conventional letter grades—which reveal no more than they did prior to the assessment movement.

But learning assessment is only part of the digitalization project. Today, student learning is treated as one element of the overall “student experience” that is believed to be as critical to a college education as courses and coursework. This “experience” includes high school, family income, financial aid, advising, counseling food, housing, sports, campus amenities, internships, atmosphere (or “climate”), and other types of organized and organizational support for students. Because virtually all student-university transactions take place on-line—or can be digitized, if off-line—it is possible to track student behavior and participation, collect and aggregate data and develop profiles of individual students. This, in turn, allowing construction of “normative” profiles based on the median performance of students who share similar characteristics and comparison of individuals to the norm. Individual deviations from a category norm can then be treated either as indicators of likelihood of success or failure in college, or as pointers to where additional organizational support might be
required. In either case, while the student is being served, the hope is that the costs of support and time to graduation can be reduced, thereby providing a bigger bang for the buck, while allowing the organization to operate more efficiently.

Similarly, data on faculty research, teaching and other activities can be collected in order to assess individual activity and ranking, and to compare individuals against the normative profiles of similar faculty at other institutions. Administrators can use these comparisons to determine whether individuals on their campus should receive salary increases and promotions, and whether tenure should be granted. Again, while this is touted as a way to more “accurately” assess faculty performance it can also be used to justify lower salaries and future savings from separations of “unqualified” individuals.

Has digitalization achieved the promised efficiencies? Certainly, there are more data available than ever before, and they are more easily accessed and analyzed (by biased algorithms). But data must be first created to be collected, and someone must decide what constitutes useful data. Furthermore, the availability of new software platforms and the ability to create and distribute forms and surveys, and the relative ease with which these can be deployed, conceal a particular type of mystification: a proliferation of, rather than any reduction in, the volume of demands on time and attention. Faculty, staff and students are asked to spend more and more time responding to surveys, filling out on-line forms, completing on-line trainings, trying to figure out how on-line platforms work, and being available online or by phone after working hours. What seems to be happening is a massive transfer of costs from mid-level staff to the lower ranks of complex institutions, who must then carve out the labor time to complete digital requirements demanded by the university. So far as I have been able to determine, while many tout the benefits of digitalization, there are no studies to determine its costs or who bears them.

V. Conclusion

Is UCSC any different from all other public universities, which face much the same environment and contingencies? The quick and facile answer is “probably not,” especially where other University of California campuses are concerned. Still as the appearance and disappearance of corporations reminds us, those that produce near-identical products, such as cars and computers, may operate very differently, even down to the assembly line. To what degree differences in internal structure, organization and *habitus* make a difference in the long-term success and operation of an organization is difficult to determine, although it is clear they do matter. I have argued elsewhere in this book that, notwithstanding the principles of Foucault’s genealogy, the initial structure of an organization has an enduring effect on what follows, and those structures and effects can never be wholly eliminated or reformed. At the same time, however, ongoing struggles to rationalize or compensate for initial structure can consume enormous amounts of time and energy that can never be

78 Again, exacerbated by the shift to remote instruction during the COVID-19 lockdown.
recovered. To paraphrase Max Weber (perhaps), the choice of which track to follow in Colorado can make an enormous difference in where one ends up: California or Oregon.

In the chapters that follow, I take up three case studies that describe and assess how history and structure can have enduring impacts on what can and cannot be done. In Chapter 9, I address the story of UCSC’s Colleges and, in particular, the multi-decade struggle to define their “mission” and “academic role.” As we shall see, insofar as these missions and roles were articulated in the early planning and design of the campus, they had to fall before the institutionalized ideal of the public research university, to which UCSC was expected to conform. In Chapter 10, I return to the “Tragedy of Strategic Planning” and why the 15-odd plans composed between 1965 and 2020 seem to have had only limited effects in terms of UCSC’s operation. Finally, Chapter 10 focuses on UCSC’s efforts to establish research parks and satellite campuses, efforts to increase graduate enrollments, and the fate of the most recent strategic academic planning exercise, from 2017-2019.
Chapter 9

Making & Breaking the Colleges

The discussion of conflict between colleges and boards seems continual, to the point of boredom; like the weather, everybody complains, but nobody has confidence that anything can be done (Lamb, et al. 1975: 39)

I. Introduction

Ever since UCSC’s very first day of operation, there has been a power struggle between Administration and the Colleges over the latter’s role in undergraduate education. By 1974, when Dean McHenry stepped down as Chancellor, the struggle had not been resolved. By 1988, when Robert Sinsheimer stepped down, the struggle had not been resolved. Even in the early 2000s, when MRC Greenwood left for UCOP, the struggle continued. Indeed, the issue of “the academic role of the colleges” occupied administration and faculty well into the 21st century, consuming vast quantities of time, energy and paper. Administration and faculty have repeatedly produced memos, letters, reports, statements, proposals and proclamations about the issue. By my count, no less than 25 major documents can be found in archives and libraries and on the internet (see Table 9.1). For the most part, these reports came to nothing, although nothing did not prevent the academic roles of the colleges from diminishing.

All of this happened in an external environment that, after the firing of Clark Kerr in 1967, devalued the Santa Cruz experiment. During the 1970s, as enrollments dropped and state funding began its long decline, most ladder-rank faculty proved unwilling to teach in the Colleges while students complained about the diminishing College core courses. Administration grew in scope and became increasingly cumbersome, as Chancellors came and went; each one made commitments to the Colleges but most did little or nothing. By 1980, the Colleges had been, in essence, “broken,” although it was not until the 1990s that they lost their role as longer major players in campus politics and power. Of course, as part of UCSC’s architectural landscape, organizational bureaucracy, student housing and campus brand, the Colleges did not go away. Nor could they be abolished, lest a unique feature of UCSC be lost. They were too deeply embedded in the mythology of UCSC to be transformed into purely residential units without any academic functions.

I regard the disputes over the role of the Colleges as symptomatic of the much broader power struggle that, as suggested in previous chapters, arose from both the peculiar division of authority between the campus units and Administration and continual external and internal pressures to normalize the organization. The struggle between Colleges and Boards of Studies was present almost from the very beginning of planning the Santa Cruz campus. A tilting of the balance began to emerge quite

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79 Greenwood’s full first names are Mary Rita Cooke. She preferred “MRC” pronounced as “Marcy.”
early, as the Boards acquired growing influence, especially where hires were concerned and even as the number of colleges and their relative weight increased.

According to McHenry (1974b: 56-57) “The boards of studies packed a big wallop in the appointments that came for both Stevenson and for Crown....” As more faculty were hired in specific disciplines, the college provosts found it increasingly difficult to sustain what authority and autonomy they held, especially in the face of pressure from the boards and individual faculty. Faculty were tenured in both College and Board, but an excellent teaching performance in a College did not necessarily mean an excellent research evaluation by a Board. Those who failed to publish to the satisfaction of their disciplinary colleagues found it difficult to get Board support, even if a Provost and College supported tenure. By the time McHenry retired, in 1974, the power was tilting seriously toward the Boards, portending the eventual abolition of the college’s role in faculty hiring and review. How did this happen?

The histoire evenementielle, at least through the mid-90s, has been described in detail by Carlos Noreña (1999) and others (Bassett, 1990), and I will not seek to duplicate their work (although, so far as I can tell, there has not been a campus history or serious analysis since Rogers, 2011, whose story concludes in 2005). In this chapter, I recount the more salient features of this struggle and how it was reflected in the many documents referred to above. I conclude this chapter with a general assessment of the impacts of this struggle on the functioning of the campus over its 50-year history.

II. Running the colleges

Because the colleges were so central to the UCSC experiment, they dominated the early focus of vision, planning, design and implementation. But how they might fit into the larger organizational structure was largely left to happenstance and ad hoc measures. As we have seen, McHenry relied on the colleges and their faculties to figure out how to run things by granting authority, power and autonomy to the early College provosts and faculties. He had been warned against this approach, by the Tschirgi Committee: McHenry wanted the faculty in place before planning; Tschirgi thought planning should precede hiring. Leaving the task of “detailed operation” to the faculty and provosts, especially in the absence of clearly defined relations of power, authority and responsibility, was a formula for endless haggling, struggle and resistance.

The “things” College faculty and Provosts were expected to design and run included teaching and supervision of academic curriculum; personnel matters; student life and activities; and financial affairs relevant to the college. At most universities, faculty members who are strongly committed to teaching and research are not very good at “running things,” even though they usually have very strong opinions and ideas about how things should be run. Those who move up into administration tend to teach and research less and become consumed with running things while losing touch with the body politic, so to speak. Scientists and engineers are frequently appointed to high
positions for reasons of prestige and fame, but are poorly versed in the operation of human systems, know little about human psychology and rarely understand economics or finance. Administrators from other disciplines are not that much better. Both often tend to ignore inconvenient details, and assume implementation of a new policy simply requires people to put it into practice. In short, they suffer from the “spherical cow” syndrome (Harte, 1988), assuming that stuff just happens and faculty will do what they are told.

Faculty are more like cats that spherical cows. They tend not to move in herds or straight lines. And (more or less), at the founding, each newly hired member of the UCSC faculty had his or her own idea about how the colleges and campus ought to function. Moreover, and notwithstanding the importance of the college provost in making the ultimate decisions about hiring, individuals in the disciplines asserted their priorities and choices without much consideration of college needs and requirements. Finally, because appointments were still made largely on the basis of research record and potential, he (and almost all of the new faculty were men) who could yell louder than a particular provost often got his way.

Consequently, a great deal rested on the decisions and actions of the first college provosts. Here, a bit of explanation about the meaning of “provost” is in order. On most campuses, a provost is the individual who oversees operations and is, essentially, the equivalent of a Chief Administrative Officer in a corporation (at UCSC, this position is called “Campus Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor”). If the campus chancellor plays a significant role in administration, the provost carries out the chancellor’s decisions. When the campus chancellor is a “hands-off” type person, the provost runs the campus. A UCSC College Provost’s remit was far from this, however, and was not a role or position whose powers and authority were, anywhere, specified—one searches the various reports, letters and oral histories in vain for such a description. The position had to be created, largely from scratch.

The decision to bestow this title on the head of a College was, according to McHenry (1974a: 260-61), Kerr’s, and came after consideration of Dean, Master, Warden and Principal as other possibilities. When the UCSC Academic Senate Committee on Colleges later sought to categorize the College Provosts within the campus and system bureaucracy, it was forced to “read between the lines” of the UC Systemwide Senate By-laws, which did not “envision the collegiate structure at Santa Cruz.” Among other decisions, the Committee (1966: 1) proposed that

We do not find that identifying our concept of “College” with that of the [UC Systemwide] Senate By-laws in any way restricts us in developing our kind of

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80 This is an old physics joke with several versions (including a “spherical horse,” which is what I learned in physics). Here is the version from Harte’s book. A farmer has a milk cow with an excellent gene line that produces hardly any milk. So, she hires several academics, including a physicist, to determine what the cow’s problem is. All of the academics give absurd answers, of course, but the physicist begins his presentation with “First, assume a spherical cow.” A more detailed version can be found at Allain, 2011.
College. Nor do references in the Senate By-laws to “Dean” in any way impair our concept of the Provost as head of the College.”

The Committee therefore proposed (1966:2) to amend the campus by-laws to read that “references in the [UC Systemwide] Senate by-laws to ‘Dean’ are interpreted to be equally applicable to [College] ‘Provost’ at Santa Cruz.”

This decision, however, turned out to be something of a major categorical error that still stands today, inasmuch as the Deans of academic colleges at most universities have greater authority and budgets than do UCSC College Provosts and are responsible to the departments comprising the college. Provosts, by contrast, had very different responsibilities and only limited authority (at most) in relation to other units at UCSC. This has had long-term consequences for how the campus operates.

The ideal Provosts were, according to McHenry (1974a: 374-76) highly qualified scholars who were “strong leaders” and able to lead the faculty and shape the college, although exactly how they would do this was less clear. He reports that “I had only a generalized pattern and a whole list of ideas that I’d like to see tried in the various colleges at various times…. The detailed operation had to be left to the faculty and the provosts” (1974b: 1). Moreover, McHenry hoped (1974c: 11) that “there might be people of very moderate scholarly achievement who would fill these roles as provost…. I wanted them to be full professors, and in the University of California, you’re unlikely to be appointed to a full professor without some scholarly attainment.”

To fill the role of the first Provost of Cowell, UCSC’s first college, McHenry appointed UCLA Professor Charles Page Smith. He knew Smith from UCLA, where both had been faculty members, but the decision to hire Smith seems to have been somewhat casual, as were all such early decisions (Smith reports that he was only McHenry’s second choice). According to Smith (1996: 1), McHenry wrote him a note saying “if you are ever passing through Santa Cruz, stop by. I think you’d be interested in what we are doing, starting this new campus up there.” McHenry (1974b: 11) regarded Smith very highly and called him a “real scholar’s scholar.” Smith was a full professor at UCLA, with a number of well-regarded books under his belt, and the charisma to do the job, according to McHenry. When Smith did stop by, McHenry asked whether he might be interested in becoming provost of the first college (Smith, 1996: 1). After giving the offer some thought, Smith accepted.

But the two had different ideas about how the colleges and campus were to be organized and run. McHenry emphasized repeatedly that the college faculties were responsible for developing the curricula and procedures for each college, presumably on a consensual basis, and he relied on the wisdom and good intentions of college faculty to develop appropriate practices expected at a research university. Such an approach, it should be noted, is one often held by the creators of new organizations, who assume that (i) employees will be inspired by and follow the precise visions and ideas of the founder and (ii) those employees are adults who are able to work
together consensually to implement the founder’s visions and ideas. When the founder does not exercise strong leadership and management skills, however, both assumptions may prove incorrect.

For instance, McHenry expected the Colleges to handle the job of new faculty even as he was not about to let the Colleges determine the selection of new faculty. As McHenry reported

part of my job has been to strengthen the hand of the provost, not to the point where he could get appointed an assistant professor of Literature who is unqualified, or was unsuited to the needs of Literature, but to make sure that his special needs, and the special style of the college, such as College Four, Merrill College, is met by the appointment (McHenry, 1974a: 267).

In other words, the provost would appear to be an independent actor making choices while, in the background, McHenry would lend a guiding and invisible hand. The resulting contradictions emerged even before UCSC opened for business and became evident in the bureaucratic and personal relationship between McHenry and Smith.

Smith was not inclined to act as McHenry’s front man. He (Smith, 1996: 4) was “interested in power and who has the power these days to appoint a faculty’…. [and] the whole notion of beginning something was very appealing to [him].” But Smith also seemed to believe that McHenry was giving him considerable freedom in this regard and he was “really horrified—horrified is too strong a word, but dismayed—at the notion that Dean [McHenry] already had very much in mind the faculty he wanted” (Smith, 1996: 4). As Smith (id.: 4-5) put it, “I very strongly resisted Dean’s guidance in this and I was very determined to run my own show, so to speak, because I was spoiled, I’d always had my own way…. I had a notion of what I wanted to do and the kind of people that I wanted to get and I was determined to carry that through.”

When McHenry told Smith whom he was going to appoint as the first faculty hire in literature—a individual who would be a fellow of Cowell but whom Smith did not want to hire—he threatened to resign and made clear that he would not be led and directed by McHenry (Smith, 1996: 5-6). The latter backed down on the appointment but told (id: 6) Smith “Never threaten to resign on me again....” As with Humpty Dumpty, the real question became “which is to be master?”

Ultimately, Smith found it more expedient to ask for forgiveness rather than permission: “if you’re going to do something you’re far better off if you decide to do it and then go and try to find people who are interested in doing that, rather than trying to do everything in committee” (Smith, 1996: 28).

81 “When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all” (Carroll, 1872: 124).
Impatient with the slow procedures of the fledgling bureaucracy, Smith made unilateral decisions, often without consulting others. He often failed to follow even those rules and regulations required by UC (Smith, 1996: 12), and was “careless sometimes in regard to clearing things with [McHenry]” (Smith, 1996: 14). He recalled (1996: 23, 52) “never having administered, my inclination was always to do things myself which then appeared to be arbitrary or authoritarian…. If… decisions have to be made, I would rather that powers revert…to administrators like provosts and elsewhere have one czar do it for a year” (id.: 52). Great scholars are rarely great administrators, and Smith was no exception in this regard, admitting (1996: 15) that he “was always a wretched administrator; I never did things right…, I was just a careless, disorganized, bad administrator…. Whatever gifts I had were on the side of my relations with the students and the faculty, [and] my teaching…."

III. Who’s on first—Colleges or Boards of Study?

The origins of the Board-College struggle can be found at the creation. McHenry reports that Kerr once told him “Let’s never have departments at Santa Cruz, to which the McHenry replied, “never is a long time” (McHenry, 1964a: 279). McHenry’s initial memo on a collegiate system for UCSC (1961:2) proposes a “series of schools, such as Humanities, Social Sciences, Natural Sciences, etc.” His second (McHenry, 1962) says even less about them, with no mention of disciplines or departments. The “Educational Plan” drawn up by Neil Megaw and Karl Lamb in 1962 (Megaw, 1962: 33) specified that there would be both colleges and “divisions” but no “formal ‘departments’.”

Departments were downplayed in the Provisional Academic Plan (1962: 5), presented to the Regents in November, 1962, which stated that the “colleges will be the dominant academic units in the early development of the campus” and will “take the place of the conventional College of Letters and Science….” But that plan (id.: 8) also laid the groundwork for Academic Divisions: “For a variety of reasons, it will be necessary to organize campus-wide academic units that cut across college lines” organized as Humanities, Social Sciences, and Natural Sciences. Furthermore, “ultimately the arts and sciences groupings ought to become schools, operating mainly on the graduate level. For the initial period it would suffice if they are organized as ‘faculties’” (id.: 9; McHenry, 1974a: 281-82).

In the definitive 1965 Academic Plan (p. 15), these “faculties” are called “divisions,” to be “headed by vice chancellors or deans who share power and responsibilities with the college provosts in initiating and consummating decisions on academic personnel matters, including appointments and promotions.” While the possibility of departments is raised in the Academic Plan of 1962, these would not appear for some time: “Until the colleges are firmly rooted and the character of the undergraduate instructional function is established, it appears ill-advised to set up conventional departments” (Provisional Academic Plan, 1962: 9; my emphasis).

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82 In Smith’s defense, there are few faculty members intimately familiar with those roles and regulations.
McHenry explains (1974a: 280-81) that “we wanted to give the colleges a head start... We concentrated heavily on getting the colleges going,” in order to prevent the disciplines from “develop[ing] too much muscle” which would allow them to “dominate this place just as they do virtually every other institution in the country.” Nevertheless, he (McHenry, 1974a: 279) “realized there’d have to be some way of cross-campus inter-college, a board or committee or council or something or other, in the discipline.”

The term “department” does not appear at all in the 1965 Academic Plan, which observes that “Groupings by discipline are also needed to fix the responsibility for determining professional competence of staff, for judging the quality of research work, and for guiding graduate students” (Academic Plan, 1965: 15). But these were Divisions, not Boards of Study. Of “Board of Studies,” McHenry relates (1974a: 266) that the “terminology came from Britain... [where] some of the new universities in Britain are calling their disciplinary organizations boards of studies. It seems to convey the idea and to give us a measure of flexibility that we couldn't have otherwise.”

In the event, establishment of Boards of Studies was only proposed to the Academic Senate in Fall, 1965. A Board would consist of “three to five members” from the specific discipline, including one of whom would be from an “outside but related discipline.” (In the original proposal, not all faculty in a discipline would be Board “members.”) These groupings would function as “boards of examiners,” based on the Oxbridge model in which teaching and examinations are “separate functions.” This stipulation was later dropped (Lamb, et al. 1975: 31-33) and the Boards became closer to ordinary departments.

Once the Divisions and Boards were established, McHenry operationalized his “separation of powers” approach to administration, giving power to the Divisions, while making sure “not to let the boards set up a bureaucracy of their own, a large secretariat and so on, and not to let them dominate at various points in the appointment process, at personnel transactions generally, and in services” (McHenry, 1974a: 266).

In order to save money and fulfill the commitment to the Board of Regents that UCSC would cost no more per student than any other UC campus, funds were carefully husbanded. Divisions were provided with limited budgets in order to make them relatively weak in relation to the Colleges (McHenry, 1974a: 277; Cowan, 2013:151, 188; Smith, 1974: 40). According to McHenry (1974a: 268), Boards “have no budgets to work with; they need to prepare no budgets; they need to administer no budgets. This is all done in the divisional offices.” The Divisions took on most of the responsibilities usually given to conventional departments, while the Boards handled whatever needs might arise for their affiliated faculty, students and the campus, including establishing requirements for a major, developing and teaching courses in the discipline, and overseeing the comprehensive examination requirement (one of the
conditions for making permanent the narrative evaluation system; Lamb, et al., 1975: 29).

Most of the academic and administrative support for undergraduate education would be provided through the Colleges, where the need was judged to be greatest. Although faculty salaries were split 50-50 between Colleges and Divisions, Provosts were, at least on paper, given greater influence over faculty appointments since priority was given getting the college curricula off the ground (McHenry, 1974a: 267). As noted above, however, this power was only conditional.

**IV. What’s on second? Research or teaching?**

The second critical feature of the power struggle revolved around the tension between teaching and research. On the one hand, following the Oxbridge “craft-based” approach described in chapter 6, the Colleges sought to emphasize small classes and high levels of faculty-student contact, requiring a significant time commitment to teaching and low student-faculty ratios. On the other hand, a large German-type research university, which was the standard UC design, could not afford to expend its capital on individual undergraduates, instead limiting the craft-based model to graduate students and research while relying on Fordist-based large undergraduate courses, especially during students’ lower division years in the Colleges.

Kerr and McHenry believed that UCSC could be a *tabula rasa* and break away from the German model, and that it would be possible to structure the campus to support both research and teaching as needed. The UCSC Colleges were, therefore, designed on paper to provide a lower-division, liberal arts education to freshmen and sophomores, after which students would move to their major disciplines (Boards) in the Divisions to complete their degree requirements. Colleges could offer upper division courses and even create and offer their own majors, but there would be many fewer than offered by the Boards.83

On paper and in theory, this tension did not seem to matter. The Provisional Academic Plan (1962: 4) stated that the primary goal of the colleges was “To establish an undergraduate liberal-arts program on such a firm basis in the early years that it will not be adversely affected by the subsequent launching of graduate work, or subordinated to the concurrent research and creative work of the faculty.” The Colleges would be “the dominant academic units in the early development of the campus, and enduring, distinctive features of the ultimate campus organization” (Academic Plan, 1962: 4). The final Academic Plan (1965) emphasized “(1) the ‘college’ as the basic unit of planning, and of student and faculty identification; (2) initial concentration on undergraduate liberal arts education...; (5) a restricted

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83 Most of these majors were highly regarded, but some were eventually disbanded (Aesthetic Studies) while others went on to become Departments (Feminist Studies; Latin American and Latinx Studies).
curriculum, designed mainly to serve students’ needs rather than reflect faculty interests....”

Nevertheless, it proved quite difficult for junior faculty, in particular, to balance teaching and research; according to Chemistry Professor and the first Provost of Crown College Kenneth Thimann (1997: 21), McHenry envisaged “a school like Swarthmore where there were good scientists, but they didn’t have time to do any research.... I told him right away that you can’t get first class scientists with that scheme.” Even non-science faculty, especially those not yet tenured, faced the problem of “publishing or perishing” in defined disciplines (Cowan, 1981: 5-6). As a result, “faculty, during the seventies, began to back off just a little...trying to find a way of pacing themselves...[as they] began to come up for promotion” (Cowan, 2013:91-92).

The Founders were not oblivious to this contradiction. Both the Pepper (1953; 1955) and the Sanford-Ten Broek (1957) proposals for colleges at Berkeley acknowledged it but tried to elide it by including only lower division students and relying on senior faculty who would be expected to put aside their research for a time and dedicate themselves to undergraduate liberal arts education. The contradiction was raised by the Tschirgi Committee, as well, which suggested in a preliminary memo (Tschirgi, 1964a) to Clark Kerr that UCSC was focusing too much on hiring eminent senior faculty who were unlikely to give up their research, and needed to seek out those who had demonstrated a commitment to teaching over research programs. The committee (Emaneau, et al, 1964: 17) suggested that faculty hired for Cowell (and subsequent colleges) should be willing “to forego their research interests for several years while planning, compiling, and revising curricula, course syllabi and examinations,” repeating this stipulation throughout both the report and subsequent communications. McHenry took exception to such arguments, regarding them as a recommendation that UCSC “should seek a second-rate faculty for the Colleges” (Tschirgi, 1964e; McHenry, 1964c; Stookey, 1964).

Page Smith took the Academic Plans seriously. In his “Statement of Aims for Cowell College” (Smith, 1964: 2,3), Smith asserted that “The initial charge to the faculty of Cowell is to develop a ‘distinguished program in the liberal arts which challenges traditional habits of teaching and curricular organization’,” with faculty who will be “men and women...chosen on the basis of their scholarly accomplishments or promise, their commitment to undergraduate teaching and their general intellectual breadth.” Later, however, Smith (id.: Appendix, i) acknowledged that the academic plan for Cowell “must allow faculty substantial time for advanced teaching and research.” The work required to mount the Cowell Core course in 1965 and 1966 suggests, however, that there was not much time available for “advanced teaching and research.”

The situation was even more complicated because each College was given the task of developing and implementing its own distinctive liberal arts curriculum with its own faculty fellows drawn from specialized disciplines but possessing the ability to staff and teach the wide-ranging College core courses. At the same time, the Divisions
(and Boards) were tasked with coordinating their course offerings with the College curricula so that there would be no duplications and students could complete a major in a particular discipline.

In his oral history, Michael Cowan repeatedly mentions (e.g., 2013:134) that insufficient consideration was given to ways in which the colleges could have supported both faculty teaching and research, thereby reducing pressure from the Boards and mitigating some of the challenges to getting junior faculty tenured in both College and Board. Once the Boards of Study were created, however, reforming the structure to provide research support in the Colleges became impossible, since that would require reallocation of resources to units. Smith (1996: 29-30) recounts that “year after year, the faculty participated less and less in the life of the college and I blame that largely on the competition from the boards. The real mistake was in just not having the gumption to make the colleges the whole show.”

Finally, once classes began in 1965, the time demands on College faculty—mostly humanists and social scientists—far exceeded what was available, and many found it necessary to put their research aside. Cowan (2013: 91-92) points out that “if you look at people’s bio-bibliographies of that period, you will see just a huge number of independent studies. Sometimes people were taking on...forty or fifty independent studies.” Supervision of these took a great deal of time that might otherwise have been available for research activities.

By the late 1960s, the College curriculum system was already facing serious problems. According to the Carlos Noreña (1999:130), Professor of Philosophy, the Academic Senate had “encouraged colleges to ‘take more initiative in deciding college courses’ and asked the rhetorical question whether ‘the academic role of the colleges should be more prominent’.” But the portfolio of courses demanded and needed by students was simply not available from the Colleges, so the Boards stepped in to fill the gap.

And then the core courses started to die off. Stevenson, Merrill, Crown and Kresge initially copied Cowell in offering a core course, but these did not last. Cowell cancelled the second year of its core course in 1968, and the first year in 1971, replacing them with “strongly recommended” quarter-long seminars (Lamb, et al, 1975: 26-27). Stevenson reduced its core from three quarters to one while Crown replaced core with interdisciplinary seminars in 1969 (Noreña, 1999:143). Kresge made its core course optional while Merrill did not even offer one (id., 159). The disappearance of core courses absolved faculty fellows from the responsibility to teach in their home colleges. And the few courses fellows did teach in the colleges did not always contribute to general education or disciplinary needs. As this happened, the “interdisciplinarity intellectual contact among faculty and between students and faculty” began to fade (Lamb, et al., 1975: 68-69).

The Lamb Committee (1975: 27) suggested that the decline of core was due to “the nature of the era in which it was attempted”—required courses were “viewed with suspicion” as the expression of an authoritarian impulse. Many faculty members
believed that “a required course inhibits learning.” Half of students surveyed in 1971 “felt that required courses were detrimental to student learning.” This left-libertarian attitude vanished after the end of the Vietnam War, and required core courses were restored in the 1980s.

In addition, as the colleges began to develop their individual thematic focuses, some faculty found that these did not correlate with their disciplines or specializations. To counter these trends, several Colleges developed their own interdisciplinary majors—which they were permitted to do under Senate Bylaws and Regulations—that, eventually, migrated to Divisions, with some become full-blown departments and others disappearing.

V. I don’t know is on third—what is the academic role of the Colleges?

The continuing tensions and contradictions repeatedly raised questions about the “role of the Colleges” at UCSC: were they to be academic as well as social and cultural units for students? Or would they become purely residential facilities, providing what has come to be called “Student Life” but leaving academic functions to the Boards of Studies? Both positions had their advocates, with the division running roughly, but not wholly, between the sciences, on the one hand, and humanities and social sciences, on the other.

These struggles over the role of the Colleges almost always took place within a context of “reorganizing” the university, which meant moving faculty around and changing old or creating new administrative configurations. But the continuing uncertainty about the “role” of the Colleges was a symptom of a deeper problem: the power struggle over the very structure of the campus and who would decide it. As Literature Professor Harry Berger (2015: 27, 60) put it long after the fact, “The lines of power were getting established conversation by conversation... It was a very loose combo of college and disciplinary control—not really much control.”

According to my reckoning, between 1970 and the early 2000s (largely corresponding to the arrival of each new Chancellor), questions were raised about the academic role of the colleges no less than 25 times (Table 9.1), in major documents and memoranda (of course, there are many more minor documents not listed here). These tended to run in cycles of roughly five years, during each of which committees were formed, meetings held, documents prepared and proposals made to strengthen the “academic role of the colleges” either through increased faculty participation or collaborations with departments. Paradoxically, however, at the end of each cycle, the outcome was a decreased academic role and the weakening of the Colleges. The cycles reflected three factors.

First, they are evidence of the ongoing power struggle between factions of the faculty (and students), on the one hand, and other factions of the faculty and the Administration, on the other. Along with other procedural and substantive conflicts, one consequence was an enduring faculty suspicion of the methods and motives of the
Administration, and a growing reluctance on the part of the Administration to consult with faculty.

Second, each new Chancellor arrived at UCSC intending to grasp the “third rail of politics at Santa Cruz” (Greenwood, 2014: 52) by rationalizing the role of the Colleges and making the campus operate more “efficiently.” Even those who succeeded to some degree in this effort were badly shaken by the experience.

Finally, the growth of administrative complexity—a phenomenon observed across higher education between 1970 and today—gradually turned the Colleges into an administrative conundrum. Whereas, in the 1960s, the Provosts reported directly to the Chancellor, by 2018, they and the Colleges had been relegated to one of the six units in the Division of Undergraduate Education, overseen by a Vice Chancellor/Provost (UCSC, 2019; Undergraduate Education, 2018).

Table 9.1 provides a chronological listing of the major statements, reports and proposals made during each cycle of angst and reflection. Table 9.2 describes concerns expressed and outcomes during each cycle in more detail.

**Table 9.1: Major college-related documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Cowell College—A Statement of Aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Report of the Committee on Colleges</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Academic Future of the Colleges at Santa Cruz</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Report on the Colleges by the Academic Senate Chair</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Report to the Regents on Cluster Colleges at San Diego &amp; Santa Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Marcum Report on the Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Role of the Colleges in Faculty Recruiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Proposed Guidelines on Reorganization of Boards &amp; Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Academic Quality at Santa Cruz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Taylor on Campus Organization &amp; Conduct of Academic Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Report regarding implementation of reorganization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Student Life and the Colleges at UCSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Report on College Budgeting and Financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Report by the Sinsheimer Committee on the Role of the Colleges</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Provosts’ report on the Role of the Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Sinsheimer on the Role of the Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>McHenry on “Whither the Colleges?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Faculty membership in the Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>A Study of the College System at UCSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Academic Mission of the Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Review of the Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>WASC Final Accreditation Report, chapter on the Colleges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Final Report of the Special Senate Committee on the Colleges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.2: What are we do with the Colleges?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates of cycle &amp; chancellor</th>
<th>Critical issue(s)</th>
<th>Proposals</th>
<th>Key document(s) (see bibliography)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966-70 McHenry</td>
<td>Need to establish balance between Colleges &amp; Boards, and between teaching and research</td>
<td>Each College should offer a liberal arts curriculum appropriate to themes; define faculty role in Colleges &amp; Boards; provide incentives for teaching &amp; research</td>
<td>Academic Plan, 1965; McHenry, 1974a; Cowan, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-73 McHenry</td>
<td>Need to revive College academic programs; get faculties committed to developing &amp; staffing college academic programs; provide general education</td>
<td>Reward college service; greater weight should be given to teaching in promotion; need to reduce stress on research &amp; scholarship</td>
<td>Academic Senate, 1971; Bunnett, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75 Christensen</td>
<td>Colleges unable to develop significant academic role for faculty; Boards more successful in enlisting intellectual energy of faculty and students; “clarify the expectations of what a college should do and be, academically, and what the role of a Provost should be” (Christensen, 1/21/75)</td>
<td>Reaggregate board faculties into limited number of colleges to facilitate lower division education; develop general education, general interest &amp; introduction to disciplines courses in colleges; faculty should propose college “clusters” for interdisciplinary teaching &amp; research</td>
<td>Academic Senate, 1974a; Reaggregation of Faculty, 1974a, 1974b, Christensen speeches to Academic Senate, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-77 Taylor</td>
<td>Inadequate coherence in course planning &amp; curricular design; Senate not thorough &amp; careful in authorizing and supervising courses of instruction, especially in colleges; colleges are not assuming responsibility for the general education of its members.</td>
<td>Colleges should develop plans for academic programs according to wishes of Provost, Fellows &amp; other members of college community; clarify campus policy on educational functions of the colleges; create durable agreements regarding division of responsibility for instruction between colleges &amp; Boards</td>
<td>Taylor 1976, 1977. Academic Plan, 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-80 Sinsheimer</td>
<td>Division of responsibilities &amp; fragmented curriculm between Boards &amp; Colleges unclear; faculty dispersion in colleges hampers “academic vitality and intellectual development of disciplines”; frustration over teaching loads; unclear role of colleges in student life</td>
<td>Reorganization of faculty into disciplinary groups in one or two colleges; restore mandatory college core course; give Boards sole responsibility for hiring and personnel reviews; Colleges should focus on student life quality</td>
<td>Sinsheimer, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1979; Reorganization Committee, 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-87 Sinsheimer</td>
<td>Colleges have not succeeded as academic units; dispersing faculty vitiates intellectual life of the Board; colleges are not endowed &amp; compete for funds with other programs; individual instruction is expensive; emphasis on liberal arts comes at expense of research university; must shift from small, liberal arts, undergrad campus to one with full complement of undergraduate, graduate and professional programs</td>
<td>Colleges should be “modular” unit of campus growth; Divisions should provide courses for College “core” courses; core courses should be taught by ladder-rank faculty w/ small sections led by TAs; all faculty should be affiliated with a college; Provost should be relieved of as many college administrative functions as possible; Colleges should strive to achieve distinctive identities</td>
<td>Sinsheimer, 1985a, 1985b, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-96 Stevens &amp; Pister</td>
<td>Colleges should be focus for intellectual and cultural concerns; need mandatory general education; lack of professional schools; colleges not used efficiently as education centers; need to bring faculty, especially scientists, back into colleges; no incentives for faculty to teach in colleges</td>
<td>$50k to “turn one college into a model of cultural and intellectual efforts”; faculty must be member of a college &amp; share responsibilities &amp; benefits; at least 3 Boards should be represented in each college; provide space in colleges for research &amp; grad students; change funding mechanisms for academic and student life; introduce 1-3 unit courses taught by ladder-rank faculty, with compensation</td>
<td>Stevens, 1987, 1989, 1991; X Report, 1989; Academic Senate, 1991; WASC Self-Study; WASC, 1994;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000 Greenwood</td>
<td>Academic roles of colleges has declined as curricula have been reduced and faculty affiliation has become less significant; connection between the faculty and academic mission of the colleges attenuated; best use of colleges to strengthen undergraduate education &amp; faculty life undefined; newer faculty unaware of historical role of colleges in faculty appointments; college curriculum reduced to core course; potential for experimentation and improvement of general education not well exploited; 1-3 unit courses not effective use of faculty time</td>
<td>Encourage participation of faculty in developing college academic programs &amp; intellectually-rigorous core course, but don’t add to workload; college faculty determines academic profile, core course themes &amp; college requirements; create alliance, collaborations &amp; affiliations among colleges, departments and divisions to assist divisional goals, with Provosts as Associate Deans; clarify college affiliations &amp; recognize faculty service to colleges; revise provost responsibilities; do not provide space for faculty offices and research in colleges; involve graduate students; develop ties to outside partners &amp; sponsor colleges; provide adequate resources; increase college endowments</td>
<td>Millennium Committee, 1998; Advisory Group, 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-2004 Greenwood</td>
<td>Core course needs significant writing component; need to recognize benefits of first-year academic experience in colleges; enhance core outside traditional courses and majors; faculty in colleges not a good in itself; comes at cost of faculty time spent on other activities, may displace other contributions by faculty to UE; faculty make greatest contribution teaching inter/disciplinary courses; college faculty &amp;/or provost must be responsible for curriculum &amp; academic activities; many college &amp; Academic Senate functions overlap—substantial changes should be vetted by Senate</td>
<td>Complete reaggregation of department faculties; faculty affiliation with colleges should be voluntary; affiliation process should be formalized; additional colleges should not be placed under divisional administration; principal role of colleges should be in first-year experience of undergrads; utilize colleges to affect [sic] better faculty-student interactions; assess general education &amp; colleges</td>
<td>Special committee on colleges, 2003; WASC Proposal, 2002; Senate Special Committee, 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2019 Denton; Blumenthal</td>
<td>Colleges are critical to “Student Experience,” which includes core course as well as advising &amp; student life; Colleges are a unique feature of UCSC &amp; must be advertised as such; Colleges provide a small learning environment in a large university</td>
<td>Combine core &amp; introductory writing seminars to lower costs &amp; increase efficiencies; separate core &amp; introductory writing to increase effectiveness w/o increasing cost</td>
<td>No specific documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VI. Grasping the third rail**

In 1974, in an attempt to address the dispersion of the faculty in individual Colleges, which some regarded as both ineffective and problematic, the Academic Senate (1974c) proposed a “reaggregation” of faculty with similar research interests into specific Colleges. This would bring together members of individual Boards of Studies as well as those who might wish to “cluster” with such disciplinary groups. As a result, the requirement that each College have a complement of fellows from each Board was dropped, which also meant that any possibility vanished of a broad, lower-division “liberal arts” curriculum in each College (to be replaced by general education requirements). Moreover, the expectation that faculty would teach at least one course in the Colleges began to wane—especially since most faculty were either not sufficiently knowledgeable or sufficiently adventurous to teach in College Core courses, which anyway had largely disappeared. Faculty might just as well teach in their fields of specialization in the Boards. While the movement of faculty among Colleges was limited, some regarded it as the beginning of the end for the academic role of the Colleges.
When Robert Sinsheimer arrived at UCSC in 1978, he was determined to grasp the “third rail” of campus politics. To address the ongoing tensions between the Boards and Colleges, he proposed both an administrative and academic restructuring that came to be known as “reorganization” (which differed considerably from the “reaggregation” of the early 1970s). Under his plan, the appointment, promotion and salary roles of the colleges were be abolished and transferred entirely to the Boards of Studies (id: 25). Colleges would be assigned to specific Divisions or disciplinary “fields”\(^84\) with and faculty encouraged to create research “clusters” within the divisional designations by changing colleges, if necessary (id). Curricula would be rationalized with all college courses that could be moved to Boards or listed under interdisciplinary majors transferred to them, leaving only the relaunched core courses and interdisciplinary and service classes in the Colleges (id: 27; Sinsheimer, 1980; Cowan, 2013: 212-17). The role of the College Provost would be changed from an academic and administrative position to something more like the symbolic head of college with responsibilities for core courses and intellectual aspects of student life (id: 28). Reorganization worked in terms of greater disciplinary concentrations but did little to address the academic role of the colleges.

In another attempt to deal with the problem, in August 1985, Sinsheimer (1985) wrote to the faculty that “During the coming year, we must again consider and now decide the future role of the Colleges...as we contemplate the relatively imminent construction of additional Colleges.”\(^85\) Sinsheimer continued:

I believe a candid assessment of the history of the Colleges at UCSC would indicate that they have served well as living and social and (to some degree) cultural units, but that they have, in the main, not succeeded as academic units.

In his view, the Colleges had

vitiate[d] the intellectual life of the Board[s]...are inevitably placed in competition for funds with programs in the disciplines...necessarily expensive of faculty time and effort...and [were established at the] expense of development of graduate and professional education....

To devise a solution, Sinsheimer (1987) appointed a “Committee on the Role of the Colleges” to prepare proposals to radically revise the place of the Colleges on campus.

This generated no little degree of concern among faculty, students and past UCSC Chancellors. Hoping to enlist UCOP to oppose Sinsheimer’s initiative, Dean HcHenry

\(^{84}\) After some controversy and discussion, Sinsheimer (1978c) proposed for consideration the following “collegiate purpose[s]”: Cowell—humanities emphasis; Stevenson—multidivisional, social science and humanities; Crown—natural sciences emphasis; Merrill—social sciences emphasis; College V (Porter)—arts emphasis; Kresge—humanities emphasis; Oakes—multidivisional; College 8—environmental studies.

\(^{85}\) College Eight was finally under construction.
and Angus Taylor (1985) wrote to UC President David Gardner of their concern “about the future of the colleges at the Santa Cruz campus....”

we believe that, because of changes in the relationship between the colleges and the Boards of Studies, and because of a lack of explicitness about the colleges in the present state of planning for the next twenty years...the future role of the colleges is in a precarious and uncertain condition.

The two ex-Chancellors urged Gardner to “preserve and enhance the future of the colleges,” by offering views about the curricular role they should play. Expressing a lack of confidence in Sinsheimer, they also suggested that “the future leadership of the campus...[should be] decided upon with a commitment to the colleges as part of the criteria laid down in the selection of that leadership.”

Sinsheimer’s Committee on the Role of the Colleges met for five months, issuing a draft of a set of proposals in June 1986 (Sinsheimer, 1986) and a final report a year later (Sinsheimer, 1987). The result was probably not as extensive or radical as Sinsheimer had hoped. The Committee (id.: 2) wrote that “the Colleges provide a natural locale for the establishment of a social, cultural and intellectual milieu for the less formal but essential aspects of education and for the provision of many student services” (my emphasis).

The Committee recommended that “Colleges combining housing, offices, classrooms and other facilities should be the modular unit of campus growth” (Sinsheimer, 1986: 1). It further proposed that “the Divisions be required to provide courses ... suitable for College ‘core’ courses” and that “all faculty should be affiliated with a College” (id.:3). The Core Course was deemed “an important part of the ‘Santa Cruz experience” (id.: 3) but no other academic role was proposed for them. And, the report concluded (id.: 7), “we believe that the Colleges can play a major education role in the lives of our students, complementary to that provided by our more formal academic disciplines.”

By now, both McHenry (1987) and Taylor (1985, 1986) were sufficiently disturbed by the Committee’s report to attack it, with Taylor sending long, handwritten letters to both Sinsheimer and UC President David Gardner. McHenry disputed virtually all of the claims made by Sinsheimer in his 1986 letter to the campus and suggested that the Committee’s proposals were wanting. Taylor (1985:1) expressed concern that the Chancellor might be “unintentionally creating a situation that could lead to disaster.” At a moment when the search for Sinsheimer’s successor was already under way, Taylor (1986) wrote to Gardener that “it is very difficult indeed to formulate constructive comments” about the report issued by the Committee on the Role of the Colleges. There was considerable dissent from other quarters, as well. In the event, while the “problem” of the Colleges did not go away, the Chancellor did. Not long after the final report appeared, Sinsheimer stepped down, leaving the Committee’s recommendations largely unfulfilled.
VII. Here is the answer. What was the question?

The problem of the Colleges was thus left to Sinsheimer’s successor, Robert Stevens, and over the following four years, again occupied considerable time and energy. In his inaugural address to the Academic Senate, Stevens (1987: 15), expressed his “strong commitment to the Colleges” and called “for greater use of the colleges as educational centers” without proposing to restore the Colleges’ role in appointment and tenure decisions. At this particular moment, the new College Eight campus was nearing completion and the prospect of any additional colleges was uncertain, notwithstanding an implied commitment to go all the way to College Twelve at some time in the future. But utilizing the Colleges as “educational centers” meant defining what that entailed.

As one of his first acts, Stevens appointed a Committee on Undergraduate Education (CUE), which was asked to: “(a) study undergraduate education at UCSC and report on what it represents and its condition; (b) consider general questions of what an excellent undergraduate education should encompass and, what undergraduate education at UCSC should be...; and (c) propose measures to translate that vision into reality” (CEP, 1990: 1). CUE released its report in February 1989. Although it addressed a number of college-related questions and issues, the primary focus was on general education (GE), which was almost all that remained of the campus’s initial commitment to a broad undergraduate liberal arts education. As the academic role of the Colleges declined, leaving behind only the core course and a few others, the content of general education requirements became a focus of concern. What courses could offer the breadth of knowledge and awareness thought necessary for all undergraduates? Who would decide what such breadth encompassed? Who would offer the GE classes?

Given the division of teaching at UCSC, there were only two entities in a position to provide GE courses: the Boards and the Colleges. But, if “breadth” were the goal, how could the single-disciplinary-area Boards provide it? And if the Colleges were given responsibility for GE courses, who would pay for them and who would teach them? Could GE courses taught by lecturers meet the standards expected by the campus and was there any way to induce faculty to commit teaching time to these courses if they were based at the Colleges? CUE provided only general recommendations to the Chancellor and the campus, leaving the particulars to be hashed out. But those recommendations became the basis for addressing the College “problem” over the next few years.

The same month as the CUE Report was released, Stevens (1989a) addressed the Academic Senate about his “position on the college system.” He told the faculty that the collegiate system was “non-negotiable” but that it was necessary to “pour content into what we mean by the collegiate system.” Stevens pointed out that the Colleges were “still important cultural and social centers,” but asked whether they could “also be educational or academic centers?” And, he wrote, “it would be a great mistake to rule out the possibility of some appropriate educational
developments within them.” Stevens also discussed the question of faculty fellows in the Colleges, how boards should be represented in them and whether it would be possible to have representatives of the sciences in the Colleges, as well. Finally, he wrote that “my preference would be to mandate [faculty] membership in the colleges.”

At an Academic Senate meeting a week later, faculty were asked to consider and discuss a joint Senate/Administration report on “Faculty Membership in the Colleges” (Academic Senate, 1989). Anticipating enrollment growth to 15,000, the document also suggested that accommodating such an increase (by 50%) would require five new colleges by 2000. Therefore, decisions needed to be made about the allocation of faculty to the Colleges. The report suggested ("proposed" is too strong a term) that:

i. There should be clusters of faculty defined by board or shared interdisciplinary interests in each College, informed by the College theme, if possible;
ii. There should be “multidisciplinary” faculty diversity in the Colleges to foster “productive interchange,” and such groups should be encouraged [to form];
iii. Any Board of Study represented in a College should occupy no more than one-third of the faculty offices, with a minimum number of four from a [single] Board;
iv. Faculty fellows should come from more than one Division, and faculty with offices in non-collegiate space should be College Fellows;
v. New Colleges will not be “pioneered” by new faculty, so that “new faculty members will be socialized into our folkways, without having to invent them”;
vi. There should be space in the Colleges for research and graduate students as well as for Board offices;
vii. College memberships should remain flexible.

Behind these suggestions was another challenge not addressed by the report: the Colleges were costly to sustain and a shortage of funding threatened their future. Speaking to the Senate on October 11, Stevens (1989b:3) asked whether “in a time of scarce resources, we need to consider whether it is appropriate to provide, out of our instructional support [i.e., state] funds, the kinds of monies that we have been providing for the colleges for activities not directly related to teaching.” In 1988-89, such monies totaled two million dollars. Stevens also argued that “We have reached the point where students no longer think of themselves solely as students in colleges,” although he did not suggest where this might lead.

The Provosts saw this as an attack on the Colleges and panicked. In February, 1990, the Council of Provosts (COP, 1990) wrote to Academic Vice Chancellor (AVC) Michael Tanner that it was “very worried about the funding of future colleges at UCSC,” since there was no indication that additional funding would be available for operating additional Colleges. “[All] we have to look forward to is at best a constant
amount of money, divided by a continuously increasing denominator as new colleges are added.”

Consequently, COP proposed that (1) The campus should decide immediately to combine Colleges IX and X into a single College IX; and (2) The campus should decline to plan for any new colleges beyond College IX unless sufficient operating funds can be secured for those colleges. Additional growth would have to be accommodated in the existing Colleges (which has since largely been the case) and in new housing not affiliated with any Colleges, if necessary.

The COP was heavily criticized for this memo when it became public (Peskin, 1990). In the event, both Colleges 9 and 10 were built, but that was the end of any additional Colleges at UCSC. In other words, continued funding for the Colleges required a redefinition and reorganization of their academic role on the campus, which had to go beyond just core and enrichment courses. This was hardly a new issue.

AVC Tanner (1990:1) took up this never-ending issue in October 1990, writing in the campus PR newsletter *Currents* that

This year the campus undertakes a rethinking of the academic and educational role of the colleges. After a quarter century of evolution and change at UCSC, a new sense of the college system must be formed. For some years the colleges have suffered a malaise born of lingering ambiguity in their academic mission. it is time to chart a course for the 1990s that will be exciting to faculty, staff, and students alike.

Tanner (1990: 3) then retold the storied history of the Colleges, warning against romanticizing small liberal arts colleges and proposing that a student fee “of no more than a few hundred dollars a year per students [sic]” could cover the “slightly higher” costs of operating the colleges. He wrote “I seek to reinvigorate the academic and intellectual life of the colleges” and that it would be possible to “provide excellent general education courses...as well as academic advising in the colleges, at little greater cost than via other organization modes... but to do this, state academic funding must be directed toward supporting academics [in the Colleges]” (id.).

Tanner proposed that “The administration of the college should be restructured to allow the residential life aspects to be handled without burdening the provost”; “well-considered incentives” should be provided to induce faculty to engage in general education, wherever the courses might be offered; and each college should

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86 The University is currently planning to build “Student Housing West,” which will have beds for 3,000 students (SHW EIR, 2019). The estimated cost of the project is more than $500 million. There is also a plan to “rebuild” Kresge College, which will cost on the order of $250 million. The 2020-40 Long Range Development Plan (LRDP 2019: Slide 26) in preparation at this writing envisions four new colleges, although it is almost certain these will never be built due to cost considerations.
set an “exciting academic agenda” organized around an “appealing and distinctive identity...[with] at least one element [that] does create a strong link between academic and residential life” (id: 3-5). He did not say how this might be done.

In response, the Academic Senate (1990) created a CEP-CPB Subcommittee on “The Intellectual and Cultural Life of the Colleges.” According to then-Senate Chair William Domhoff, the Subcommittee’s task “would be a broadly focused review of submittals from the campus community to answer the question ‘How it is possible to have an intellectual life for undergraduates in the colleges?’” (id.: 2). In a subsequent City on the Hill column, Domhoff and Joe Allen, Dean of Admissions and coordinator of the college review, wrote

There are no limits to this discussion. That is, the campus might end up deciding that the colleges have no academic future. In that event, they would focus on residential life and student activities, which they have done extremely well. Or, we might decide that provosts should be primarily teachers and scholars, not administrators (Allen & Domhoff, 1991).

The Subcommittee would consult with all “interested parties,” propose “models” to present to the Senate and send those selected the Administration “for its decisions on which plans it can live with.” The individual colleges would then, somehow, choose one of the models and select a provost for the “refounded college.” Ultimately, “in the jargon of the university, the ‘academic mission’ of the colleges will ‘drive’ the administrative plan” (id.).

The Subcommittee did consult widely, with faculty, staff and students, sending out surveys to gauge opinion about the proper role of the colleges. Once again, some doubts were expressed. Several faculty and staff members submitted their thoughts and proposals (Henderson, 1990; Jorgenson, 1990; Machotka, 1990), none of them very supportive. But the Subcommittee’s conclusions and recommendations were hardly earthshaking or “refounding” ones, finding it not “necessary to create a new vision of the colleges’ mission” (CEP-CPB, 1991: 1). Indeed, our “goal...has not been to develop a new idea of the colleges but rather to discover ways to make the existing idea work in the present circumstances” (id.). These included, in addition to offering the traditional core course, providing a set of “enrichment courses,” student advising, extracurricular programs, mandated faculty affiliation with a college, and a provost largely relieved of administrative duties (id.).

The report (CEP-CPB, 1991) was submitted to the Senate in April 1991 and discussed at length at that month’s regular meeting. The Senate then approved four resolutions (Academic Senate, 1991: 8-9) summarized here:

1. To approve, “in principle, that the colleges are social and intellectual entities with responsibilities to mount courses taught by Senate faculty; develop and administer an
advising program; and plan and sponsor a wide range of extracurricular intellectual activities.”

2. To require “all faculty members will be affiliated with colleges as General Fellows.”

3. To require “Senate faculty to teach an additional 1-3 unit course every 3 years, or offer comparable service to undergraduate education in a college or board...[with] stipends or ten-month salaries to be paid to Teaching Fellows who agree to a 2-3 year term of college service” and

4. To recommend “that the Joint Subcommittee continue to work with the administration and relevant Senate committees on the further refinement and implementation of the proposal” (id.: 8-9).

On June 12, Chancellor Stevens (1991) told the “UCSC Community” that the Senate’s vote “committing the faculty to increased teaching responsibilities—makes possible the renewal of the colleges as academic institutions” and also offered “an opportunity to rethink structure and the economic costs of the colleges.”

AVC Tanner (1990) announced he would make available “a significant sum to fund initiatives in undergraduate education generated by proposals from the provosts,” but made no mention in his letter of any teaching stipends or incentives, as proposed by the Senate. But he then turned around and imposed a $425,000 cut in the Colleges budgets, to be funded by elimination of 1.95 staff FTE in each College. The provost position would be reduced to a half-time job and the costs of maintaining the provosts’ houses would be covered by housing monies. All nonacademic college staff would henceforth report to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of their College, with their salaries to be covered by housing funds and registration fees. The net effect was to eliminate virtually all state funding for the Colleges, except for core course support.

While these decisions were pitched by Tanner (1990) as “renewal,” their net effect was to all but eliminate the academic role of the Colleges. Intellectual life was defined more as meetings of faculty minds through public events and, if desired, gatherings. Cultural life was defined largely as happening via student affairs and events. Reducing the Provost’s position by half (with the other half remaining in a Provost’s department) served to further reduce participation and influence. And the one to three-unit courses—a mandate never fully met or funded—had almost no impact on the broader academic goals and responsibilities of the institution or Colleges. Indeed, no small number of faculty simply ignored the mandate, which was eliminated toward the end of the 1990s.

Still hoping to have an impact on UCSC, in 1991, Stevens appointed a “Committee on 2005” (Hankemer, et al, 1992:1) to “advise the administration on academic planning for the UCSC campus over the next fifteen years.” The “2005 Report,” released in February 1992, made several recommendations concerning the Colleges, including “re-establishment of the colleges as intellectual and academic entities with
appropriate differentiation between colleges...” (id.: 1). The Committee imagined that, by 2005, there might be as many as 13 Colleges (id.: 10), and that it is crucial that we carefully integrate the planning of the remaining colleges (Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen) with the overall academic plan... [which] must take into account the changing emphases of the campus. Graduate and research space must be built into the plans, and at the same time the role of the colleges in undergraduate education must be clarified and enhanced. We propose greater differentiation of the colleges, both through different associations with graduate and professional emphases and through college-specific requirements at the undergraduate level.

For the most part, the Committee noted activities already underway on the campus, but also suggested the possibility that, in addition to their individual themes, colleges might offer more specialized concentrations and skills. For example, there could be a “bilingual college” for students interested in languages, a music college at which “every student become proficient in the use of some musical instrument,” and a math college “requiring all of its students to master some basic area of mathematics” (id.:26-27). None of these latter ideas were ever implemented, much less examined or discussed in any serious way.

Perhaps as important at the time was Stevens’ rather unexpected departure in 1991 from UCSC to return to the UK. His chancellorship was, by that time, regarded as something of a failure. Due to drawn-out controversies around personnel and tenure issues, not a few were happy to see him go. But the net effect of his departure was to pass the College “problem” on to his successor, Carl Pister, who seems to have had little interest in the Colleges. There is almost no mention of them in the archives or other documents, at least not until the arrival of the Pister’s successor, MRC Greenwood.

VIII. Last stand for the colleges?

As soon as she arrived on campus in 1997, Greenwood appointed a “Millennium Committee” (Hershatter & Mangel, et al, 1998: 3) to develop “a set of principles to guide campus planning during the period in which we will grow from about 10,600 toward 15,000 students.” The Committee offered a familiar “vision” in its report embracing “a view of UCSC as an outstanding public research university that engages students and faculty across the liberal arts, sciences, and professions, while maintaining an uncommon commitment to teaching and a unique system of residential colleges” (id.).

We envision a UCSC in which the colleges are strengthened and in which the provosts function as associate deans. We further envision an alliance among the colleges, departments, and divisions. They must cooperate, not compete. A sensible association of faculty with colleges, in which powerful incentives are provided for faculty to bring departmental teaching into the colleges, will give the faculty a reason to be active in the intellectual life of the colleges (id.: 15).
The Committee recommended as “Next steps” to

Determine a means to associate faculty with colleges in a manner that emphasizes interdisciplinary connections; ensure that faculty instruction in the colleges is not an overload by coordinating teaching between departments and colleges and providing appropriate teaching credit to departments when faculty teach courses in the colleges...; develop means so that clusters of faculty, in cooperation with their departments and under the leadership of the provost, will offer an intellectually rigorous entry course that stresses critical thinking and regular and meaningful interaction with the faculty (id.).

The Committee also proposed eliminating the one to three unit course requirement, improving college advising with respect to diversity, maintaining and strengthening “the integrated learning communities provided by the colleges,” providing the provosts with resources to allow them to meet their responsibilities, pursuing college ties with businesses and industrial organizations, increasing college endowments, and finding ways to bring graduate students into the colleges (id.: 14, 15, 17, 18, 23). Of these, only elimination of the one to three-unit course requirement was actually implemented.87

In mid-2000, still another committee, chaired by the dean of undergraduate education, with no faculty members except a single provost, was set up by Executive Vice Chancellor (EVC) John Simpson and tasked to “examine the present state of the UCSC colleges and to make recommendations to guide future development [of them]” (Goff, 2000: 1). This review may have been prompted by an impending strategic academic planning exercise; at any rate, it offered few new proposals or recommendations. What the Committee did emphasize was the division between student and academic affairs (Figure 9.1).

According to this new committee (Goff, et al, 2000), “The colleges' original mission as academic units has been greatly reduced... As academic units of the campus, they are successful in certain areas but they have potential that we think could be better realized through more collaboration with departmental and divisional programs.” For this, it would be necessary to “explain the college system to the campus and reaffirm the commitment to organized undergraduate student life in collegiate units.”

87 On February 24, 1999, the Academic Senate voted unanimously to rescind the resolution that required teaching of the 1-3 unit courses (Academic Senate, 1999: 17-18). As the joint CEP-CPB committee (CEP & CPB, 1999: 1) charged with considering abolition of the requirement pointed out, “fewer than half of the courses have actually been offered in the colleges as originally intended,” and many faculty members complained that the requirement interfered with their other work with undergraduates.
According to the committee, the new Colleges Nine and Ten, affiliated with and funded by the Social Sciences Division, with one Provost and Chief Administrative Officer serving for both, offered a “new model” for subsequent colleges. Although the committee reviewed the academic role of the Colleges, it seemed to suggest that their primary functions in the future would be residential, focusing on student life, undergraduate advising, and the required core course. Without recognition or incentives, most faculty were unlikely to become active Fellows of a College or teach in them.

In 2001, as EVC Simpson’s academic planning exercise got underway, the Dean of Undergraduate Education, Lynda Goff, put out two more documents. The first, in March, provided an “Executive Summary” of academic planning issues (Goff, 2001a: 12):

> During the next academic year, all college provosts will work with their fellows to begin to define what the college academic programs will be of their colleges. College faculty fellows must decide whether core courses are to continue, what will be the content of these courses, and there must be a commitment on the part of faculty to teach in these courses if they are to have a future.

Somewhat optimistically, she thought (id.) that “This process may help to reinvigorate the academic programs of the colleges and reengage the faculty in curricular planning in a way this campus has not seen in nearly two decades.”

The second document, in December, was a “Long-Range Academic Plan” for undergraduate education, which recognized (Goff, 2001b: 6) that

> One of the most perplexing and important issues facing UC Santa Cruz is determining what academic role(s) our colleges will play in its future and how
this role will be synergistic with the academic missions of our divisions and departments....the campus must find ways to better integrate the academic programs of the colleges and divisions.

The document recapitulated the perennial questions: What were the responsibilities of faculty to their colleges? What were the academic roles of colleges in the planning process? Should there be more colleges? Should there be a graduate college? Should there be a transfer college? Should colleges be paired academically and administratively? How large can the colleges grow? Where should faculty be “housed” and could clusters foster “intra- and interdepartmental programs where warranted? How could university development help funding for the colleges? Could provosts become development officers? (Goff, 2001b: 8,9,10).

Goff also floated some suggestions about doing away with or postponing core courses: “Departments from the sciences, engineering and social sciences [have] intensified their complaints about requiring incoming students to spend one third of their academic time in the fall quarter on the core course,” proposing instead a two-unit orientation in the fall and a frosh seminar in winter or spring (id.: 13). The trend here was fairly clear: even maintaining the weak academic role of the Colleges was costly, interfered with student progress to degree and might be better addressed through other venues. Again, none of these notions had much impact, especially since this particular academic planning process eventually fizzled out in 2004, as described in Chapter 10.

Nevertheless, in late 2001, Goff asked the Academic Senate “to consider how the campus should go about planning for the academic mission of the colleges.” In one of three reports to the campus on “Planning for the UC Santa Cruz of 2010” issued in 2001 (Simpson, 2001a) and 2002 (Simpson, 2002a, 2002b), EVC Simpson wrote that

The residential colleges are one of the signature features of UC Santa Cruz and were a critical part of the original vision for the campus.... we must commit to maintaining and strengthening the integrated learning communities provided by the colleges. But that commitment does not necessarily imply that they should have the role originally established by the campus, nor does it mean that a uniform model should apply to all colleges (Simpson, 2002a: 16).

He proposed that the Academic Senate create a

    task force to work quickly to identify specific college-related issues that need to be resolved and develop hypotheses that will frame the discussion of those issues, as well as suggest a timetable... [and] a major Senate/administrative committee charged with coming to grips with the issues identified by the task force and to recommend a coherent academic role for our colleges that is consistent with the campus objectives for the undergraduate student experience (id.).

195
In response to this invitation, the Senate created a Special Committee “to evaluate alternate models for college academic organization” by considering two issues: “First, it should explore a range of models for college academic mission that preserve the present function of the college as units for delivering services and perhaps an academic program to undergraduates.” Among these were:

1) Remove all curricular content from the colleges; keep them solely as student affairs units. 2) Keep our current, one-size-fits-all, core-course model. 3) Have all the colleges forge tight links with divisions (i.e., adopt the College Nine model, if it proves successful). 4) Have the colleges develop much more focused curricula and allow them to set general education requirements (e.g., the UC San Diego model in which students choose, at the time of application, among a relatively small number of college). 5) Move to an eclectic system, where different colleges have very different types of academic organization.

“Second, the committee should explore whether there may be creative uses of the colleges other than as the primary conduit for delivering undergraduate student services,” including “professional schools or other academic units as new colleges” (COP & CPB, 2002). 88

The Subcommittee published its Interim Report in April 2003 (Special Committee on the Colleges, 2003a) and a Final Report in October 2003 (Special Committee on the Colleges, 2003b; the two were not significantly different). The authors of the Final Report (2003b: 1) wrote that

the colleges play their most important role in the initial academic experience of undergraduate students. The colleges serve an important function in the transition of first-year students from high school to university academic life. On the academic side, the most important roles of the colleges in the first-year experience are advising and the core course.

The Final Report was, however, somewhat equivocal about the fate of the core courses, which were “currently under reconsideration...but should not be the subject of perpetual review” (id.). The writing and community-building functions of the core course were important ones that should not be significantly altered, although there were discussions about “moving the core course out of the colleges... [which] would effectively end the role of the colleges as academic units” (Special Committee on the Colleges, 2001a: 1).

The Committee argued that “involvement of the faculty in the colleges should [not] be sought as a goal in itself... [and] a more active faculty role in the colleges” could be “counterproductive” (2001b: 2). Hence, “faculty affiliation with a college should be voluntary” (id.: 3). In effect, the Subcommittee ratified what was largely the

88 The campus developed proposals for professional schools over the subsequent two decades but never followed through on any of them. None of those proposals were organized around “professional colleges.” These are discussed in later chapters.
status quo. The question of the academic role of the Colleges would remain one of those perennial questions never to be unequivocally answered—at least not in writing. Left implicit in all of these documents was the possibility that the Colleges, as they had then existed for 40 years, be disestablished and become purely residential units providing student services with few or no course offerings.

In his final update on the planning process, in October 2002, Simpson (2002b: 7) wrote that “The colleges will join departments, research institutes, and other campus venues to support scholarly interaction between faculty, graduate students, and undergraduates.” And, he committed the campus to “Strengthen the academic, co-curricular, and service roles of the colleges, in a way that is clear and widely understood, and implement these roles in a way that is synergistic with the academic missions of the divisions and departments” (id.). This was almost the last time that anyone paid serious attention to “the role of the colleges at UCSC.”

IX. Coda

After “Planning for the UC Santa Cruz of 2010” fizzled out, the colleges almost disappear from view in subsequent documents. The 2008 Strategic Academic Plan invokes the colleges a few times.

The foundation for the campus itself [which] rests on the interdisciplinary nature of the residential colleges and their core courses which integrate writing into topical studies. If this is the foundation upon which we build, it is fitting that we pursue this distinctive feature as UCSC develops and grows (Strategic Academic Plan, 2008: 9).

More dubiously

An often over-looked but exceptional arena for border-crossing work is the college system. Aside from its interdisciplinary core course structure, colleges continue to house faculty offices and small research groups. To varying degrees based on their level of funding, they also sponsor upper division courses which draw upon the faculty fellows. Many of these courses are team-taught, uniting faculty from divergent perspectives. The independent nature of the colleges lends themselves ideally to an incubator for exploration across and between disciplines (id:15).

The “Action Plan” for the 2008 Plan (OPB 2008: 8) reports that “The campus’s residential college system will continue to provide a nurturing setting to introduce and support students as they address the challenges of university life” and that “Working with CEP and the Council of College Provosts, [the campus will] assess the effectiveness of courses in the first year experience and explore the development of new options for first-year experience/college core courses” (OPB, 2008: 9). But nothing happened.
“Envision” (Galloway, 2016), a planning process that took place between 2014 and 2016, suggests that campus goals include “enhancing the role of colleges in student support” (id.: 3), but says nothing else about them. The “Final Draft” of the 2017-19 Strategic Academic Planning exercise suggests that the colleges offer a natural home for innovative classes that don’t easily fit into our existing departmental structure. This opportunity could invigorate the colleges and help students make new connections with one another. A funding allocation could provide curricular stability and incentivize courses taught between departments and the colleges thereby providing new opportunities for interdisciplinary and APA-related [Academic Priority Area] course offerings (Draft SAP, Final, 2019: 22).

How this might be done is not revealed, nor is it likely to be done.

On its web site, UCSC continues to advertise the Colleges as providing a unique experience for undergraduates, and rightfully so:

UC Santa Cruz combines the resources of a world-class public research university with a distinctive undergraduate experience characterized by our college system. Each college is a vibrant living/learning community supported by faculty and staff who provide academic support, organize student activities, and sponsor events that enhance the intellectual and social life of the campus. The colleges are committed to fostering a nurturing and [sic] academically thriving environment for students of all backgrounds. Each college strives to promote the attributes of a diverse and multicultural community in its own unique way (Registrar, 2019).

Today, each college offers a core course, organized around a particular “theme,” which allows students to participate in relatively small classes of 28 focused on reading—as of 2018, the writing function of the core courses was wholly transferred to the Writing Program—and a periodic “plenary” gathering of the 400+ students in a colleges frosh class. The Colleges also offer “enrichment” classes supported mostly by non-state funds. These courses have no specific relationship to any of the Divisions or Departments, although a few are accepted as electives for a major. The Colleges still offer academic advising, although this function is under stress as staff is reduced and enrollments increased. The College Provosts perennially hope to identify an academic role that the campus will support, and the campus rolls out the Colleges whenever they seem to offer potential for fundraising.89

89 Poignantly, I recently received a communication from the chair of an Academic Senate committee (who will remain unnamed here) suggesting that “they should function as full academic units, preferably each with at least a minor.…. [W]e need i) an endowment for each college ii) proper involvement of ladder rank faculty iii) a set of themes that span the range of interdisciplinary themes that might be expected at a university, and that these three could lead to a meaningful curriculum in each college.”
The death knell for the Colleges might well be struck in the coming decade. The proposed Student Housing West (SHW) project, a group of massive dormitories with almost 3,000 undergraduate beds, is scheduled to be built to the west of Porter College (SHW EIR, 2019). SHW is assigned to upper division and transfer students and intended to absorb some of the enrollment growth of the past 10 years (it will not absorb proposed future enrollment growth). If SHW is built as proposed, it could hasten the end of decentralized housing in Colleges.

Large dorms appear to be the future at UCSC, and the Colleges may well finally vanish as academic units when those future dorms start housing large numbers of lower division students and the core courses come to be seen as too costly to sustain. Since the working enrollment envelope for the new Long-Range Development Plan is 28,000 students, of whom at least 5,000 to 6,000 are likely to be undergraduates, those new students will have to live somewhere. It won’t be in the Colleges.

The other looming threat is, as already mentioned, the economic crash arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Universities across the country have experienced significant revenue losses as students have sheltered-in-place with parents, and there is some expectation that many might withdraw if they cannot return to their campuses in Fall 2020. UCSC will need to reduce support for all units, staff and faculty, as well as research funding. As described earlier, UCSC already faces significant budgetary pressures from other sources and will be looking for places to reduce expenditures. Unfortunately, the Colleges might well be an attractive target.
When you think of planning documents, they are really utopian documents, that is they are projecting an ideal world that the planning is going to lead to, or at least a more ideal world, within constraints (Cowan, 2013: 82).

I. Introduction

In Chapter 3, I described “The Tragedy of Strategic Academic Planning” as a general exercise undertaken periodically by corporations, organizations, universities and colleges. In this chapter, I take up the history of academic planning at UCSC. In theory, effective planning requires regular forward planning by all units, in anticipation of future needs and desires. But effective planning is also contingent on what an uncertain future may bring, in terms of money and other factors. It helps enormously to know how much money will be available in order to sketch out what is possible, but the dreams and wishes of units often far exceed what is likely to be available even under the most favorable conditions.

Strictly speaking, UCSC has tried to prepare academic plans every five years, although sometimes the interval between them has been as little as three years or as many as eight. These have consumed considerable time, energy, attention and money, with an expectation that the future returns on investment resulting from realized plans will more than make up the present costs of such exercises. To the best of my knowledge, no one has attempted to estimate any of these quantities and I doubt any of them would show a favorable benefit-cost ratio. This chapter begins with a general restatement of the logic and objectives of strategic planning and how it is executed at UCSC. I then turn to a broad overview of goals and accomplishments of the many plans prepared by UCSC since the first one was conducted in the early 1960s. Finally, I review the “tragedy” of planning and UCSC and provide an Appendix describing the contents and goals of each individual planning document.

II. Processes & practices of academic planning at UCSC

There are two important aspects to long-term academic planning, which must address existing programs while proposing new initiatives. First, what are the future funding requirements to support existing programs; second, what are the funding requirements for growth in existing and new initiatives? The first generally represents increments to a base budget that is frequently determined only for the year in which the planning process begins; the second is a wish list of funds required for business-as-usual plus those funds needed to create and operate the proposed new programs and initiatives. Because the two are not independent of each other—existing programs may want to launch new degrees and programs; new programs and initiatives rely on existing ones for various kinds of support—precise planning is difficult, if not
impossible (as a result, academic planning can never be more than a broad gesture to hopes for the future).

In addition, there are several basic rules and principles that limit what is feasible in terms of projecting into the future. First, planning only for existing programs is not acceptable; growth is an imperative, even if it might require diversion of funds from existing programs. Second, no unit or program will accept a steady-state situation or a reduction in funding unless it is forced to; paradoxically, notwithstanding a promise of growth in resources, planning is a zero-sum game in which no unit willingly makes individual sacrifices for the good of the whole. Third, every program and unit asks for more future funding than is ever practical or feasible, which means that someone has to decide what is to be included for funding and who will be excluded or even reduced.

Notwithstanding these strictures, practically speaking, by the time the first year of a plan arrives, it is already out-of-date; indeed, it is the rare academic plan that is still in effect at the end of those five years. As we have seen, “stuff happens,” which can range from an unanticipated recession with budget cuts, to pandemics, to the rise and fall of problems, issues and matters deemed essential by both plans and programs.

Two examples of how university activities are constrained, directed, or independent of the strategic planning process are offered here (these are not sui generis to UCSC, of course). First, the hiring of new faculty is subject to tension between filling instructional needs and mounting new programs. Second, the launch of new initiatives requires supportive funding to provide for staff, administration and course relief for faculty associates before extramural funding can be sought, yet such seed funding is often not available in adequate amounts (if it is available at all).

1. New faculty hiring: The Administration and Divisional Deans send out an annual “FTE call” to departments, asking for hiring requests for the coming academic year. Departments must take into consideration a number of elements, such as gaps in curriculum that need to be filled because of retirements, separations; new issues or topics not already addressed; the relevance of proposed hires to broader campus research and teaching goals; and, not infrequently, cluster hires for specific initiatives or new programs (see Senate FIGH, 2014). The last requires consultation across departments and divisions. Other considerations include diversity, in order to increase representation of women and minorities amongst the faculty and graduate growth, that is, FTE hired to attract more graduate students and to work with them; and fundraising prowess.

At some point, usually in January (but sometimes as late as April or May), departments send their requests to Divisional Deans, who are authorized to approve a certain number of hires from their own resources and to ask for support from centrally-controlled FTE allocations. The Deans’ requests are sent to the Administration and the Academic Senate, both of which must vet the Divisional proposals and approve or reject part or all of them.
During the following academic year, approved searches are conducted. Some may succeed, others may fail and be reauthorized for the next year or withdrawn, and some may be canceled due to mid-year budget cuts. Whether all or any of this process is cognizant of what appears in the relevant academic plan is debatable, since contradictions between departmental needs and a plan’s vision may result in a pool of new FTE quite different from either (and left to dangle if new initiatives do not come to fruition). Thus, as a five-year period passes, the divergence between plan and practice grows until there is little resemblance between the two.

2. Funding to support new programs and initiatives: The theory is that higher visibility of campus research and innovation will attract outside attention and the interest of funders, especially private foundations and donors, who will then provide the financial support that will allow these efforts to become more visible and reproduce this virtuous circle. Academic plans are frequently built on new research projects and programs that often exist only on paper or in minds and whose future income potentials are largely speculative. Faculty are expected to develop these new research and teaching projects and programs, often in collaborations that take years to succeed, and to write the proposals that can be sent to prospective funders. The campus might provide small quantities of seed funding to get these projects off the ground, but rarely enough to support the early needs of program growth (e.g., staff, faculty time). Which projects succeed, which fail and which languish is unpredictable and these outcomes are as much a result of external exigencies as internal actions.

Meanwhile, the academic plan is premised on the success of such initiatives, which are expected to bring in funding to raise campus visibility and attract more funding. All of this is done with a great deal of idealism, in an environment of uncertainty and limited managerial pragmatism. In Chapter 11, I will describe and analyze UCSC’s “Strategic Academic Plan” launched with great fanfare in 2017, continuing through 2019, and generally abandoned when its champion left the campus.

III. Goals, objectives and outcomes of strategic academic planning at UCSC

Depending on how one counts and beginning with the initial “provisional plan” of 1962, there have been on the order of 16 academic plans (excluding the 2013 plan for Silicon Valley), either completed or left unfinished. Between 1965 and 2019, they have appeared roughly every 3.6 years (Table 10.1). Of course, there are a myriad of supplementary documents and studies that review, comment on and critique the planning processes. Some of these are cited below but most remain stashed in such paper file drawers as continue to exist, various forms of data storage and nonoperational or vanished servers.

90 Exactly what qualifies as an “academic plan” is not always clear, since each exercise in planning is usually accompanied by many documents preceding, during or following publication. I focus here on the 16 exercises most clearly defined as academic plans, recognizing that there are others that might be included.
Some of the 16 plans take a stable future as given. Others focus on a single trajectory to take UCSC “into the future.” Many seem to have been prepared simply to meet the apparent Systemwide requirement of a five- to six-year planning cycle, but were often foiled by changes in and shocks from the external environment. Most are not “strategic” in the sense of gaming alternative scenarios and the conditions that might give rise to them (e.g., is there a “Plan B” in case funding does not appear or is reduced). Very few plans acknowledge their predecessors, whether they were followed, ignored or simply forgotten, or the outcomes of projects and initiatives proposed therein. All are characterized by high degrees of idealism.

Table 10.1: UCSC Strategic Academic Plans over the years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Purpose or rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Provisional Academic Plan for 1965-75 (18 pp.)</td>
<td>Initial plan for provisional approval by Board of Regents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Final academic plan for the Santa Cruz Campus, 1965-1975 (31 pp.)</td>
<td>Official plan as approved by Board of Regents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Academic Plan UC Santa Cruz, 1970-1980 (33 pp.)</td>
<td>Regular cycle of academic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>The Academic Plan of UC Santa Cruz (205 pp.)</td>
<td>Regular cycle; late due to turmoil in Chancellor’s office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Santa Cruz Plans for the 80s (30 pp)</td>
<td>Regular cycle of academic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Report of the Commission on the 18th Year (60 pp.)</td>
<td>Review of campus accomplishments &amp; proposals for the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>University of California Santa Cruz Twenty-Year Plan (88 pp.)</td>
<td>Regular cycle of academic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Academic Planning Study, Office of the Academic Vice Chancellor (60pp.)</td>
<td>Review of 20-year plan and requirements to fulfill it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Report of the Committee on 2005 (56 pp)</td>
<td>Advice to administration on academic planning for the next 15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>UCSC at a Crossroads—Advisory Report of the Millennium Committee (48 pp.)</td>
<td>Principles to guide campus planning during the period of major growth in the early 2000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2001-03</td>
<td>Planning for the UC Santa Cruz of 2010 (multiple documents)</td>
<td>To develop the principles and proposals of the Millennium Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Strategic Futures Committee Report (33 pp)</td>
<td>Enrollment trajectories for UCSC through 2020, with LRDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Strategic Academic Plan (24 pp + 12 p “Action Plan”)</td>
<td>Regular cycle of academic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Joint Senate/Administrative Task Force on Academic Structures and Strategic Planning (19pp)</td>
<td>Delivery &amp; support of curriculum &amp; research to meet needs of 21st century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Strategic Academic Plan for Silicon Valley (30 pp.)</td>
<td>Proposal for revival of Silicon Valley initiative after failure to establish as School of Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2014-17</td>
<td>2017: Envision UCSC (27 pp.)</td>
<td>Regular cycle of academic planning, based on extensive surveys of staff, students and faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2017-19</td>
<td>Strategic Academic Plan (April 2018; 47 pp.)</td>
<td>Process to identify large-scale research projects to raise extramural funds &amp; increase campus visibility &amp; status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is worth noting in all of this is the absence of much, if any, institutional memory. Faculty and staff recall time spent on previous planning exercises but are
generally uncertain about what they said or proposed, and whether anything came of them. Even those in administration seldom refer to more than the most recent plan if they do at all. Each new planning exercise takes place on a blank slate (Santayana would be an appropriate quotation here).

What factors have had the greatest impact on academic planning and its outcomes? What consistencies and differences are there among the many plans? And what was proposed and implemented, and proposed and never implemented? Table 10.2 offers sets of goals and objectives that have appeared in these plans, followed by a discussion of each.

Table 10.2: Goals and objectives: proposed, implemented, failed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals &amp; objectives</th>
<th>Time they appeared</th>
<th>Implemented, tried, or a failure?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procure adequate external funding to cover shortfalls</td>
<td>Virtually all</td>
<td>Continues to be a theme &amp; objective, with limited success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal arts undergraduate education via colleges</td>
<td>1962-1985</td>
<td>Tried but eventually failed (although it remains an aspiration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritize research over teaching</td>
<td>1988-present</td>
<td>Gradual shift in emphasis linked to recognition, funding, merit, promotion; teaching has increased in importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build new colleges</td>
<td>1962-2000</td>
<td>Shrank from 20 to 13 to 10 due to prohibitive costs; 4 more proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase faculty FTE</td>
<td>all of them</td>
<td>Growth, but not to need or projections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase graduate enrollments</td>
<td>all of them</td>
<td>Proposed fraction declined from 40% to 10-12%; current proposal is 11%, but probably lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build professional schools &amp; degree programs</td>
<td>1962-2017</td>
<td>Prohibitive cost; shift to department-based professional Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand into Silicon Valley</td>
<td>2001-2019</td>
<td>Yet to be fully realized (Chapter 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Pre-professional/experiential education to undergrads</td>
<td>2001-2019</td>
<td>Gradual growth in degree programs &amp; internships, and post-graduate skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase faculty, staff, student diversity</td>
<td>1977-2019</td>
<td>UCSC now an HSI campus; faculty diversity remains low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Money, money, money**: Funding, as noted earlier, has been a constant theme in these plans (no surprise there). In the case of UCSC (and San Diego and Irvine), the Founding took place under propitious and prosperous circumstances. Over time, the vagaries of the California economy and the state’s politics have rendered the financial picture ever more uncertain and unpredictable, with the result that UCSC has pursued a range of large-scale projects that, if successful, might generate surplus revenues (although none has, so far, done so; see Chapter 11. Indeed, except during its first years, the campus has been dogged by an inability to raise the substantial external funds necessary to support existing programs, much less pay for new ones.91

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91 The “Campaign for UCSC,” launched in 2009 and concluded in 2017, reportedly raised $335 million. “Students and programs that directly impact them received $143 million in support; faculty and

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This difficulty in raising external funds can be attributed to several factors (many already mentioned). First, geography: funders in Silicon Valley have been reluctant to support UCSC in the face of more lucrative and highly visible recipients (e.g., Stanford; UC Berkeley); hence, the effort to create programs in the Valley. Second, competition for federal funds is very stiff and UCSC lacks the size and infrastructure (although not the excellent faculty) to provide overhead funding for the campus from such grants. Third, it is costly to start new revenue-generating programs, which generally run deficits during their first few years; UCSC lacks the capital to support such efforts through the “Valley of Death.” The most recent Strategic Academic Planning sought, again, to generate new, highly visible initiatives to attract external interest among funders and donors, but its results will not be clear until the mid-2020s. Some of these initiatives may continue, although that plan is largely dead.

2. Undergraduate education: The first academic plan took stock of the external environment as a challenge rather than a constraint. Design and implementation of a new approach to undergraduate education required systemic changes in the relationships between students, faculty and teaching, which meant that conventional structures had to be replaced or displaced. As we have seen, the colleges were the means through which a broad liberal arts education was to take place, and continuing support by the UC system for the UCSC experiment was assumed. The Founders also believed that the high levels of student demand for alternative forms of education would persist into the future and validate the Santa Cruz approach (which has not been the case). For a campus that had been receiving many more highly qualified applications than it could accommodate—especially from well-educated and well-off white applicants—the decline in enrollments during the 1970s represented a major crisis. As state demographics began to change, and with Proposition 13, students from less-wealthy families came to campus increasingly unprepared for college-level work, requiring more attention to lower-division student needs.

During the first years of UCSC’s existence, the propitious external environment vanished. The Vietnam War wound down, the military draft was replaced by a volunteer army and the value of a draft deferment for what were mostly young white men crashed. The economic conditions and recessions of the 1970s and 1980s panicked both students and parents worried that a liberal arts education would not lead to gainful employment after graduation (for which there were some grounds for such concerns). The large corporations, such as insurance companies, that had, historically, offered middle-management positions to new graduates with BA degrees were in their first throes of downsizing, while subsequent outsourcing and offshoring reduced entire employee cadres, leading to the near-disappearance of an entire category of jobs that had absorbed liberal arts graduates during the 1950s and research programs received $130 million. Donors gave $42 million toward campus enhancements and $18 million in unrestricted and other support” (Springhetti, 2017). A close reading of various documents suggests that all extramural support, whatever the source or purpose, and whether or not it was in direct support of the campaign, were included in the final reported sum.
Computers were beginning to work their way into corporations, requiring skills not generally associated with the liberal arts (except, perhaps, as a “foreign language” equivalent). Students began to demand more “professional” training to prepare for their futures, which was not the goal of the liberal arts education offered by UCSC. The recent rage for “experiential education” is intended to fill this lacuna, but there are real problems with its design and implementation (Favaloro, Ball & Lipschutz, 2020).

The impacts of the external environment on the internal environment of the campus were profound, evident especially partly visible in the “decline and fall” of the colleges (Noreña, 1999). Liberal arts was transmogrified into large, lower division “General Education” service courses that fulfilled “breadth requirements” that, taken together, offered only limited coherence, integration or continuity but that were acceptable to faculty and departments (CEP, 2009; this now seems to be the case at all UC campuses).

Over time, the emphases of UCSC’s academic plans have shifted from liberal arts as a priority to the role of graduate students and faculty research in supporting undergraduates in their college careers. Graduate programs provide teaching assistants to undergraduate courses. Faculty research offers experiential opportunities to undergraduates, teaching them skills that they will need in their careers, and extramural funding for labs supports graduate students as well as providing overhead for broader campus needs. The most recent plan (Draft SAP, 2019) says little about the actual content of undergraduate education and nothing about “liberal arts.” “Undergraduate” appears in the document 30 times, and “education” about 19, with a significant fraction of both appearing in the job titles of participants and contributors. “Teaching” appears about 37 times, usually in the context of “research, teaching and learning.” By contrast, “research” appears about 110 times (Draft SAP, 2019). Sic transit gloria mundi!

3. Research vs. teaching: In earlier chapters, the widely acknowledged contradictions inherent in prioritizing teaching over research on a UC campus were made clear. The aspiration for a balance between teaching and research is a constant throughout the plans, but the emphasis clearly shifts beginning in the 1990s, along with the disappearance of liberal arts and the colleges’ role in undergraduate education. “Craft-based” undergraduate education was too costly, both in terms of money and faculty time, and the organization shifted to a more Fordist model, especially for lower-division courses that did not require an instructor with a PhD.

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92 Arguably, liberal arts students could find employment in high tech companies and internet platforms, such as Google, as many do, but these are not “liberal arts” graduates in any older sense of the word (Cohen, 2016; Hart Research Associates, 2013).

93 A “service course” is one that is open to all undergraduates without regard to their proposed major or specialized knowledge and skills. In some instances, the class may fulfill a lower division prerequisite for qualification for a major.

94 Or so it is claimed. There is strong evidence that much of the overhead from federal grants is skimmed off long before it reaches campus units. Moreover, STEM faculty and labs are much more costly than faculty in humanities and social sciences (Graduate Council, 2019).
But there is a larger social phenomenon at work here, too. At one time, both pure and applied research were regarded as contributing to the totality of human knowledge, whether or not they could generate revenues in markets. Today, market logic largely drives research that will attract attention due to visibility and innovation, generate extramural funds for the university, and create property rights that the University can monetize. Indeed, faculty research is judged increasingly (Draft SAP, 2019: 15) in market-based terms rather than quality or contribution: How many citations? How much funding? How many graduate students? “Research” is no longer about knowledge, it is about commodification and commercialization of knowledge-based products, in a highly competitive market for research and the goods it can produce.

Over the past decade, however, accreditation agencies have begun to require universities to “prove” that their undergraduates are actually learning from the classes they take. Student evaluations of instructors and assignments and exams are regarded as too subjective to provide accurate assessments of teaching and learning. As a result, UCSC has begun to emphasize teaching assessment by instructors and departments as an essential requirement for tenure, merit reviews and promotion. This shift does not, however, come with any reductions in evaluation of research or service but takes the form of increased workload.

4. New colleges: Suffice it here to point out that the earliest plans forecast 20-25 colleges across the campus, including specialized ones, a graduate college and possibly some professional colleges. As the costs and logistics of designing, locating and building new colleges rose, the number was reduced to 13 and, eventually, to 10. While four new colleges are proposed in the 2040 LRDP, they are unlikely to be built, although they may appear as purely residential units. Based on the cost of rebuilding Kresge College, a new college would cost at least $250 million (White, 2018). Given future undergraduate enrollments, it is entirely possible that the existing ten colleges will, in the future, be reduced to purely residential units, as student services come to displace academic offerings and introductory frosh courses are transferred to Divisions and Departments.

5. Growth in faculty FTE: In the past, ladder-rank faculty numbers have, like state support, been tied to student enrollments (actually, student-faculty ratios), again, with graduate students weighted more heavily. In 1965, a student-faculty ratio of 19.5/1 was projected for 1990, implying 1,400 faculty FTE (today, the actual payroll student-faculty ratio is 26.7; IRAP, 2019: 1). In the event, UCSC has never broken 1,000 faculty FTE; today, with roughly 19,000 students, the campus employs about 730 ladder-rank faculty and lecturers with security of employment (LSOE). Each UC campus is required to hold at least 10% of its FTE appointments “in reserve”; in 2017-18, UCSC held 259 FTE in reserve—far more than the UCOP requirement—so that total budgeted FTE are in the range of 970 (total payroll FTE are 714). Including teaching assistants brings actual FTE up to 1,323 and budgeted FTE to 1,078 (IRAP, 2019a: 1).
The most recent publicly available budget information (OPB, 2016: 29-31) lists $97,300,000 in “academic salaries” from the “general fund” or $88,700 per FTE, excluding benefits (actual annual salaries range from about $24,000 over nine months for TAs to $425,000 over twelve months for the new Chancellor). Assuming an average annual faculty FTE salary of $100,000—which may be low—259 reserve FTE implies $25.9 million in “reserve funds.” This is not extra money, however; it is expended for various purposes, including new appointments, startup funding, salary increases for faculty, temporary academic staffing, special and new programs, etc.

Either way, the figures suggest a shortfall in tenured and tenure-track faculty at UCSC. Over time, the university has compensated for this gap by relying more and more on casual instructors and graduate student instructors, who are hired to teach, and are paid only for, specific courses. By keeping such instructors at an annual employment level below 50% equivalent, they are ineligible for full benefits. But, according to Table 8.2, the number of “lecturer” and “other academic” FTE has remained relatively steady over the past 15 years. With rising salaries and operating costs, and in the face of declining state support, stable tuition levels and financial aid needs for low-income students, there is unlikely to be much growth in tenured and tenure-track faculty numbers at UCSC in the future.

6. Increased graduate enrollments: As noted earlier, greater numbers of graduate students are attractive for a number of reasons. First, many faculty members want to work with graduate students (rather than undergraduates) and need graduate student researchers in their labs and on their projects. Collaborations are more likely to result in publications. Graduate students bring status to faculty and universities and enhance the reputation of both. But UCSC has repeatedly set and missed goals for graduate enrollments over the decades. Figure 10.1 shows undergraduate and graduate enrollments at UCSC from 1966 to 2018. Over that period, aspirational fractions have ranged from 40% (in 1965) to 12% (in 2019; Table 10.3), but actual numbers have only grown from a few percent to around 10% in 2019 (OPB, 2019).

This perpetual game of catching up has had much to do with the founders’ original objective of reforming undergraduate education. Only a few, small PhD programs were established during the first five years of the campus and the need to support undergraduate education meant that resources for graduate growth were scarce. Early plans to open a School of Engineering were dropped due to concerns at the time that, given the demand for engineers, there were too many such schools in California. Plans for other professional degrees and schools never got very far off the ground (see Chapter 9). Every academic plan proposes growth in graduate enrollments; none of them is very precise about how this is to be achieved.
In an effort to raise graduate enrollments, in 2011, the UCSC administration and the Academic Senate agreed to support a UCOP revision of the formula for central allocation of resources to the individual campuses, which would treat all students equally. One important feature of this revision was “rebenching” (previously mentioned) whereby UCSC would receive several additional million dollars per year to redress the historical underfunding of the campus. The university launched a “graduate growth” initiative, involving new faculty hires, new graduate programs and more robust funding packages for graduate applicants (which, unfortunately, remain inadequate for the cost of living in Santa Cruz). These new millions have not been sufficient to support the necessary level of graduate growth.

At almost the same time, the campus decided to increase enrollment of international students, the majority of whom are from China. These students must pay full, out-of-state tuition and provide a new flow of funds into the campus beyond what in-state students would pay (400 international students, for example, bring in an additional $6 million in revenues). These new monies were touted as going to the support of undergraduate education, but there is some reason to believe that a significant fraction of this tuition has been redirected into graduate growth.
A parallel effort has been made to encourage creation of new Masters degrees, especially in engineering and other professional fields, in the hope that these would attract mid-career students able to pay very high fees in return for a credential (and they would also count as growth in graduate student numbers). As an incentive to departments, the campus administration offered to return a small portion of Masters’ students’ tuition, which could be used to recruit and support PhD students. Due to the low numbers of such programs, however, the returns have been limited.

The cost of new FTE and funding packages for graduate students has far outstripped the $2-3 million provided by rebenching (at $40,000 per student per year, this could
support only an additional 50-75 students or 10-15 faculty). The fact of the matter is that PhD students are very costly and the campus is hard put to provide funding packages that are competitive with even other UC campuses (Graduate Council, 2017, 2019). To reach the stipulated 12%, UCSC would need to enroll roughly 400 additional PhD and Masters’ students and hire some 40 new faculty (@ $150,000/year), at a cost of more than $20 million per year. Even if a significant fraction of graduate students were full-fare Masters (150 professional @ $50,000/year fees; 150 nonprofessional @ $25,000/year fees), the cost of an additional 100 PhD students and new faculty would be at least $10,500,000 million/year, not much less than the additional revenues ($11,250,000) from the Masters students.

A recent UCSC Graduate Council report (2019: 9) notes that, taking into account indirect cost recovery (i.e., “overhead”), the actual annual cost of a graduate student researcher may be as high as $120,000, and the total cost of GSRships for 400 additional PhD students could exceed $80 million annually (id.: 10). In light of high startup costs for new programs and STEM faculty, this initiative would almost surely run at an annual deficit and provide no additional support for the other 1,900 graduate students already on campus.

If we project forward to 2040 and a total enrollment of 28,000, a graduate complement of 12% of undergraduate enrollments would total 3,000 students, or 1,100 more than are currently on campus. This would also represent an increase of 5,000 undergraduates, whose tuition would not cover the increased costs of additional instruction, salaries and overhead (even with the inevitable tuition increases) and the rising costs of providing for that which is already in place. How the campus can square this circle is not at all obvious (Graduate Council, 2019).

The contradictions of graduate growth were revealed in all their glory during the 2019-20 academic year, when several hundred teaching assistants launched a wildcat “grade” strike and demanded a monthly cost-of-living increase of some $1,400/month to submit grades. The inability to increase TA salaries, set by a contract between the University and UAW representing the graduate students and limited by resources, and the policy of now giving five-year funding packages to attract new graduate students, seems to be leading to a reconsideration of graduate growth by the UCSC Administration. This is a story yet to be told in full, but I leave this task to others.

7. Build professional schools & degree programs: Early academic plans envisioned a series of professional schools and degrees, including engineering, business, basic medical sciences, landscape architecture and natural resources and recreation (Academic Plan, 1965: 16-17). These would offer both Bachelors’ and Masters’ Degrees, with the latter adding to graduate enrollments. Except for Engineering, none of the other proposed programs were ever formally launched. Nevertheless, the promise of professional schools and degrees is a proposition that appears throughout the entire series of academic plans. As noted previously, during MRC Greenwood’s

Of course, any new faculty and teaching assistants will also teach undergraduates.
tenure in the early 1990s, UCSC considered taking over the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). Faculty were generally opposed to the idea, especially since it was not clear how the MIIS faculty would be integrated into UCSC. Professional schools are not mentioned in the latest draft of the current Strategic Academic Planning process.

8. Expand into Silicon Valley: The campus has had a long-standing commitment, since the late 1990s (Santa Clara Valley, 2000), to develop a campus and degree programs in or near Silicon Valley. More recently, the campus has sought to develop professional Masters’ degrees in Engineering at its Silicon Valley site (this will be discussed in more detail below and in chapter 11). To date, however, only three such degrees are being offered: Master of Science in Games and Playable Media, Master of Science in Serious Games, and Master of Science in Electrical Engineering. No information about the status of other proposed degrees or finances is available, so it is impossible to determine whether the site is operating at deficit or not.

9. Provide Pre-professional/ experiential education: As “liberal arts” have fallen out of favor, the notion that universities fail to provide appropriate skills, both vocational and management has motivated a turn toward “pre-professional” training and “experiential learning.” Virtually all universities describe themselves as offering such activities, often for college credit (Favaloro, Ball & Lipschutz, 2019). A Google search in May 2020 with the terms “experiential learning” and “university” returns almost eight million hits.

“Pre-professional” refers to majors that would not exist independent of an occupational track. Accounting, business, and engineering match this criterion. One might study chemistry, physics, or biology on a pre-medicine track. Yet, these sciences exist independently of chemical engineering, aeronautics, or medical schools. Nuclear engineering, on the other hand, presumes the existence of nuclear engineering occupations (Norris, 2017: 62).

A common definition of experiential education is “learning by doing,” that is, putting the student subject in a situation in which knowledge and skill must be learned and applied to address a task or solve a problem, providing a “concrete experience.” As Moon et al. (2004:165) describe it

In EL, the student manages their own learning, rather than being told what to do and when to do it. The relationship between student and instructor is different, with the instructor passing much of the responsibility on to the student. The context for learning is different—learning may not take place in the classroom, and there may be no textbooks or academic texts to

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96 Seriously! “Serious games are designed to accomplish a purpose other than pure entertainment and aim to impact measurable social goals” (Stephens & McGirk, 2019).
study. Finally, the curriculum itself may not be clearly identified—the student may have to identify the knowledge they require and then acquire it themselves, reflecting on their learning as they go along.

In both cases, the notion on offer is that most academic majors do not teach the skills and practices that meet employee needs and facilitate students’ entry into the job market (Hart Research Associates, 2013). Both students and their parents demand opportunities to acquire such skills, and universities have responded with alacrity. Internships are highly valued because they give students “on-the-job” training, although many are unpaid, which disadvantages low income students who cannot afford internships and must work to cover their costs of education.

The term “pre-professional” appears first in “Santa Cruz Plans for the ‘80s” (Cowan, et al., 1980: 7, 33), a report commissioned by then-Chancellor Sinsheimer:

Courses in organizational skills and issues will be collectively identified as a preprofessional supplement for students who might otherwise fear to immerse themselves in the intellectual realm of the liberal arts.... Given the increased vocationalism of many students, the campus needs better to communicate information about the existing strength of its preprofessional offerings.

“Experiential education” is mentioned once in the 2008 Strategic Academic Plan (p. 21) and once in the 2016 “Envision UCSC” plan (Galloway, et al., 2016: 23). The Spring 2019 Strategic Academic Plan (Draft SAP, 2019) mentions “experiential learning” no less than 21 times, without ever offering a definition, although it is claimed that such learning helps students by

Deepening connections to internal and external organizations [that] could enable more enriching collaborations and partnerships. The wide range of valuable on- and off-campus experiential learning, includes but is not limited to, internships, field study, project-based scaffold-type research and scholarship either within a class or as an independent study. Experiential learning helps prepare both undergraduate and graduate students to be creative thought leaders who are sought after for their innovative thinking and who have capacity to make an impact on the world around them (Draft SAP, 2019: 16-17).

It is assumed that experiential learning adds “value” to an undergraduate education, but no hard evidence exists to support this assumption.97

There is no question but that UCSC offers a wealth of experiential education opportunities (Favaloro, Ball & Lipschutz, 2019) as well as several pre-professional tracks. But there has been no assessment of either the content or success of these

97 It is difficult to find recent studies assessing the relationship between experiential learning and postgraduate employment; one reported that “graduates who complete three or more internships are more likely to secure full-time employment” (Saltikoff, 2017).
programs, and the plethora of programs is highly disorganized. The University needs to keep closer track of these programs in order to determine their long-term impact.

10. Increase faculty, staff, and student diversity: This, too, is an area of mixed results. The need to diversify the campus was first recognized during the 1960s, when most of the faculty and administration were male, the staff largely female, and the student body virtually all white (Brown, 1979: 9). During the 1970s, there was broad acknowledgement that, as the relative fractions of California’s races and ethnicities changed, UC needed to reflect this change. Increasing the diversity of UCSC faculty has been difficult; as of 2016, 61% were male, and 53% were white (23% were “international” and are not counted for purposes of diversity). In the same year, the staff was 56% female (administrative staff, 61%; services staff 37%), and 60% white, 20% Latino and 8.5% Asian (Office for Diversity, Equity and Inclusion, 2019). The student body exhibited the greatest diversity: in 2018, it was 31.4% white, 25.1% Latino, 26.6% Asian, 4.1% African American and 9.7% international (UCOP, 2019; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2018).

Table 10.4 shows fall 2018 student data on race and ethnicity for UC as a whole and for nine of the campuses (more recent data can be found in Chapter 5). Figure 10.2 illustrates trends. The percentages of ethnicities and races at each campus show considerable variability, which probably reflect (i) regional demography, since some students do not want to go to college far from their homes; (ii) campus status and desirability, especially in terms of professional occupations; (iii) admission criteria at specific campuses; and (iv) other, less tangible reasons. The distributions do not reflect California’s demography as a whole (as shown in the last column of the table).

Table 10.5 shows median 2012 household income in California by race and ethnicity. Generally speaking, students from wealthier households are more likely to pay for part or all of their tuition, whereas students from lower-income households may be supported by loans and grants. A portion of the latter comes from the tuition paid by the students from wealthier households. Hence, those campuses with higher Asian and White student populations may have more revenue to spend on needs other than financial assistance.

The figures for UCSC diversity can be explained in several ways. First, national competition for minority faculty and students is fierce, Santa Cruz is an expensive place to live, and the resources that UCSC offers to candidates and student recruits are probably only marginally competitive. Second, due to the high cost of living in Santa Cruz, the pool of potential staff is heavily white. Third, salaries are much higher in Silicon Valley, which draws away highly qualified applicants. Fourth, it must be recognized that UCSC is not always the first choice of undergraduate applicants. By law, UC campuses are not allowed to admit students on the basis of race, but there are locational (residence and high school), social (first generation college student) and economic indicators (income and wealth) that skew in terms of race.
Table 10.4: Demography of UC Campuses, Fall 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>UC</th>
<th>UCB</th>
<th>UCD</th>
<th>UCI</th>
<th>UCLA</th>
<th>UCM</th>
<th>UCR</th>
<th>UCSB</th>
<th>UCSC</th>
<th>UCSD</th>
<th>California (2017)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280,203</td>
<td>42,501</td>
<td>38,009</td>
<td>36,032</td>
<td>44,537</td>
<td>8,554</td>
<td>23,913</td>
<td>25,966</td>
<td>19,700</td>
<td>37,887</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG</td>
<td>222,493 (79%)</td>
<td>30,853 (72.6%)</td>
<td>30,718 (80.8%)</td>
<td>29,736 (82.5%)</td>
<td>31,577 (70.9%)</td>
<td>7,881 (92.1%)</td>
<td>20,581 (86.1%)</td>
<td>23,070 (88.8%)</td>
<td>17,792 (90.3%)</td>
<td>30,285 (79.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grads</td>
<td>57,710 (21%)</td>
<td>11,648 (27.4%)</td>
<td>7,291 (19.2%)</td>
<td>6,296 (17.5%)</td>
<td>12,606 (29.4%)</td>
<td>663 (7.9%)</td>
<td>3,332 (13.9%)</td>
<td>2,896 (11.2%)</td>
<td>1,908 (9.7%)</td>
<td>7,602 (20.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Af-Am</td>
<td>11,292 (4%)</td>
<td>1,438 (3.4%)</td>
<td>1,366 (3.6%)</td>
<td>1,209 (3.4%)</td>
<td>2,344 (5.3%)</td>
<td>543 (6.3%)</td>
<td>1,311 (5.5%)</td>
<td>1,067 (4.1%)</td>
<td>816 (4.1%)</td>
<td>992 (2.6%)</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am Ind</td>
<td>1,585 (0.6%)</td>
<td>195 (0.5%)</td>
<td>258 (0.7%)</td>
<td>151 (0.4%)</td>
<td>249 (0.6%)</td>
<td>32 (0.4%)</td>
<td>124 (0.5%)</td>
<td>225 (0.9%)</td>
<td>168 (0.9%)</td>
<td>162 (0.4%)</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsp/Lat</td>
<td>6,001 (21.4%)</td>
<td>543 (12.8%)</td>
<td>7,507 (19.8%)</td>
<td>8,110 (22.5%)</td>
<td>8,079 (18.1%)</td>
<td>4,270 (49.9%)</td>
<td>8,698 (36.4%)</td>
<td>6,062 (23.3%)</td>
<td>4,946 (25.1%)</td>
<td>6,488 (17.1%)</td>
<td>38.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>8,5018 (30.3%)</td>
<td>1,4176 (33.4%)</td>
<td>1,0870 (28.6%)</td>
<td>1,3177 (36.6%)</td>
<td>1,2491 (28%)</td>
<td>1,770 (20.7%)</td>
<td>8,078 (33.8%)</td>
<td>5,895 (22.7%)</td>
<td>5,250 (26.6%)</td>
<td>12,542 (33.1%)</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>6,7450 (24.1%)</td>
<td>1,1662 (27.4%)</td>
<td>1,0662 (27.9%)</td>
<td>5,868 (16.3%)</td>
<td>1,2426 (27.9%)</td>
<td>937 (11%)</td>
<td>3,337 (14%)</td>
<td>8,310 (32%)</td>
<td>6,187 (31.4%)</td>
<td>7,886 (20.8%)</td>
<td>37.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>9,398 (3.4%)</td>
<td>2,377 (5.6%)</td>
<td>934 (2.5%)</td>
<td>1,264 (3.5%)</td>
<td>1,830 (4.1%)</td>
<td>143 (1.7%)</td>
<td>498 (2.1%)</td>
<td>658 (2.5%)</td>
<td>411 (2.1%)</td>
<td>1,025 (2.7%)</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int’l</td>
<td>45,459 (16.2%)</td>
<td>7,222 (17%)</td>
<td>7,032 (18.5%)</td>
<td>6,893 (19.1%)</td>
<td>7,018 (15.8%)</td>
<td>849 (9.9%)</td>
<td>1,867 (7.8%)</td>
<td>3749 (14.4%)</td>
<td>1,912 (9.7%)</td>
<td>8792 (23.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 10.2: Trends in demographic composition for new freshmen admitted to UC campuses, 1999-2014.

[Graph showing trends in demographic composition]

Source: UC, 2015: Table 7.1.2. Racial/ethnic distribution of new undergraduates, UC campuses, Fall 1999 to fall 2014 (selected years). More recent data are not available.
Table 10.5: Median household income based on income in the past 12 months, in 2012 inflation adjusted dollars, by race/ethnicity, California, 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Income 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>42,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>45,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American/Alaska Native</td>
<td>42,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>74,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>59,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>69,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


IV. The Tragedy of “Strategic” Academic Planning at UCSC

Slogging through UCSC’s academic plans (which I have done for this book), it seems more appropriate to call them “tragedies” than merely “texts.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines a “tragedy” (in this context) as “any literary or dramatic work written in an elevated style, dealing with serious themes and having an unhappy ending.” The numerous academic plans produced over UCSC’s history almost certainly fit this description: they exhibit a particular writing style, promise a great future, yet almost inevitably end up unfulfilled and on the shelf. There are a number of reasons for such tragic outcomes, most of which can be found at all universities, some of which seem unique to UCSC.

1. The environment in which such plans are developed has become increasingly uncertain and unstable, making it difficult to actually deploy projects and programs over periods of five or more years;

2. The formulators of each successive plan ignore the ones that came before, have no way of identifying what went right, what went wrong and what did not happen, yet either repeat what has been proposed before or fail to carefully assess the requirements for new initiatives;

3. Plans are, for the most part, administration documents, written so as to highlight successes, hopes and promise without much acknowledgement of obstacles and barriers that stand in the way of implementation;

4. The success of a plan rests on buy-in and commitment from faculty, yet repeated failures breed an air of cynicism that leads many to remain as far from the process as possible.

5. Market logic and funding needs increasingly drive planning, without a realistic assessment of what would be required to achieve success (the example of graduate growth is illustrative of this failure, as discussed above), in the hope that future income can cover core costs.

Planning does occur, of course, albeit on a time frame usually less than five years. Departments, programs and divisions are asked to revamp their curricula and identify new hires that fit with the grand strategy even as they must figure out how to deliver
required courses on a regular basis. Given the alacrity and frequency with which new faculty recruitment initiatives are launched, and the complexities of even replacing departing and retiring faculty, it is difficult to plan even for the coming year. Yet, the show must, and does, go on.

Students—for whom, after all, the university exists—must plan their course schedules in advance but are confronted with curricular uncertainties, full classes, and impacted majors. Moreover, students make decisions and behave in ways that frustrate planners and wreak havoc with both strategic and short-term planning, especially when new majors become the fashion of the day. Different advisors give different advice and instruction because they have not learned or do not know the latest changes in procedures (web sites cannot keep up with such changes and they are often not communicated to those who most need to know).

The many plans produced between 1962 and 2019 suggest that UCSC has been able to exercise only limited control over its future and suggests that all public universities are rarely in full control of their destinies. It does appear that it is the external environment which matters most in predicting the future, and which subjects the campus to pressures and changes from every quarter: governments, markets, civil society, demography, even geography. The internal environment is as important but not nearly as autonomous or independent from the outside as the Founders hoped and today’s administrators and faculty might wish. To put the point another way, one campus does not matter very much to the outside world, but the outside world matters very much for that campus.

Several broad elements emerge out of the history of planning at UCSC. The most evident is the continuing mismatch between campus visions for the future and the resources available to achieve them. A second is the mismatch between those visions and the future as it comes to pass, and the ways in which those visions actually create difficulties in that future. The third is the gradual shift from a focus on undergraduate liberal arts education to a more “normalized” UCSC focused on STEM (or STEAM) fields. Finally, there is the impact of changing demography and the impacts of decline in K-12 quality on the institution on low-income and minority students, in particular.

All of these factors have been and are faced, of course, by public universities across the United States, but most of those began and have experienced existence as “normal” institutions and are not wreathed in the Camelot-like legends that surround UCSC. And while all public universities find themselves engaged in power struggles between faculty, staff, students and administration, few have had the struggles characteristic of UCSC etched so deeply in their institutional structure.

I suggested in earlier chapters that dysfunction at UCSC is, in part, a consequence of early power struggles among faculty and administration that imprinted particular long-lasting practices on its faculty, staff and students (some might call this “culture” or “tradition”). Invocation of these “traditional” practices is intended to introduce a degree of stability into daily life even as rationalization of new or changed practices

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in the name of some “tradition” is meant to legitimize and reduce resistance to them. Often, it is the perception or experience of relative decline that triggers opposition to innovation: people (aside from so-called entrepreneurs) are much more concerned about the risk of loss than they are interested in the possibility of gain, and the uncertain impacts of change means that risk-aversion is the default response. *Habitus* means that people would like to continue what they have been doing, rather than changing their practices.

Is it surprising then that, as early as 1970, the second academic plan acknowledged that the vision of the Founders was proving much more difficult to achieve than they had imagined it would be? Some of problem was attributed to the firing of Clark Kerr, whose support for UCSC was critical, and the low level of interest by his successor, Charles Hitch. Budget cuts imposed by the governor and a new resource allocation scheme implemented by Hitch meant that UCSC was penalized for its focus on undergraduates. As well, the national atmosphere of resistance and opposition to the institutionalized practices of higher education was beginning to fade, although student disruptions of business-as-usual (as during the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970) were not.

Many of the Academic Plans generated strong, and sometimes fierce, criticism from the committees of the Academic Senate, especially since there was no way a single document could address all concerns, contingencies and possibilities facing the campus. During one cycle of academic planning (2000-03), for example, all campus units were asked to devise 10-year plans, which were then aggregated into academic and business divisional documents. These were so expansive and expensive that they could not be reconciled. The Executive Vice Chancellor never prepared a final document and soon departed for a more attractive job. Similarly, the managers of the 2017-19 Strategic Academic Planning process asked all faculty and staff to engage in an exercise that was meant to culminate in a single, comprehensive document good for the period 2020-25. Yet, narrowing this down to something that can be pursued means that many people’s interest and concerns were cut out along the way.

A further complication has been campus leadership (or lack of it): Dean McHenry sought to lead by inspiration rather than direction, leaving behind a weak and disordered administration, and the rapid succession of three chancellors after his retirement and led to a period of confusion that lasted until 1980, when Robert Sinsheimer began to impose his vision on the campus. Needless to say, successive Academic Plans try to convey and project a setting that was much less confused and conflicted than was the case on the ground. Chancellors who sought to impose their desires and goals on the faculty, in the interest of order, have generated antagonistic responses. Those who were less interventionist, however, have been blamed for passiveness and lack of leadership and direction. In 2019, Cynthia Larive, formerly at UC Riverside, succeeded George Blumenthal as UCSC chancellor (a new EVC was
appointed in Spring 2020). At this writing, however, there has been little in the way of strong leadership apparent in the current Administration. 98

Thus, the “tragedy of strategic planning” lies less in the inability to accurately predict the future environment within which the university must operate and more in the faith that repeated efforts at such planning can be implemented and produce desired outcomes (one popular definition of insanity). One can blame all sorts of internal and external factors as playing a role in the failure to achieve those outcomes but, at the end of the day, the absence of historical memory and lessons learned from past experience might be as important as anything else in these failures. In Chapter 11, I will describe and assess the current Strategic Academic Planning process and evaluate whether it might succeed where so many others have failed. The Appendix to this chapter provides summaries of each of the plans prepared over the past 55+ years.

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98 This judgment might seem unfair inasmuch as the new Chancellor has been confronted with an unfamiliar campus, a TA strike, the COVID-19 shutdown and other, more conventional matters. This brings to mind the misattributed and incorrectly interpreted conversation Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai were reported to have had in 1971. Kissinger asked Zhou what he thought of the French Revolution, and Zhou responded, “It is too soon to tell.” Apparently, they were referring to the 1968 student uprising in France, although whether they actually had such a conversation is unclear (Rothkopf, 2015).
Appendix: UCSC's Academic and Strategic Plans

This Appendix contextualizes and summarizes the major academic and strategic plans produced by UCSC between 1962 and 2018. Each table describes a specific plan and (i) the vision expressed therein; (ii) stated goals and objectives; (iii) projected enrollments, and graduate student fraction; (iv) proposed role of the colleges; (v) undergraduate educational focus; (vi) research and graduate studies; and (vii) outcomes (what goals were accomplished).

1. Provisional Academic Plan for 1965-75 (1962; 18 pp.) was prepared during consultations in Summer 1962 and approved by the Regents in Fall 1962 (see Chapter 6). The document is focused largely on the function of the colleges and curriculum development, although there are also discussions of research, graduate students and other topics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/vision</th>
<th>Through colleges, educate undergrads in abilities, attitudes, habits central to a liberal education (critical thinking in different fields, expertise in one field, foreign language, writing, reading, historical &amp; philosophical perspective)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
<td>Establish undergrad liberal arts program on firm basis so it will not be adversely affected by faculty research &amp; graduate program; no departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment projections</td>
<td>3,250 by 1970; 7,500 by 1975, w/ 100 grad students by 1970, 800 by 1975 (10.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Colleges</td>
<td>Colleges will range from 250-1000; curricula organized by &amp; specific to individual colleges; undergrad courses (lower division) in colleges whenever possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Focus</td>
<td>Undergraduate liberal arts curriculum in each college, with science component; small classes w/ specialized approaches to teaching; reaching each student through close instruction; 50% of student work should be in colleges if possible; no general education program; upper division teaching outside the college in the Boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; graduate studies</td>
<td>There will be professional schools; language &amp; linguistics; South Pacific Studies; conservation; psychology; mathematics, plus more conventional ones in Natural Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>Final version prepared for Regental approval in 1965 (see below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Final academic plan for the Santa Cruz Campus, 1965-1975 (1965, 31 pp) This version of the plan was approved by the Regents in 1965. It is less focused on vision or goals and objectives and more concerned with college curricula and degree requirements. Up to this point, academic planning was a largely theoretical exercise: how it was imagined the campus and colleges would operate, what they would feature, what the faculty hoped to accomplish. Reality outran the plan almost from Opening Day, as faculty and administration tried to put in motion what was proposed in the plan, some of which did not work out as hoped or intended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/vision</th>
<th>Establish an undergraduate liberal arts program to produce students with abilities, attitudes, and habits deemed central to a liberal education, including speaking, reading &amp; writing competence, historical and philosophical perspectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
<td>Establish colleges as basic unit of planning, student life and activities &amp; student &amp; faculty identification; seek early distinction in arts &amp; sciences; restrict curriculum to serve student and not faculty; provide instruction &amp; research in arts &amp; sciences, business, basic medical services and other fields; develop intramural sports program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment projections</td>
<td>7,200 by 1975, 27,500 at buildup; 125 grads by 1968, 15% by 1975; 40% by 1995; 12,000 undergrads, 12,000 grads; 3,500 professional &amp; special students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Colleges</td>
<td>Same as above; 20 colleges plus professional schools; most student activity will take place in the colleges;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Focus</td>
<td>Provide students with undergraduate liberal arts education through College &amp; Board courses with curriculum designed to serve student needs and not faculty desires; innovative teaching through small classes, tutorials, seminars &amp; independent study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; graduate studies</td>
<td>PhD programs only in disciplines selected for early emphasis plus 5-year BA/MA options; engineering School by 1967 + other professional schools; support faculty in balancing teaching and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes by 1970</td>
<td>First five colleges opened; Cowell implements curriculum, other colleges have more trouble and drop core course; graduate programs in sciences and History of...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Academic Plan UC Santa Cruz, 1970-1980 (1971; 33 pp.) was part of a regularly required reporting process; the authors described it as a “loose-leaf document, subject to revision from time to time, as the Santa Cruz campus develops, as new needs emerge, and as improved methods of instruction become available” (p. 2). Dean McHenry called it “in part a progress report” recording “both successes and failures” but arguing that “Most of what we planned has happened.”

By 1970, five colleges were in business, with three more scheduled to open. Multi-quarter college core courses had been tried and mostly dropped; several graduate programs had been launched; the Boards were beginning to make their influence felt relative to the Colleges. What was not anticipated were the cuts in funding imposed by Governor Reagan or the decision by UC President Hitch to provide funding based on weighted enrollments, which disadvantaged campuses with few graduate students.

4. The Academic Plan of UC Santa Cruz (1977; 205 pp) was initiated as part of the 5 year planning cycle during Mark Christensen’s tenure as Chancellor but delayed by his departure, and completed by the end of Angus Taylor’s tenure as chancellor, just prior to Robert Sinsheimer’s arrival on campus. This took place in the midst of the recessions of the early 1970s, uncertainties in state support (especially by then-Governor Brown) and a decline in applications and stagnation in enrollment. These uncertainties are reflected by the tone of the document, changes in the vision of the collegiate system and questions about how to proceed. Recall that the first round of “reaggregation” had earlier taken place.

Mission/ vision

Plan reinforces founders’ model but “unforeseen shifts in enrollments, student body composition, fiscal resources and the nature of higher education” have interfered; that plan is not “immutable” but meant for “ongoing planning and decision making”; question is not whether campus should have been prepared for changing external...
circumstances, but whether full realization of initial plan is still possible.

Goals & Objectives
Sets forth an agenda for years ahead; discusses campus direction over next decade. UCSC will: continue high-quality undergrad education in a wholly collegiate setting with graduate programs and research; respond to changing ethnic composition of state and student body; reverse the decline in undergraduate enrollments via "redirection" of students from other UC campuses & more transfer students.

Enrollment projections
5,910 students in 1975-76 w/ 5.7% grad, rising to 6,600 w/ 6% grads in 1985-86; graduates should be 10% or more by 1992.

Role of the Colleges
Colleges are administrative units and academic communities in intellectual and social sense; colleges & divisions function to insure that UCSC is not a departmentalized university; further develop colleges & divisions to assure continuance of distinctive and valuable differences between UCSC and other universities; colleges can offer interdisciplinary majors; faculty membership in colleges is not voluntary; some faculty reaggregation has occurred; limited success in meeting general education goals.

Educational Focus
High-quality undergrad education; no possibility of designing general education in any single pattern or curriculum; all undergrad curricula should be planned so that they make some contribution to the ideal of liberal education; education should address global problems & issues.

Research & graduate studies
Small, high-quality grad programs; maintain reasonable disciplinary balance among humanities, sciences & social science; balance faculty research & teaching; research in global problems important; limited funding for research.

Outcomes by 1980
Second round of reaggregation; further displacement of Colleges by Boards; Colleges stripped of personnel functions; core course requirement reinstituted; growth in applications & enrollments resumes; changing ethnic diversity of state begins to be addressed.

Source/Citation

5. Santa Cruz Plans for the ‘80s—Long-Range Academic Planning Statement, 1980-85 (1980; 30 pp.) appears to be an academic plan type of document requested from the Academic Senate by Chancellor Sinsheimer as part of the regular cycle, after he began to impose his authority and began to view UCSC as an “anomalous” campus. This began as a multipage article in City on a Hill in 1979 and then produced in a separate document. At this point, curricular details no longer appear and the focus is more on broader and longer-term goals and objectives. The question of “normalization” is raised, which was ostensibly a goal of Sinsheimer but not so much faculty and students.

Mission/vision
“This campus has chosen to emphasize the role of education & exemplify its power to broaden intellect and sharpen perception during formative undergraduate years... This campus symbolizes and affirms the dedication of UC to excellence in undergraduate education, which is not incompatible with graduate programs and research” (R. Sinshiemer)

Goals & Objectives
In a constricted context of funding and enrollments, UCSC could move toward formula-based university, and undervalue undergraduate education & selective excellence, but this must not happen; increased cooperation w/ UC-Berkeley can stretch resources; need to develop effective measures to increase selectivity and provide cushion for projected decline in California high school graduates.

Enrollment projections
In the 1980s, 6,250 students, w/ 10-15% graduate students.

Role of the Colleges
Provide intellectual/social context for residence life and academic support functions; no role in hires and faculty personnel process; offer core courses & limited number of other courses; divisional deans should be assigned general responsibilities for first 6 colleges; provosts should focus on quality of intellectual life & their own careers.

Educational Focus
Superb undergrad education not incompatible with research environment but requires it; programs should be more attractive and accessible to "new student constituencies"; new initiatives in general education needed; courses in organizational skills to be identified as “preprofessional supplement” for students not directed toward liberal arts; proposal for new academic programs to be closely vetted by “campus impact checklist”.

Research & graduate studies
Desirable to have 3-4 organized research units plus selected research activities; small, selective graduate programs of highest standards; modest expansion in existing PhD programs except for those with “significant growth potential”; no new
PhD programs through 1985; move toward 5 year BS/MA programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes by 1985</th>
<th>Women’s Studies becomes a Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Source/Citation**

6. **Report of the Commission on the 18th Year** (1983; 60 pp.) was established by Sinsheimer as part of his effort (it would seem) to assert his authority as Chancellor, during a period when there was significant faculty opposition to some of his policies and personnel decisions. The document primarily addressed the future of divisions and academic programs and how they might grow and develop. But it was also, in part, a treatise examining the philosophical underpinnings of education at UCSC and its “institutional culture,” with proposals about how both could be changed to promote a more unified vision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/vision</th>
<th>Reconsider guiding principles of institution and formulate appropriate precepts for the next 18 years; clarify relationship between a “research university” and an “intensive and personal undergraduate education”; distinguish between short-term problems and long-term issue of providing a university education commensurate w/ resources &amp; challenges through 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
<td>UCSC must avoid middle-term problem of stagnation &amp; redistribute resources internally in order to grow; UCSC has come to rest halfway between “alternative” campus and a more accommodationist &amp; traditional one—justified in terms of economic &amp; institutional pressures; UCSC should maintain its exceptionalism and not become ‘smaller version’ of other UCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment projections</td>
<td>10,000 students by 2000, w/ 15% graduate students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Colleges</td>
<td>Must develop clearer vision of role of colleges and relationship to undergrad education, divisions, General Education, remedial work, interdisciplinary programs, institutes and grad programs; colleges can be a resource and base for institutes &amp; programs &amp; center of undergraduate life; colleges could bring excellence to curriculum through complementary courses w/o raising college-board conflicts; Provost houses could be used for purposes other than housing (e.g., faculty club).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Focus</td>
<td>Smallness may not be an obstacle &amp; UCSC may be able to provide education comparable to Princeton &amp; Brown; remedial work now needed for most entering students, not only minorities; need to provide rewards for teaching; lower division General Education is enhanced by core courses; college-based tutorials are proposed, as well as interdisciplinary programs; remedial work &amp; student support; thematic integration of curriculum; and cross-college lectures and classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; graduate studies</td>
<td>Interdisciplinary faculty clusters and graduate groups should be created; should be fullest possible organizational and fiscal support for new organized research activities that facilitate faculty research and grad research, especially in Humanities and Social Sciences; graduate students might move toward research institutes after their first two years, which would then take responsibility for them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes by 1990</td>
<td>None evident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **University of California Santa Cruz Twenty-Year Plan** (1985; 88 pp.) was part of the regular planning cycle, presumably informed by its two predecessors (but not the “Report of the Commission on the 18th Year”). This plan is strongly oriented toward normalization of the campus and can be regarded as marking the transition from an idealistic campus focused on liberal arts undergraduate education to more professional majors, with research and graduate education assuming higher priority. It did acknowledge, however, that in “twenty years the character of the Santa Cruz campus will still be largely undergraduate, with a strong bent toward liberal education...in the arts, letters, and science” (Sinsheimer, 1985b: 4).

| Mission/vision | Reaffirms belief in virtues of a liberal education coexisting with excellent graduate programs and research; undergraduate education should prepare students for the “looming technological age” and its “revolutions” (nuclear energy, genetic engineering, computers and AI). “Relatively anomalous position of UCSC within the UC system needs a legitimation it never had” (Sinsheimer). |

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### Goals & Objectives
Shift from small, predominantly liberal arts undergraduate campus to one characterized by a full complement of programs, while sustaining historical commitments to undergraduates; increase number of professionally certified undergrad degrees and “applied tracks” to 10% of students by 1995 (e.g., computer engineering, business economics, science communication); achieve ranking among top 100 research institutions during 1990s.

### Enrollment projections
6,994 students, with 8% graduate students; grow to 12-15,000 by 2000 with 10% graduate students and 15-20% graduate students by 2005; enrollment growth will continue through 1988 and then decline, which will require preparation.

### Role of the Colleges
Maintain colleges and add new ones; colleges serve valuable academic roles if carefully defined and funded; they still have an academic role, especially through diversified group of student support systems and loyalty structures, academic advising & monitoring of student progress student support; review and monitoring of college courses integrated with campus GE curriculum

### Educational Focus
Commit to excellent & distinctive undergraduate education; diversify & enrich degree programs, add younger faculty, emphasize critical inquiry & professional skills; continue interdisciplinary programs and courses; reevaluate programs that do not contribute; develop applied programs to improve recruitment and retention

### Research & graduate studies
Seek out faculty w/ research interests in a small number of fields, w/ 30% of new FTE allocated to new foci & opportunities; support Organized Research Units & programs (18 existing; 17 proposed); develop new graduate and professional programs, strengthen those that are or have potential for distinction; intensify commitment to research & creativity

### Outcomes by 1995
Funding constraints limit what is possible; several new programs established

### Source/Citation

8. Academic Planning Study, Office of the Academic Vice Chancellor (1988; 60pp) was not an Academic Plan, as such. It was submitted to Chancellor Stevens as an assessment of the “implications for campus development of the goals and academic programs in the 20-year Plan” of 1985 and specifically examined what growth in faculty, graduate students and programs would be required in order to achieve “excellence” with a student population of 15,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/vision</th>
<th>The University’s quality and breadth requirements must be the primary considerations in campus planning, but quality and breadth are directly related to the number of faculty and students on campus.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
<td>Become a comprehensive research &amp; teaching university; increase Boards’ size; develop new programs to meet UC program and degree standards; develop nationally-regarded departments; be comparable to leading research universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment projections</td>
<td>Campus should grow to 15,000 students, with 20% graduate students to compete with other universities of similar ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Colleges</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Focus</td>
<td>Offer more disciplines and majors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; graduate studies</td>
<td>Must have at least 15,000 students &amp; more faculty to achieve rank; on other UC campuses, medical research represents a large portion of research funding which UCSC does not have; addition of 23 proposed PhD &amp; MA programs will help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes by 1995</td>
<td>None obvious, although this informed the subsequent plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Report of the Committee on 2005 (1992; 56 pp) was commissioned by Chancellor Stevens “to advise the administration on academic planning for the UCSC campus over the next fifteen years...not only to explore directions in academic development that seem to make sense for the campus, but also to identify existing sources of energy and strength which might serve as the basis for promising initiatives.” (Hankamer, et al., 1992: 2). By the time this plan was completed, Karl Pister had replaced Stevens as Chancellor. The Committee worked under the shadow of the recessions of the early 1990s, which not only threatened campus growth but also raised rumors that one of the smaller UC campuses might be closed.

| Mission/vision | Define the character of UCSC as a UC campus; mission for the next 15 years should be to shape teaching, research and service programs to address ethnic & cultural |
Goals & Objectives
Clear space for new programs; remove weaknesses & weak programs; rebuild the academic role of the colleges; develop professional programs in Education, Arch/Design, Environmental Issues, Public Health, Information Tech; Establish an “Environmental Issues Center”; move toward distribution of programs & students similar to other UC campuses; contribute to society & generate useful knowledge

Enrollment projections
9,720 students in 1991, rising to 15,000 in 2005; graduate enrollment rising from 8.3% in 1991 to 3,000 in 2005 (20%). Doubt expressed about supporting more than 1,500 Ph.D students without substantial growth in professional programs

Role of the Colleges
“Rejuvenate” colleges by articulating & rebuilding coherent academic mission; expand course offerings, especially 1-3 unit courses; integrate planning of remaining colleges (9-13) with campus academic plans; differentiate college emphases and themes; appoint 1-2 faculty in each college to provide enhancements to teaching & advising; possibly move to UCSD college model

Educational Focus
Establish direct connection between new issues & educational mission & adopt them to build campus strength; offer more MA & professional degrees; increase language studies (including computer languages); more coherent definition of general education & required component of curriculum; implement substantive requirement in quantitative &/or formal reasoning; emphasize undergraduate research

Research & graduate studies
Conduct research in key problem areas; choose a few focuses and really do them well; integrate graduate and undergraduate education, teaching & research; establish funding reserve to support launch of new initiatives

Outcomes by 2005
Planning for Colleges 9 & 10 & School of Engineering underway; 1-3 unit courses in colleges are launched; acquisition of land for Monterey Bay Education, Science & Technology Center at Fort Ord.

Source/Citation

10. UCSC at a Crossroads—Advisory Report of the Millennium Committee (1998; 48 pp.) was commissioned by Chancellor Greenwood to develop a set of principles to guide campus planning during the period in which UCSC planned to grow from about 10,600 toward 15,000 students. The document laid out an ambitious (and idealistic) set of goals and a series of steps and actions needed to move toward them. With the “Dot Com” boom underway, fiscal pressures declined, although the state never restored the budget growth rates of earlier decades or made up the difference.
for a lifetime of learning; implement undergraduate education characterized by disciplinary depth, rigorous breadth, and a high level of direct interaction with research faculty; foster high-quality research and the generation of new knowledge

| Research & graduate studies | Offer a variety of graduate degree programs at the M.A./M.S. level that complement Ph.D. programs, consistent with educational mission; develop interdisciplinary graduate groups; research priorities must be determined by the research community, individually and in groups; provide institutional support that fosters faculty initiatives; provide financial support and research opportunities for additional graduate students; demonstrate commitment to development of top-quality, internationally recognized research programs; encourage faculty initiatives to build and maintain top programs; help faculty secure time, financial support, and collaborations to maximize research success |

| Outcomes by 2005 | 1-3 unit college course requirement eliminated; Colleges 9 & 10 & Baskin School of Engineering open; planning for Santa Clara Valley Center begins; 15,000 enrollment reached |


11. Planning for the UC Santa Cruz of 2010 (2001-03; multiple documents) was initiated by then-EVC John Simpson to develop the principles and proposals made by the Millennium Committee. The various academic and business divisions and units were asked to prepare 10-year plans that would become the basis for a “long term blueprint for the campus.” All units prepared detailed proposals, whose costs far exceeded anything feasible and whose implementation was (after the Dot Com crash) never implemented. No comprehensive final document ever appeared; as an overview, there were only three reports to the campus from EVC Simpson (from which the text below is taken). In the event, budget cuts foreclosed most of the objectives generated by the exercise.

| Mission/vision | UCSC will focus on excellence in both research and teaching and further define a unique niche among very highest quality institutions; pursue definition mindful of its unique characteristics, capacities, areas of excellence, and values; not be simply another R1 university; the very aspects that make UCSC unique in UC system should be celebrated and guide pursuit of goals and aspirations |

| Goals & Objectives | Strengthen research and scholarly accomplishment and distinction; increase graduate programs and enrollments; develop interdisciplinary programs; enhance faculty, staff and student diversity; increase external support from public & private sources; combine present resources with new resources; develop innovative programming in non- traditional areas, including Silicon Valley, summer instruction, and other off-campus enterprises; address local issues & global/international issues; develop culture of strategic thinking, ongoing planning and assessment, and building academic program and academic support leadership |

| Enrollment projections | 16,900 by 2010; w/ 1,500 grad students by 2006-07 & up to 15% by 2010; create new professional schools to increase grad enrolments |

| Role of the Colleges | Define role of the colleges in delivery of academic programs (General Education & writing); determine how colleges can function synergistically with divisions in education of “whole” student; colleges as catalysts for interdisciplinary education and research; colleges will not have role originally established by the campus, nor will uniform model apply to all; coherent academic role for colleges consistent with campus objectives for undergraduate experience; develop graduate college |

| Educational Focus | Retain uncommon commitment to undergraduate education; innovative initiatives programs between core programs and interdisciplinary approaches, between “theoretical” and “applied programs”; develop courses within 12-month curriculum allowing students to substitute summer for a regular year-quarter. |

| Research & graduate studies | Expand top-level research and cohort of graduate students; build on current areas of scholarly excellence; campus-wide integration of research, training, and action-oriented programs around public service/knowledge/policy topics; develop “graduate groups.” |

| Outcomes by 2010 | None evident |

### 12. Strategic Futures Committee Report (2004; 33 pp)

(2004; 33 pp) was charged with considering possible enrollment trajectories and recommending an on-campus enrollment scenario for UCSC through 2020, in conjunction with the 2005-20 LRDP then in preparation.

| Mission/vision | Serve society and the region; discover, advance & transmit advanced knowledge; maintain public research emphasis; value public space; make provision for sufficient numbers and breadth of faculty to fully develop existing and newer programs & be competitive in emerging fields; responsibility to provide higher education to state’s growing number of academically prepared and increasingly diverse high school graduates, community college transfers, and post-baccalaureate (graduate or professional) students. |
| Goals & Objectives | Growth and development need to be planned strategically and directed to achieve agreed-upon campus priorities, or development (especially physical development) may foreclose future options or not advance articulated goals; articulate academic rationale and principles associated with growth; identify factors driving new physical facilities and infrastructure (e.g., significant research growth, new professional schools, mix of on- and off-campus programs); identify significant/emerging academic directions; quantify future capital requirements; enable LRDP Committee to define matters that should be addressed in the LRDP. |
| Enrollment projections | Achieve or exceed a total three-quarter average on-campus enrollment of 21,000 FTE, with 15% graduate students by 2020. |
| Role of the Colleges | Colleges are places of continuing innovation; pride in the bold experiment of a major research university at which key scholarly engagements occurred as part of the intellectual life of residential colleges; colleges and their physical plant as valuable resources in meeting needs of our faculty and students, providing intellectual opportunities so compelling that faculty will carry out research/teaching programs at colleges; retain some existing administrative and academic structures and practices, dispense with others, adopt new approaches; potential benefits for colleges and campus are great. |
| Educational Focus | Academic plans have consistently articulated breadth and depth of undergraduate academic programs, fully developed range of academically-focused graduate programs, and appropriate professional degree programs; sustain excellence in departments at near-mature size, with selective growth and larger proportional growth to support recently and newly established programs & those at less than optimum numbers. |
| Research & graduate studies | Commitment to high-quality, vibrant & internationally-recognized research enterprise that contributes to quality of undergraduate and graduate education, to faculty quality and satisfaction, and to service mission, including new ideas and solutions to local, national and global challenges, service the national and international academic community, and public service and outreach activities; graduate and professional school and research growth should focus on emerging disciplines in which campus has core strengths and can attract quality faculty; encourage faculty initiatives to build and maintain excellent programs; take risks when the potential rewards are great. |
| Outcomes by 2015 | Undergraduate growth goals largely met |


(2008; 24 pp + 12 p “Action Plan”) was another turn of the planning cycle, following up on the 2001-03 exercise. Once again, it offered expansive visions but was more focused on “a near-term view of the actions we can take to begin to fulfill our mission within available resources” (OPB, 2008: 1). An “Action Plan” listed steps to take while “Measuring Our Progress,” a set of “high-level indicators” was supposed to report on whether goals were being met (although I have not been able to find this last document).

| Mission/vision | Campus is making its mark as premier research university with a commitment to educational programs that promote active learning, critical thinking and involvement with research; mission is to provide a comprehensive education for undergraduate and graduate students in focused, high quality programs, in which research and teaching link faculty and students in independent, critical thinking, |

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active understanding, creativity, and social responsibility; disciplinary excellence provides the surest basis for interdisciplinary collaboration responsive to the needs of current and future students & multiethnic and global society; lead in development of new disciplines, advances in established disciplines and in new lines of collaboration between disciplines’ rigorous scholarly activity; celebrate the diversity of students, faculty and staff and value differing perspectives and contributions.

### Goals & Objectives

UCSC must be committed to high-quality undergraduate and graduate education; serve the people of the region, the state, and the world; enable students to become tomorrow's leaders and lifelong learners; attract, retain, and advance a diverse student body, faculty, and staff; commit to high-quality production and transmission of knowledge across all disciplines; plan growth and development with attention to sustainability and in consultation with the larger external community.

### Enrollment projections

Goal of at least a 15% graduate enrollment; no specified enrollment target

### Role of the Colleges

Colleges will provide a nurturing setting to introduce and support students in addressing challenges of university life; colleges will continue to house faculty offices and small research groups; sponsor upper division courses based on availability of funding; colleges’ independence from departments allow them to act as incubators for exploration across and between disciplines.

### Educational Focus

Commitment to innovative interdisciplinary study extended to creating entirely new cross-disciplinary departments (across the Humanities, Arts and Engineering, and the Social, Physical and Biological Sciences); shift established disciplines into new areas and unfamiliar approaches; think of disciplines and fields of study as evolving rather than simply growing

### Research & graduate studies

Invest differentially rather than incrementally and homogeneously by targeting development of departments and programs to areas where with greatest impact; add professional programs & schools; pursue Six Themes for the Future: Cross Cultural Initiatives; Evolving Environments, Science and Policy; Human Health Initiative; Public Documentation and Communication; Technological Development and Societal Impact; Transnationalism and Globalization;

### Outcomes by 2015

Few if any of the goals that were not already being pursued appear to have been met

### Sources/Citations


14. Joint Senate/Administrative Task Force on Academic Structures and Strategic Planning (2013; 19pp) was created “to provide a venue for considering the delivery and support of curriculum and research to meet the needs of 21st century higher education, both undergraduate and graduate, within the context of realistic budgetary models,” and in preparation for a “campus wide strategic planning effort for the... [following] academic year” (2014).

### Mission/vision

Task Force intended to “provide a venue for considering the delivery and support of curriculum and research to meet the needs of 21st-century higher education, both undergraduate and graduate, within the context of realistic budgetary models.”

### Goals & Objectives

Focus resources on targeted investments and seek new revenue sources required to support them; don’t dwell on the decline of state investment in higher education; develop campus consensus regarding priorities to provide framework for pursuit of innovation and growth; Guiding Principles Essential for Campus Progress: 1. Whole budget is always under consideration; 2. Don’t look to ‘restore’ cuts; continually shape institution for the present and future; 3.Structures supporting the institution must evolve constantly, including efforts requiring multi-year transitions; 4. Foundation of excellence is effectiveness on basic functions; 5. Introduce transparency to the budgeting process.

### Enrollment projections

Up to 27,000 w/ 15% graduate enrollments

### Role of the Colleges

Not mentioned

### Educational Focus

Need more strategic and comprehensive cross-campus planning of interdisciplinary programs, research initiatives, and courses within and across departments and divisions; planning process seems to be driven in large part by the academic divisions, which assess needs and opportunities in their areas of familiarity and advocate for resources to fulfill their corresponding goals and aspirations.

### Research & graduate studies

Promote values of interdisciplinary research but recognize challenges to cross-divisional and interdisciplinary teaching and research; academic planning at core of
large-scale graduate growth; choices made about faculty hiring and disciplinary emphasis define research profile and graduate programs, are basis for reputational excellence; emphasize professional training rather than academic study in development of new graduate programs, increase enrollments of non-resident undergraduate students; campus appetite for directing new resources towards support of graduate growth should be assessed.

Outcomes by 2020
Many of the goals listed remain aspirational, but are being addressed

Source/Citation

15. Strategic Academic Plan for Silicon Valley (2013; 30 pp.) was composed as part of a UCSC initiative to revise plans for the Si Valley campus, after the failure of the proposed School of Management (see Chapter 11). The goal was to develop Masters’ level degree programs drawing from across the campus (only engineering programs are offered at this time).

Mission/vision
As closest UC campus to Silicon Valley, UCSC has the responsibility and the mandate to develop instructional and research programs for world’s leading center of innovation, and has much to gain from closer engagements with industry; research problems originating in industry provide intellectually stimulating projects for students and faculty; hire new faculty aligned with emerging technology directions & create channel of access to commerce for all UC campuses; technology foci of this effort will drive level of interdisciplinarity that will supersede the departments and promote stronger engagements with companies.

Goals & Objectives
Silicon Valley’s position as center of innovation makes investment in instruction and research a visible contribution by UCOP to California’s economy; UCSC growth in Silicon Valley is most compelling route to serving local professional community in the Monterey Bay/San Jose region; corporations have greater need and desire to interact with academia for research and instruction; engineering schools bear responsibility for bringing technology problems into academia; start-ups are seen as essential for continued growth of Silicon Valley economy; “tech transfer” via university-originated start-up companies will play a major role in this respect

Enrollment projections
not specified

Role of the Colleges
not mentioned

Educational Focus
Expansion of Ph.D. programs in fields relevant to Silicon Valley; UCSC will not build standard complement of large-scale professional schools; the campus is still considering School of Management in Si Valley, growing out of Baskin SOE’s Engineering’s Technology and Information Management program; opportunity for students to do their undergraduate degree at any UC campus, then come to UCSC Silicon Valley for an M.S. or M.Eng degree.

Research & graduate studies
All graduate level with research presumably conducted in collaboration with tech companies in Si Valley

Outcomes by 2020
School of Management dropped; replaced by individual Masters’ program. Chancellor Blumenthal made commitment of 14 FTE to Si Valley, but these positions are mostly occupied by instructors.

Source/Citation

16. Envision UCSC (2017; 27 pp.) was again part of the regular academic planning cycle, involving focus groups and consultation with faculty, staff and students. These groups tended to focus on problems rather than solutions, regarding progress on state goals as being impeded by “obstacles and barriers.” The final document did not reflect many of the sentiments expressed during the consultation process.

Mission/vision
UC Santa Cruz is a world-class research university with extraordinary commitment to society and success of its students; faculty research programs advance human knowledge, understanding, and creativity through shared spirit of innovation and discovery; outstanding academic programs, broad student research opportunities, and varied extracurricular activities fully engage students and prepare them for the challenges of the future; share core values that include a commitment to diversity,
17. Strategic Academic Plan (Spring 2019; 47 pp.) was an exercise launched by the then-newly arrived EVC Marlene Tromp in 2017, intended to provide leadership through a major, collaborative process that would identify large-scale research projects that could raise extramural funds and increase campus visibility and status. This table quotes from the Fall 2018 draft; a “final draft” was released in April 2019. The exercise was largely halted after Tromp left the campus and a new Chancellor arrived. The SAP process is described and assessed in detail in Chapter 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals &amp; Objectives</th>
<th>Focus resources on targeted investments and seek the new revenue sources required to support them; develop campus consensus regarding priorities to provide a framework empowering campus leadership to pursue innovation and growth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment projections</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Colleges</td>
<td>Enhance the role of colleges in student support &amp; success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Focus</td>
<td>Develop holistic approach to undergraduate student experience to close gap between UCSC and UC-wide graduation rates and time-to-degree numbers; pursue campus-wide goal of diversity and inclusion by improving the campus climate for all students, with special attention to groups underrepresented in higher education; Division of Student Success has developed and piloted systems that support predictive analytics to identify students at risk, support case management for advising and academic services, and provide for better tracking and management reporting of service outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research &amp; graduate studies</td>
<td>All faculty FTE resources, whether new or replacements, must be used strategically; academic resource planning process must revitalize existing academic strengths while developing programs that grow and enhance our research portfolio, support graduate program growth, and maintain dedication to undergraduate education; strengthen the focus on graduate education, including greater internationalization, to align more closely with the AAU institutions of the University of California; improve performance on nationally accepted measures of quality as assessed in external benchmarks and rankings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes by 2020</td>
<td>While the planning process was highly consultative, it did not generate much useful response; the Plan’s six goals are all longer-term, and were revisited in 2017-19.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/vision</th>
<th>Be intentional in investment and communication around research, teaching, and public service in areas faculty have identified as most exciting; identify, highlight, energize, prioritize and invest in academic areas that strengthen university as a whole, build stronger programs for students, create new research opportunities for faculty, and bolster global impact, while utilizing resources consciously and thoughtfully; planning over next 3-5 years must assume that budget resources will continue to be limited and resource allocations prioritized to achieve objectives.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
<td>Drive research and creative work that transforms world; create enriching experiential learning and research opportunities for students; engage and support a diverse faculty, staff, and student body; support generative interdisciplinary connections in research and teaching; expand excellence in innovation in areas distinctive to UC Santa Cruz, such as social justice, diversity, and sustainability; develop cross-disciplinary research and creative work projects that can raise significant extramural support; eliminate or modify institutional and structural barriers that impede teaching, research and learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment projections</td>
<td>Not specified; new LRDP plans for up to 28,000 students by 2040 at various sites. Graduate fraction to grow; specified in other docs as 12% of undergrad enrollments, although some think it impossible to achieve this target due to resource constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the Colleges</td>
<td>Colleges offer natural home for innovative classes that don’t easily fit into existing departmental structure; with small amount of funding, could support development of interdisciplinary teaching opportunities and courses in colleges that apply to multiple programs; invigorate the colleges and help students make new connections with one another; if courses include experiential learning, they will “create enriching experiential learning and research opportunities for students.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Focus</td>
<td>Support most transformative experiential learning and research opportunities to build on strengths, find new ways to be inclusive, and expand learning opportunities outside classroom; special funding for development of experiential learning components of large classes; adjust curriculum and pedagogy to be more inclusive to social responsibility, and environmental stewardship; promote and protect a community that values and supports every person in an atmosphere of civility, honesty, cooperation, professionalism, and fairness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Research & graduate studies**

Proposed Academic Priority Areas build on existing campus strengths, advance priorities critical to the university mission, and represent distinctive research areas in which the campus can (or already does) excel; increase citations, extramural funding, doctoral enrollments; implement formal seed funding program for new interdisciplinary research/creative activity efforts.

**Outcomes**

Several APA-proposed initiatives continue to be developed with some seed funding, but the bulk of the plan has been shelved for the time being.

**Sources/Citations**

Chapter 11

“Great plans are like streetcars”99

UCSC is seen...as one of the most exciting...campuses in the University of California System.... However, to put it bluntly, this campus has a reputation for an unfailing ability to shoot itself in the foot. There is some element of this, of course, in any academic institution, although it does appear to be refined...to a high degree here (UCSC Chancellor Robert Stevens, 1987: 18).

I. Introduction

Geography and topography have long bedeviled UCSC. The Santa Cruz site was chosen as much for its sublime landscape as its coastal location and low cost, yet it could be argued that, over the histoire événementielle, these features turned out to be traps of a particular sort. Not only does the campus continue to be a problematic site to build on due to its geology, it is also widely perceived as a space similar to a state park whose character must not be changed by major alterations or interventions. Its distance from Silicon Valley and the daunting and curvaceous Highway 17 are barriers to flows of the vast wealth from just over the hill. As with many college towns, UCSC is rather like the elephant in the Santa Cruz room, always there, but not always very careful or attentive. Consequently, as the scarcity of financial resources has become ever more pressing over the decades, the University has pursued various major initiatives intended to bring home some of those riches and to expand elsewhere, without great success.

Many of these appear in earlier chapters. Here, I focus on two initiatives intended to attract attention and money to the campus: the Silicon Valley Campus (SVC) and the Strategic Academic Planning (SAP) process of 2017-19.100 Each, in its own way, highlights the interplay among history, space, structure, culture and agency as well as the impact of the various factors described in Chapters 1 and 2. There are numerous other projects that could be included here, but these two seem to offer the greatest insights into UCSC's organizational dilemmas.

To be sure, research, teaching and service, the mandated functions of the University of California, play central roles in both SVC and the SAP. At the same time, however, the two initiatives have been framed as a means of attracting external attention, especially from extramural and private donors and foundations, on the principle that greater visibility generates increased interest and, ideally, financial support and operating revenues. On these counts, SVC, launched in the late 1990s, must be judged

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99 The title alludes to McGeorge Bundy’s famous claim that “Pleikus are like streetcars; if you miss one, another will come along shortly.” He was referring to an attack on Camp Holloway, near Pleiku, in February, 1965 as well as the Gulf of Tonkin incident and other similar events that could be used as pretexts for attacks on an enemy.

100 I had initially planned to include the so-called Graduate Growth plan, as well, but the obstacles to increasing graduate enrollments have been documented throughout this book.
something of a failure. Since the departure of its champion, the SAP has mostly disappeared. But both have relied on faculty commitment and involvement, on the one side, and gaming an unpredictable market and economy, on the other.

Because I have repeatedly addressed the problem of resources and funding in earlier chapters, I will forego here a detailed background of those conditions. Instead, the history and context of the two initiatives will be discussed separately, with conclusions drawn from each and from the two taken together.

II. Go East, Young Campus!

In 1961, there was no “Silicon Valley”—it was still the Santa Clara Valley and San Mateo peninsula, stretching from San Jose north to San Francisco. There were numerous defense corporations and industries, such as Lockheed and Hewlett-Packard (Blank, 2009-10), based in the area, launched with help from government military spending during World War II and the Cold War. But today’s proliferation of hardware manufacturers, dot com and app startups, internet giants, and venture capitalists were, as yet, unimagined and unimaginable. Moreover, the 1960s were a different time, and state support for higher education, strongly driven by suburban growth and Cold War resources, was at its apotheosis. The new social movements were just beginning to emerge. The Red Scare and Loyalty Oath were mostly over, no one dreamed that UC might have political enemies, such as Ronald Reagan. Putting UCSC in Santa Cruz, away from San Jose’s urban hustle and bustle, seemed a small price to pay for Kerr and McHenry’s bucolic experiment.

By the 1980s, however, as Silicon Valley became well established in something like its current form, the distance began to matter. The UCSC administration, seeing industry-university collaborations elsewhere, began to seek ways to attract suitable companies to the Santa Cruz area. A pet project of Chancellor Robert Sinsheimer was a research and development park in the North Campus area. He explained (Sinsheimer, 1996: 97) that UCSC was not “surrounded by a whole variety of science, biotech, electronics and other kinds of industries” that could bring in grants, contracts and rents. To do that, it was necessary to bring in a “critical mass of scientists.” He recalled that

The date was 1982. We’d been through four years of post Prop. 13 with budgets being cut every year and things didn’t look as if they were going to get any better. How could we get some money? What could the campus do? The one asset the campus had was land, that was valuable. Could we use that land for something useful….? Could we make use of the land in such a way as to do something worthwhile, generate income for the campus and also solve the isolation?

A consultant was hired, a feasibility study was conducted, and the results seemed propitious. Developing the site would cost the University, but that would be returned
later, when the park was generating a few million dollars per year (id.: 98). The logic seemed impeccable.

What Sinsheimer did not anticipate was local opposition to the proposal, by politicians who believed that research park employees would not vote for them, to faculty and students concerned that classified defense work might take place at the site, to neighborhood residents who warned that they would sue to stop the project (id.: 98-101). Nor did Sinsheimer seem to understand that land alone would not attract outside capital to Santa Cruz. The final blow came when the new UC President, David Gardner, proved not to be “enthused at all” about the proposal, especially due to its upfront costs (id.: 99). So, the R&D park idea died and with it the dream of new sources of funding.

Perhaps what was needed was a site far away from the campus, out of reach of local opponents and politicians and far from student and faculty protests? During the 1990s, a new R&D park project was proposed and developed at Fort Ord, a former Army base not far from Monterey (a much wealthier community than Santa Cruz) but some 40 miles south of Santa Cruz. Through the efforts of then-Congressman Leon Panetta, the decommissioned base was transferred into civilian hands. UCSC received 1,100 acres of the base, dedicating about 400 acres to creating a natural reserve and the rest to MBEST (Monterey Bay Education, Science and Technology), “a multi-institutional center for science, technology, education, and policy” (MBEST 1996a:1; Pister, 2000: 111-14; MBEST, 1996b: 1-1).

While Fort Ord’s landscape could hardly be described as sublime (it was close to the ocean), it did offer a brownfield site
to develop and promote the collaborative and cooperative interaction between private business, government research agencies, public and private education and research institutions, and policy makers in strategic alliances to address the environmental opportunities and challenges of the next millennium (id.: 2).

In 2001, UCSC opened the MBEST headquarters building, designed to house a number of organizations that had, by then, signed up for space (Stephens, 2001). But MBEST never fulfilled its potential: it was underdeveloped, housing was an issue, capital was absent and demand for space by suitable tenants was weak (Urban Design Associates, 2011; Herrera, 2016). The expected rush of companies from over the hill failed to materialize. In 2010, Chancellor Blumenthal announced UCSC’s intention to maintain ownership of the reserve lands and the 70 acres with installed infrastructure, while seeking “alternative uses for peripheral lands” (Urban Design Associates, 2011: 10). In 2018, almost 50 acres were sold to a real estate developer (Herrera, 2018), while the rest remains for sale at this writing.101

101 According to the MBEST website, “The Central North Campus (70 acres), the West Campus (48 acres) and the 8th Street Parcel (48 acres) of MBEST lands are all within ‘opportunity zones’ created by recent federal tax legislation. Investing in these zones through development allows significant capital gains tax advantages.”
Why did MBEST fail? Chancellor Blumenthal listed the dot-com bubble, the Great Recession and lack of interest from Silicon Valley as reasons. U.S. Representative Sam Farr, however, “pointed to the politics of Santa Cruz and UCSC faculty at the time who ‘could not get excited about land in Marina’ (Herrera, 2016). At any rate, by the end of the 1990s, growing interest in Silicon Valley pushed MBEST off the stage.

III. Return to the Santa Clara Valley

Round One: Silicon Visions

Sometime during the latter half of the 1990s, the UC Office of the President decided that UCSC should be awarded the “franchise” for Silicon Valley, a rapidly growing, increasingly wealthy and UC “underserved” region (a somewhat ironic gesture in light of the rejection of Almaden Valley thirty years earlier as a potential site for UCSC). UCSC already had a significant University Extension operation there, serving tens of thousands of students, providing mostly continuing education courses to employed professionals between the ages of 35 and 60, with one or more degrees, and lots of disposable income (SCVIC, 1999: Appendix 1, p. 1).

UC had ulterior motives in awarding the franchise. In anticipation of the arrival of the children of the Baby Boomers—aka, “Tidal Wave II”—UCOP was seeking places to build centers (or satellite campuses) that could absorb some part of that wave. A new, satellite campus in the Santa Clara Valley might accommodate several thousand UCSC undergraduates and many graduate students (Greenwood & Simpson, 1999), allowing growth without additional pressure on the main campus and the City of Santa Cruz. The 1998 Millennium Committee report (Hershatter, et al., 1998: 7) suggested that “satellite units” in Silicon Valley and Fort Ord could become important in dealing with the wave.

Chancellor Greenwood (1999) responded to the Committee’s “invitations to action” by appointing a “Committee on the Establishment of a Regional Center in the Santa Clara Valley” (SCVIC, 1999) to develop a colonization program. The Committee’s Interim Report—a “Final” version was never released—was expansive, optimistic and comprehensive in outlining possibilities and seemed especially interested in research opportunities and industry partnerships (read “money”). The report recommended (SCVIC, 1999: 1) that UCSC use “video conferencing and other distance education technologies” in Cupertino to provide access to computer engineering classes, and create a “Santa Cruz Academy,” to “provide lower- and upper-division curricula tailored to meet the needs of UC-eligible students from Santa Clara Valley, as well as Masters in Advanced Studies (MAS) targeted at working professionals and teachers.”

The public response to a UCSC outpost was less than enthusiastic. The San Jose Mercury News reported (Woolfolk, 1999) that
More often linked to the Age of Aquarius than the Information Age, the University of California-Santa Cruz hopes to become the UC campus of Silicon Valley by opening an educational center in Santa Clara County. Many in the high-tech industry say that while they have a lot of respect for UC-Santa Cruz, it isn't the first place they think of when looking for new engineers.

Some campus observers felt that the Committee focused too much on potential rather than available resources. The Chair of the Academic Senate, Roger Anderson (1999), expressed concern that the SCVIC report said too little about the academic program for the Center, and that the faculty required more information in order to make a decision about supporting the project. He also pointed out that “There is likely to be initial faculty resistance about teaching at the Center,” that better transportation would be necessary to ferry students and faculty back and forth, and that startup costs would be significant (id: 3). On all three counts, Anderson proved prophetic.102

The UC President’s 2000-2001 Budget for Current Operations (UCOP, 1999) requested $2.5 million to provide startup funds for the Santa Clara Valley Regional Center to provide

- support for core staff and academic administration; academic program development..., physical planning activities including facilities planning and associated environmental impact assessments; the initial increment of operational, business and technical services; outreach; as well as leasing costs, tenant improvements and start-up funds for equipment to adapt classrooms with technology to accommodate distributed learning (id.:51).

UCOP’s request was approved by the UC Regents in October 1999 but not by then-Governor Gray Davis, who reduced the proposed appropriation to $1.1 million. Even that was too much, groused the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), which recommended that the State Legislature deny the request “because UC has neither shown a need for the center nor gone through the established process for new center proposals” (LAO, 1999).

The LAO raised four questions, none addressed in the request:

(1) Was there a need in the Bay Area for more undergraduate and graduate education?
(2) If so, which institution is best positioned to meet the need and accommodate the students?
(3) Is there a need in the region for internships and research placements, and which institution is most appropriate to meet it? and

102 Personal anecdote: I recall a meeting in 1999 or 2000 with SVCIC co-chair and Vice Chancellor Francisco Hernandez to discuss the proposed center, at which he waxed enthusiastic about UCSC faculty offering onsite classes to the deprived citizens of the Valley, offering feminist scholar Bettina Aptheker as his example. When I suggested she might not be as enthusiastic about the assignment as he was, my concerns were waved away.
(4) What does regional industry need in future employees, and which institution is most appropriate?

The LAO’s questions highlighted (but did not mention) that UC Berkeley, Stanford, Santa Clara University, San Jose State University and a number of smaller institutions were all nearby and were potential competitors to the proposed center. While $1.1 million was approved it was insufficient to accomplish very much.

Still, the campus continued with planning. Former EVC Professor Michael Tanner was tapped by Greenwood to be interim director of what was now being called the “Silicon Valley Center” (SVC). In January 2000, he released a draft “Vision Statement” (Tanner, 2000) proposing the NASA Ames Research Center in Mountain View as a “unique and valuable location [that] will bring UC faculty, researchers, and students close to the leaders of this globally renowned region, expanding opportunities for research contact and permitting new educational collaborations” (id.: 1; see below).

Tanner’s “Vision” offered few ideas regarding education because its primary focus was research. He acknowledged the transportation difficulties facing a regular commuter to Ames but suggested that carpooling and buses with computer access could mitigate some of the stress and strain of daily travel (id.: 6-7). At the same time, he envisioned a relatively autonomous operation:

The first and foremost remedy [to commuting] is to design the SVC to be substantially self-contained, so that physical movement between the main campus and the SVC is not actually necessary for large numbers of people.... [This will motivate] the hiring of faculty who see the Silicon Valley Center as their principal research and instructional location (id.: 6).

Faculty expressed concern about the lack of academic offerings proposed for the SVC and so, in March 2000, EVC Simpson appointed another committee, the “Santa Clara Valley Regional Center Academic Planning Task Force” (SCVRCAP, 2000; the new name had not yet fully taken hold), which recommended “a framework that places highest priority on the establishment and maintenance of programs that enhance the academic programs of UCSC by capitalizing on the Silicon Valley location.”

The Task Force considered two academic models: a full-service satellite campus offering four-year and graduate programs, which it largely rejected, and a center focused on “transfer-oriented lower-division, upper division and graduate education,” which it favored (SCVRCAP, 2000). The Task Force also proposed that curriculum at the SVRC be designed to “better serve that [local minority] population with targeted courses that could attract students in this population to majors at UCSC” (id.).

Finally, reflecting Academic Senate concerns about money (CPB, 2000b), the Task Force made clear that the Center could not be funded with resources from the budget.

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103 “UCSC is moving into Silicon Valley to serve the historically underrepresented, economically disenfranchised and underprivileged, as well as working adults” (CPB, 2000b).
of the home campus and would require dedicated capital and operations budgets (id.).

Over the following year, however, it became clear that this budgetary circle could not be squared. While the Administration was confident that the required resources would be forthcoming,\(^{104}\) the Senate expressed growing concern that the SVC might have to be funded through student enrollments (state funding was, at the time, enrollment driven). In its 1999-2000 Annual Report, the Committee on Planning and Budget (2000c) expressed concern that “the rigid budgetary firewall originally offered by the Chancellor is now deemed impractical, as the SCVRC is envisioned not as a separate facility or satellite campus but an integral part of the UCSC overall program.”

Relying on student enrollments at the SVC was fraught with problems, because of the state’s funding formula for each additional student, which was less than “the average appropriation for each student already in the system.” Moreover, if the SVC’s students were the sole source of funding for the Center, “the average expenditure per student would therefore be significantly less than on the main campus,” which would provide less support for academic programs at the SVC (CPB, 2000c: 1). To avoid this outcome, the campus might have to provide as much as $4 million annually to SVC for academic programs (id.: 3). Needless to say, this did not sit well with the Senate.

At the same time, the effort to develop an academic plan for SVC was in trouble, while tracking whether home campus funds were being diverted to the SVC was unclear because the Administration was neither consulting with the Senate or providing reliable budget data (CPB, 2000c: 2-3). Inasmuch as the research and service components of the SVC were less controversial and would (presumably) generate their own resources, planning for those functions was proceeding apace. This led the Committee on Planning and Budget to observe that “The academic component is no longer driving the SVRC” (CPB, 2000c: 4).

In January, 2001, CPB reiterated (CPB, 2001a) much the same concerns as before, now made worse by the prospect that over-enrollments at the main campus might have to be absorbed by the Center, requiring as many as 100 faculty and 200-600 staff (Academic Senate, 2001a: 3). The Senate warned that it could “no longer support, by inaction, the continuing absence of academic and fiscal plans for the SVC. The time has come for the Senate...to set deadlines for the actions we expect of our administration at this critical moment in the development of UCSC” (CPB, 2001a: 3). To this end, CPB demanded consultation with the Administration as well as the fiscal data that would allow it to proceed with academic planning (id.). Such consultation did not happen.

\(^{104}\) Chancellor Greenwood reported in 2001 that UCOP “had agreed to hold an additional $20 million in reserve for this project [SVC] until UCSC is ready to move forward” (Academic Senate, 2001: 3). These, however, were capital funds and would not be provided without an approved academic plan (CPB, 2000c: 4). This funding promise was not supported by the Legislature and Governor.
Ultimately, the academic planning for the SVC became caught up with and sidelined by the 10-year planning process launched by EVC Simpson in 2000 (SVC, 2001), leading CPB (2001b: 1) to comment that

Our review of the March 15 [Divisional planning] submissions...suggests that there are several plausible research and graduate proposals that could make good use of the NASA/AMES site, but that few academic units have any significant plans to mount undergraduate instruction at the SVC.

At that point, and given pressing budget concerns, virtually all planning for an undergraduate program at SVC stopped (CPB, 2001c: 10-11), leaving provision of graduate programs, research and public outreach as the Center’s mission.

Round Two: NASA Ames & UARC

The previous year, in July 2000, Chancellor Greenwood identified the NASA Ames Research Park as the site for the proposed SVC (Irwin, 2000). A few months later, this became official with the announcement of “a historic UC/NASA partnership to create a world-class educational R&D campus focusing on innovation and scientific discovery at the proposed NASA Research Park in the heart of Silicon Valley” (Mewhinney & Irwin, 2000). In the press release accompanying the announcement, Greenwood enthused that, with the NASA-UCSC collaboration along with San Jose State University (SJSU) and the Foothill-DeAnza Community College district, the University would “provide education programs that will work to bridge the digital divide and address Silicon Valley’s workforce needs” (id.) What, exactly, these programs might entail was not made public.

In 2003, the collaboration gained greater credence when UCSC was awarded a 10-year NASA contract, worth $330 million, to create and manage a “University Affiliated Research Center” at NASA-Ames (UARC, 2004b; Greenwood & Hubbard, 2003). UARC would focus on research into “information technology, biotechnology, nanotechnology, computer science, aerospace operations, astrobiology and fundamental biology” (UAR, 2004a). Early press releases mention education, along with “issues of social justice, education, labor, and economics, among other topics” to be established at UARC (Irwin, 2000). By 2004, these had disappeared, replaced by a “Systems Teaching Institute” sponsored by UCSC and SJSU, and designed to provide professionally educated scientists and engineers with on-the-job experience akin to what a medical doctor receives in medical school.... Students will learn through direct experience on research projects where they examine realistic problems and data... [and] create accomplished new researchers by bringing together curriculum and practice (UARC, 2004b).

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105 The contract, which provided UCSC with between $4 and 10 million per year in “core funding,” was not renewed in 2013.
For a time, students signed up for STI, but it seems to have largely disappeared after 2016 (my efforts to determine whether STI still exists have proved unsuccessful).

In 2008, UCSC and NASA announced a plan for “the creation of a new, unique community of educational institutions and industrial partners in collaboration with NASA Ames in the heart of Silicon Valley.” This would be a “public-private partnership” (PPP), with Santa Clara University, the Foothill-De Anza College District and Carnegie Melon University, to establish a “sustainable Meta-university” to collaborate on research with NASA and industry (Blumenthal, 2008). That plan, too, died a quiet death.

**Figure 11.1: UARC, as imagined in 2007**

![UARC Image]


**Figure 11.2: The NASA Ames PPP, as imagined in 2008.**

![NASA Ames PPP Image]

Source: Blumenthal, 2008.
Some UCSC faculty and scientists set up research projects at NASA Ames, and space was provided for classes and conferences, but the project never really took off as planned. Mountain View was still far from the main campus (40 miles), traffic congestion was growing as the Valley boomed, especially after the Great Recession in 2008 and, with the exception of STI—focused on experiential learning—the educational mission of the SVC remained undeveloped and non-existent. In 2014, the UARC management contract was put up for renewal and won by a consortium that did not include UCSC. This put an end to a Center at NASA Ames and the SVC was forced to retreat to the building leased by UCSC University Extension (itself suffering from serious financial problems; CPB, 2004; SVC, 2018).106

Meanwhile, back at the home campus, the effort to identify potential academic programs for the SVC continued. In 2005, an “Educational Opportunity and Workforce Development Study,” proposing creation of a School of Management at the SVC, was prepared by Economics Professor Nirvikar Singh (Singh, et al., 2005) and submitted to the Chancellor. The authors reported that interviews with Silicon Valley executives “suggested that typical MBA graduates are not able to combine their analytical toolkit and case study experience to engage very readily in creative problem-solving, decision-making in new situations, or innovative thinking (Singh, et al., 2005: 32). The group therefore proposed

a targeted program that would provide training in the management of innovation processes toward successful commercialization (including an integrated approach to research, product development, manufacture and marketing across national and international boundaries), and a broader management program, which would subsume the above skills and ideas in a broader theme of “global high tech management” (Singh, et al., 2005: 54).

The study elicited a profound silence from the campus Administration, although it subsequently became the basis for a professional school pre-proposal in 2008 (see below).

In mid-2005, in response to recommendations in the reaccreditation report submitted earlier that year (WASC, 2005), and at the request of EVC David Kliger, the Academic Senate (2005a) asked faculty and departments for professional school pre-proposals that might be based either on the home campus or at the SVC. These were to be vetted by both the Administration and the Academic Senate. Groups submitting

106 In 2016, UCSC paid the Irvine Company $46.5 million for a Silicon Valley Building constructed in the mid-1970s (Estrada, 2016). At 40-year bond interest rate of 4% (UC Regents, 2018: 2), the total outlay over 40 years will be around $225 million or about $5.6 million per year. Repayment of the loan only requires enrollment of about 180 Masters’ students paying tuition plus the professional degree supplement. Presumably, UCSC Extension is paying rent for its space but, according to financial data from 2013-14, SVC receives an annual subsidy of more than $2 million from core operating funds (UCSC Budget Handbook, 2014: 19).
acceptable pre-proposals would be provided with “course relief, discretionary funding; or a combination” and expected to submit a final proposal by August 2006 (Academic Senate, 2005a: 3) for further consideration by the Administration and Senate. The vetting process would be a lengthy one, because degree and program proposals not only must make it through the gauntlet of campus review, they are also subject to review and approval by the Systemwide Academic Senate, comparable programs on other UC campuses, and the UC Office of the President. Seeking to make the best of a bad financial situation, however, the Senate warned that

The present dire budget situation precludes the immediate development of any professional school. Budget troubles also make this the ideal time to plan for future professional schools and other programs targeted at increasing our graduate presence. After all, good ideas take time to be developed conceptually and more time to be implemented (Academic Senate, 2005a:1).

In 2008, during another round of proposal preparation, CPB noted that

In the last five years of focus on graduate growth, we have seen the number of new graduate programs increase, but neither the total number of graduate students nor the rate at which graduate programs have been brought online has kept pace with increases in undergraduate numbers. Professional schools provide access to another, different pool of students, in addition to those who enroll in academic programs (CPB, 2008: 2).

The reasons for developing professional schools were explained as

- A means of increasing graduate growth outside traditional academic M.A./M.S. and PH.D. programs.
- A means of linking undergraduate and graduate programs (in targeted areas such as Public Health and Business Economics).
- A means of building on and enhancing areas of campus strength.
- A means of meeting state needs for well-trained professionals in a variety of areas currently not covered by UCSC.
- A means of developing community ties around the region (including Monterey Bay area institutions and Silicon Valley).
- A means of responding to the Systemwide priority of strengthening graduate education at UC (CPB, 2008: 2)

Professional school options (CPB, 2007) included:

- Architecture and Design, Education, Environmental Science and Policy, Library and Information Technology, Nursing, and Public Health (suggested by faculty groups and deans)
- Climate Change (pre-professional school program)
- Coastal and Marine Policy, Public Media, and Public Policy (pre-proposals funded through Senate process)
School of Management (most fully funded and developed)

In the event, four pre-proposals were ultimately submitted: Management, Education, Environment and Public Health. CPB (2008b, 2008c) decided that, with the exception of the proposed School of the Environment, three of the four pre-proposals could proceed, with the School of Management proposal (Singh, 2008; a revision of the 2005 proposal) most fully developed due to the resources it had already received, but all needed “more work before they can move forward to the full proposal stage” (CPB 2008c: 1). Of the four, only the School of Management (SOM) pre-proposal (Singh, 2008) was framed explicitly for the SVC. The Education proposal mentioned the SVC, the other two not at all.

Senate Committee reviews of the four pre-proposals were mixed (CPB, 2008b, 2008c), writing that

the fundamental test for any professional school, given a sound intellectual and pedagogical conception, [is] whether the proposed school’s structure will accomplish the school’s research and training goals (or whether an alternative, such as a graduate group, would serve as well or better), and whether there is an identifiable milestone when school status becomes critical. We looked for timelines with conditional plans for growth based on observable metrics and decision points (CPB, 2008c: 1).

A primary—if not the primary—question was how these Schools would be funded? None of the pre-proposals fully addressed the resource question, with Senate Committees warning that “any professional school must demonstrate ‘financial sustainability within an appropriate time-frame’ in order not to divert resources from departments and divisions” (CPB, 2008b: 2). Only the School of Management proposal included any estimates of the startup and operating costs of such a venture (Singh, 2008: 26-33). The others were less clear on costs or said nothing at all about them.

On this basis, the School of the Environment proposal was rejected outright, in part because it was regarded as simply an expansion of the Environmental Studies Department, in part, because it made a poor case intellectually and in terms of demand; the other three were provisionally approved to proceed if certain questions and concerns were addressed in revised versions (CPB, 2008c). Ultimately, only the Management School made it to the next milestone (Academic Senate, 2009).

But then, everything stopped. CPB told (CPB, 2009) the Chancellor that “We have concluded that the process has reached an impasse…. We have never been satisfied by either the intellectual conception or financial planning for SOM. Further consultation of this informal kind is unlikely to be productive…. ” CPB was especially concerned about the “increasing resources devoted to SOM planning with apparently

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107 These can be found at https://senate.ucsc.edu/archives/Past%20Issues/professional-schools/index.html).
diminishing or incommensurate returns... [and] without showing any measurable progress? CPB pointed out that fundraising for the SOM had been going on for some time with no concrete results (CPB, 2009). SOM died. In the end, the Great Recession and lack of adequate resources seems to have put an end to the entire effort.

Round Three, Playing Games

The Administration did not, however, give up on the SVC. It released a new “Strategic Academic Plan for Silicon Valley” in 2012 and a revised version in 2013 (UC Santa Cruz, 2013). By this point, the planning focus had shifted almost entirely to research (notwithstanding the term “academic” in the title). According to the plan, because UCSC was the campus closest to Silicon Valley, it had “the responsibility and the mandate to develop instructional and research programs for what is arguably the world’s leading center of innovation...”(id.: 1). Private industry was increasingly reliant on academia for “research and instruction”; engineering schools were responsible for “bringing technology problems into academia” (id.).

Thus, the Baskin School of Engineering (BSOE) would now be central to courses and degrees at the SVC, on the premise that tech corporations were more interested in engineers than humanists or social scientists (which not wholly true). Rebenching funds could be “leveraged to grow BSOE programs on the main campus, while a combination of funding sources will be used to grow the SV programs... [and] allow the launch of a wide variety of professional master’s programs whose graduates would be readily employable by local companies” (id.:1). These programs would operate with support from SVC research institutes that “will grow to become thriving research and teaching hubs, supporting a diverse community of students, faculty and industry collaborators” (id.: 5).

The key point here is that the SVC would not be home to full-service upper division or graduate programs. Instead, groups and departments were asked to propose “professional master’s degree programs” aimed at mid-career individuals seeking to enhance their skills and credentials, and willing to pay more than full fare for the opportunity.108 The impact on resources would be neutral in the longer term, because “professional master’s degree programs are often supported by supplemental tuition paid by the student, which offsets all or part of the cost of running the program.”

Full rollout could be accomplished, according to the Plan, in four years, with further expansion to follow (id.: 3-5). This would provide valuable data since “over the four-year rollout, we will track costs and revenues, learn from successes and failures, gauge demand for other programs, and ensure that the necessary infrastructure is in place before additional programs are launched” (id.: 5).

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108 With various fees included, a California resident pays $45,000 per year and a non-resident, $57,000, for a year in an SVC professional Masters’ program (BSOE, 2018: 3). Undergraduate tuition at UC campuses is around $15,000 for a California resident.
While it was too soon, according to the plan, to determine the precise menu of programs to be offered at SVC, the primary objective of the Center would be to tap into the wealth of Silicon Valley: “The growth of associated research agendas will be critical for deeper connections to the resources in Silicon Valley. This plan is centered on programs that match the research opportunities provided by strategic partnering with companies on emerging technologies” (id.: 8).

But was there a demand for such professional degrees? On this, the plan offered thin evidence—market research was not conducted until a few years later, while potential competition for this tech niche from other nearby universities—Stanford, Santa Clara, San Jose State, Carnegie-Mellon and, of course, UC Berkeley—was not mentioned. The plan also ignored what every startup entrepreneur fears most: “The Valley of Death,” that period when negative cash flow is experienced by new enterprises and revenues are insufficient to cover operating costs (very few startups survive this period). By starting “small,” the SVC planners seemed to assume, and linking the new degree programs to BSOE, startup costs would be an integral part of the normal campus budget and relatively insignificant. This can be seen only as handwaving. There were no hard cost estimates in the plan.

Academic Senate committees took a dim view of the revised plan (Academic Senate, 2013). The Senate Chair wrote that “Unfortunately, with this document the Senate is no closer to understanding the campus’ true vision [for SVC] than it was 18 months ago [with the 2012 draft]” (id.: 1). Moreover, “there is a strong feeling that the process of asking faculty buy-in to an ‘academic plan’ is misconceived absent a vision statement of how Silicon Valley operations will help our main campus and absent a business plan that allows us to assess the benefits and opportunity costs” (id.).

The Committee on Teaching “expressed concern at the extent to which the plan appears to put UCSC in a position of financing Silicon Valley private industries' research through academic programs and research at the new campus” (id.: 11). The Committee on Educational Policy thought the SVC should not just serve business interests but pursue the academic mission of the university. [W]hich types of academic and professional training are most likely to cultivate long-term success for our students [?].... When we form advantageous partnerships with SV industry leaders, are we keeping our educational mission at the fore? (id.: 7-8).

Finally, the Graduate Council asked who had authored the document, wondering “if the SVAP was primarily a collaboration between the VPAA’s (Vice Provost for Academic Affairs) office and that of the Engineering Dean, or whether it was developed with a broader participation by campus administrators” (id.: 13). Ultimately, the decision to proceed with the SVAP was the Administration’s, although faculty and Senate would have to review and approve any academic programs and curricula established there.
Quick action was needed because competitors were lurking. At an Academic Senate meeting in November 2014, Chancellor Blumenthal warned darkly that “a number of other UC campuses are expressing growing interest in that area, and if we don’t move quickly, this could jeopardize UCSC’s stance as the UC most closely associated with Silicon Valley” (Academic Senate, 2014: 2). To hold off such challenges, he announced that “14 FTEs will be set aside for UCSC’s Silicon Valley initiative” (id.). A storm of outrage broke out among faculty concerned about the impacts that the allocation might have on the main campus and doubtful that there was a demand for professional degree programs in Silicon Valley (Academic Senate, 2015a: xii-xiii). After all, there was little point funding FTEs at the SVC if there were no students for them to teach.

To address such concerns, EVC Galloway responded that “the administration is currently working on is assessing what support would be necessary for programs in Silicon Valley, and what the budgets for those support systems would look like” (id.: xiii). When asked whether any kind of market demand analysis had been done, the Administration argued that such a study could not be conducted until degree program pre-proposals were reviewed and approved (Academic Senate, 2015b: 9). Would the SVC be able to cover its costs or would it require subventions from the main campus? No response. Neither the cart nor the horse seemed to be there, as it was explained that

Return to investment is not something that is always looked at when discussing new programs because there cannot be certainty where these projections are made. Instead, a program’s benefits are analyzed based on aspects such as academic and intellectual benefits for students, and whether or not a certain program would align with UCSC’s academic mission. However, the Silicon Valley initiative will bring money back to the campus through financial aid packets that the campus will then be able to use to support doctoral students (id.).

To clarify, there was no way to determine whether the “Silicon Valley Initiative” would attract students or how much it would cost to operate until the actual degree programs had been selected revised, reviewed and approved. At that point, a market analysis for each degree program would become possible. By that time, however, the commitment to the approved degree programs would be so great that it would be difficult to cancel them (in the case of the proposed School of Management, there was no department to defend it).

To put pressure on the Administration to produce budget data, in Spring 2015, several faculty members (including the author) introduced a Senate resolution calling on the Administration to provide an SVC business plan that would show that the Center would be self-sufficient or revenue generating, detail startup costs and, if necessary, “documents the resources needed, the resultant opportunity costs, and benefits to campus academic programs.” Until such a plan was produced, the Administration was asked “not to commit permanent resources such as faculty FTE to Silicon Valley until Senate consultation in the manner outlined above has occurred” (id.: 10).
The resolution passed by a voice vote but the requested consultation never took place (as was the Administration’s prerogative). When a market analysis was finally conducted, it was deemed proprietary and not released to the faculty out of concern that UCSC’s competitors might steal ideas from it.

At almost the same time as the resolution was passed, the Administration explained “Why UC Santa Cruz Should be in Silicon Valley” (UCSC Administration, 2015) in a PR puff piece that closely tracked the 2013 SVAP. It pointed to the Games and Playable Media degree program already operating at the SVC as an example of future degree programs. According to the document, “a UC Santa Cruz Silicon Valley presence provides a number of academic opportunities”, including: (1) a rich venue for research collaborations and questions of academic interest; (2) a market for workforce and professional training; (3) opportunities to place UCSC students in internships with corporate and public sector partners; and the “opportunity to truly be the lead UC campus for that region...[and to provide] more visibility for Santa Cruz’s distinctiveness and direct access to philanthropic potential of the region.” In addition,

There are significant benefits to UC Santa Cruz from implementing masters’ programs in Silicon Valley. They include the overall support for graduate growth, expansion of our research impact, and access to a “power base” for policy, sponsorships, and fund-raising” (UC Administration, 2015: 4).

These and other arguments were asserted, however, without much in the way of supporting evidence (or experience, for that matter).

And what would the 14 FTE allocated to SVC actually teach? In late Fall 2014, a call for professional master’s degrees pre-proposals went out, with the stipulation that a “substantial portion” of new centrally-held FTE for the coming three years would be dedicated to the SVC, “contingent on timely, committed development of viable program [pre]proposals with specific benchmarks and accountability measures” (Galloway, 2014). These would be evaluated on three criteria (SEC, 2015):

1. Research should be important and raise UCSC’s visibility, should leverage campus strengths, have a “natural and demonstrable connection to Silicon Valley” and be financially sustainable;

2. Teaching should “included development of graduate professional degree programs” that are “distinctive” or provide a “demonstrable competitive edge” over other program, demonstrate strong student demand—at least 30 student per cohort—and have no negative impact on the main campus; and

3. Demonstrate financial viability through supplemental tuition, self-support, not utilize financial resources of the main campus, generate industry and government support, and “build a critical mass” of students and faculty, “with incremental
increases in program funding being contingent on achieving specific benchmarks and enrollment targets in a timely way” (SEC, 2015).

Ultimately eight Master’s degrees pre-proposals, heavily weighted toward engineering, were submitted for consideration: “Electrical Engineering (Nanotechnology); Computer Engineering (Aeronautics); Data Science; Computational Media (Serious Games); Computational Media (Human-Computer Interface); Computational Media (Human Language Media and Models; Technology Management; and Global Technology and Social Innovation” (id: 7-8). At this point, the programs were described only in very general terms such that it was too soon to be able to even estimate revenues and costs.

In June, CPB announced its pre-proposal evaluations, recommending that Computational Media and Data Science be allowed to proceed, while Nanotechnology be revised for future consideration. The other pre-proposals either needed extensive additional work or were deemed too small or impractical to be successful.

As noted earlier, it is difficult to find current information about the state of Silicon Valley degree programs, but the SVC’s web site reports that in addition to the Games and Playable Media Master’s, an MS in Electrical Engineering is also available, while “Other new M.S. programs, including Serious Games and Human Computer Interaction (HCI), are expected to come online in 2017 and 2018, respectively” (SVC, 2016; note that the web site has not been updated in three years). In academic year 2018-19, 26 students were enrolled in Games and Playable Media (personal communication). The SVC needs at least 200 Master’s students in order to become financially self-sustaining.

**Knockout?**

During the more than 20 years of effort by UCSC to colonize Silicon Valley, the vision has gone from a satellite campus with several thousand students and both undergraduate and graduate degree programs, to a site for professional graduate schools, to a venue for a few Master’s degree programs linked to departments on the home campus and targeted to those who want to get into the Valley’s industry or to enhance their skills and obtain an additional credential. How this story is to be judged, I leave to the reader, but here are a few observations.

First, it is quite expensive and time consuming to establish a “satellite” campus, especially one whose access requires a considerable commitment of time and energy and which must offer all the student services available on a home campus. Many universities have satellite campuses, but most appear to be largely self-contained units, offering a full program of majors and degrees and often generating enough revenue to be self-supporting. Students may be allowed to move among such campuses, but faculty are, for the most part, not mobile. Many such satellites do not offer full-bore research programs and subsist largely on student tuition.
Second, the resources available to UCSC to establish the SVC have never been sufficient to help it cross the “Valley of Death” without having a serious impact on the finances of the home campus. The $20 million supposedly allocated by UCOP in the early days of the SVC—which was for capital projects and not operations—would have helped but disappeared in the 2000s. Subsequent school, project and degree proposals required big donors to provide startup capital, which, despite strenuous efforts on the part of those involved, has never been acquired.

Third, administration infighting and turnover, and widespread faculty skepticism on the home campus, meant little or no continuity from one “round” to the next, limited and declining interest in and support for each new grand initiative, and repeated reinvention of wheels already on dusty shelves somewhere.

Finally, there was probably no way that any broadly-accepted academic plan for the SVC could have been (or could be) formulated, negotiated and implemented, given that participation in the effort was limited largely to those departments and groups whose research interests were linked to what was going on in Silicon Valley. Those with no potential role in SVC were interested only insofar as they might have to give up resources to support it. Even if these were not in the majority, opponents and skeptics have effective veto power where academic programs were concerned.

The upshot of all of this is that the full potential of the SVC has never been and may not ever be realized. The critical questions are: how much time and energy should the campus devote in the future to any one of the three or more visions of the SVC that have been proposed over the past two decades? Do grand initiatives actually cost more than they will ever return? Is time better spent on sustaining the main campus? These questions ought to be asked before anything new is proposed; it could save a lot of time, energy and tears.

IV. Strategic Academic Planning: It’s Déjà vu all over again

Over its lifetime, as we saw in Chapter 10, UCSC has engaged in and produced many “strategic academic plans.” Some addressed everyday operations but most offered visions of what the campus could and should be, if only it asserted a stronger will. For one reason or another, most of the visions did not materialize, although some proposals remained on the agenda for a long time. In Chapter 3, I pointed out that, in some corporate management circles, strategic planning is regarded as passé, primarily the external (business) environment is unpredictable and changes so rapidly. I also suggested that UCSC’s plans, often as not, have either been disrupted by the business cycle and its accompanying budget crises or dropped when their champions left the building.

Beginning in Fall 2017, the campus found itself engaged in yet another strategic academic planning (SAP) exercise. Inasmuch as the immediately previous strategic academic plan, “Envision” (Galloway, 2016) was published only a year earlier, it might seem a bit soon to embark on yet another. But a new Executive Vice Chancellor
arrived on campus in 2017 and made the SAP her signature project. My presentation here is more descriptive than analytical, inasmuch as the current SAP is still in progress, and not expected to bear much fruit for some years, I can only, at best, discuss the process as it proceeded and encountered many of the same obstacles and contradictions that faced earlier planning exercises

Prologue

In early 2017, Dr. Marlene Tromp was appointed the new Executive Vice Chancellor of UCSC (replacing Anthropology Professor Allison Galloway). Tromp came from Arizona State University West Campus, a satellite of the main campus in Tempe, Arizona. There, she was Professor of English and Gender and Women’s Studies, Dean of the New College of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences and Vice-Provost of the campus (Hernandez-Jason, 2017).

On its website, the ASU West Campus is described itself as “blending liberal arts education with 21st century workforce preparation” (ASU, 2019a). The New College includes four “schools” which, in Fall 2018, enrolled 2,143 undergraduates, 145 Master’s students and two PhD students (ASU, 2019b). Upon becoming Dean of the New College in 2013, Tromp said (ASU, 2013)

We bring together the best of both a small-college experience, with its close personal relationships, and a top-tier research university, with its cutting-edge research faculty.... Most small colleges simply don’t have the exceptional faculty records that we have at New College. And our faculty members offer something really exciting for students because they work across old disciplinary boundaries to produce the innovative research on which others just report.

Indeed, ASUW’s New College and Tromp’s rhetoric sound very much like the original vision of Kerr and McHenry.

One of Tromp’s first initiatives upon arriving at UCSC in mid-2017 was the launch of a “strategic academic planning process” (Tromp, 2017). This was intended to “create a plan that”:

• Sets clear, achievable academic priorities for the campus
• Builds on and enhances pre-existing campus strengths
• Develops a road map for heightening our national and international impact
• Imagines how UC Santa Cruz can shape the national and international conversation not only in our fields of study, but on higher education as a whole
• Outlines new means of generating resources
• Identifies internal structural barriers to change
• Results in a clear and actionable implementation plan to guide the campus’s academic development over the next five years (CPEVC, 2018).
According to Tromp (2017), her plan would differ from “Envision” (2014-2016) which was “a strategic campus plan, not an academic one” \(^{109}\) and

We now need to identify, and then highlight and energize, academic areas that will strengthen the university as a whole, allowing us to build stronger programs for students, create new research opportunities for faculty, and strengthen our global impact.

To guide and manage the planning process, Tromp hired a consulting firm, “Entangled Solutions” (ES). \(^{110}\) According to its web site, ES is an “action-oriented strategy consultancy for the educational ecosystem” (Entangled Solutions, 2018a). ES is cagey about naming its clients, either on-line or in person, and keeps its work proprietary. As a result, it is difficult to evaluate the claims of success that is makes on the website (and, of course, nothing is said about failures). \(^{111}\) What is clear is that ES bases its operations on various \textit{au courant} management strategies and practices and is not shy about piling on the jargon to make its case.

Why did Tromp’s launch the SAP so soon after arriving at UCSC (in fact, before she even arrived on campus)? Here I can only speculate. Like many new, high-level executives, Tromp probably wanted to make her mark on the campus and, in response to the low faculty and staff morale revealed by Envision, perhaps anticipated that a new mission and vision would generate the interest, energy, commitment and involvement of faculty, staff and students to complete. It would seem, however, that Tromp launched the SAP without much awareness of or sensitivity to campus culture or review and assessment of earlier planning efforts. This was probably a mistake on her part, as well as Entangled Solutions, because the entire exercise was continually being altered.

\(^{109}\) The difference between a “strategic campus plan” and an “academic one” was not explained.

\(^{110}\) According to Paul Freedman, the founder of the “Entangled Group,” the company that owns Entangled Solutions, the name is “an homage to the physics research that his late father and a colleague undertook that proved Albert Einstein wrong about the theory of quantum entanglement” (Wan 2019). My joke was that ES is a hair salon for people with dreadlocks.

\(^{111}\) According to another article about the “Group,” “Paul Freedman’s last big venture in higher education did not end well…. In the summer of 2013, Mr. Freedman, along with Tiffin, Altius, and four other people associated with Ivy Bridge, was notified by the U.S. Department of Justice that he was being investigated under the False Claims Act for matters related to Ivy Bridge’s recruiting and handling of millions in federal student-aid funds. Since then, there has been no public indication about whether the investigation is active or closed…. But apparently he rebounds fast…. Less than two years after being ordered by an accreditor to shutter the 2,500-student Ivy Bridge College at Tiffin University and then selling most of what was left of his Altius Education to another company [he started the new business…. ” (Blumenstyk, 2015).
Entangled Solutions’ three-phase workplan was opaque (Figure 11.3). The first phase was a “Campus Landscape Analysis” designed to document our current state and begin to think about our challenges and opportunities. During this phase, we will conduct an analysis of campus priorities, goals, and motivations to inform the direction and development of the academic strategic plan (CPEVC, 2018b).

The Landscape analysis collected information through individual interviews with “campus leaders,” an on-line faculty survey, “feedback” on funding and “structural barriers to research and teaching,” and meetings with student leaders (id.). It should be noted that interviews were limited to campus and student “leaders,” with no direct contact with line faculty, staff or students at large.

The second phase was a set of “Future State Design Workshops,” (Entangled Solutions, 2018c) to identify “the academic themes that make us unique and on which we should build.” These meetings would also assess required “resources, institutional structures, organizational capacities needed to successfully develop these academic themes... and prioritize a list of assumptions... that must be true in order to achieve the desired future state” (CPEVC, 2018c).

Future State Design included an “environmental scan of our current academic profile,” engagement with a “range of campus stakeholders,” group collaborations “to refine the most promising and plausible ideas for academic development,” followed by a “Future Brief” that “outlines a series of academic priority areas that the campus community wishes to see developed” (id.).

Phase three was an “Opportunity Analysis,” which looked at “peer institutions so that we can have a clearer sense of our opportunities and external models for success and
examine and validate opportunities and assumptions surfaced in the Future State workshop” (CPEVC, 2018c). This phase included (1) Higher Education Trend Analysis; (2) Opportunity Analysis of Peer/Aspirational Institutions; (3) Synthesis of Findings to Date; and (4) Campus Presentations of Opportunity Profile (id.). However, no documents, slide decks or presentations were forthcoming from this phase, so it was difficult to determine what it involved.

The fourth and final phase was the preparation of a “Strategic Plan & Implementation Playbook” (Entangled Solutions, 2018d), offering “a clear and actionable academic plan with measurable implementation markers [and]...ensure that the plan developed over the course of the year will lead to real change” (CPEVC, 2018d). This phase was meant to

- Develop a clear understanding of what would be needed (regarding resources, structural changes, partnerships, etc.) to build the academic priority areas identified [through faculty group proposals and vetting];
- Action-oriented Strategic Academic Plan Development
- Implementation Playbook (with clear milestones) produced (id.).

What happened? This ES scheme ran into problems almost immediately, for a number of reasons. First, EVC Tromp wanted a completed plan in hand for the 2018-19 academic year, which meant that the plan’s schedule was very compressed. Second, the few, early consultations with faculty, staff and students took place in an atmosphere of opacity and skepticism, before any substantive documents had been published. Moreover, such meetings as took place consisted of slide presentations by ES staff about the goals and elements of the process rather than substantive discussions with faculty, staff or students. Third, from my participation in a number of these meetings, there was a considerable degree of cynicism among faculty about their outcomes, with few in attendance (staff was somewhat better represented). After all, why should this SAP turn out any differently from earlier ones, which had required a considerable time commitment and vanished without much effect?

There was also considerable confusion about what, exactly, ES was seeking to accomplish. What was a “landscape analysis?” Why not call it an assessment of the present state of affairs on campus? What was a “future state design?” Why not call it proposed initiatives? ES engaged in “sentiment analysis”—that is, what did faculty, staff and students think about the campus, its values and its strengths and weaknesses? And what would an “implementation playbook” consist of (and why “playbook,” for God’s sake?

The ES people interviewed 100 people (only 26 of whom were students), received 150 faculty survey responses, and conducted meetings with 215 attendees (Entangled Solutions, 2018b, slide 47). Unsurprisingly, the results (Figure 11.4) were framed in very positive and upbeat terms, but a closer reading of accompanying text indicates that, while those interviewed and surveyed expressed passion for the campus and viewed it as having great potential, they also mistrusted the process and
administration and described a campus culture resistant to change (id.: 26). ES found “broad support” for the potential of the SAP to trigger action but concern about how it was being developed. One survey respondent wrote

The administration has been consistently unresponsive to faculty interests. We are given one short meeting to weigh in on pre-prepared questions about the Academic Plan with two days’ notice. That is not enough and is symptomatic of this attitude on the part of the administration (id.: slide 68; see also slides 76-83).

Such complaints pushed ES to widen its remit, with mixed results, as seen in the process of “identifying obstacles” and soliciting group research proposals at the beginning of 2018.

To initiate this next part of the process, any and all interested parties were asked to submit a list of “obstacles”—subsequently renamed “institutional barriers,” which
sounds more professional and less problematic—to teaching, research and other activities that needed to be addressed to make the campus operate more efficiently and effectively. The response to this assignment was an enthusiastic one, with more than 400 submissions (some were duplicates). The list was pared down, first, to 53 and then to a more manageable 10 (VPAA, 2018a; Berger, 2018). The ten included, among others, the difficulty of making joint appointments, obstacles to team teaching, a “risk-averse institutional culture,” and lack of administrative staff support (Draft SAP, 2018: 27). The SAP managers decided two or three of these “barriers” would be addressed each year, by committees of faculty and staff, who would investigate the problem and devise methods for eliminating them (VPAA, 2018b). Aside from group meetings held during 2018-19, no observable results have been forthcoming.

Second, in December 2017, ES completed a “Faculty Insights Survey which asked our Senate Faculty to weigh in on the most promising existing and emerging areas of research on campus” (Tromp & Berger, 2018). The goal of this effort was to create “Academic Priority Areas” (APAs) that would receive campus support, generate research and resources, and increase campus visibility (Tromp, 2018). Topics were identified through creation of “Themed Academic Working Groups” (TAWGs)112 that would, as Tromp described them,

offer faculty—and those possessing academic appointments—the opportunity to join together across department and divisional lines in collaborative efforts to reimagine how their research and/or teaching efforts could be enhanced through the infusion of new resources, reduction or elimination of internal campus barriers, and, potentially, the groups’ ability to generate new resource streams (CPEVC, 2018f).

Initially, 20 themes were identified, and 80 more were then submitted (Tromp, 2018b). Faculty indicated their interest by signing up as potential participants in one or more of the 108 listed topics (CPEVC, 2018g), although most of those who did signed up did not contribute to further proposal development. The list of 108 was reviewed by Divisional Deans and the Academic Senate, which identified 28 groups who were asked to work together to “to consider what is needed to ensure that their collaborative work is enhanced, and so nurture the development of a research and teaching area that is both of high quality and distinctive” (id.).

Each TAWG then submitted a “two- to four-page overview paper of their group’s potential and needs...” and made a brief video presentation. These were vetted by leadership and the campus community, while ES “conduct[ed] external research [into similar initiatives] at other universities to test and, ideally, validate our assumptions.”

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112 An earlier initiative to encourage hiring of thematic faculty clusters was called “Faculty Initiative Group Hires,” or “FIGHs” (Senate FIGH, 2014). Ugh.
Following the April submission of TAWG proposals and video pitches, an “Academic Advisory Committee” (AAC, 2018) and Senate committees were given two weeks to review and rank them (Academic Senate, 2018d). Many of the Committees were impressed by the diversity of proposals and the collaborations they reflected, but the short turnaround time and a lack of clarity about the ranking process created difficulties in assessing the presentations. The Committee on Educational Policy complained that “the short writeups sometimes make it difficult to assess what will be achieved if a proposal is funded. Furthermore, with resource requests ranging from a staff FTE and a handful of GSRs to ten faculty FTE, it is not clear how to compare proposals” (id.: 16).

The Committee on Planning and Budget spent considerable time reviewing and ranking the proposals (id.: 21-30), but observed that “choosing to support some TAWGs and not others is not in itself a SAP; these choices should emerge as an outcome of a SAP” (id.: 21), and noted that they were not fully representative of the campus:

UCSC already has many strong programs, departments, and areas of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research excellence. Most of the TAWGs build upon these existing strengths, but not all campus strengths are necessarily reflected in the TAWGs…. Areas of research and programmatic excellence aligned with campus themes must be supported, regardless of whether they are represented by one (or more) of the TAWGs (id.).

Information required to make recommendations about resource allocation was not made available, either. As the Committee on Planning and Budget wrote to the Senate Chair in June 2018, “the campus budgetary information that is usually provided to CPB was inadequate for addressing the issues raised…. The Office of Planning & Budget (P&B) was unable to provide the data CPB wanted” (CPB, 2018: 1).

The Academic Advisory Committee was impressed with “the sophistication of the proposals and with the innovative collaborations that emerged from the TAWG process” (AAC, 2018: 1) and created “one list of the most promising eight areas, which included both stand-alone and recombined TAWGs” (id.). The “winners” were announced in June 2018.

Out of the 28 proposals reviewed, Chancellor Blumenthal and EVC Tromp selected three:

- *Earth Futures*, focused on the long future of humans on Earth and “examining the question scientifically, philosophically, and practically, generating

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113 The Committee on Admissions and Financial Aid wrote “With regard to the deadline for individual faculty feedback, members found that a 12:00 a.m. Monday morning time does not respect the work/life balance of faculty (Academic Senate, 2018d: 8).
scenarios, and proposing strategic practices that will lead to particular outcomes (APA White Paper, 2018a);

- *Justice in a Changing World* to pay “particular attention to the rapidly changing landscape of our world— environmentally, demographically, politically—rather than reading it as a static construct on which to apply theories or ask questions” (APA White Paper, 2018b); and

- *Digital Interventions* to bring together “makers, artists, inventors, and data scientists to make new creations and propose novel means of theorizing culture and the future” (APA White Paper, 2018c).

In selecting these three APAs, the Administration chose to focus on approaches that promised to generate visibility and resources, rather than on TAWGs that might build on existing campus initiatives and programs. Inasmuch as these APAs needed to be further framed, one might say that the choices were made “on spec,” in the hope that they would succeed. That, of course, is a gamble and risks losing resources if any of them should fail.

**SAP Process, Round Two**

After ES released its “Campus Landscape Analysis” (Entangled Solutions, 2018a) and “Future State Brief” (Entangled Solutions, 2018b) in the first quarter of 2018, Academic Senate committees were asked to review and comment on them and on the SAP process as a whole (this was taking place at the same time as the TAWG-related activities). The first bundle of Senate comments came in response to the request by Vice Provost of Academic Affairs, Martin Berger, that Senate committees consider the lists of barriers and opportunities for resource generation (Berger, 2017).

Many of the committees expressed praise and hope for the SAP but also took the occasion to criticize the compressed timeline and associated rush, which made it difficult to respond coherently to the flood of documents. Several of the committees also expressed concern that, by focusing on a small number of opportunities, the drive to generate resources might shortchange some departments, distract faculty by time requirements, drive research and teaching (rather than the reverse) and make money the only metric for measuring success (Academic Senate, 2018a).

In April and May 2018, the Senate committees responded to the Campus Landscape Analysis (Academic Senate, 2019b, 2019c). Again, many were appreciative of the opportunity to review the Analysis and expressed hope that it would contribute to the planning process, but they also expressed some doubts and misgivings. According to the overview letter from the Senate Chair, several committees requested “a document [rather than a slide deck] for the Senate to respond to: one that provides a coherent, cohesive narrative and rationale for the conclusions it purports to reach” (id, 2019b: 2; emphasis in original). More generally, the committees were concerned
about the small numbers of actual interviews conducted, especially with students, and expressed skepticism about the conclusions drawn from such limited data.

For example, the Committee on Planning and Budget “had concerns about how the data were presented and the inferences to be drawn from the findings” (id, 2019c: 9). The Committee on Preparatory Education wrote that “Many faculty and staff... describe a widespread lack of confidence in the planning process and cynicism regarding the commitment of high level administrators to policies that will align with the priorities of the campus community” (id, 2019c:11). The Committee on Academic Freedom said “We will be utterly frank: we found it [the Landscape Analysis] deeply unsatisfying. It presented information in a visually arresting but often confusing format. It contained contradictory statements” (id.: 3).

In April, ES released the “Future State Brief” slide deck, describing campus “recommendations to inform the CP/EVC and Chancellor’s decisions about the design principles that will guide the campus over the next five years” (Entangled Solutions, 2018c: slide 2). But what are “design principles?” What was being designed? What were principles in this instance? Rules? Aspirations? Guidelines? Actions?

According to the Administration,

Design principles are clear, tightly defined guidelines that identify a conceptually coherent set of institutional aspirations... intended to represent the objectives of a large number of campus constituents, and be distinctive, precise and unambiguous. The design principles advance our institutional values and will help facilitate a shared understanding of why particular initiatives have been prioritized (SAP, 2019).

Why not just call them goals and objectives (or are those terms too mundane)?

Reflecting the press of end-of-the-year business, only two Senate Committees found the time to comment on the Future State Brief. The summary from the Senate Chair reported that “Broadly speaking, the committees found the principles to be vague and not sufficiently contextualized within the brief itself. Moreover, CCI [Committee on Courses of Instruction] suggests that the principles lack efficacy and guidance when hard choices and decisions are required” (Academic Senate, 2018d). The Committee on Rules, Jurisdiction and Elections asked

- How will these principles be applied in the context of a long-term academic plan?
- Are these principles limited to the context of the TAWGs, or will they inform campus planning well beyond the next few years?
- With such broad sweeping principles, how can accountability to these principles be measured?
- Why are certain vague areas called out in Principle #5 [social justice, diversity and sustainability], while other concrete areas of campus distinction
are omitted? The committee noted that two of these areas already appear in Principles #3 and #6, and the third was consistently ranked near the bottom in the workshops (id.).

The final design principles selected by the Chancellor and EVC were largely unobjectionable, if not inspiring:

1. Drive research and creative work that transform our world; 2. Create enriching experiential learning and research opportunities for students; 3. Engage and support a diverse faculty, staff, and student body; 4. Support generative interdisciplinary connections in research and teaching; 5. Expand excellence in innovation in areas distinctive to UC Santa Cruz, such as social justice, diversity, and sustainability (SAP, 2019).

There was some concern expressed that these principles left out important swaths of research and teaching. Why prioritize interdisciplinary efforts? What about “non-experiential” learning in the classroom? Why highlight “social justice, diversity and sustainability” when there were so many other areas of distinctive innovation on campus?

The Playbook

In July 2018, ES met the one-year deadline for completion of the SAP with the “Strategic Academic Plan and Implementation Playbook” (Entangled Solutions, 2018d). This was a massive, 193-slide compendium incorporating the earlier slide decks and reporting on literally everything accumulated through the four “phases” of the SAP. ES spent a lot of time on graphics as opposed to information and, given its hodge-podge organization, the Playbook required considerable stamina to work through. It included very little in the way of readable or explanatory text.

Once again, Senate Committees, not wishing to appear obstructionist, gave mixed reviews to the Playbook. On the one hand, they were broadly supportive of the SAP exercise and the opportunity to contribute to the plan (Academic Senate, 2018f: 1). On the other, there was general agreement that the July “draft” had to be redone, possibly in a more accessible form: “Some of the committees, including CFW [Committee on Faculty Welfare] and P&T [Promotion & Tenure], also noted that the PowerPoint-like report with bullet points was not very helpful and recommended a comprehensive revised report with full sentences...” (id.: 1). Several committees found fault with the presumption that final decisions had been made, for example the selection of APAs, without offering an intellectual rationale for the choices made.

CPB wrote “The central weakness of the draft SAP... is that it fails to provide any intellectual specificity or coherence that could have been distilled from the efforts of faculty in their TAWGs” (id.). Some committees “pointed out misalignments and disconnects among the design principles, goals, initiatives, and outcomes, and between the goals, grand challenges, and funding opportunities in the draft SAP/IP”
There was concern expressed that the Playbook seemed more focused on quantitative metrics and increased campus visibility and recognition rather than “substance” (id.). And the fact that little or nothing was said about resources was problematic. Finally, among other omissions, the almost complete absence of any discussion of graduate education was a point of widely-expressed concern (id.: 4).

The Senate Chair’s letter concluded that “the Senate committees that responded found the SAP/IP inadequate in formulating academic goals that would guide future resource allocations on campus; regretfully, the committees found that the draft did not build on the excitement generated during the TAWG process” (id.: 6). Indeed, general dissatisfaction with the SAP process and the Playbook was so great that the ES contract was terminated.

Before going on to “Round Three” of the SAP, it might be useful to speculate whether and why Entangled Solutions failed to provide an acceptable and useful strategic plan.

First, outside consultants are usually presented with projects that have clearly defined objectives and boundaries, without the possibility that these parameters might be challenged or need to be changed. In this instance, it would seem, the work to be done by ES, as stated in its contract with UCSC (ES Contract, 2017), was very expansive and rapid, allowing little time for in-depth contact with the many parties and interests across the campus.

Second, ES came in without any sense of the institutional culture or history of the campus. The SAP project was framed as one that would interview and survey but dig no more deeply, in order to keep to the timeline. Since nothing ever happens at a university in less than two years—and, at UCSC, at least three—the schedule was thoroughly impractical (as the SAP’s extension to a second year of planning indicates).

And third, although ES claims to have worked with many universities, it appears to be a willing purveyor of the Powerpoint Syndrome, which relies on presentation of data and findings in slide rather than in textual form. Of course, academics give many talks and teach many classes with Powerpoint, but these are intended to be informative rather than to offer the *ex cathedra* pronouncements that appeared in the Playbook. It might also be the case that the EVC did not fully understand what ES was proposing to do, accepting that “Future State Design,” its “proprietary process...which is a design framework built for mission-driven organizations that want to shape the future” (id.: 25) would work as advertised. Certainly, with its jargon and promises, it appeared to be “cutting edge.” What ES was cutting was less than clear.

**The SAP Process, Round Three**

Following receipt of the Senate committees’ reviews of the Playbook, and in response to broad skepticism of the SAP among rank-and-file faculty and staff (Nodine, 2018), the Administration decided to produce a “more comprehensible” text-based document. As Tromp (2018c) wrote at the end of Fall Quarter 2018, a new draft SAP
was being produced “based on robust feedback from the Senate and our community” and “to reflect the wise counsel we received…. The format of the new document has been completely re-worked, and the implementation section significantly revised” (id.).

Two text-only SAP drafts were released in Fall 2018 (Draft SAP, 2018) and Spring 2019 (Draft SAP, 2019). For the most part, the first draft translated the Playbook into readable English, without pictures and fluff, while repeating the reasons and rationales for the SAP, the University’s vision, mission and goals (Design Principles), the process of reviewing and acting on so-called Barriers, and the content of the three APAs. The second draft sharpened up the language, deleted some problematic sections and added a few new ones, while incorporating more details about planning process. A final version was promised for Fall 2019 but did not appear. The figures below illustrate the proposed timeline for the entire SAP process.

**Figure 11.5a: SAP Timelines, 2017-18**
Figure 11.5b: SAP Timelines, 2018-19

Figure 11.5c: SAP Timelines, 2019-20

Source: Draft SAP, 2019: 45-47.
The Academic Senate Committees were asked to review both drafts and offer comments and recommendations (Lau, 2019; Academic Senate, 2019). In the case of the second draft, they were also asked to prioritize among the initiatives listed under each Design Principle. In both instances, many of the committees reported insufficient time to properly evaluate the drafts and, in the case of the second draft, “expressed their frustration and disappointment that many of their recommendations, concerns, and questions have not been addressed nor reflected in the final draft” (Lau, 2019: 1).

The summary letter from the Senate Chair (Lau, 2019) listed four primary problems:

1. Concerns about the resources and infrastructure to support these initiatives...: several committees noted that this final draft of the SAP remains vague on the question of the resources and the infrastructure required to bring these initiatives to fruition.

2. Concerns about SAP initiatives encroaching on Senate purview....: the main concern here involves the potential for the experiential learning initiatives to negatively affect the personnel process.

3. Concerns about the SAP’s lack of a coherent vision (as a whole and/or within specific design principles)...[which] makes it difficult to understand and opine on specific elements of the SAP, which are frequently disconnected and decontextualized.

4. Suggestions about relevant Senate committees that may be helpful in the implementation of and accountability for SAP initiatives [reflected in] ... previously articulated concerns about the Academic Oversight Committee and its redundancy with Senate committee and review structures.

Several committees asked again what was so special about interdisciplinarity and how might this emphasis affect hiring, resource allocation and the needs of existing disciplinary departments and programs? Why should the APAs be prioritized and privileged when there were many excellent, under-resourced research initiatives already underway on campus? Would implementation of the SAP not lead to creation of another bureaucratic monitoring infrastructure? Would too much emphasis on “experiential learning”—whatever that was—reduce support for normal, classroom-based classes, and wouldn’t this presage a shift towards more “vocational” instruction?

To be sure, once again the committees also expressed appreciation and support for many of the proposed initiatives in the two drafts, but several suggested that the Administration had played too great a role in its formulation and execution, excluding Senate, faculty, staff and students from the process (Lau, 2019; Academic Senate, 2019).
During Academic Year 2018-19, the Administration convened town halls, fora and “cafes” to update faculty, staff and students, accept questions and, sometimes, solicit input regarding implementation of various SAP elements. These events did not add much to what was presented in the drafts. As the year progressed, fewer and fewer faculty attended (Epstein, 2019), perhaps reflecting a sense that, first, there was not much that would be changed even through consultation and, second, confusion about how implementation would take place (notwithstanding creation of various working groups and subcommittees meant to deal with the latter task).

Two additional Administration initiatives were launched during the year. First, it was announced that annual department and divisional requests for new faculty positions needed to be framed in terms of how they would fit into the APAs, with a view toward providing time and labor for developing them. Second, the Administration asked that TAWG requests for resources other than new faculty “be integrated into the Deans’ responses to the upcoming resource call” and any additional resource requests be submitted through normal channels, aka, via the Divisional Deans (Lee, 2018). The Deans, in turn, were encouraged to prioritize in considering Divisional support for any TAWG requesting resources (id.).

In a personal email exchange with VPAA Lee, I asked how this process might differ from standard operating procedure. Very rarely, the Administration funds requests as might come from a TAWGS, but faculty and groups seeking support are normally directed to ask their Deans. For the most part, faculty are informed that the requested resources are not available, that the Division has other priorities or that a formal proposal must be submitted for consideration by the Dean. It is virtually impossible, although not unheard of, to get two or more Deans to agree to co-fund an initiative, because they each fear loss of resources to another Division more than the possibility of gain.

Lee (2018) responded to me that “the EVC is making a more general resource call to the deans that includes both FTE resources and non-faculty financial resources.... the EVC is interested in using some of them as seed funding for new TAWG initiatives and/or money to help catalyze taking existing efforts related to a TAWG to a new level.” The virtual termination of this most recent planning process has meant little or no support for any of the initiatives selected to proceed.

Coda

In Spring 2019, EVC Tromp announced she would leave UCSC to become President of Boise State University in Idaho. Along with his many other responsibilities, VPAA Lee was assigned the task of completing a final version of the SAP and overseeing its implementation. Despite Lee’s assurances that the plan would be carried on, the departure of the primary motive force behind the SAP meant that there was no longer an impetus to keep it going. The new Chancellor expressed no great enthusiasm for the SAP and the acting EVC found themselves much too busy to think very much about
pursuing a plan in which neither had had any hand. For the most part, it seems to have ended on the shelf with its many predecessors.

Finally, was this SAP really different from its predecessors? It is important to remember that a “strategic academic plan” is neither strategic nor academic nor a plan, as such. To be strategic is not only to devise plans for the future, it is also to recognize and prepare for unanticipated events and contingencies. Simply saying something will be so does not mean it will turn out so. Idealism is important, but it cannot make something become real (the Velveteen Rabbit notwithstanding). To repeat Michael Cowan apropos description of planning: “When you think of planning documents, they are really utopian documents, that is they are projecting an ideal world that the planning is going to lead to, or at least a more ideal world, within constraints” (Cowan, 2013: 82).

There is also the continuing problem of enlisting rank-and-file faculty and staff in such as effort. Faculty operate largely at the level of their departments, helping to maintain curricula and ensure there are classes for students. If there are curricular gaps, someone must be hired to fill them, often at short notice. Inasmuch as UCSC operates with a curricular planning and course scheduling time horizon of a year or less, strategy is not much in evidence. Furthermore, based on the results of past academic plans and the exigencies of an uncertain world, there is little the campus as a whole can do except to provide funds when they are available and to cut budgets when they are not. Imagined and imaginary future resources are not a reliable basis on which to construct plans for the future.

Finally, what is a “plan?”114 A plan is founded on the assumption that the planner, or those who will implement a plan, exercise causal power over the sequence of actions and events required to achieve an objective or goal. This requires a clear understanding of causal relationships, and anything that involves more than two or three causal “variables” can become very complex, with indeterminate outcomes. As I noted earlier in this book, following Foucault, plans assume determinism, as well, yet longer-term plans rarely follow the straight and narrow to desired outcomes, and interventions in order to get a plan “back on track” can result in unanticipated endpoints. At best, a plan conveys a desire and intention, along with necessary steps and actions, to achieve the desire and intention, but it is an imaginary and not a reliable map of how the actual future will turn out.

Marlene Tromp’s SAP fell short on all three counts: it was not strategic insofar as it projected into the future without assessing potential success and failure modes. It was not academic, in that very little was (or could be) said about the actual delivery of services or programs. It was is not a plan, in that there were (and are) so many

114 Speaking of “plans,” I am reminded of the Joker’s soliloquy in “The Dark Knight” after he has blown up a hospital: “Do I really look like a man with a plan, Harvey? I don’t have a plan.... I hate plans. Yours, theirs, everyone’s.... I show schemers how pathetic their attempts to control things really are.... Look what I have done to this city with a few drums of gas and a couple bullets.... Introduce a little anarchy, you upset the established order, and everything becomes chaos” (O’Neill, 2008).
competing elements and confounding variables that implementation as written will be improbable, if not impossible. I beg off here from the question of what I would have done differently although, as Alfonso the Wise of Castile (1221-84) is reputed to have said, Si hubiera estado presente en la Creación, habría dado algunas indicaciones útiles (Had I been present at the Creation, I would have given some useful hints for the better ordering of the universe).

V. Conclusions

In this chapter, I have provided a descriptive and analytical history of two major initiatives launched by UCSC over the last 20 years—the Silicon Valley Campus (SVC) and EVC Tromp’s Strategic Academic Plan—in order to convey the very complex and complicated environment within which universities must operate. I have argued that the primary reason for these failures is the problematic organizational structure of UCSC and the particular operational culture that has developed within that structure. It is also evident that resources are at the foundation of every functional expansion pursued by a university and, if there are none, the expansion can take place only at the cost of other, already-existing units that are bound to oppose anything that might impoverish them.

What about the fate of these two initiatives? In the first instance, the scope and scale of the SVC vision has diminished because developing a coherent curriculum has proven almost impossible to accomplish at the necessary scale with available resources. Given the costs of launching a new university, very few satellite campuses are ever funded with internal resources. UCSC has either been very unfortunate in or very inept at finding such funding. The early promise of $20 million in capital funding from the UC Office of the President vanished in the budget crises of the early 2000s, while the hoped-for corporate and private donors have not appeared to fill the gap. Given the paucity of resources available, the SVC offers a few Masters’ degrees, many extension classes and various research opportunities, but nothing that counts as a full-service department. This is not likely to change over the coming decade, unless UCSC can find its own billionaire to endow it.

The Strategic Academic Plan is, of course, a very different beast. It is a chronicle of hopes, aspirations and dreams that might be realized were resources, personnel and will mobilized. The history of such plans at UCSC is not promising and it did not last any longer than its predecessors. But could it? There are only limited resources available to fund the initiatives proposed in the SAP, there are many competing demands on these resources, turf wars will break out among units once resources do become available, and the faculty were not, in general, very interested in the entire project, although many remain worried that undergraduate education will be cannibalized for any similar initiatives in the future.

What, if anything, can these two narratives tell us about “what’s the matter with UCSC?” At the outset of this chapter, I proposed that geography was a critical factor, since it placed the campus at a considerable distance from the wealth in Silicon
Valley. But that is too much of a determinist geopolitical explanation (and classical geopolitics is, by its very nature, highly determinist). Earlier in this book, I suggested that there was something about the structure of the campus and the resulting power struggles, instantiated in the early life of UCSC and existing until today, that made the campus “ungovernable” (Ibarra, 2019: 1). I don’t believe the campus is “ungovernable” although it is difficult to govern. I return to this topic in the final chapter of this book.
Chapter 12
What’s the Matter with UCSC?

I. Introduction

Is there really something the matter with UCSC? Is UCSC really different from other university campuses? Has it stumbled and failed any more than other organizations? And if there is something the matter with UCSC, can anything be done (or should something be done)? Let me make something clear: as a public institution, UCSC has had many successes, in teaching, in research, in service, and its graduates, service and research accomplishments should not be dismissed. The University does an excellent job of touting its accomplishments, so I will not spend any time repeating them here. My task in this final chapter is to offer some thoughts and conclusions, drawing upon the materials in the preceding chapters, about the reasons UCSC does not work as well as I think it could and should.

The relatively sudden arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic and the shutdown of university and college campuses around the world may, of course, result in changes that cannot, as yet, be anticipated—it is too soon to tell, in other words. But this book was written before the onset of the Great Lockdown, and the pandemic has played only a minor role in its revision. The pandemic is one of those “contingent events” (number 12 in Table 1.1.) whose arrival is inevitable yet unpredictable. We are warned daily about such events but are always surprised when they happen. Prevention and preparation for inevitable earthquakes, forest fires, recessions and, yes, pandemics, are quite costly and carry significant opportunity costs. Uncertain future benefits arising from real expenditures today cannot hold a candle to other, more immediate and demanding needs, and only the high risk of potential injury, death and lawsuits seems to resolve this particular dilemma. Thus, the damages arising from contingent events are usually paid for only after the fact.

As I write this, in May 2020, it seems highly unlikely that the status quo ante will be restored fully, at least not where higher education is concerned (Paxson, 2020; Marcus, 2020). The long-predicted shift to remote and online instruction may become a permanent feature of the educational landscape with concomitant impacts on faculty, staff, students and organization (Mintz, 2020). The decline in public funding will continue (Carey, 2020) while the economic crash will, with a few exceptions, force virtually all public and private universities and colleges to make painful reductions and budget cuts. But all of these are only educated guesses: it is too soon to tell.

In this final chapter, therefore, I will not revisit the various external and internal factors and forces that shape higher education in general and UCSC in particular. Instead, I address six themes (out of many) that seem especially relevant to the campus at this juncture: (1) visions and missions; (2) teaching and research; (3) management and shared governance; (4) money, money, money; (5) campus culture.
and DNA; and (6) privatization and the commonwealth. I will end the chapter with some ideas about what UCSC might do.

II. Visions and missions

All collective human endeavors involve what we might call imaginaries, visions and missions. Imaginaries are pictures of desired futures. Visions are what is imagined to be possible so long as everything falls into line as hoped and designed. Missions involve those goals and objectives toward which actions are directed. The three are often conflated, but should not be. Imaginaries are wholesale constructions of alternative societies, whether utopian or not. Visions are notions or proposals for how particular organizations should change. Missions are the purposes of an organization relative to the assumed needs of society and its members. Imaginaries and visions are more exciting than missions, inasmuch as what can be imagined is not constrained by the material conditions of everyday life, as are missions. A realistic vision will take into account material conditions and constraints, but realism about those constraints can impose mundane limits on vision.

For example, it is possible to imagine envision an energy system that provides power “too cheap to meter” through nuclear (an early promise of nuclear power supporters) or solar. In both cases, the vision was/is a society in which nuclear or solar would be ubiquitous and normal. The mission was and is providing a necessity of daily life at affordable rates (whatever those might be).

In the 1950s and 1960s, it was possible to imagine a system of higher education leading to the “ideal” citizen with skills required for life in a rapidly growing Cold War economy. One vision for getting there was a large public university that would provide students with a small liberal arts college experience. The mission was structuring and organizing a campus that delivered such an experience. The reality was that the needs of disciplinary education proved substantially incompatible with the early vision, which was repeatedly modified in response to material, social and institutional constraints. Paraphrasing Clausewitz, the “fog of operation” began to work against imaginaries, plans and missions almost from opening day.

UCSC began its life as a relatively prosaic addition to the existing roster of UC campuses. All of the three new campuses were envisioned as places that would admit the flood of Baby Boomers while sustaining the record of excellence set by UC Berkeley and UCLA. The new campuses would provide high-quality college education to a then mostly white high school population in rapidly growing California suburbs, supported by generous public funding from tax revenues collected by the state. Research would be funded and motivated by generous federal grants generated by the Cold War and post-Sputnik panic. For a while, this was true. But no one believed the era of post-war prosperity would ever end. No one imagined that changes in the political economy would affect higher education. No one could imagine changes in the university’s mission.
The initial vision for UCSC was both expansive and daring, combining (it was hoped) the best features of small colleges and large universities. Dean McHenry promised that UCSC would cost no more per student than any other campus (vision). Kerr imagined a Swarthmore in the Redwoods; McHenry a federalized campus stabilized through a balance of powers. Implementing Clark Kerr’s and Dean McHenry’s vision was not possible through conventional means and, indeed, required a new *habitus*, a new way of operationalizing a set of shared norms and practices that would be unique to UCSC. Material realities intervened impacting the realization of the mission.

The Founders had had different educational experiences but both worked in administration at UC Berkeley, where an 80-year tradition of norms and practices had become deeply embedded and true organizational “reforms” were few and far between, taking a long time to design, develop and deploy. They were visionaries but neither had any experience in institutional design and implementation.

I do not mean to blame Kerr and McHenry for the flaws in their vision; both knew how to run organizations but neither was well-versed in founding one. The political culture of the 1960s was not much concerned with history or institutions and anything seemed possible. Behavioralism dominated the social sciences and the new institutionalism was still some years off. The visionary institution the two imagined, designed and sited in the Arcadian forests of the Santa Cruz Mountains could never be fully reconciled with the brutal material realities of American politics, the California economy or looming demographic change. As the campus struggled with these and other realities, it was forced to compromise its vision, even as these adjustments came into conflict with the institution’s structure and mission.

This problem was most evident in the never-ending effort to identify an “academic role for the colleges,” as many faculty and administrators struggled to retain as much of the original vision as possible while still fulfilling the UC mission, and others saw little reason to innovate or change. Under more propitious conditions, the money to support both colleges and disciplines might have permitted the vision to be carried on and fulfilled (as seems to have happened with the much larger colleges at UC San Diego), but neither adequate resources nor the new *habitus* materialized at UCSC. The UCSC colleges have not withered away, but they have certainly withered.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, the vision for UCSC remains expansive, but it has proved difficult to sustain a commensurate mission. The colleges are often suggested as sites from which new initiatives could be launched, and Silicon Valley is still touted as a gateway to tech-based wealth. The campus aspires to exceptionalism, yet it is forced more and more to normalize. Indeed, it cannot afford exceptionalism if that takes away from undergraduate education and the needs of students entering from California high schools. Perhaps it is time for UCSC to pay attention to what it has rather than what it wishes to acquire. The time alone saved could make major contributions to what is a basic mission, the teaching of undergraduates.
III. Teaching and research

The colleges withered because the campus was never able to fully reconcile the educational vision and the teaching it entailed with the institutional emphasis on research as the highest calling of a UC campus. The Founders imagined a lower-division liberal-arts curriculum in the colleges, to which faculty would dedicate themselves, followed by upper-division disciplinary training dependent on faculty with active research programs. These faculty would also supervise graduate students. While many who came to campus were inspired and motivated by the emphasis on teaching liberal arts to undergraduates, the reality was that the founding faculty almost all came from prestigious institutions (which remains much the case today), renowned for research, which was rewarded, rather than teaching, which was not. Those who put most of their energy into teaching soon found out that, notwithstanding the vision, UCSC was not that different from other universities when it came to tenure and promotion: “publish or perish.”

The prioritization of teaching established an early habitus that has proved almost impossible to eliminate. UCSC has a reputation—whether deserved or not—for emphasizing undergraduate education, and many students choose to enroll on that basis. Many new faculty believe it, too. Faculty overall remain highly committed to undergraduate education, but it seems safe to say that few have ever been denied tenure or promotion for their teaching, as opposed to their research. In recent years, and partly in response to pressures from various sources, the campus has sought to make the quality of teaching a more important part of its mission and of personnel reviews. But not at the cost of research.

At UCSC, as throughout higher education in the United States, many teaching assignments are now filled by casual instructors. They teach one or a few classes every term, often small frosh classes and large, lower-division ones, and never acquire much in the way of employment security. In many fields, the tenure-track job market for new PhDs—especially for those who did not receive a degree from one of the Ivies or major public universities, such as Berkeley and Michigan—is not very promising (and is only likely to worsen post-pandemic). Indeed, it is something of an ethical failure to encourage people to enroll in graduate school. Most will devote six to ten years of relative penury and long-lasting loans to a future of “freeway flying,” and little or no hope of a tenure-track position as newly-minted PhDs enter the academic market.

Moreover, as the TAs 2019-20 wildcat grade strike, intended to force an increase in monthly stipends, has made all too clear, UCSC lacks adequate funds to support its graduate cohorts. These students live in or near one of the most costly cities in the United States and can barely afford rent and food. Yet it has still sought growth in

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115 The “employment security” offered to what are called Unit 18 instructors consists of the right of first refusal on classes they have been assigned previously, if such classes are being offered. Otherwise, there is no guarantee of even casual employment.
PhD students to work in labs and classes, increasing the supply in the face of limited or declining demand.

Universities argue that faculty are reputed to “want” graduate students to assist them in their research and teaching, and to enhance reputation and social capital, so more is better. Yet, PhD students are more costly than post-doctoral researchers and casual instructors, they require management in the lab, supervision in their research and writing, and counseling for their frustrations and futures. Those new PhDs who find work, publish research and acquire recognition are certainly feathers in the caps of their supervisors, but not every graduate will become a star. Faculty members who supervise few graduate students or none, but are very dedicated to undergraduates, are regarded as failing in their responsibilities and not “producing” research. They may be penalized for this lack with increased teaching loads.

This dilemma is not unique to UCSC, of course. But the shift in institutional logic from Keynesianism to the market, from mass production to individualized entrepreneurs, from creditors to debtors, highlights the contradictions between teaching and research and the risks of disciplinary specialization. The longer-term demand for particular knowledge, skills and expertise cannot be predicted with any certainty, yet undergraduates must be taught in changing specialized disciplines in order to enter the job market. At the same time, pure and applied research is directed toward finding and developing the means for making those disciplinary skills obsolete (especially in computer science and engineering, but also as automation appears in non-STEM fields). The rise of experiential learning and entrepreneurship are meant, in part, to make graduates more “self-reliant” in creating their own employment opportunities, but this is a skill poorly taught, if taught at all (and it requires a form of risk-taking that most people seek to avoid).

UCSC and other universities have begun to address this tension by seeking and hiring “Teaching Professors” and “Lecturers with Security of Employment” (LSOE), both of which are eligible for tenure. They expected to teach more than the ordinary workload and are not required to conduct research for merit reviews and promotion. On the one hand, this seems to indicate a reconsideration of the importance of undergraduate education. On the other hand, it might also result in further class divisions, so to speak, between those who conduct research and those who do not. But a few teaching professors and LSOEs will not do much to change the balance.

IV. Management and shared governance

As much as faculty would like it, universities are not democracies. Management runs the institution and, depending on charter and state, has more or less authority over all matters, including academics. “Shared governance” is closer to a division of labor in which management reserves authority to set budgets and providing funding for operating and academic functions. The result is that management has an effective
veto over programs and initiatives authorized by the faculty and does not even have to respond to faculty requests for financial or other information.\textsuperscript{116}

At UCSC, shared governance has had a particularly contentious history, manifest in the description of the campus as “ungovernable.” Certainly, as the narratives through this book suggest, there have been repeated and ongoing struggles between Administration and faculty. I have attributed this dysfunction to Dean McHenry’s decision to let college faculty decide how to run the Colleges and his theories of “federalism.” He believed (or seemed to think) that, under his oversight, the absence of mandated rules and structures for the Colleges would foster organizational imagination and creativity, give faculty a deeper stake in the supporting and sustaining the results over time and stand as a model for new approaches to higher education. This approach seemed to work fairly well in the case of Cowell College, which was governed by a strong and decisive provost and Stevenson College, which closely followed the Cowell model, but less so for those Colleges that followed. By 1970, the organizational freedom given to College faculty was beginning to fail in terms of robust administrative and instructional structures and procedures.

I have argued that, perhaps paradoxically, the source of this failure was the division of academic labor between the Colleges and the Divisions (and, by extension, the relatively weak Boards of Studies). Recall that Divisions, rather than conventional schools or colleges, were the sites of research and upper division instruction, and that Boards were provided with scant authority and money in order to prevent them from turning into the bona fide discipline-based departments that are the norm throughout the United States. This structure endowed the Divisions with significant resources, power, and decision-making authority relative to both Colleges and Boards, leaving the Divisional Deans the task of overseeing many functions that would otherwise have been granted to conventional departments. The struggle among the Colleges and Divisions to govern and manage curriculum, and the McHenry Administration’s apparent reluctance to intervene strongly on one side or another has had long-lasting effects that continue even until today. Here is a story about a recent initiative that illustrates this phenomenon.

Normally, all student tuition goes into the University’s general fund and is then redistributed by the Administration to Colleges, Divisions and thence to Departments. The latter can ask for new FTE and administrative funds, but those are normally allocated at the discretion of the Divisional Dean. As a general rule, Master’s students receive little or no financial aid (aside from student loans) and most are expected to pay all costs out of pocket. Hence, they do not appear to impose a financial cost on the organization.

Some years ago, the Administration sought to increase enrollment of Masters’ students as a means of meeting graduate student targets and increasing revenues

\textsuperscript{116} In California, under the Open Record Act, the public has a “right” to request documents from state agencies that are not confidential or otherwise made readily available. It helps to know exactly which to request, since a blanket topical one may result in a flood or nothing at all.
from graduate students. It announced that new MA and MS programs would return to sponsoring departments a set number of dollars from each enrolled student’s tuition. These funds could be allocated however a department wished, but they were strongly encouraged to use the money to attract new PhD students and support continuing PhD students. Existing Masters’ programs would not offer this incentive, since those students were already counted in enrollments.

In mounting a new program, however, a departmental faculty would have to decide whether these benefits exceeded the costs. The incentive funds would, at most, support a few PhD quarters, but there would be additional costs of teaching, supervising and reading theses from up to 30 Masters students each year. New specialized courses might also be required (although this was not expected). No additional FTE would be provided to staff these new disciplinary degree programs. The additional workload would come on top of existing research, teaching and student supervision. The response to the incentive program was not overwhelming.

In the Social Sciences Division, for example, there were a few, tentative explorations of new degree proposals but, for the most part, there was little interest in pursuing them. The then-Social Sciences Dean decided—with limited consultation with faculty—to pursue development of a Divisional MA in Public Policy. New faculty could be requested by departments to teach a few classes in the program, while continuing faculty would be encouraged to teach appropriate courses in the program. Incentive funds would go to the Division and the Dean would decide how to reallocate them among the Departments. Among then-Department Chairs (of whom I was one), there was no great enthusiasm for the Dean’s initiative, but the Dean assembled a faculty committee to develop a proposal for the degree which, so far as I am aware, was never completed.

Two years later, that Dean retired. His successor recognized that the returns from the proposed MA program would be relatively small. Seeking larger returns, she decided to launch a new divisional research center, the Institute for Social Transformation, that did not require multiple reviews and approvals, could be started up much more quickly than a new degree program. If successful, moreover, the center could generate considerably more funds for PhD student support. Under an enterprising director, the Institute has been successfully launched and has raised “Well over a million dollars in external funds we’re managing directly, and probably more than another million that we’ve helped leverage...” (Benner, 2020).

My point here is that the Public Policy degree program was initiated largely as a unilateral decanal decision to generate FTE positions for which Departments had to compete and revenues to support graduate growth. The faculty would have to develop courses and degree requirements for the divisional degree program and supervise its students, but funding would flow wholly through the Division, with uncertain returns to the Departments. There was little or no campus-wide consideration of or consultation about this proposed degree program, either. It was a classic case of “shared governance” at UCSC: you listen, we decide.
I don’t believe that shared governance is better or more efficiently practiced anywhere else in California or the United States. My argument is an historical-structural one: the early structuring of power and authority at UCSC, with all of its flaws, crippled and continues to cripple shared governance on the campus. Is there anything that might be done in the future to make governance more “shared” at UCSC?

The contradiction here is that most of the top members of the Administration are drawn from tenured faculty, either at UCSC or some other university. Once in the job, they must juggle the exigencies of management with those of education, and these don’t always comport with the wishes of either faculty or students. At the same time, however, it is clear that most faculty, staff and students do not understand what shared governance is or how far it extends. To openly acknowledge these limits might well generate growing outrage across campus and demands for greater inclusion. Whether that would benefit or cost UCSC is not at all clear but, sometimes, a dose of realism is a good idea.

V. Money, money, money!

No university or college ever has enough money to fulfill both vision and mission, although some do much better at accumulating wealth, and are much richer than others. And money sucks: those organizations that are richer are more able to attract private donors which, in turn, brings in more donors who want recognition beyond a campus. Stanford is a prime example of this phenomenon. As I noted earlier, before Silicon Valley existed, Stanford was neither especially wealthy or that highly regarded. But it was in the right place at the right time and so were its graduates. Some of them parlayed tech startups into multi-billion dollar operations and became extremely wealthy. In turn, they gave lots of money to Stanford, for which they received excellent publicity. Other donors—not all of them ex-students—recognized that they, too, could get their names on programs and buildings. Money attracts money, and geography was (and is), for Stanford, very fortuitous.

Much the same is true for many UC campuses sited in or near relatively wealthy communities and able to tap local donors, which, in turn, attracts other donors (see UCLA, for example). UC campuses located in relatively less-wealthy locations must range farther afield to find wealthy supporters—who might not be their graduates and may already be contributing to other, more prestigious institutions. The genteel poverty of UCSC, UC Riverside and UC Merced, who are disadvantaged by demography and geography, and the related distribution of wealth, also means they are less visible and attractive to private donors. They have struggled mightily to overcome those disadvantages, with only limited success (and UC Merced is still too new).

Arguably, UCSC would have been less challenged in this regard had the Almaden Valley site been selected over Santa Cruz. There would have been no struggle over a Silicon Valley Center (or MBEST), the environment for professional schools would have
been much better and there would probably have been fewer town-gown antagonisms. Other problems would undoubtedly have emerged, but fewer of them would have to do with geography and demography.

Can anything be done today about UCSC’s geographic and demographic disadvantage? The campus cannot be moved and cannot afford to create a full-service satellite in Silicon Valley. Santa Cruz and its surrounding communities have, in aggregate, grown wealthier but still lack vast corporate platforms and tech billionaires, who prefer the tony communities at the other end of Highway 17. Alumni from UCSC’s first three decades were more motivated by ideals than income and post-1990 graduates are only now coming into discretionary wealth (much of which may be under assault because of COVID-19). Most of those graduates moved out of Santa Cruz when it was affordable because of the limited job market, while few of the more recent grads can afford to live in Santa Cruz.

Professional schools are seen as a potential source of income but are expensive to start up and need to be located near or in sizable population centers (hence the Silicon Valley Center). Privatization that depends mostly on student tuition requires regular increases, much of which must be redistributed as financial aid. The State of California is not about to become more generous, especially in the face of COVID-19. High-visibility research can only bring in funds dedicated to specific projects and buildings, and overhead is insufficient to cover the full costs of those projects. There is no obvious solution in sight, even though UCSC needs only a couple of billionaires to make a difference.

If we look at what UCSC finances are visible, we see that, as with most businesses and organizations, labor costs comprise as much as 75% of expenditures (see Tables 5.7 & 5.8). Tenured and tenure-track faculty and administration are much better paid than casual instructors, staff and graduate and undergraduate students, with a big chunk of that 75% going to the former. The wages paid to the latter is already insufficient to the cost of living in Santa Cruz and reducing salaries for the former might well make many leave for greener pastures.

More transparent budgeting might illuminate where money is being spent and what sorts of duplications take place in various units and services. Yet, this would also generate fierce opposition were it to lead to decisions to transform, merge or shut down units and the services they provide. To live within its means, UCSC may have to cut back on its ambitions and visions and do better with what it has. This is not a very exciting formula.

VI. Campus culture and DNA

University dysfunction is often attribute to “campus culture” and “DNA,” both of which I find to be pernicious concepts, smacking of a kind of structural determinism that suggests that rapid or planned change is difficult, if not impossible, because of inbred or inherited irrationality. No self-respecting anthropologist or sociologist would
argue, today, that any culture is static and unchanging, but popular use of the term still suggests both fixed tradition—as in “this is the way things have always been done—and normative stasis—as in “things must be done in this way in order to be acceptable.” The metaphorical invocation of organizational DNA implies something akin to biological determinism: one cannot escape one’s genetic inheritance (although in this context, such notions hark back more to Lysenko than Darwin) and so there is no point in trying.117 Calling on culture and DNA as explanation is also a form of mystification and naturalization that obscures the role of power and historical structures in sustaining particular social relations and contradictions.

A better explanation for dysfunction can be found in Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, which bridges agency and structure and implicitly includes both historical materialism and idealism. Recall that an emphasis on “agency” tends to reify models of individual freedom and rational choice, while ignoring the constraints imposed by social roles and relations and organizational and bureaucratic rules and structures. By contrast, “structure” gives too much weight to the fixity of norms and rules in Weber’s “iron cage.” Habitus addresses appropriate practices instead, that is, what is normative (and required) in a particular situation, setting and time. It recognizes structure as constraining and agency as constrained, but not in wholly deterministic fashion.

In the context of a university, “appropriate practices” depend upon an individual’s role—student, faculty, instructor, staff, administrator—location in organizational structure—management, department, bureaucracy, classroom, and the repeated activities that reproduce those roles, rules and organizational relationships. A student’s role, for example, is to attend classes, do homework, write papers, take exams, socialize with other students, etc. Most of the time most students engage regularly in these practices, which facilitates the organization’s mission. If they were to stop engaging in these practices, the normal operation of the campus would cease. Faculty habitus similarly engages in sets of practices that reproduce their roles as teachers and researchers and the university as an organization. Without those practices, the university would not fulfill its mission, either.118

Habitus operates on at least two levels: the broad practices that constitute a university as institution and the narrower practices that constitute a particular organization. The former is encoded in the binders, websites and broad norms of higher education. The latter constitutes what might be called “campus culture” and it is in this respect that norms and practices differ from one campus to another. To a significant degree, individuals learn appropriate habitus by observing their more-experienced colleagues, who have learned it from their predecessors, and so on (except for the first generation at UCSC, which had to create a habitus, albeit one

117 Those who invoke such metaphors seem to think that DNA must be changed, either by will or some type of educational CRISPR.
118 Which might be one reason that unions have a hard time forcing universities into submission through selective strikes. Most campuses can continue to operate in some fashion if only a few segments of the staff walk off their jobs.
based on or different from their prior experience and knowledge of faculty roles). Thus, *habitus* is articulated in terms of “culture” and “DNA,” although neither is an especially accurate or helpful metaphor.

How embedded or fixed is such local *habitus*? Can it be changed? And how? Here, we have to recognize and acknowledge that bureaucratic and administrative attempts to alter and reshape the *habitus* of an organization and its population tend to generate resistance because such initiatives may be seen as threats to the identity and status of individuals in particular roles (and occupants of some roles are more able to resist than others).

For example, the Chancellor’s unilateral allocation of 14 UCSC FTE to the Silicon Valley Center, as described in Chapter 9, raised concerns about impacts on the wellbeing and fortunes of departments and faculty on the main campus, who wanted to be assured that no core operating funds would be dedicated to the SVC. The fear was that diversion of startup and early operating funds to SVC would require budget reductions to programs on the main campus that might negatively affect the social capital of departments and individual faculty members through increased workloads and decreased student support. The Administration argued that, eventually, degree programs at SVC would pay their own costs and return money to the main campus. To date, however, this has not happened, although the impacts of support for SVC have, so far, not been onerous (in fact, it is not clear how much SVC actually costs).

This does not mean that *habitus* does not change. Consider the saga of narrative evaluations (NES). Cowell Provost Page Smith sought to implement a “no grades” policy with narrative evaluations for students—an initiative approved by the Academic Senate, despite some misgivings—that was in keeping with the experimental nature of the new campus and its emphasis on a less-competitive environment for undergraduate education. This approach did not conform to the almost-universal practice of awarding grades as a metric of performance. It raised claims, especially among science faculty, that narrative evaluations disadvantaged UCSC applicants to graduate and professional schools, some of which supposedly threw out any such applications (there were only anecdotal claims to this effect and empirical evidence was never provided). Note that faculty were required to write evaluations and could be penalized for failure to submit them, which mean that most normalized the practice.

Over the decades, support for NES was slowly eroded, as grades were made optional in more and more classes. It was finally abolished in the early 2000s, after repeated struggles to continue the policy, with the stipulation that students could request a narrative evaluation should they desire one. Faculty exhaustion, grade inflation and the rise of the “metric society” all contributed to the demise of NES. Fewer students requested narratives and, although these are still an option, virtually no one asks for one any longer. There is no penalty or threat to social capital for failure to submit narratives. What was once an accepted, if sometimes resisted, and required practice has vanished from UCSC, leaving behind only a few fond memories. This suggests
that, in keeping with considerable sociological research, the practices associated with *habitus* change only very slowly and cannot be simply abolished at the stroke of a pen or a sword.

Other forms of *habitus* created during the early years of the campus have not disappeared or been changed. For example, UCSC continues to be regarded by graduate students across the country as a radical and “left” campus at which revolutionary ideas are still welcome (this was clearly evident in the national response to the TAs wildcat grade strike). Radical ideas often appear in non-STEM classes and some number of students carry them off after graduation. This tradition is regarded by many as both venerable and necessary and continues to influence the campus—some might say to its detriment. Every effort to shift to a more functional *habitus* is regarded by some as an attack on tradition that must be opposed, lest market logic triumph. Even though Golden Ages have never actually existed, it is very hard to kill the myths and legends of such remembered times.

**VII. Privatization and the public good**

The gradual shift to market logic practices came with a panoply of associated ideas and practices intended to rationalize the shift. One of these is the rise of the heroic CEO as an individual who can “turn around” an enterprise. Theories of organizational change and innovation abound, most centered on Randian heroes driven by ideas that are successfully brought to market (failures are largely ignored). Such theories reflect the dominance of market logic across American society (and the world) and the woefully misleading idea that markets can avoid the painful struggles associated with politics.¹¹⁹

Notions of the “entrepreneurial individual” and “creative destruction,” in particular, imagine a world of rational actors who immediately perceive the benefits (to them) of rapid change and innovation—and the need for destruction of *habitus*-driven practices—and are willing to take great risks for the chance to become rich. In a market-driven organization, such as a corporation, innovation almost always comes from the top, with benefits accruing mostly to management and shareholders. If they are lucky, employees may see a small increase in their incomes, although more likely is that some number will be laid off in the name of efficiency and profits.¹²⁰

But universities are not corporations, as much as some might like to treat them as such. While the standard model for public universities is still premised on Keynesian logic and Fordist education of undergraduates, there remains a strong craft-based element to undergraduate education, taught by individuals trained through

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¹¹⁹ It is not too far-fetched to see the rise of populism and the “new nationalism” as reactions to reliance on markets to make political decisions. Globalization was supposed to make the earth “flat” through economic entrepreneurialism; instead, it seems to have cratered the planet.

¹²⁰ As is evident during the COVID-19 shutdown. Amazon’s commitment to “retrain” up to 100,000 of its 300,000 workers, in the face of automation, to do “more high-tech tasks” may be more PR than practicality (Casselman & Satariano, 2019).
“apprenticeships” and acquisition of specialized expertise. The rise of casual instruction and on-line colleges and courses seeks to change this mixed model, but so long as there are bricks and mortar campuses offering specialized disciplinary instruction, a full market logic will not come to wholly rule higher education, although it will not be for a lack of trying. Perhaps advocates of privatized and marketized education will, eventually, triumph, as individuals become responsible for training and retraining themselves through software platforms and on-line courses.¹²¹

The tension among operating logics and the struggles of its agents over them have profound implications for higher education. In many ways, the tension and struggles run in parallel with the shift in contemporary capitalism from accumulation through the material production of goods and bodies to accumulation through the generation of knowledge and its subsequent privatization through intellectual property rights that can be bought and sold. Privatization and commodification of the very essence of the university’s mission are diametrically opposed to higher education as contributor to a knowledge commons that, protected from enclosure through privatization, benefits the taxpaying commonwealth as a whole (Polanyi, 1944/1957). Research and teaching were premised on the proposition that the creation and transmission of knowledge in labs and classrooms would increase the skills and capabilities of members of society who, in turn, would pay taxes to continue the chain of knowledge production and dissemination for the betterment of society. That is no longer entirely the case.

Once knowledge is privatized, access to it can be controlled and benefits to its owners increased by managing its availability and sale. The electronic subscription-based journal model, for example, requires that universities pay for access to the research published by their own faculty, research that has often been supported by public funds. The tuition-based model of privatized university funding requires that students pay for access to such knowledge, both published and taught, even though public monies pay for much of their teaching and education. And the fundraising-driven model of privatized financing of research and teaching can even, in some circumstances, lead to restrictions on generation and access to knowledge in the name of ideological and proprietary zealotry. Arguably, the enclosure of the knowledge commons is contributing to the growing wealth gap that has appeared across virtually the entire world.¹²²

¹²¹ As I have suggested, the rapid move to remote instruction in the face of COVID-19 is almost certain to result in greater reliance on distance learning, even though many think this is a threat to the “college experience.” A greater threat comes from students forced to learn from home, who decide not to re-enroll (Lieber, 2020; Carey, 2020; Paxson, 2020).

¹²² L. Bob Rife, a telecommunications mogul and owner of the Metaverse in Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash (1993: 116) explains the logic: “If you’ll just follow my reasoning for a bit, that when I have a programmer working under me who is working with that information, he is wielding enormous power. Information is going into his brain. And it’s staying there. It travels with him when he goes home at night. It gets all tangled up into his dreams, for Christ’s sake. He talks to his wife about it. And, goddam it, he doesn’t have any right to that information. If I was running a car factory, I wouldn’t let the workers drive the cars home or borrow tools. But that’s what I do at five o’clock each day, all over the world, when my hackers go home from work.”
Parenthetically, it is also worth noting that, for the moment, although instructors “hold” the copyright to the particular versions of the classes that they teach, a shift to online and remote instruction might well take that right away. For the vast majority of instructors, there is no way to monetize their “copyrights,” so course syllabi exist in a kind of gray knowledge commons. On-line classes seek to break this mold by signing up large numbers of students willing to pay a small amount to enroll. But these are not cheap, and usually require capital to prepare, provided by universities who then share copyrights with the notional creators of the class (but not necessarily those who teach the class). While universities and “course creators” sign agreements to share any “profits” that might result, few on-line courses have provided any monetary windfalls.

But one could imagine (as I did in an op-ed published 30 years ago), the hybrid universities of the future, in which star professors lecture on-line, to large classes located on bricks-and-mortar campuses all over the world, with discussion sections curated by low-paid PhDs for whom teaching jobs are simply no longer available. That future has partially materialized in the form of MOOCs and similar platforms, even though they have proved more difficult to monetize than hoped. Still, the shift to remote instruction driven by the COVID-19 pandemic may drive a transition much more significant than would otherwise have been the case. We could imagine a scenario in which universities have agreed to offer fungible course credits that can be applied to any degree from any institution, with students shopping around for classes required by their major without ever setting foot on a college campus.

Is there an alternative to privatization and any way to fight it? Unfortunately, market logic rests on the notion of free and fair competition—which does not exist—and maximal benefit to the individual consumer of higher education—which is only calculable in a future that might not come to pass. UCSC will be hard put to win very much in this marketized environment and would do well to return, with energy and commitment, to the idea of a “well-rounded” graduate who is not only an expert in one or two fields but also accomplished in what we once called “liberal arts.”

A liberal-arts curriculum for the new millennium would not look very much like its predecessor of the mid-Twentieth century, focused as it was on a Eurocentric and neocolonial curriculum. It would not be predicated on the college model of small ivory towers shaping mostly children of the bourgeoisie. But it would recognize that graduates must be prepared and ready to engage in political struggle and to defend a vision that is not predicated purely on individual enrichment. Could UCSC do this? Quite possibly, but it would require leadership, imagination, vision, risk and, even, disruption. Are there any administrators or faculty willing to take this on?

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123 This does not include published materials assigned to students to read but, under the fair use doctrine, teachers must be cautious in permitting only their enrolled students to view these books and articles.
VIII. What is UCSC to do?

Unfortunately, I can find no magic formula or silver bullet to solve all of UCSC’s problems. Such miracle items are the premise of most visions, which elide or downplay the very real effects and long-standing impacts of both history and the material world. Everyone has a different vision and, when visions collide, gunfights ensue. But gunfights are very disruptive to missions and it takes struggle to address and resolve them. The alternative seems to be gradually descending chaos. This is not a plea for harmony on campus; conflict can be very productive. But there are better ways to change a campus than to repeatedly dismiss or suppress productive innovations, initiatives and changes.

Of course, neither I nor anyone else can change the past, and my influence over the present (and future) is very limited. But my goal in writing this book is not to imagine what could be, were all the pieces to somehow fall into place. That way lies madness. What I have tried to do here, instead, is to identify, describe and analyze the impacts of UCSC’s past on its present (which, presumably, will continue into the future) and to suggest where changes might be feasible, if not necessarily probable.

What is clear, I think, from the narratives and critical analysis presented here is that large organizations embedded in larger institutions are difficult to change, however attractive an innovation might appear in the moment. And inspiring imaginaries are even more problematic if there is no clear path to get there. These are not necessarily judgments about the wisdom, efficiency or effectiveness of an effort to innovate and change, or even about the putative benefits that could arise from innovation and change. It is simply an observation that, over time, *habitus* becomes deeply engrained in even the smallest organization (e.g., a household), something that college student often learn, to their sorrow, when they return home on vacation or for refuge.

The stories presented here do raise questions about how innovations and changes in large organizations are designed and deployed and how those who labor in the organization’s innards (so to speak) are consulted and included in those decisions and designs. Even if a university is not a democracy, broad support for directed change is essential if that change is to succeed.

I offer three final recommendations concerning what UCSC might do in regard to such consultative and decision-making processes. These might seem radical and puerile, but I make both in utmost seriousness.

First, abolish the Divisions and incorporate their functions and departments into one or two Schools (e.g., Arts & Sciences or Arts & Humanities and Social and Physical Sciences). This reorganization would be enormously difficult to engineer, since so many bureaucratic and organizational structures would have to be unwound, rearranged and rebuilt. But for more than five decades, the parochial interests of the Divisions (and their Deans) combined with the subordination of departments have
militated against both awareness of common interests across campus and among disciplines and the transparency of decision-making procedures. I do not argue that abolition of the Divisions would necessarily increase efficiency or lower costs; I do believe it would improve communication and transparency and increase collaboration across campus by shifting power and authority and increasing departmental and faculty stakes in the new Schools’ operations. It would certainly have more impact than rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, which is the normal modus operandi.

Second, turn shared governance into a meaningful practice. Perhaps UCSC is truly “ungovernable” but, if that is the case, it is due more to inept decisionmaking than governance, per se. As noted throughout this book, a university is not a democracy—but it is not a corporation, either. If everyone tries to run it, no one will be able to, but if the management mostly ignores everyone else, as I have argued is the model at UCSC, it is bound to run into strong resistance from below, indeed so strong that effective governance becomes close to impossible. What would be required to turn shared governance into meaningful practice is a good deal more consultation, review and discussion than takes place at present. It would be very valuable to pursue this matter.

Third, create a faculty club or pub on campus. This might seem tongue-in-cheek but it is deadly serious: the design of the campus, with faculty and instructors sequestered in single buildings often distant from other disciplines, makes it difficult to mingle with colleagues across Divisions and departments. There is no single place where faculty and instructors can gather for regular and casual intellectual conversation, communication and discussion.

A bona fide faculty club could do much to facilitate such exchange, although it might acquire a musty, restricted character (as seems to be the case at UC Berkeley). That is why a pub would be even better. Virtually all British and European universities have pubs or cafes on campus (or located nearby), where faculty and students can gather to talk and drink (in moderation, of course), compare notes, deplore the state of the world, and develop joint projects. A pub would do much to improve campus morale and fertilize productive discussions and collaborations.

All three of these changes would, I believe, do much to “open up” UCSC and encourage the types of social collaboration that are required for mobilization, action and change to take place. Disruptive? Probably. Innovative? Maybe. Productive? Almost certainly. Enjoyable? Definitely!
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